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The U.S. Congress’s initiative to solve the problem of steamboat boiler explosions in 
the mid-nineteenth century resulted in the Steamboat Act of 1852. The Act brought 
radical changes to the western rivers, including reform of the engineering cadre, 
introduction of new safety devices and procedures, and the creation of a new 
bureaucracy (the Steam Boat Inspection Service). One of the new safety devices 
introduced by the Treasury Department was the controversial Evans Patent Safety 
Guard. This is the story of the safety guard as a central actor in framing the expertise 
of scientists, inventors, and practical engineers in attempting to make technology safe. 
The case study of the safety guard helps us to understand where expertise came from, 
how that expertise was defined and justified by government officials and inspectors, 
and why the notion of technological expertise depends on a complex mix of technical, 
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This is the story of the Evans Patent Safety Guard.  The safety guard was a self-acting 
mechanism perfected by inventor Cadwallader Evans (son of Oliver Evans) in 1850 
that warned the steamboat engineer of an unsafe condition in his boiler.  Although the 
safety guard was an obscure invention, and one that apparently did not work well, 
nevertheless in the mid-1850s it became the technological centerpiece of the Treasury 
Department’s steamboat safety initiative.  The public never knew of the safety guard; 
it was acknowledged only by the inventor, government officials, their scientific 
experts, and certain segments of the steamboating community.  Yet, this obscure 
invention was installed by the Treasury Department on hundreds of American 
steamboats by 1855 and dominated the relations between all of the technological 
actors in our story.  Why was this so?  Answering this question is the prime focus of 
this thesis.  We will show how government regulation and policy regarding steamboat 
safety revolved around the safety guard, how the practical engineers aboard 
steamboats saw the safety guard as robbing them of their professional autonomy and 
control over their machinery (they labeled the guards “intolerable nuisances,” 
“humbug,” and threats to innovation), how Government officials believed that the 
self-acting control of the safety guard was necessary as an insurance policy against 
incompetence and neglect of the engineers, and how an engineers’ rebellion occurred 
that brought the safety guard’s career to an end by the early 1860s. 
 
 
For historians of technology, the occurrence of the practical engineers’ rebellion is 
fortunate.  The conflict generated much archival documentation, mostly 
correspondence, that shows us how the Department worked with its inspectors, the 
steamboating community, and scientists in the attempt to execute its technological 
safety program.  Many of these records, kept in the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C., have not seen light in 158 years, and 
thus provide new material.  A sizable portion of the correspondence focuses on the 
central component of the safety guard, fusible alloy metal, which was designed to 
perform as an “active thermometer” to monitor heat in the boiler.  Therefore, much of 
our story explains how government and academic chemists tried to develop an 
accurate alloy, and how the inventor used scientific rhetoric to transform the status of 
his machine for employing the alloy, the safety guard, from that of a mere clever 
mechanism to that of a scientific instrument. 
 
In these attempts to develop and showcase the safety guard as a progressive and 
sophisticated scientific instrument, a rich story unfolds of the relationship of science 
and invention to engineering, and all of these to government legal administration of 
technology in Antebellum America. As such, this story informs us of a different side 
of the so-called Steamboat Inspection Service than we are used to seeing in existing 
historical accounts, which have focused on the dry legislative history of the 
Steamboat Acts of 1838 and 1852.  With a new micro-historical perspective, we will 




technological actors, as well as gain a better understanding of the socioeconomic and 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1850, Captain Thomas J. Haldeman, commander of the Steamer 
Yorktown, recorded his firsthand impressions of the explosion of a steamboat docked 
near his own at a New Orleans wharf.  He had just given the order to his engineer to 
start from the wharf when he heard two loud reports, the second an “awful crashing 
sound” as the 200-foot side-wheel steamboat Knoxville disintegrated before his eyes.  
Haldeman suffered a severe blast as the shock wave passed him.  Bricks and debris 
rained down on several adjoining boats.  He immediately went out on the wharf to the 
exploded boat and could see in the moonlight that she was a total wreck - - “a 
broadside from a seventy-four… could not have more completely torn her to pieces.”  
He saw that two of the four boilers on the Knoxville had exploded, collapsing the 
flues of the remaining outside boilers and hurling them in opposite directions.  One 
had landed in the ladies’ cabin of the steamer Griffin Yeatman after passing through 
the cabin of the Martha Washington; the other landed on a nearby levee.  The 
explosion launched the Knoxville’s iron safe skyward, whereupon it followed a 
ballistic arc over two boats and hit the steamboat Buckeye, tearing through its lower 
guard.  Two boats at the wharf on each side of the now-obliterated Knoxville were 
“shattered,” especially the Martha Washington, which in addition to suffering 
debilitating structural damage lost boiler pressure due to broken steam lines and was 
rendered unable to navigate during the subsequent fire.  Haldeman’s own boat, 
protected as it was by the Martha Washington, only suffered a few bricks falling 
through the hurricane deck and the mess of entangling debris descending on it from 
 
above.  Haldeman quickly gave the order to get underway to avoid the conflagration 
and steamed downstream to recover at a safe distance.  
 
Haldeman stated that this was the first time in his life that he had seen and felt the 
effects of an explosion. He wished it to be his last: “Never can I erase from my 
memory the awful shrieks and cries for help among those poor souls who were 
scalded and struggling in the river for their lives but sunk to rise no more.”  In 
Haldeman’s eyes, with proper training there was no excuse for explosions, and the 
refusal of the Knoxville’s engineer to read texts on technical advancements designed 
to prevent such explosions was particularly galling.  Haldeman wrote, “On the day of 
the explosion, [the engineer] was solicited on board the boat to purchase a pamphlet 
on the subject of explosions, written by Cadwallader Evans of Pittsburgh (the 
inventor of the [Evans Patent] safety-guard) but he declined and told the boy that he 
understood his business, and had no use for such books..... Unfortunately, we have 
too many engineers who think they can gain no knowledge of their business by 
reading books, and do not devote that time and attention to the subject of explosions, 
which is so necessary in order to understand the dangerous properties of steam under 
all circumstances.”  Haldeman advised that the federal government pass a law 
requiring owners to carry Evans’ safety guard on steamboats, “or else these horrible, 
worse than gunpowder, explosions will never, never cease to occur.”  “So sure and so 




perfectly willing to stand over a set of boilers and defy the artifice of man or the 
ingenuity of the world to blow them up.”1 
1.1  What This Thesis Is About 
 
The Evans Safety Guard described by Haldeman was the direct product of a 
government-funded scientific laboratory. Haldeman’s emphasis on this device shows 
how, as Edwin Layton has described, science was succeeding in guiding the 
mechanical arts in the United States in the first part of the nineteenth century.  
However, when we consider the story of the safety guard, we see that the authority 
and reputation of science had its limits, and in fact became weaker in influence once 
regulation began in 1852.2  
 
Evans’s device was introduced in the mid-1840s to prevent boiler explosions aboard 
steamboats. The device enjoyed some popularity in scientific and technical circles 
when first introduced, but within a few years it was plunged into ignominy and 
obscurity. In fact, it can be argued that, despite the highest levels of government 
support, the safety guard was doomed from the start. Why? What was it about this 
technology that evoked so much passion both on the part of the scientists, inventor, 
and government officials who supported it on the one hand, and the steamboat 
owners, practical engineers, and inspectors who opposed it on the other? As the prime 
focus of “insider” technologists of steam boiler safety in its day, the safety guard 
                                                 
1 1852 4-24. (See the appendixes at the end of this thesis for details on all “date” references.) 
2 Layton, Edwin: “Mirror Image Twins: The Communities of Science in 19th-Century America,” in 




proved pivotal—in a most unexpected and negative way—in defining the expertise of 
steamboat safety. What were the features of this technology, and what were the 
factors at work that placed it in a central position of controversy? 
 
The answers to these questions go to the heart of the subject of technological 
expertise, for through this case study we shall see that technological expertise, like 
technology itself, is shaped in large part by many non-technical factors. It may seem 
strange to think of expertise as an entity that filters a piece of technology through 
non-technical lenses such as cultural norms, institutional power, socioeconomic and 
geographic influences, and even personal ambition, but indeed if any central point 
emerges from this study, it is the notion that technological expertise is not a purely 
rational, disembodied, scientific or engineering entity that points like a divining rod 
toward the improvement of a technology. There is no doubt that scientific and 
engineering principles play a key part in the process of institutionalizing the 
necessary expertise, but these principles are not the sole players in the game, and in 
many cases they can easily be subverted or augmented in favor of more subjective 
human impulses. And perhaps in some cases this is justified. But the key question 
then becomes, Who has the right to decide what constitutes expertise?  The scientist?  
The engineer? The government bureaucrat? The user? The public? The legal system? 
The labor unions? Should all of these decide (or some?) in similar (or different) 
proportion? Or, is this approach all wrong? Should the vetting of expertise be through 
some kind of pyramid in which those having the most power, authority, and economic 




are intriguing questions, and they have incomplete answers, but the characters in the 
story of the safety guard had to struggle with them, and their struggle points the way 
for us to view the human complexities of deciding upon what constitutes the “expert” 
point of view. 
 
Regardless of the method used to validate expertise, the outcome is often chaotic and 
leads to surprising results: a skilled inspector is removed because of his political 
affiliation, a clever mechanism is rejected because it threatens to put members of a 
group out of work, a government official believes that a mechanism operates 
perfectly even though historical experience indicates otherwise, the engineer 
condemns the technology as useless because it interferes with his job, and so on. Just 
how does the consensus about technological expertise evolve, and what is the process 
of deciding which form a technology should take, or whether a given technology is 
even needed at all? We shall explore these questions. 
 
At the institutional level, we will be able to observe in our study that institutions tend 
to husband their own notions of expertise, and that often they do not even provide 
enough information to outside groups to allow a proper debate on the subject. As 
historian Tracy McDonald described Heizen’s notion of vedomstvennost, “an 
institution has cultures, political interests and constituencies that shape its actions, 
often in unexpected ways.”3 This is certainly true in the case of the Treasury 




inspectors and the steamboat engineers. We shall explore how the theoretical 
scientific knowledge originating within scientific institutions such as the Franklin 
Institute conflicted with the practical knowledge of the engineers, who had their own 
institutional norms that were rooted in traditional shop culture. On a more personal 
level, but reinforcing this point, is the fact that the safety guard’s inventor, 
Cadwallader Evans, did not grasp the scientific implications of his device for some 20 
years. To Evans, the clever mechanism was the ultimate goal. Evans’s myopia 
characterizes the compartmentalization of expertise: the inventor was in his own 
world, the scientists were in theirs, and the Department bureaucrats and practical 
engineers in theirs. Thus, we shall be able to observe how a common body of 
expertise could emerge only when the different perspectives of each group came into 
conflict, were negotiated, and were agreed upon (over a long time period of almost 20 
years). Such agreement was often tentative since as we shall observe, one man’s safe 
practice might constitute another man’s scourge.  
 
Finally, there are time dimensions associated with expertise that complicate the mix 
of factors defining technological praxis and products. In the earliest period (1810s-
mid 1820s), American inventors and engineers focused their energies on increasing 
horsepower to overcome river currents and achieve speed.  As William M. Gouge, a 
senior Treasury official, wrote, “The general rule was to prefer speed to safety…”4  
                                                                                                                                           
3 Heinzen, James W., “Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State, Power, and the Transformation of Rural 
Russia, 1917-1929,” University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004; reviewed by McDonald in the Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 2006, p. 785. 
4  Hunter, Louis C.: Steamboats on the Western Rivers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 





By the mid-1820s, with the advent of more numerous and higher pressure engines and 
boilers and an attendant increase in explosions, elite members of the scientific, 
government, and engineering communities, as well as the press, shifted the emphasis 
from horsepower to safety. Scientists and inventors began expanding and adapting the 
arsenal of steam boiler safety devices from stationary to marine applications; new 
types of exotic inventions came on the scene.  After 1852, the nature of expertise 
changed once again—to one having legal and bureaucratic dimensions.  Here, we see 
the enshrinement of the safety guard in the Steamboat Safety Act of 1852, which 
established a powerful bureaucracy that resulted in the forced introduction of the 
device on the western rivers.5  The meaning of the engineers’ prior tradition of 
tampering with safety equipment now changed from an innocent but risky 
preoccupation to one of a serious crime punishable in Federal court. 
 
So, with these points in mind, an exploration of the early Steam Boat Inspection 
Service shall delineate the complexities and difficulties inherent in defining 
technological expertise. The Federal government took upon itself the role of gathering 
the components of that expertise in order to solve the serious problem of steamboat 
accidents, perhaps not realizing the complexities of their endeavor. How that body 
went about the exercise of expertise is captured in the story that follows. It is not a 
story of a purely rational process, or one with easy answers. Rather, it is the story of a 
                                                                                                                                           
 
5  The safety guard was not explicitly required by the Act, but a technical provision in the act 




set of human problems to be solved; and as with technology itself, it carried with it 
the problems of human beings. 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, each of which captures a slice of time in the 
development of the Evans Safety Guard in the context of the early years of the Steam 
Boat Inspection Service. The remainder of Chapter 1 provides background material 
on the Federal Government’s early efforts to regulate steamboat boiler technology 
from the 1820s up to 1852. Chapter 2 gives a history of early laboratory research by 
the Franklin Institute in trying to develop a successor to the common safety valve 
(1830-1836), out of which emerged the first versions of the safety guard. Chapter 3 
covers the period between the Steamboat Acts of 1838 and 1852, in which Congress 
invited western practical engineers in 1850 to help overhaul the unpopular Act of 
1838. The chapter also charts the rise of the important associations of steamboat 
engineers, a hitherto obscure but important group whose members played a crucial 
role in shaping boiler safety expertise and whose power on the rivers offset that of the 
Treasury Department in Washington. Chapter 4 covers the passage of the watershed 
Act of 1852 and the ascendancy of the engineers as inspectors and powerful agents of 
government authority assigned to enforce it. This period marked a sea change in the 
situation of owners, captains, pilots, and engineers, who were now forced to deal with 
both a radically changed regulatory regime and the “humbug” safety guard that 
accompanied it. The chapter ends with the onset of the Civil War and the inspectors’ 
quiet rejection of the safety guard, marking a final victory for the engineers and their 




1871). Finally, Chapter 5 provides conclusions about the case study and about 
engineering expertise in general. 
 
A Note on the Archival Source Material 
 
Standard research on steamboat boiler safety has been limited mostly to the views and 
perspectives of the most powerful groups as revealed in official documents—those of 
Congress, the Treasury Department, the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia, and the 
press—and this has resulted in an overly simplified story of a unified, systematic, and 
altruistic government reform of an industry. Official and scholarly histories of the 
Steam Boat Inspection Service have largely based their accounts on legislative 
history, and on technical provisions contained in the Steamboat Acts of 1838, 1852, 
and 1871.6  These provisions provide an easily traceable chronological snapshot of 
government and engineering “best practices” over the years and hence are attractive 
and convenient materials for assembling a factual history.  However, in reality a body 
of laws can better be understood as representing merely an ideal that embraces the 
definition of technological expertise as understood by those in power. The recounting 
of laws and legislative history does not illustrate how effectually the technical 
provisions are carried out —and in the case of the safety guard, they were not—or 
                                                 
6 For example, see Greene, Arthur Maurice: History of the ASME Boiler Code. The American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers, New York, 1955. See also Burke, John G.: Bursting Boilers and the Federal 
Power.  In Technology and Culture, Vol. VII, No. 1, University of Chicago Press, 1966; and Hunter, 
SBOTWR, (1949). Of these, Hunter is the most sensitive to complexities; he does not reach some of 
the broad conclusions and generalizations that Burke does. Recent authors are in the habit of 





how politics and patronage by government officials themselves interfere with the 
prevailing technical expertise on which, in part, the law is based.   
 
Another easily accessed body of research is to be found in the annual reports of the 
supervising inspectors of steamboats. These are in fact sanitized snapshots of the 
implementation of the Steamboat Act of 1852, and present a biased picture of 
regulation.  This was the side the supervisors wished to present: that the steamboat 
law was working.  In fact, it was not working as well as the Supervisors portrayed. 
The explosions continued, remedies were based on debatable assumptions (as is the 
nature of the attempt to define expertise), engineers and government officials alike 
interpreted the law through the filters of their groups, and although the results were 
difficult to measure, the reports portrayed a guarded optimism that success had been 
achieved.7  Still, the annual reports are quite important to mark events, and the 
present study used them where applicable (see index, Appendix A).   
 
More candid and more reflective of the complexities of the Government’s attempt to 
impose a safety regime on the steamboat community in 1852 is the body of internal 
correspondence of the Treasury Department (see Appendix B for an index of selected 
letters and documents to and from the Department from 1850 to 1862). The present 
                                                 
7 David J. Denault of the University of Connecticut undertook a modern statistical analysis proving 
that the Steam Boat Inspection Service, while not making the accident situation worse, cannot be 
shown to have decreased the rate of deaths and injuries due to explosions. He demonstrated that 
sustained Federal boiler strength of materials knowledge transfer to industry contributed most to the 
reduction in explosions, rather than administrative oversight by the Inspection Service. See Denault, 
David J.:  An Economic Analysis of Steam Boiler Explosions in the Nineteenth-Century United States.  




study accessed more than 800 pages of these records. From the occasional sparse 
penciled notes in these letters, it appears that only journalists and a few historians 
from decades ago may have delved into them; the former for the purpose of 
investigating individual steamboat accidents (perhaps to commemorate the  
anniversary of an accident for the popular media), and the latter perhaps for the 
purpose of compiling accident statistics.8  
1.2  General Facts about Steamboats on the Western Rivers 
 
Steamboats were a relatively new technology in the United States at the beginning of 
our study period.  At a time of expansion of commerce in general in the U.S., with 
increased settlements west of the Appalachian mountains, vast systems of trans-
portation sprang up to meet demand.  The Erie Canal, for example, constructed 
between 1817 and 1825, opened the northern regions and the Great Lakes.  With the 
development of the practical shallow-draft steamboat, the vast river systems of the 
west -- i.e., the Ohio River, the Mississippi River, the Missouri, and their tributaries-- 
had by the early 1820s become major arteries for the transportation of goods and 
settlers inhabiting the frontier beyond the “trans-Appalachian Gap.”  This natural 
barrier between the Atlantic Seaboard and the western rivers “favored steamboats as  
the primary, if not only, form of transportation for reaching and supplying the western 
settlements” until the advent of the railroad in the mid-1850s. 9 
                                                 
8 The letters can be found in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), central 
repository in Washington D.C., Record Group 41, Records of the Steamboat Inspection Service (see 
Bibliography for details). To illustrate how fresh these records are, we note that one key multi-page 
letter was found folded into the binding of its volume; it had not been opened and read for nearly 160 





Before the steamboat, access to the western settlements was limited.  Goods and 
passengers could only be transported economically on non-powered barges one way, 
downriver.  With steam power, it was now possible to bring cargo from the Atlantic 
Coast manufacturing centers to New Orleans and from thence upward through the 
river systems into newly settled areas.  This was a market for transportation that the 
incomplete rail systems would not be able to serve for another three decades. 
 
Development and growth was rapid after development of the specialized high-
powered, shallow-draft steamboat, which was able to cope with the swift currents and 
seasonal changes of the western rivers.10  Some statistics will illustrate the geometric 
growth experienced in the United States in general. The first steamboat operated on 
United States waters in 1807.11  In 1825, at the start of a period of rapid expansion of 
steam technology on U.S. waters, 31 million passenger miles were logged aboard 
steamboats.  In 1830, the figure stood at 62 million miles.  In 1838, the year of the 
passage of the first comprehensive steamboat act, the figure was 385 million miles, 
and on passage of the second, the act of 1852, 1.6 billion miles.  In 1860, near the end 
of our study and at the outset of the American Civil War, the figure was just a little 
                                                                                                                                           
9  On the character of the river systems served and the trans-Appalachian barrier, see Hunter, 
SBOTWR (1949), p. 482.  He stated that the need for steam technology was not for landed industry so 
much as for inland commerce, especially the commercial needs of the continent’s interior basin 
(Mississippi and Ohio valleys).  The principal technological agent that opened the frontier was the 
steamboat:  “In the development of the greater part of the vast Mississippi basin from a raw frontier 
society to economic and social maturity the steamboat was the principal technological agent.”  And on 
page 3: “The wheels of commerce were almost literally paddle wheels.” 
10  The western rivers had swift and unpredictable currents over shallows and sand bars, which allowed 
little space for navigating; snags (logs and submerged fallen trees) that posed a collision hazard; 
seasonal flooding from river tributaries that produced new and unfamiliar navigation channels; and 
dense, muddy water. 




over 2 billion passenger miles logged.12  To put this growth in perspective, roughly 
between the time of the first U.S. steamboats and the beginning of the Civil War, 
there occurred a 65-fold increase in passenger miles logged, with about 40 percent of 
that growth occurring on the western waters. 
 
The tremendous growth in the number of western steamboats, along with the 
technological changes that simplified the running of the steam engine, flooded the 
labor market with inexperienced engineers by the 1830s, creating a labor shortage for 
skilled practical engineers.  This was of enormous importance later for the “look and 
feel” of the inspection service of 1852. 
 
Celebrated inventor and steam-transportation visionary Oliver Evans (Fig. 1) first 
realized the need for a higher powered engine to propel steamboats against the swift 
currents of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, and is credited along with England’s 





                                                 
12 See Langois, Richard N.; Denault, David J.; Kimenyi, Samson M.: Bursting Boilers and the Federal 
Power Redux: The Evolution of Safety on the Western Rivers. University of Connecticut Department of 
Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper 1994-01, May 1994, p. 4.  
 
13  Oliver Evans’s importance and reputation in the arena of steam technology led to his figure being 
included in a mural entitled, The Apotheosis of Pennsylvania, in which he shares company with 
illustrious fellow Pennsylvanians such as William Penn, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris Hancock, 







































Figure 1. Inventor Oliver Evans (1755-1819) is immortalized in the 1904  




design was radically different from the traditional Eastern “walking beam” engine 
(Fig. 2).  Eastern steamboats running on relatively calm rivers used these Boulton and 
Watt-type low-pressure engines in the 4 to 8 psi range.  The adaptation of this 
massive, vertically oriented cylinder-and beam design to a more powerful and 
compact version began with Evans’s 1804 patent for a high-pressure engine (Fig. 3).  
Through many years and small adaptations by Evans, engine builders, and 
steamboatmen, the successful western steamboat engine emerged by the mid-1830s, 
displacing the low-pressure model. Said Hunter, “The engine that became standard 
equipment on western river boats was a high-pressure, noncondensing, direct-acting, 
horizontal-cylinder affair with a cam-actuated valve gear. Crude and inefficient from 
an engineering point of view, it had the practical advantages of being light, compact, 
powerful, cheap to build, and easy to repair. It was admirably adapted to the 
conditions of navigation on the western rivers where shallow depth placed a premium 
on light weight, where swift currents called for great power, where scarcity of skilled 
labor dictated simplicity of construction and operation, and scarcity of capital favored 
low cost.”14   
 
A further radical change was the amount of pressure carried in these engines; from 50 
to 125 psi initially to more than 200 psi by the mid-1850s.  It was this pressure that 
provided the power needed to overcome strong river currents. There were many 
complaints and fears lodged about these higher pressures; some early investigators 
blamed the use of Oliver Evans’s high-pressure engine for the spate of boiler  
                                                 
14  See Louis C. Hunter, "The Invention of the Western Steamboat," The Journal of Economic History, 














Figure 3. Standard high-pressure western river steamboat  





explosions, but prominent practical engineers believed that poor design and crude 
manufacturing processes were the true faults. 
 
The Eastern steamboat hull required adaptation to Western waters as well; it evolved 
from a ship-like, vee-shaped hull to one with a shallow, flat bottom for negotiating 
extremely shallow riverbeds.  In consequence of the reduction in volume below the 
waterline, the engine and boilers were moved up from the hold to the deck.  
Following the evolution from deep to shallow draft, and from low to high pressure 
engines with boilers and machinery on the main deck, by 1850 the western steamboat 
engine was more or less fully developed. 
1.3  The Flip Side of Progress:  The Phenomenon of 
Explosions 
 
Cadwallader Evans noted in 1850 that “The commerce and wealth of the world will 
soon pour into our lap, to be conveyed by our own railways and borne on our steam 
vessels… bringing back… the richest and rarest commodities of the earth.”15  The 
statement was made in the context of hope that the growing phenomenon of 
steamboat boiler explosions might be overcome through the use of his safety guard;  
only when the explosion problem were solved could human progress continue.  
 
Without experiencing a steam boiler explosion as Haldeman had in 1850, it is 




released a tremendous amount of energy; for example, the energy of a cubic foot of 
boiling water at 60 to 70 pounds per square inch pressure matched that of a pound of 
gunpowder. Thus, a typical western steamboat boiler containing hundreds of gallons 
of water at 200 psi or more produced the equivalent explosive energy of about 300 
pounds of dynamite; enough to propel a boiler more than two miles in the air and 
leave a mushroom cloud over the wreck. Aggravating the dangers of explosions were 
densely packed boats at wharves; passenger salons and steerage accommodations 
directly above or adjoining the boilers; and the clutter of ejected machinery and 
cargo, which could entangle victims.16  
 
In many cases, passengers thrown into the river could not swim, and drowned.  
Another danger was that when one boiler exploded, it could set off a chain of 
explosions in adjacent boilers, multiplying the explosive force three or four fold. 
 
In terms of the cost to human life, Haldeman collected his own statistics and 
forwarded them to the Commissioner of Patents in 1850.  Although slightly 
exaggerated—4,660 persons killed and wounded over the 30-year period between 
1818 and 1848 in 233 explosions (of the 4660 he includes 2,563 killed)--these figures 
                                                                                                                                           
15  From Evans, Cadwallader: A Treatise on the Causes of Explosions of Steam Boilers with Practical 
Suggestions for their Prevention to Which is Added a Description of Evans’ Improved Safety Guard, or 
Engineers’ Assistant, 1850.  In NARA RG 46, Commerce Records, Tray 26, folder 1 of 2, p. 67. 
16  Boilers occupied a sizable portion of the boat, being up to 40 feet in length and 4 or 5 feet in 














Figure 4. Explosion of the Medora, Baltimore Harbor, 1842. “The scene presented 
by the boat afforded at once a mournful evidence of the immense power of steam, 
and of the ruin of which it can be the instrument.” (Col. John Thomas Scharf, The 
Chronicles of Baltimore, Baltimore, 1874).  At least three casualties (or possible 
casualties) of the accident -- John Hoofnagle of Baltimore, Joseph Cragg, C.A. 
(Charles?) Reeder, and A.G. Ramsey -- are listed as licensed steamboat engineers 
in the Third Supervising District in the 1857 Proceedings. It is possible that 
Reeder’s son was aboard the steamer at the time of the accident, and was badly 











were commonly accepted and in fact appear as late as the 1955 American Society of 
Mechanical Engineering (ASME) official history of boiler development.  Denault 
conducted a review in 1993 and arrived at 2,221 killed in roughly the same period.  
Seventy-nine percent of these occurred on the western rivers, with more than twice as 
many steam boiler accidents occurring in these districts as compared with the 
remainder of the country.  As Hunter stated, “Steamboat explosions were a peculiarly  
Western phenomenon. Next to racing they became the most prominent feature of the 
steamboat legend.” 
 
Hunter estimated that the maximum number of lives lost in the whole period of 
steamboat development from all causes (not just explosions, which constituted about 
seventy-two percent of the total) for the period 1807 to 1853 was 7,000. He put this in 
perspective: “[the death toll does not] appear to have been an excessive price to pay 
for the advantages of the steamboat (judged by the toll taken in other types of 
industrial accidents), particularly in the West where the whole development of the 
regions was so dependent upon it.”17 
 
Nevertheless, explosions and accidents stirred the public imagination and had very 
real and devastating social consequences.  Mention is frequently made in the accident 
reports of prominent citizens suffering death or injury, as well as widows and orphans 
left to fend for themselves.  There were special occupational hazards for the crew as  
                                                 
17  Haldeman’s figures are from a news article, 1850 12-23; Denault’s are from (1993) p. 99; and 





well.  The crew were the ones in closest proximity to the machinery tending the fire 
or checking gauges.  Less sensational than explosions but equally deadly to engineers 
and persons near the engine room were flue collapses; these near-explosions were 
very common in the accident reports.  In a flue collapse, crushing steam pressures 
smashed the flues’ metal tube-like structures in an instant, twisting them like 
corkscrews and expelling the contents of the boiler--scalding hot water and steam-- 
on unwary engineers and other persons in close proximity (often, from one to twenty 
persons or more were killed in this way). 
 
Regarding their construction, boilers were not being built strong enough for the duty 
expected of them (Figs. 5-7).  At working pressures, the expansive force of steam 
could exploit any weakness or flaw in boiler iron, which consisted typically of sheets 
of iron or copper of 3/16-inch to 1/4-inch thickness joined together with rivets. 
 
Fractures could develop at rivet holes due to poor manufacturing processes, or at 
seams of improperly patched used boilers.  In manufacturing, the quality of iron used 
was sometimes poor or of the wrong type (i.e., cast iron versus wrought iron); 
scientific engineers and government officials confronted manufacturers and 
distributors who introduced bad material into the market, if they could be found—the 
chief complaint was the fraudulent stamping of boiler iron.  Many boilers were built 






Figure 5. Intense pressures constrained within steamboat boilers 
contributed to accidents. A typical boiler of the period consisted of a 
firebox, a channel for the hot gases to pass under the boiler shell to 
reach the flues; the flue system for conveying the hot flue gases through 
the boiler (see “a” in top figure); a boiler shell to contain the heated 
water and steam under pressure; and an exhaust consisting of tall 
chimneys or stacks for gases to travel to the atmosphere.  Because of the 
tall stacks, the draft produced air of “cyclonic” velocity, generating 
tremendous volumes of heat and passing them through the water. The 









Figure 6. A Cornish boiler similar to those used aboard early 





   Figure 7. A Lancashire boiler shown here in 
a land application. This design was the most common used in steamboats at 




sides as the engine’s valves opened and closed.  This required the engineer to insert 
wedges in joints to make the boiler not just “water tight,” but “steam tight.” 
 
Design was a problem also; steam pressure could exert a violent force on 
inadequately stayed internal flues, causing the flue collapses noted above.  The 
government responded to this by enlisting the Navy in developing tougher boiler 
construction standards and by emphasizing that inspectors carefully note the internal 
stay systems when conducting their boiler inspections. 
 
Quality manufacturing and reconditioning of steam boilers were hampered by the 
general economic conditions of the time.  In reading contemporary correspondence, 
one is struck by just how strapped for cash were manufacturers, boat owners, 
captains, and crew.  Everyone cut corners; safety was a secondary and especially 
expensive commodity, with safety devices costing tens of dollars or even 150 dollars 
or more; expensive manufacturing processes such as the production of wrought iron 
in place of cast iron was thought by many owners to be cost-prohibitive.  Yet safety 
demanded stronger materials and better designs. 
 
Most scientific and practical men believed overheated iron from low water was the 
main hazard leading to explosions and flue collapses.  Once water fell below the level 
of the flues, the resulting red-hot iron of the flues could weaken and implode.  The 
water level above the flues in a steamboat boiler was typically only one inch; in low-




some 14 inches.  This in part explains why locomotive boilers suffered proportionally 
fewer accidents than steamboats.  In steamboat boilers, forcing pumps kept the water 
level up, but these pumps ran off the engine and could not operate at a landing when 
the engine typically was not running.  Inventors were particularly interested in 
detecting extreme pressures within the boiler as a result of heat build-up—for this 
purpose they invented mercury pressure gauges and other instruments. Subsequent 
scientific investigations focused on calculating the expansive force generated by a 
volume of overheated steam and tried to relate it to internal boiler temperatures.  The  
emphasis of a key scientist in our story, Alexander D. Bache, was thus focused on 
heat and not pressure as the prime quantity to be measured. 
 
Navigational Difficulties of the Western Rivers—There were many challenges in 
adapting steam technology to shallow rivers like the Mississippi or Ohio Rivers, and 
this led to greater risks of accidents.  The steamboat engineer had a much more 
difficult job than the stationary engineer who ran a typical land plant.  A steamboat’s 
engines and boilers rested on a floating foundation that “worked and strained under 
the buffeting it received in its passage along the rivers.”  This assemblage frequently 
collided with sand bars, snags, banks, and other vessels, producing shocks to the 
machinery.  Machinery often was operated twenty-four hours a day for days on end.  
This kind of abuse frequently led to breakdowns and ad hoc repairs: “Leaking joints, 
cracked steam pipes, blown-out cylinder heads and broken shafts, wheel arms, and 




shocks to which the machinery was subject…”18  In these conditions, engine driving 
was improvisational, and this led to the use of excessive steam pressures.19 
 
The need for more power and higher attendant steam pressures even changed the way 
the engine was set up to function.  At the same time that Evans high-pressure engine 
was being introduced, for example, engineers had begun on their own to temporarily 
disconnect the steam condenser on their low-pressure engines: 
 
“The shift from the low-pressure, condensing engine to the high-
pressure noncondensing engine on the western rivers was largely 
effected during the first ten years of the steamboat age.  It was not an 
abrupt change but a series of steps.  First, there was a gradual raising of 
the pressures used in the condensing steamboat engines until they were 
really medium- rather than low-pressure engines.  Next, there was 
evidently a tendency on the part of engineers to disconnect the 
condenser temporarily in order to obtain under difficult conditions of 
navigation the operating characteristics of the high-pressure engine.  In 
this manner the condenser, the heart of the low-pressure engine, 
appears increasingly to have fallen into disuse, and in a final step it 
                                                 
18  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), pp. 261-262 
19  This emphasis on pressure was a common focus of engineering experts in the 1820s and 1830s and 
has significance for our later story.  Some practical engineers saw high operating pressures as a major 
contributing factor to accidents and urged Congress to limit pressures to 150 psi, or even less, to 100 
psi.  When the Act of 1852 was passed, that law stipulated a limit of 150 psi, which some practical 
engineers thought too high.  In practice, even this pressure limit frequently was ignored, and inspectors 
after 1852 were satisfied if they could hold steam pressures to no more than 170 psi.  The usual river 




was eliminated altogether, the advantages attending its use not proving 
worth the difficulty and cost of obtaining them.”20 
Inventors and design engineers in the engine-building centers at Saint Louis, 
Cincinnati, and Louisville were forced to make other adaptations to their engines as 
well, and these subjected boilers supplying the steam to dangerous pressures.  Oliver 
Evans himself encouraged dangerous adaptations of his own designs, contrary to 
Burke’s statement that explosions were due to a departure from Evans’s design  
rules.21  The encouragement by Evans of the “cam cutoff” and the technique of 
“steam pinching” were adaptations that produced instantaneous and often  
dangerously high steam pressures needed to achieve extra horsepower in tight 
situations.22 
Significantly, in making these adaptations, engineers were caught in a classic Catch 
22; they risked explosions but were loath to give up mechanical flexibility, for, 
paradoxically, their lives and those of their passengers depended on it.  The lack of 
power in a swift current could lead a boat to collide with the rocky shore, another 
boat, or some obstacle; in such circumstances many more passengers had been 
drowned than been killed in boiler explosions.  As Hunter put it, “That this method of 
                                                 
20  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 126 
21  Burke (1966) wrote, “Despite [Oliver] Evans’ prudence, hindsight makes it clear that the rash of 
boiler explosions from 1816 onward was almost inevitable.  Evans’ design rules were not heeded.”  In 
fact, Evans proposed dangerous engineering practices in his early work, Abortion of the Young Steam 
Engineer’s Guide, pp. 28, 49, as noted in Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 149.  Evans opposed the 
practice of unhooking condensers, however, because it was an infringement on his patent. 
22  “The principal reason of explosions having been more frequent of late, on the western waters, than 
formerly, is simply because the engineers work the steam higher; and this they are enabled to do with 
the same boilers by cutting off the steam shorter, not only with cams suited to that end, but by 




obtaining extra power resulted at times in disastrous explosions did not deter what 
seemed to be a necessary practice.”23 
 
Once the prevailing techniques and adaptations became common practice, they 
became entrenched as rules and technological artifacts.  This situation would (and 
did) naturally lead engineers to disable any device that would limit steam pressure or 
otherwise impair their ability to produce instantaneous power. We can see in this 
practice the rank-and-file engineers’ inclination to habitually disable the safety valve, 
and later, the safety guard. 
 
The Search for Causes of Explosions—The 1830s were spent searching for causes of 
explosions, some of which were based on vogue theories.  The more common 
theories were: the formation of a combustible compound such as hydrogen in the  
boiler (accompanied by observations of a mysterious blue flame); low water, in which 
the water level fell below the boiler flues, causing the iron to become red hot; a 
variation on the low-water theme, the “flash theory,” in which cold water came in 
contact with the red hot iron to generate prodigious quantities of steam, causing 
foaming and a sudden and dangerous increase in steam pressure; and electrically 
                                                                                                                                           
published in the Journal of the Franklin Institute (JFI), Vol. VIII (new series), No. 6, December 1831, 
p. 385. 




induced explosions.  These and similar postulated “causes” became the focus of a 
formal experimental investigation by the Franklin Institute beginning in 1830 (results 
were published in 1836).  The intent was to separate fact from fiction and settle on the 
“true” cause or causes of explosion, and then use this newfound knowledge to frame 
the first federal boiler safety act. 
 
Despite the attempt to pin each explosion on a particular cause, savvy engineers 
simply reverted to a strength of materials approach; explosions ultimately resulted 
from the carrying of a steam pressure greater than that of the tensile strength of the 
boiler iron used to contain it.  Thus, astute observers such as steam navigation agent 
William C. Redfield showed more apprehension of the solution than most; in 
focusing not on specific causes but on building more robust boilers and employing 
qualified engineers to run them, boiler safety could be achieved.  Indeed, gradually, 
the number of explosions declined and leveled off once improvements to the strength 
of materials were instituted (Fig. 8).24 
                                                 
24   Denault (1993) stated that government research during the period 1830-1850 led to better boiler 
construction and management techniques; along with these improvements, developments in the 
insurance and legal fields to properly assess risk and assign liability for accidents led to subsequent 
gradual improvements in the accident rate.  Thus, there was a shift from the search for causes of 
explosions to a recognition that boilers were so intrinsically dangerous that overdesign was the only 
path  to safety.  Denault’s historical revisionist work makes two key points in this regard.  First, 
determinants of safety had become fixed by 1850.  This is borne out by the NARA letters.  While 
engineers and Treasury Department officials pondered over whether or how to use Evans’s safety 
guard, the fundamental engineering practices for monitoring the boiler remained unchanged during the 
period of study; these were the basic safety measures such as the steam gauge, the water gauge, and the 
safety valve.  Second, steamboats became larger over time and carried more persons per ton, increasing 
the level of congestion.  This way, “even as the relative number of boiler explosions fell, each 
individual explosion became more dangerous because more potential victims were exposed to the 
danger of steam as the steamboat age progressed.” (p. 190).  Denault noted that explicit safety 
regulation may have been only a contributing factor in increasing safety over time.  “Safety is not a 
static product; users of a technology learn over time.  The first practitioners pay the highest cost in 
























Source:  Denault 1993, p. 184.
 





1.4  The Reaction of the Public, Press, and the Steamboat 
Industry to Boiler Explosions; Ineffectual Early State 
Regulations 
 
Accidents, according to the historical accounts, made a strong impression on the 
public mind. Shock was manifested by townspeople when accidents occurred at their 
communities’ doorstep; according to Hunter, accidents of this type could not be 
subconsciously dismissed by wishful thinking and “served as an intimate reminder of 
the hazards associated with steam power.” 
 
“The unexpected suddenness and devastating force of steamboat 
explosions held a morbid fascination for the public, attracting greater 
attention and arousing more concern than other disasters on an equal 
and often larger scale.  In total casualties, in the amount and degree 
of suffering, in the number of major disasters, and in the generally 
dramatic character of their occurrence boiler explosions outranked 
every other class of steamboat accidents.”25 
 
Newspapers contributed to the fear by sensationalizing accident accounts and 
expressing alarm in editorials.  These multiplied years later, in 1850, during 
Congress’s concerted efforts to draft the Act of 1852 creating the new inspection 
service.  Congress was under severe criticism for the too-long delaying of the 
enactment of effective steamboat safety regulation.  One newspaper wrote, “It is only 
                                                 




a matter of wonderment, as it is of reproach, that national legislation has not been 
more effectually applied… and that members of Congress… should have been so 
criminally culpable, and derelict in their manifest duty..... None know better than 
these very members of Congress the extent of loss of life; the degree of physical 
suffering endured by those who escape a horrid death, to endure a miserable 
existence, maimed and mutilated; the bereaved households, the destitution of 
homeless and friendless widows and orphans, and the millions of property destroyed, 
by what are considerately called the casualties of steamboat navigation, but which in 
fact are the results of a criminal disregard of life, and shameless neglect of 
responsibility and duty.”  The editorialist further urged authorities to reform the 
“careless, ignorant, mismanagement among those who have the control of the 
immense fleet of steamboats which run upon our rivers and interior seas.”26 
 
Trade groups were a large factor in exerting pressure for reform using the print 
media.  Letters and memorials appearing in the newspapers were often signed by 
“citizens of” some western city; these usually turned out to be owners of property 
(steamboat owners or merchants) or members of engineering associations.  
Newspapers also goaded the government to get involved in reform through 
regulation. 
 
                                                 
26   1850 12, IMG 1093-1094.  The approximate date of this article appears to be December 1850 
because it is found among other similarly dated correspondence relating to Senator John Davis’s 
deliberations in drafting of the Act of 1852 (Sen. Davis, 1787-1854, was chairman of the Steam Safety 





Interestingly, despite the glare of negative publicity about the dangers of 
steamboating, there was no outward indication of any extraordinary degree of concern 
among the members of the public who were in the most immediate danger save the 
crewmen themselves: western steamboat passengers.  In fact, it appears that this 
group looked with only ordinary apprehension at the mode of travel chosen.  
Passengers bored of long trips on the Western waters could be found pressing the 
captain and crew to race with other boats when the opportunity arose (Fig. 9).  “Those 
who failed to share the general enthusiasm for the sport usually found it difficult to 
make open protest and the more timid sought such safety as they could by retreating 
as far as possible from the boilers, there to follow the proceedings in trepidation,” 
noted Hunter.27  Winning such a race was the all-important goal. John G. Cassedy, in 
an 1830 issue of the Journal of the Franklin Institute, condemned the actions of a 
captain:  “A boat had overtaken him; the steam was raised to ‘blowing off;’ he 
jumped upon the safety valve, and swore he would either ‘beat her, or else blow 
up.’”28  Alfred Guthrie, the first supervising inspector of steamboats in the eighth 
district (Chicago) similarly told of an explosion of the Prairie State on the Illinois 
River in which eight persons were killed.  “This was beyond all question the result of 
great recklessness on the part of the engineers.  I understand this was a race, probably 
the water shut off and the consequence was explosion.”29   
                                                 
27  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 406 
28  JFI, Vol. IX (new series), 13, p. 95, 1830 






















The First Local Regulations—In the mid-1820s, municipalities and states began to 
investigate steamboat boiler accidents, but these efforts fell far short of formulating 
standard regulations for the entire industry.  National regulation, and indeed 
regulation of industry in general, were anathema to some in those laissez-faire times 
and were thought alien to a progressive industry.  Steam power was just coming into 
use and was considered an important means to attain progress and prosperity, 
especially in opening the West; many industry insiders thought it better to not 
hamper it when its tremendous benefits were just being realized.  Steamship agent 
William C. Redfield, for example, believed that regulation “would do more harm 
than good, by alleviating owners of responsibility,” and would invite interference by 
the national legislature.30  Another problem was that river commerce straddled too 
many legal jurisdictions for regulation to be practicable.  Hunter noted, for instance, 
that a boat could pass through ten states in the lower Mississippi region alone; trying 
to hold a violator answerable to state regulations in such a situation was a practical 
impossibility.31 
 
The most retarding factor of all, however, was one of a lack of expertise:  The causes 
of explosions simply were not known and the phenomenon held an aura of mystery; 
steam boiler technology was relatively new and no experimental authority had 
examined the internal workings of boilers save the compiling of rudimentary steam 
                                                 
30  House Ex. Doc. 21, 25 Cong., 3 Sess., 1838, p. 449. 




tables.32  The first step, therefore, was to collect information about boilers, and to 
study European safety practices and the available research.  In this manner, the City 
Councils of Philadelphia set up one of the first boiler accident investigation 
committees in the United States in 1824; this consisted of prominent civic scientists 
and engineers, one member of whom was Jacob Perkins, a prominent Philadelphia 
inventor of early refrigeration and later developer of engraving technology for bank 
notes.  Out of the investigation came three recommendations: install two safety valves 
on each boiler, one to be kept locked to prevent tampering (a French precaution); 
pressure test all boilers in a manner similar to that employed in the proof-testing of 
gun barrels, also a French practice; and finally, install blow-out sections in 
steamboats, to channel “the force of accidental explosions through a weakly 
constructed wall or roof.”  The committee’s findings were passed on to the state 
legislature, but these were advisory only and were not made legally binding. 
 
Some states, notably Alabama, reacted to the growing number of accidents with 
coroners’ inquests and indictments of steamboat officers.  These proceedings tended 
to place blame for accidents on personnel rather than on the technology itself, a habit 
that would prevail for many years to come and would plague the reputations of 
practical engineers in general.  The associations of steamboat engineers, whose 
profession had begun to be stung by accusations of carelessness and negligence, tried 
to police themselves by conducting investigations when accidents implicated their 
                                                 
32  Disagreement as to causes retarded regulation – Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 525; French scientists 




own members.33  In public documents, the association engineers tried to distinguish 
in the public mind the difference between the “good engineer” and the bad, but th
influx of low-paid, untrained engineers aboard the boats continued to blur the 
distinction.  Wrote engineer and Captain T.J. Haldeman in 1830:  “There are now a 
great number of men engaged and engaging in the engineering business, through the 
influence of their friends and relatives, who are no mechanics at all, and scarcely 
know anything about either theory or practice; and as long as this course is pursued 
and allowed, so long will man be blown into eternity.
e 
                                                
34 
 
In the 1830s, therefore, the first order of business among government, scientific, and 
engineering elite was to draft a well-crafted federal law based on sound technological 
principles; this required a truer understanding of the causes of explosions and 
effective preventative measures.  Until a proper government-funded investigation 
could be conducted, this basis was entirely lacking. 
1.5  First Steps to Federal Regulation:  The United States 
Government Mobilizes Its Expertise (1824-1836) 
 
After the explosion of the Steamboat Aetna in 1824 on the Hudson River, which 
killed 13 persons, Congress ordered the first federal investigation of steam boiler 
explosions.  Burke (1966) summarized this first step:  “A resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives in May 1824 calling for an inquiry into the expediency 
 
33  For a history of state regulation and the involvement of engineering associations, see Hunter, 
SBOTWR (1949) beginning on p. 523. 
34  Correspondence from Haldeman to Congress dated October 30, 1830.  See House Report 478, 22 




of enacting legislation barring the issuance of a certificate of navigation to any boat 
operating at high steam pressure.  Although a bill was reported out of committee, it 
was not passed due to lack of time for mature consideration.”35 
 
There were other problems as well. As mentioned previously, scientists and practical 
engineers believed there still was not enough solid information on explosions to 
justify rules regulating the trade.  What was needed was a proper experimental 
investigation to get at the facts.  In 1830 a private Franklin Institute initiative to study 
explosions gained Treasury Department funding for a series of laboratory 
experiments.36  Treasury Secretary Ingham approved the Institute’s plan of 
experiments, and these first national scientific studies marked the beginning of 
scientists’ involvement. Their expertise would eventually clash with, and attempt to 
redefine, the traditional craft expertise of the western practical engineers.   
 
The 1830 investigation critically examined the familiar but unproven suspected 
causes--explosive gas buildup in the boiler, the “flash” theory of cold feedwater on 
hot boiler iron, and the electrical explosion theory, in which lightning as an ignition 
                                                 
35  See Burke (1966), p. 9.  The committee did issue recommendations, however. These were taken 
verbatim from a report of the select committee of the British House of Commons in 1817.  The 
recommendations were similar to those of the Philadelphia committee’s, and consisted of the 
enrollment and licensing of boats; use of copper or wrought iron rather than cast iron in the 
manufacturing of boilers; inspections incorporating the French proof test; and dual safety valves set to 
open at the maximum allowed pressure. 
36  Denault (1993, p. 175) cites Wildawsky (1988) in ascribing the change heralding the 1830 
government involvement to a political reaction.  Government is predisposed toward “anticipatory 
measures,” the act of predicting and preventing dangers before damage is done.  “An elected official 
never gets credit for improvements in safety that evolve without government interference, but they are 
sure to be excoriated in the event of an accident coupled with no interference… In examining the 
history of governmental investigations and actions in this context, it is interesting to note that the major 




source of explosive gases was suspected.  There was also an investigation into the 
properties of fusible alloy - - the operative component of the (not yet envisioned) 
safety guard - - that formed one of the legs of the “French system” of boiler safety.37  
French fusible alloy consisted of a plug or plate of base metal alloy placed in the 
boiler shell or flue that was designed to melt upon the buildup of excessive heat. 
 
The Institute’s experimental results were published in 1836.  These results were used 
to frame the first steamboat act of 1838 following almost a decade of spectacular 
steamboat explosions.38  Details of the Franklin Institute’s 1836 findings will be 
provided in a later chapter, but for the purpose of this thesis, the results prescribed a 
special method for the use of fusible alloy.  This method came to be interpreted as 
requiring Evans’s safety guard. 
 
Concurrent with the Franklin Institute’s research, all through the period 1830 to 1838 
the Treasury Department (using its Customs officers) gathered facts about explosions 
and steam engines, and considered proposals from industry and academic sources for 
purposes of framing legislation.39  One proposal received from outside the industry is 
mentioned here because it represents the prevailing emphasis of the time on 
                                                 
37  The French system consisted of fusible alloy safety plugs, dual safety valves (one was locked to 
prevent tampering), and the hydrostatic test, all under government inspection and supervision. 
38  After the explosions in 1830 of the Helen McGregor (40 lives lost) and the Chief Justice Marshal 
(11 killed) until the first steamboat act of 1838, a “chorus for protest and a demand for legislative 
action” put the matter of explosions before Congress on a continual basis.  Hunter, SBOTWR, (1949), 
p. 532. 
39  See Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 525. Results of these inquiries were published in several reports, 
the earliest being House Report 478, 22 Cong., I Sess., in 1832.  This document concentrated on 
observations and facts gleaned from reports of scientists and prominent practical engineers and 




reforming the engineering cadre.  Charles Mapes, a major in the U.S. Army, proposed 
a national service with a live-in academy for aspiring young engineers.  He proposed 
monthly compensation, a national machine shop, uniforms at government expense, 
commissions at various grades, and even buttons incorporating a national insignia. At 
graduation, the candidates would earn a commission as a steam engineer or assistant 
steam engineer.  If young engineers could be trained and certified in a sort of national 
nursery according to the Mapes plan, the habit of employing dangerous rogue 
operators to run steamboat machinery would become a thing of the past. 
 
During the fact-finding initiatives, the practice of customs surveyors venturing into 
the hinterlands of steamboat country during 1830-1832 and circularizing owners, 
captains, and crews of steamboats for accident data and engine statistics met with a 
cool reception.  Curiosity by government officials was viewed by steamboatmen as a 
prelude to passing restrictions and interfering in business.  For example, a surveyor, 
Charles Kinsey, reported evasion by steamboat owners when he made repeated efforts 
to visit a steamboat in New York harbor in 1831 to collect engine and boiler 
information; the captain was always absent or indisposed.40  This response was 
typical across the country.  When the circular returns finally did come in, many 
answers were incomplete, mostly due to obstructionism or disinterest by the 
steamboat community. 
 
                                                 
40   House Report 478, 22 Cong., I Sess. ( 1832), p. 30. The form of the circular was contained in 




For a long time, Congress did little with the information collected by the Customs 
Service.  There were several reasons for both the passivity of the government and the 
industry;  Hunter cites inertia and tradition, lack of desire to interfere with business, 
and an agrarian society that lacked experience with machines.  He also noted that the 
collected data and the Franklin Institute’s subsequent experiments revealed “wide 
disagreement among both practical and scientific men with regard to matters of both 
fact and theory” and that this effectively retarded legislation.41  
 
The Role of Inventors—Inventors of safety devices were especially active in the 
1830s; they were eager to secure funding by the federal government to develop their 
ideas and perhaps receive a grant of monopoly for their inventions.  First efforts at 
devices appear in hindsight to have been naively impractical since they sought to 
control the engineer by means of the vigilance of captain and passengers; as we have 
seen, the captain and passengers were frequent advocates of steamboat racing.  A few 
inventions received a favorable hearing and provisional support from the government 
and the Franklin Institute, Evans’s safety guard being a prime example.  Development 
of the safety guard appears to have been closely orchestrated in concert with 
Alexander D. Bache of the Franklin Institute because of the invention’s connection 
with French fusible alloy.  The success of Evans’s safety guard followed a series of 
failures and refinements in the 1830s until it reached its final form in 1850.  There 
were more than 400 safety guard designs submitted for patents by 1848, with the  
                                                 




government making active efforts to force the adoption of some of them on 
steamboats.42 
 
The river engineers resented the intrusion of impractical inventions into their engine 
rooms, complaining that inventors approached them at their boats with all sorts of 
apparatus.  The label of “humbug” as applied by engineers to such inventions 
degraded the reputations of most such contrivances; expressions of contempt for the 
monopolistic intent of the inventors could also be heard. 
 
Involvement of the Customs Service—Because of the complexities inherent in local 
methods of state regulation, by the mid-1820s appeals for regulation, as we have seen, 
ultimately fell upon Congress.  President Andrew Jackson stated in his annual 
message to Congress in 1833:  “The many distressing accidents which have of late 
occurred in that portion of our navigation carried on by the use of steam power 
deserve the immediate and unremitting attention of the constituted authorities of the 
country.....  they are in a great degree the result of criminal negligence on the part of 
those by whom the vessels are navigated and to whose care and attention the lives and 
property of our citizens are so extensively intrusted.....  That these evils may be 
greatly lessened, if not substantially removed, by means of precautionary and penal 
legislation seems to be highly probable.” 
 
                                                 




The chosen method of control involved the certification of a steamboat’s customs 
papers.  This approach was laid out in President Martin Van Buren’s First Annual 
State of the Union address to Congress in 1837 in which he stated, “The distressing 
casualties in steamboats which have so frequently happened during the year seem to 
evince the necessity of attempting to prevent them by means of severe provisions 
connected with their customhouse papers.”  Since the time of the early republic, the 
Customs Service had been routinely inspecting ships in major ports for tariff and 
smuggling violations.  Now Customs would be used as the primary administrative 
structure to exert political control over steamboat safety.  Such a strategy signaled a 
shift from self-policing by industry to the expansion of regulation by a powerful and 
established federal government agency into the Western states. 
 
The involvement of the established bureaucratic organization of the Customs Service 
in regulating steamboats is a very important point to keep in mind and is the key to 
understanding why western practical engineers reacted as they did to Evans’s safety 
guard.  The engineers were technical experts trying to do their jobs in a 
bureaucratically and politically charged atmosphere; they were unaccustomed to 
control of their profession from outside of their own engineering associations.  The 
Customs Service brought to the mix a hierarchy of vested patronage positions, 
including a collector (a powerful political figure), naval officers, surveyors, weighers, 
gaugers, and inspectors.  These were powerful men; the top officials were appointed 




considerable political maneuvering, infighting, and intrigue that was alien to the 
engineers.43 
 
Further, Customs was virtually the only bureaucracy large and powerful enough to 
reach into the interior areas of the country.  Thus, handing enforcement of steamboat 
safety over to Customs not only meant extending the collectors’ and surveyors’ 
powers beyond the mere monitoring of cargo manifests in the Eastern ports; it also 
meant enlarging Customs’ operational area and scope of responsibilities to include 
the river ports in the West:  Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and 
New Orleans.  There is a need for more research of the Customs Service and its 
venture into the western states, and its new charter to regulate technology in general 
after 1838, but we do know from scholars how the Customs operated in the East.  
Wrote one concerning the collectors along the Atlantic Seaboard in the early republic: 
“These officials collected the revenue that financed the United States government as 
reorganized under the Constitution.  The collectors were also the key element in 
binding the ports of the nation to the national government.  The collectors possessed 
direct contact with the electorate, Congress, and very often one or more cabinet 
members.  They were the true links between the ports and the federal government.”44 
 
When Customs took control of steamboat inspections for the first time in 1838, the 
inspectors were notoriously ineffectual, and so there was little impact on the industry.  
                                                 
43 Historical Note, Records of the U.S. Custom House, Bristol-Warren, Rhode Island, Rhode Island 
Historical Society Manuscript Division, 1980, 1999; http://www.rihs.org/mssinv/Mss08sg2.htm. 
44 Smith, Joshua M.:  Sentinels of the Republic: Customs Collectors in the District of Maine, 1789-




However, with restructuring of the inspection service in the reforming act of 1852 
under a board of supervising inspectors, the full bureaucratic power of Customs came 
to be felt on the Western rivers.  This topic will be discussed in a later chapter 
devoted to the association engineers’ reaction to the “lame” act of 1838 and their 
promotion to the ranks of inspectors under the Customs Service in 1852. 
1.6  The Steamboat Acts of 1838 and 1852:  The “Good” 
Engineer in Ascendancy 
 
One of the chief concerns that emerged from respondents of the government circulars 
of 1832 was the need to employ a good engineer in the engine room of steamboats.  
Although originally the province of technical experts, technological and economic 
changes by the mid-1820s had driven out the most highly skilled practitioners and 
replaced them with cheaper, less qualified engineers (the terms used were, variously, 
“engine drivers,” “six-weeks” or “three-months” engineers, or “strykers”).  Forced 
out by competition, the skilled engineers found themselves returning to the shops or 
staying with the boats and compromising their former standard of safety.  As 
Haldeman wrote, “There is scarcely one engineer in twenty that can make a 
calculation of a safety valve.”  He chided engineers who had not familiarized 
themselves with mathematics, chemistry, hydrostatics, or the hydraulics of steam.  A 
steamboat engineer, Haldeman wrote, must be able to make “neat calculations of the 
pressure of steam, and know the strength of the materials that compose an engine.”45   
Thus developed a classification scheme to distinguish good engineers from bad. 
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Scientific understanding was now becoming a requirement, in part because technical 
solutions could be arrived at more easily, without resort to the older cut-and-try 
methods.  Sinclair wrote that “technical progress demanded more than traditional 
craftsmanship: if skilled mechanics understood scientific laws, the laborious process 
of experimentation by trial and error would be unnecessary.”46  Enlightened 
engineers believed that the transition from artisan to scientific engineer would f
an evolutionary path of progress.  Inventor Cadwallader Evans, for example, wrote 
that engineers would eventually “attain a higher elevation, and gain a thorough 
mastery over the laws of causes and effects, which, a familiarity with science, when 
blended with practice, never fails to im
ollow 
part.”47 
                                                
 
Not all scientific practical engineers were wholly sympathetic to this point of view, if 
only because they believed scientists sometimes erred and were inconsistent in their 
experimental results.  This did not cause the engineers to discount the aura and 
prestige of science, but they did approach science as a discourse or disputation in the 
pursuit of truth based on tangible physical observation and experience.  For example, 
one practical engineer, Charles W. Hinman, challenged three “very learned gentlemen 
(two of them, in fact, professors in an institution which is the pride of our country)” 
that a set of boilers in 1838 burst with a gradually increasing pressure of steam and a 
sufficiency of water.  Hinman believed the water in the boiler had foamed, misleading 
 
46  Sinclair, Bruce: Philadelphia’s Philosopher Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1842-
1865.  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, p. 138. 
 




the engineer into thinking he had a sufficiency of water.  Voicing his skepticism, he 
wrote, “I shall humbly cross the wake of the learned gentlemen at a respectful 
distance astern, and, standing on the shore of practical knowledge, carefully avoid the 
tide of theory entirely.”  In other words, practical knowledge was more reliable than 
scientific theory.48 
 
The effort to educate the “bad engineer” through scientific enlightenment was in 
many cases harder than defusing the simple skepticism of the more skilled engineer.   
This was due to the poor class of persons being accepted as engineers.  Many had 
come from land engines, or had little or no experience as strykers aboard the boats; 
many of them had drinking problems.  Breaking these old habits and replacing them 
with a vision of engineering that embraced Whiggish morality, scientific 
understanding, and mathematical skill was a chief preoccupation of the association 
engineers after the mid-1830s.  The engineer of wavering character and profound 
ignorance of steam would eventually cause an explosion, especially when urged by 
captain and passengers to increase speed.  The opposite role model was a man of 
firm, sober, and steady character who also knew the limits of his machinery. 
Cadwallader Evans wrote that a good engineer was one “of sobriety and temperance 
in all things.”  “He should have a proper sense of the moral relations in which he 
stands to society.  He should possess firmness, courage and self-possession. Neither 
obstinacy nor rashness should form an element in his disposition.  He ought never, 
under any circumstances, to yield to excitement, no matter what the temptation or 
                                                 




what the reward.  Coolness and calmness should be daily practiced, until they become 
fixed habits.....  Nothing should distract him from his business, or lull his vigilance 
into supineness or indifference.”49 
 
Hunter attributed recklessness and indifference of crew more generally to the 
unsettled, migratory character of steamboat life, which encouraged irresponsible 
behavior.  “The prevailing temper and tempo of steamboat life favored the 
employment of the ‘hot engineer,’ who was able and willing to push his engines to 
the limit.”  The hot engineer was “the man who would get results by hard and 
continuous driving with little regard to risk—over the careful engineer who sacrificed 
speed to safety.”50 
 
Changes in technology also played its part in this shift; the advent of double-engine 
steamboats had saturated the field with the inferior engineers.  Engineer W.W. 
Guthrie observed that in those days young men were coming in and replacing their 
tutors; they were hired by boat owners for no other reason than that they were “going 
for less wages.”51  Cincinnati engineers writing in the early forties noted that these 
men had destroyed the respectability of the business and were driving good men from 
the ranks.  Only a board of examiners made up of qualified practical engineers could 
provide a remedy through careful examinations.52 
                                                 
49  C. Evans, 1850 Treatise, p. 19. 
50  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 261. 
51  1853 12-15, IMG 1170-1173 and 1181-1187. 
52  “Government refuses to interfere and enforce the qualification of engineers, possessing no more 





All of these factors contributed to efforts by the association engineers after 1838 to 
reform the engineering cadre, take their places as government inspectors, and reclaim 
their former status and respect aboard steamboats as certified top-grade engineers.  
Their motives and attitudes form a central part of the safety guard story, and serve as 
a framework for a proper definition of expertise in the inspection service after 1852.  
This is the subject of a later chapter. 
 
The next chapter introduces the Franklin Institute and its role in the development of 
the safety guard, which began as a laboratory apparatus for detecting heat in a boiler. 
                                                                                                                                           
destroying the respectability of the business, and cutting down the price of labor so low as not to yield 
a decent support to those persons who have made the business their study, must finally drive all good 
men from the ranks; for botches in any business can always find too much patronage.”  These 
engineers pushed for “a board of examining engineers in each port of entry… to examine into the 
qualifications of those persons who are now practising or may heareafter be licensed to practise as 
steam engineers.  The board should consist of the whole body of qualified practical engineers...”   




CHAPTER 2.  THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE, 
CADWALLADER EVANS, AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAFETY GUARD 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Alexander D. Bache and the Instrumental Need to Measure Temperature in the 
Boiler 
 
Evans’s safety guard was more than a mere appliance.  It represented the alliance of 
science, invention, and government in the nineteenth century, an alliance that sought 
to elevate the mere collection of facts and theories about steam boiler explosions to a 
more systematic discovery process.  The pursuit of this discovery process employed 
scientific principles borrowed from Europe and the translation of this process into 
policy enforced through law.  As in Europe, American scientists preferred that 
remediation for explosions be imposed from above, that is, through a top-down 
process passing from the country’s elite scientists and legal institutions to the 
engineer in the factory or engine room of steamboats.  There was a hierarchy of roles: 
The scientist’s role was to discover phenomena and relationships through fact-finding 
and experimentation in the laboratory; the inventor’s was to assist in the translation of 
scientific concepts into actual working instruments and machinery; that of 
government officials and legal minds was to weave all of this into law and ensure that 
the technical mandate was scrupulously carried out.  With the Evans’s safety guard, 
we can clearly see all of these roles in action over a period of roughly three decades 





To establish the fact that the technical aspects of the safety guard were primarily a 
product of the United States scientific establishment, and in particular of the Franklin 
Institute of Philadelphia and its academic and government network, we will show the 
relationship of the ideas behind the invention to prominent Institute scientists and 
their engineering and mechanical experts (Fig. 10).  We will also show how these 
ideas were conveyed to the inventor himself, Cadwallader Evans.  It was Evans who 
refined and improved the safety guard concept and who was allowed to reap the 
benefits of a government monopoly through a clause in the boiler regulation of 1852.  
In this evolutionary process, Evans was guided primarily by the Institute’s Committee 
on the Explosion of Steam Boilers, founded in the spring of 1830.  We will also 
establish the fact that legal aspects of the safety guard were grounded in the 
conclusions of the Committee.  This will be shown by the relationship of the 
important legal code of 1852 to chief scientist Alexander Dallas Bache’s “pressure 
principle,” which stipulated that mechanisms like the safety guard had to meet certain 
technical requirements--requirements that had emerged from the Committee’s 
published findings in 1836. 
 
A larger story emerges from this connection between the Franklin Institute and 
Evans’s device, however, and this story explains the path that the safety guard would 
take throughout its career in both the laboratory and on board steamboats.  A central 
argument of this chapter is that the famous series of experiments undertaken by the 
















designed in an interlocking fashion) for the purpose of achieving one primary goal—
to create a practical safety device that would supersede the common safety valve, 
which Bache considered defective.  This is in contradiction to the common 
impression given that the experiments constituted a “shotgun” approach to 
discovering the causes of explosions.  Further, we will show that the whole intent of 
the experimental program by 1831 was to use the prevailing thermodynamic theory of 
the day, the theory of caloric, to focus on heat as the ultimate cause of explosions 
(and to de-emphasize proximate causes and other phenomena that were not heat 
centered), and to demonstrate that the only valid safety device was one that sensed 
heat and provided a mechanical remedy to alleviate it. 
 
There are three reasons why historians have missed this underlying focus of the 
Committee: (1) the focus was not explicitly discussed in the Franklin Institute’s 
published work, probably because attributing a single cause such as heat to 
explosions at that early date would have been presumptive and controversial; (2) the 
Committee’s final report was technically difficult, reading like an extended laboratory 
report of experiments and lacking general features; and (3) historians have lacked 
context because they had no exposure to the NARA records.  These records show that 
the majority of time and effort Institute scientists (and later, their government 
sponsors) spent on technical issues of boiler safety revolved around a specialized 
material for detecting heat: French “fusible alloy.”  Evans’s safety guard depended on 





In pursuing these aims, as with the Franklin Institute’s earlier waterwheel 
experiments, a more exacting scientific process was needed whereby heat could be 
precisely measured and ameliorated.  Evidence that this occurred can be found in the 
activity of the Committee as well as a careful examination of the types of experiments 
its members conducted.  The Committee’s chairman, Alexander Dallas Bache  
(1806-1867), built specialized temperature measurement tools and techniques, 
supervised empirical studies to determine the effect of heat on steam pressure, and 
painstakingly analyzed fusible alloy as the best material suitable for a heat detector 
and alarm mechanism.  Bache even created his own crude safety guard in 1832 as an 
improvement over the safety valve and then guided Cadwallader Evans through his 
inventive process to perfect the idea.  Walter Johnson, a professor of chemistry, 
worked closely with Bache and ran elaborate and exacting experiments on the 
evaporative characteristics of water in contact with red-hot iron in which it was 
assumed that heat transformed water into “ebullient” steam. 
 
Even the Committee’s non-heat-related investigations of theories of explosion were 
geared toward development of a heat-sensing fusible alloy safety device: experiments 
investigating pressure buildup in the boiler; investigations of common water-supply 
deficiencies; strength of materials tests of boilers; principles of boiler design; and 





Evidence that the Institute’s patron, the Treasury Department, followed the 
Committee in single-mindedly urging the use of fusible alloy safety device can be 
found in the NARA records.  All through the 1850s, the Department and its 
inspection service defended fusible alloy against hostile criticisms by engineers that 
the alloy was defective.  These officials commissioned expensive investigations of its 
weaknesses, and went to elaborate lengths (including theft) to reformulate its patented 
formula to shore up its reputation with the steamboating community.  Department 
officials pushed their Board of Supervising Inspectors to incorporate the use of 
fusible alloy and to bar engineers from interfering with the safety guard mechanism 
that employed it.  One engineer who had been caught engaging in this activity in 1859 
was prosecuted in federal court as an example to other engineers. 
 
Evans summed it all up in 1850 when he accentuated the operative word and the 
stratagem it represented:  “HEAT is the only effective, practicable and sure principle 
to be adopted as the means of preventing explosions.” 
 
Thus, from 1830, the new paradigm of steam boiler safety was to be a thermodynamic 
one, summed up as follows:  Heat was the ultimate cause of explosions (pressure was 
only the proximate cause); and the common safety valve, operating as it did based on 
pressure, was defective and should be superseded by a better device that sensed heat.  
The fact that the boiler investigation was dedicated primarily to creating a single new 
invention confirms historian Bruce Sinclair’s statement that the orientation of the 




opposed to pedantic theorizing, [depending] upon a new and dynamic combination of 
science and craft skill.”53  The Institute’s predilection for practical experimentation 
and invention also provides a deeper level of granularity in characterizing the 
expertise of the Institute as it was conveyed to the steamboat community.  Although 
this communication process turned out to be flawed (the Committee’s results were not 
widely disseminated for some years), the techniques employed throughout the 
investigation centered almost entirely on empirical data gathering and not esoteric 
theory. The Institute’s science was fundamentally practical; it was devoted to its 
traditional charter of improving American inventions and manufactures of national 
importance so that American goods could compete favorably with Europe’s.54  Steam 
technology was a prime example of a national product that was in need of 
improvement, and the safety guard was the Institute’s answer to the much-needed 
improvement of the most risk-bound of these, the steam boiler.55 
                                                 
53  Sinclair, Bruce: Philadelphia’s Philosopher Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1842-
1865.  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, p. 137. 
54  Sinclair (1974), ibid., Ch. 4 and p.100. 
55  Sinclair (1974), ibid., notes the various motives of the Franklin Institute in investigating steam 
boiler explosions: (1) to gain “sustained income and authority,” for the Institute’s scientists (pp. 191-
194); (2) to tackle technological problems of national significance (“The Board of Managers [was] . . . 
absorbed with concerns of national consequence.”)(p.105); (3) to assuage national embarrassment, 
dishonor, and fear of falling behind in commercial competition with rivals (chemistry professor 
William Keating had said the numerous accidents “impair[ed] the confidence of the public in the merit 
of an invention which has shed vast honor on the American name and which has contributed to the 
prosperity of this country,”  p. 174); and (4) to favorably compete with British and French 
manufactures and scientific institutions (Sinclair noted that Institute leaders saw “a critical need to 
stimulate the improvement in techniques which would raise [production] to a competitive, if not 
dominant, position at home and abroad,” (p. 105), wished to “lift American manufactures from languor 
and technical backwardness to efficiency and prosperity,” (p. 99) , strove to outdo the Europeans by 
means of domestic exhibitions that were meant to “encourage manufactures equal to or superior to the 
imported article.” p.100, and desired to command international notice and respect for American 
scientists, p. 195).  The Institute was the logical organization to undertake the boiler investigation 
because of its geographic location (Philadelphia was the iron-making and steam center of the United 
States) and because of its leaders’ connections with European scientific and government institutions. 
These foreign institutions (particularly France) had developed early boiler codes of their own and had 




The Steam Boiler Investigation, 1830-1835 
 
To show that the safety guard was a product of the scientific establishment, and that 
heat was the primary focus of its experimental program, let us turn to the Franklin 
Institute’s steam boiler investigation of 1830-1835.56  The investigation consisted of a 
carefully designed set of experiments meant to engage the results of preliminary fact-
finding efforts by the Institute from 1825 as well as a similar survey of 
manufacturers, engineers, and steamboat observers gathered by the Treasury 
Department over the same period.57  Ostensibly, the experiments were to focus on 
proving or disproving prevailing theories of explosion as well as to investigate 
fundamental physical phenomena associated with boilers.  The experimental design 
was in large part to favor the investigation of a negative premise:  The effect of the 
experiments, it was hoped, would be to “turn the minds of ingenious men away from 
false hypotheses.”  The Committee set out to show “not only what are some of the 
                                                 
56  This thesis offers a brief summary of the Institute’s investigations; to learn the full details, consult 
Sinclair (1974) and the Journal of the Franklin Institute reports in two parts (1836) (see bibliography). 
Alexander D. Bache (1806-1867) led the investigation, which consisted of a committee of scientific 
and engineering experts: professors of chemistry William H. Keating (1799-1840), Walter R. Johnson 
(1794-1852), Robert Hare (1781-1858), Thomas P. Jones (1774-1848), and Dr. John K. Mitchell 
(1793-1858); Professor Robert Patterson (natural philosophy and mathematics); civil engineer George 
Merrick; fire-engine manufacturer Samuel V. Merrick (1801-1870); engine manufacturer James Rush 
(who managed Oliver Evans’s Mars Works after Evans’s death in 1819); type-founder and industrialist 
James Ronaldson; waterworks engineer Frederick Graff; iron manufacturer Benjamin Reeves; attorney 
George Fox; machinist and engraver Matthias Baldwin (1795-1866), who would go on to build 
locomotives; and meteorologist James P. Espy (1785-1860). The subcommittee conducting the 
experiments was made up of Bache, Reeves, Keating, Baldwin, Lukens, and Merrick.  Most of these 
men had connections to the University of Pennsylvania and the Franklin Institute, and by the time the 
investigation was underway, to key Treasury Department sponsors.  Dates are from The Dictionary of 
American Biography (Oxford 1999) and other biographical sources. Facts on committee composition 
are from Sinclair (1974), pp. 175-177. 
57  Results of the Customs Service’s fact-finding initiative can be found in House Report 478, 22 
Cong., 3 Sess., dated May 18, 1832, under the title, “Steamboats.” When the Treasury Department 
learned that the Franklin Institute was conducting its own survey, the two factfinding efforts were 




causes of explosion, but… what are certainly not causes.”58  The more popular 
suspected causes were:  (1) hydrogen gas accumulated in the boiler, with witnesses 
reporting a mysterious “blue flame” just before explosions, (2) the flash theory, in 
which cold water injected into the boiler to increase the water supply made contact 
with hot metal, causing a sudden “ebullion” of steam pressure, (3) electrical explosion 
caused by lightning or other electrical phenomena, (4) overheating due to an 
insufficiency of water covering the hot flues, (5) steamboat hull design 
characteristics—i.e., careening (the tipping of the boat as passengers or animals 
crowded to one side of the boat; this disturbed the equilibrium of the boilers and 
emptied the water out of the uppermost boiler, exposing the flues to heat), (6) poor 
boiler design and construction, including the use of cast iron instead of wrought iron 
heads, copper versus iron plate, inadequate stays affixing the flues within the boiler 
shell, rivet damage from poor manufacturing processes, and poor quality iron plate. 
 
To test the theories, the Committee commissioned the construction of two small test 
boilers, one of which contained a glass window for observing the internal activity of 
heated water and steam; it also set up full-sized boilers in a quarry for the testing of 
safety devices (Fig. 11). 
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The Committee’s leader and the scientist who personally conducted the experiments 
was Alexander D. Bache (1806-1867), professor of natural philosophy (physics) and 
chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania (Fig. 12).59  He was a rising scientist and 
academic reformer, having graduated from West Point first in his class in 1825, 
served in the Army Corps of Engineers from 1826, and received an appointment at 
the University of Philadelphia in 1828.  His family connections to prominent 
Philadelphia scientists and politicians placed him squarely in the circle of 
Philadelphia’s political and scientific elite: he was a great-grandson of Benjamin 
Franklin (1706-1790); his uncle, George Dallas (1792-1864), was vice president in 
James Polk’s administration; and his grandfather, Alexander James Dallas (1759-
1817), was Secretary of the Treasury under President James Madison (1751-1836).  
Most significantly, Bache was a powerful and charismatic scientific and educational 
reformer, and his chief claim to fame was his role in professionalizing the United 
States’ most prominent scientific institutions.  These included the American 
Philosophical Society (1830s), the Coast Survey of the United States (1843), the 
Lighthouse Board (1844), Office of Weights and Measures (1844), the Smithsonian 
Institution (1846), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (1850), 
and the National Academy of Sciences (1863).  Bache’s organizational skills and 
Whiggish vision of institutional science shaped his approach to reform.  Over the next 
few decades, he upgraded staffs to a more credentialed scientific status, created a 
niche for the employment of professional scientists, modeled a framework for  
                                                 
59  “The [steam boiler reports] are published under the direction of a committee, but the experiments 



















Figure 12. Alexander Dallas Bache (1806-1867). In the days of the boiler 





organizing scientific research on an institution basis, and gained political patronage 
and funding for American scientific institutions, bringing them into line with similar 
institutions in Europe.60 
 
Bache was the chief of the “Lazzaroni,” or “scientific beggars” of Philadelphia, a 
group of ambitious scientists who sought to professionalize science in the antebellum 
period. The Lazzaroni hoped to achieve this by acquiring full-time employment status 
for scientists; promoting a research ethic geared toward advancing esoteric and 
specialized bodies of knowledge (rather than the merely practical); developing a 
service ideal aimed at gaining support from the public; embracing commonly shared 
high standards of quality; and devising a means of formally certifying scientists.  All 
of this activity was closely allied with Bache’s interest in reforming educational 
institutions to make them compatible with his new vision of a professional scientific 
cadre.  On the individual level, Bache advocated economic and moral development as 
part of a Whiggish religious attitude toward society and the individual. He wished to 
cultivate “habits such as industry and prudence that individuals developed in the 
process of working toward material ends [and] also supported the higher moral 
growth of the individual.”61  These principles of moral responsibility and service 
would similarly suffuse the steamboat inspection service two decades later and lend 
that institution its essentially Whiggish character in its founding years.  
                                                 
60  American National Biography, Vol. 1, Oxford, 1999, p. 819. 
61  Slotten, Hugh R.: “Science, Education, and Antebellum Reform: The Case of Alexander D. Bache.” 
History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 31, Issue 3, Autumn 1991, pp. 323-342.  In the article, the author 
also notes that historians of science have argued that the antebellum period saw the launching of 
American science, and he argues that Bache advocated the intervention of the public sector through 




In beginning the boiler investigation, Bache’s first goal was to explore the most 
common refrain heard from the survey respondents: that the root cause of explosions 
was excessive heat caused by low water in the boiler. Some engineers believed that 
when the boiler’s internal flues became overheated, the iron gave way as steam 
pressure increased to dangerous levels.  Engineer and inventor William C. Redfield, 
for example, wrote that “the deficiency of water is always to be considered a source 
of danger, and of certain injury to the boiler.”62 
 
There were two conditions that were thought to cause a dangerous buildup of heat.  
These were (1) stops at steamboat wharves and landings, and (2) “careening.”  Stops 
at steamboat wharves and landings exhausted a boiler’s water supply, uncovering the 
flues.  As J. P. Van Tyne wrote, “[During] the temporary stopping [of] the boat…  It 
is evident that the contents of the boiler must soon become exhausted, exposing the 
boiler to intense heat.”63  Careening was a situation whereby live deck loads such as 
people or livestock moved to one side of the steamboat at the wharf (Fig. 13).  The 
steamboat then rotated about its long axis, causing the water in the boilers to pass 
through an interconnecting pipe from the outboard boilers to the inboard ones. This in 
turn caused the water level in the outboard boilers to drop below that of the flues.  
When the boat righted itself, water re-covering the flues was thought to generate 
catastrophic steam pressures.  
                                                 
62  The respondents were professors of chemistry, practical engineers, engine-builders, boat operators, 
and passengers. Redfield quote, see House Ex. Doc 21, 25 Cong., 3 Sess. (1838), p 435. 


























At stops and landings, a working forcing pump (also called the “doctor”) was thought 
to be the answer for keeping up the water supply, but the pump was mechanically 
dependent on the steamboat’s engine. At river landings, the engine did not run.  
Therefore, because a steamboat made frequent and extended delays at such stops, the 
water level often fell low enough to uncover the flues, allowing the intense heat to 
weaken them.64  In 1830, one engineer, Eben A. Lester, attributed a steam boiler 
explosion aboard a low-pressure steamboat in New York harbor to the forcing pump 
being out of order.  “The water had not been kept up,” he reported, and when repairing 
the boiler, he found the iron to be “hard and brittle in those parts where it was much 
exposed to the heat.”65 
 
At routine stops and landings, the engineer typically tried to relieve steam pressure 
caused by overheated iron by opening the safety valve or by injecting cool feedwater. 
Professor James Renwick believed the opening of the safety valve in such cases 
actually caused explosions rather than prevented them.66  Bache knew of Renwick’s 
theory, and focused on it when considering the deficiencies of the safety valve: 
                                                 
64  One recourse was to resort to “clumsy and wasteful practices such as keeping the paddle wheels in 
slow motion at the landing, or moving the vessel in a circle while passengers and cargo were carried to 
and from the shore in yawl or flatboat.”  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), pp. 161-162.  There are numerous 
examples in the literature from the early 1820s of scientists and engineers holding the view that the 
interruption of the water supply injured the boiler iron.  Thus, a concentration on making the forcing 
pump independent of the engine was a prime strategy for achieving safety by the 1830s.   See H. Rpt 
478 (1832), p. 61. 
65  Loc .Cit. The Steamboat was the Legislator. 
66  James Renwick (1792-1863), professor of natural philosophy and chemistry at Columbia College, 
New York, focused his career on “disseminating and applying scientific knowledge of direct economic 
relevance for the early American republic.” In addition to educating students, he “served as a scientific 
consultant on numerous engineering projects and brought in new scientific knowledge through editing 





 “… the escape of steam [from opening the safety valve … relieves the 
water within the boiler from pressure; the fluid rises in foam; and 
being thrown into contact with the heated sides of the boiler, (or, as is 
supposed by some, being projected into the hot and unsaturated 
steam,) is flashed into steam, too considerable in quantity to find a 
vent through the valve, and of an elastic force sufficient to defy the 
controlling power of the materials used in the construction of the 
boiler.”67 
In this case, the safety valve, ironically, became a liability to safety.  As Bache 
declared, “[the safety valve] not only ceases to deserve the name of safety valve, but 
the opening of it, by hand, may be the very means of producing an explosion.” 
 
Bache’s Emphasis on Heat; the Program of Experiments 
 
Bache’s distrust of the safety valve soon translated into a search for an alternative. 
His search was a departure from traditional perceptions and approaches because it 
concentrated on heat, not pressure, as the root cause of explosions.  To Bache and his 
committee, the steam engine was a practical version of the ideal heat engine with its 
conveyance of “caloric” through the boiler and engine to do useful work (viewing 
heat as a moving fluid).  The traditional emphasis by practical engineers on pressure, 
which focused on strength-of-materials limits of the boiler shell, was helpful in 
                                                 
67 This was called the “flash theory of ebullient steam.” Bache, “Safety Apparatus for Steam Boats,” 




designing more robust boilers.  However, this approach avoided underlying scientific 
principles of heat theory.  These principles could be used to understand what was 
happening physically and chemically in the boiler and how heat could cause the 
production of water-foam, high steam pressures, and fatigue in interior metal parts 
such as flues.  Therefore, through its experimental program the committee sought 
empirical information characterizing the phenomenon of heat in a working boiler, and 
from this, a better practical understanding of the role of heat in explosions. 
 
It was with these thoughts in mind that, by 1831-1832, Bache undertook a series of 
experiments that would provide the data that would allow him to measure and limit 
the amount of heat in a boiler using a “perfect thermometer” as instrumentation.  The 
strategy behind the experiments was to protect against a careening scenario.  This 
would be accomplished by (1) beginning with the known tensile strength of a 
typically sized boiler shell; (2) determining the pressure of steam generated when a 
quantity of red-hot metal was placed in contact with a quantity of water (simulating 
when a careened boat was righted); and (3) limiting the temperature of the boiler to 
some margin of safety below that which could produce pressures exceeding the 
boiler’s tensile strength.  The outcome of the research program would be a 
temperature-limiting device that would be superior to the common safety valve.68 
 
The prototype device that eventually emerged was not an incidental product of the 




is a crucial point that has been overlooked in the historiography.  There was a pivotal 
connection between the Committee’s experimental program, the tangible need to 
improve existing safety devices, and the evolution of Bache-Evans’s safety guard as a 
temperature-limiting device. Further, Bache strove to develop his device with the 
view in mind that it would act in a last-ditch capacity to prevent explosions—with or 
without an operator’s having conscious control of the machinery.  He believed a self-
acting safety device based on heat would activate long before the boiler reached a 
dangerous condition of high steam pressures.69 
 
The Institute was well equipped with the various types of experts required to carry out 
not only the experimental program but also the fabrication of the safety device.  For 
example, Institute scientists could relate temperature to pressure, make precise 
measurements of heat, and calculate strength of materials of the various boiler types.  
Practical men (including solicited inventors) would assist with the calibration of an 
alarm mechanism as well as design and build the prototype mechanism that would 
connect the heat sensor to the alarm. 
 
An important aspect of the experimental program was that analysis would be exacting 
and quantitative.  Any builder, engineer, or inventor could treat the qualitative 
symptoms of dangerous conditions arising within the boiler—i.e., by inventing 
                                                                                                                                           
68 At first, Bache thought a simple plate or plug designed to melt at a low temperature would serve the 
purpose. It was found, however, that these had problems and a more intricate device (a safety guard) 
would be needed. 
69  The experimental strategy is not explicitly stated in the JFI and Congressional reports, but was 
reconstructed by the author based on the types of experiments making up the Committee’s 




devices to alert the operator to secondary conditions, such as the low-water condition.  
However, without the scientist’s theoretical-instrumental approach, such devices 
could not possess the precision required to prevent explosions.  Scientists would be 
able to quantify the processes at work in the boiler in order to prevent explosions, and 
this would lead to an effective device.70 
 
Bache’s Investigations of French Fusible Alloy as an Improvement over the 
Common Safety Valve 
 
Focusing on Renwick’s flash theory and the careening phenomenon for the first set of 
experiments, Bache’s committee set out in 1831 to measure the evaporative effect of 
a mass of red-hot metal on a quantity of cool water.  Immersing heated iron samples 
in water, principal chemist Walter Johnson derived a set of relations between the 
weight and temperature of the metal and the amount of steam generated.71  He 
calculated that within a typical boiler, for every nine pounds of iron heated to a red 
heat, a quantity of water (representing the amount of water required to cover the flues 
after a careening situation occurred) added one pound of atmospheric steam to the 
boiler. This translated into an enormous pressure amounting to 906 pounds per square 
                                                 
70  An analogy of the Institute’s empirical-quantifiable approach can be made to its earlier waterwheel 
experiments at Philadelphia’s Fairmount Waterworks (see Sinclair [1974], p. 144).  Any design that 
was not based on a quantitative approach would only be an approximation; the design could not be 
optimized.  In the case of boiler safety design, the situation was even more critical; an approximation 
when dealing with the vagaries of temperature and pressure in a confined pressure vessel had more 
import than simply increasing the efficiency of the design.  Inexactitude could be catastrophic. 
71  Professor Walter Johnson (1794-1852), professor of natural philosophy and chemistry at the 




inch.   He published tables of his findings in a report to Congress.72  Sinclair did not 
mention these important experiments or their connection with Johnson’s later work 
on the strength of materials aspects of boilers.  However, Johnson’s early evaporation 
experiments were the first step in the Institute’s attempt to understand heat as a 
thermodynamic property of boilers, as well as an attempt to put boiler chemistry on 
an instrumental, quantifiable footing. 
 
Meanwhile, while Johnson was conducting his experiments, Bache was concentrating 
on making accurate measurements of temperature in the test boilers.  French scientists 
had developed specialized mercury thermometers for this purpose. One thermometer 
was placed deep inside, in the boiler water, and another was placed only a short 
distance into the steam chamber. The method of protecting the thermometers was to 
isolate them from steam pressure using sealed gun barrels.  An 1829 French report 
gave the reasons for protecting the instruments in this manner: “The thermometer… 
was not to be directly exposed to the pressure of the steam, for if even it could bear it 
without breaking, it would have been necessary to keep account of the effect of 
compression [from the steam pressure] which it would have been difficult to estimate.  
To obviate this inconvenience, two gun barrels were introduced, shut up at one end, 
and thinned so much as to leave only the resistance necessary not to be crushed 
during the experiments.”73  Bache reported that the French tubes had their limitations.  
He wrote, “…The fragility of the instrument, its inconvenient length, or position in 
                                                 
72   See H. Rpt. 478 (1832), approximately pp. 100-104. 





certain cases, and its not acting as an alarm, are the principal objections to its use.”74  
The operative words in this selection, “not acting as an alarm,” clearly indicate 
Bache’s intent to build an alarm that reacted precisely to heat. 
 
If the French thermometer would not serve Bache’s purposes, then what would? An 
alternative was French fusible alloy.  Plates made of this alloy were already in service 
on French industrial boilers as a complement to the safety valve.  They offered an 
attractive substitution for the conventional thermometer because they were robust, 
could be placed anywhere desired in the boiler, and could serve to activate an alarm.  
In addition, in theory they could be made to melt at a precise, pre-selected 
temperature.  The plates became Bache’s next object of investigation. 
 
Fusible alloy plates were a mandated safety device in stationary (mill and factory) 
boilers in France from 1823 (Fig. 14).  The plates were composed of a “eutectic” alloy 
of lead and tin, were about 8 to 10 inches square, and were thin (between 0.04 and 
0.15 in.).  They were applied with screws to cover one-inch diameter relief holes in  
the outer shell of the boiler, just below the water line; often they were placed on the 
interior flues because the greatest heat occurred there.  The plates were designed to 
melt upon the boiler metal’s exposure to the heat of hot combustion gases (either 
directly through contact with hot metal if the flues were uncovered, or indirectly if 
heat built up excessively in the water surrounding the flues).  
 
                                                 
74  “Report of the Committee… on the Explosions of Steam Boilers,” JFI, Vol. XVIII (new series),  















Boiler’s Outboard Flue or Shell 
Fusible Alloy Plate 








Upon melting, the plates would rapidly release steam pressure (the sound issuing  
forth from this operation was sudden and was described as a “loud blast”).  These 
were “one time use” devices; they required replacement at a steamboat landing after 
the boiler had cooled down.  What made the plates highly sensitive as thermometers 
was the fact that the melting point of the alloy could be altered by changing the 
proportion of its constituent metals. In considering them for his heat monitor, Bache 
wrote in 1831 that “Experience has shown that these plates can be relied on, 
confidently, to answer the ends proposed.”75 
 
The Committee could now select the appropriate formulation of fusible alloy to limit 
the boiler’s operating temperature using Professor Johnson’s heat calculations.  The 
final task would be to make it possible to reuse the alloy and also make it easier to 
alert the captain and passengers of an overtemperature situation. What emerged was 
the first crude safety guard. 
                                                 
75  In the JFI article in question, Bache summarized the history of these plates: “The French Academy, 
when called upon, in 1823, to report to their government, the precautions to be used to prevent the 
explosions of steam boilers, satisfied of the insufficiency of the common valve to insure safety, 
required that in addition to two safety valves of the ordinary construction… there should be two plates 
of fusible metal covering apertures in the boiler… whether the steam be very elastic or not, so soon as 
it, or the boiler, arrives at the temperature requisite to fuse these plates, they melt, and the steam is 
discharged; this, too, below the limit of temperature at which such as discharge of steam would . . . be 
attended with danger.”  See JFI, Vol. VII (new series), No. 4, April 1831: “Safety Apparatus for Steam 
Boats, being a combination of the Fusible Metal Disk with the common Safety Valve,” p. 218.  On the 
sensitivity of the plates to temperature, see a compilation of notes of Treasury senior clerk William 
Gouge, 1856 11: “So very susceptible are fusible alloys of the action of heat, that they form an 
important part of a very delicate thermometer invented by Dumas for determining the heat of vapors.”  
A eutectic alloy is one that has a lower melting point than any of its individual constituent metals. 
Eutectic alloys are useful in modern sprinkler systems because they can be formulated to trigger at a 




Bache’s 1831 Combination of French Fusible Alloy with the Common  
Safety Valve 
 
Bache’s 1831 invention reflected his rejection of the common safety valve (which 
operated according to pressure) and his elevation of the fusible alloy plate (which 
operated according to temperature). The result was a hybrid of the two devices, but 
with the safety valve component effectively neutralized as a safety monitor  
(Fig. 15).76 
 
Details of the device indicate a departure from conventional approaches.  Previously, 
the fusible plate(s) had been located apart from the safety valve. Bache now 
combined the plate and the valve into one unit and moved it forward to a location 
where it could be easily monitored by the captain.  The new apparatus locked the 
safety valve in the open position using a stanchion (“to raise the valve sufficiently 
above its seat”).   
With the stanchion, Bache effectively immobilized the safety valve and used it for an 
altogether different purpose.  When an overtemperature situation occurred, the fusible 
plate was calibrated to melt, releasing steam through the valve opening, creating a 
loud noise. The crew, captain, and passengers would be made aware of the problem, 
and the engineer would seek out the cause and undertake a remedy such as pumping 
feedwater into the boiler to restore the water level.
                                                 
76  Sinclair’s (1974) statement on page 180 is inadvertently misleading:  “The committee gave 
considerable attention to valve design, and Bache himself developed safety devices which acted on 
both steam pressure and heat to signal an alarm.” While the device was designed to react to pressure, 















Why was it necessary to have a safety valve at all in the combination if the purpose 
was simply to detect high temperatures?  Would not a fusible plate alone do the job? 
The answer is that combining the two components promised to solve a technical 
problem with fusible plates that was peculiar to marine applications—the ability to 
restore power quickly after loss of steam pressure due to the melting and blowing out 
of the plate.  Activation of the fusible plates could incapacitate a boat.  Bache wrote: 
 
“The reason why this plate has been considered inapplicable to steam 
boat boilers… is obvious; when the plate melts, all the steam must 
escape from the boiler, and the apparatus must cool before it can be 
replaced by a similar plate; this sudden desertion of the prime mover 
of the engine might, in certain cases, put the lives of the passengers 
in almost as great jeopardy as an explosion; instances, in an exposed 
navigation, will readily occur on reflection, such as a boat on a lee-
shore, &c.  In all cases such a desertion would be attended with very 
great inconvenience.”77 
 
Bache’s design allowed the captain to use his key to unlock and close the safety 
valve, containing the pressure that remained.  This allowed the engineer to rekindle 
his fire and navigate with the remaining reserve of pressure to a steamboat landing to 
                                                 
77   JFI, Vol. VII (new series), No. 4, April 1831, “Safety Apparatus for Steam Boats, being a 




replace the plate.78  The reason for combining plate and safety valve, therefore, was 
that the arrangement gave the captain flexibility in maneuvering his vessel to safety, 
albeit under reduced power.  Thus, Bache was changing the safety valve from its 
conventional role of pressure reliever to that of a propulsion device (an ersatz 
throttle), an ironic reversal of the device’s purpose.  A more remarkable irony, 
however, was the fact that this was precisely the traditionally illicit role assigned the 
safety valve by tamperers, who needed extra horsepower to move the steamboat along 
quicker in a race or avoid hazards in the river. 
 
Another benefit of the safety valve/alloy plate arrangement was its tell-tale “guard” 
function.  Situated at the forward end of the boiler, the apparatus would occupy an 
exposed location.  Bache specifically mentions the fact that the engineer would not be 
able to sneak to the back of the boiler out of view of captain and passengers and pour 
cool water on the alloy plate to neutralize it, a form of tampering observed by the 
French.  This spying by captain and passengers was in keeping with the prevailing 
(and somewhat naïve) notion that scrutiny of the engineer would help prevent deadly 
accidents.  More importantly, such thinking reinforced the idea that control must be 
wrested from the engineers, who on numerous occasions had demonstrated 
insensitivity to danger in their boilers.79 
                                                 
78   This valve will be habitually open and when required to be used to prevent escape of all the steam, 
will be pressed down, as is usual, by a weight acting by the intervention of a lever.”, JFI April 1831, 
Bache: “Safety Apparatus for Steam Boats…” ibid., p. 219. 
79  “This apparatus should be placed upon the boiler as to be seen by the passengers, who are thus 
enabled to know that all is right…”  Bache: Safety Apparatus for Steam Boats… JFI, April 1831, p. 
219.  Inventions such as tell-tales that warned of boiler troubles through mechanical signals were 
common ideas before the steamboat act of 1852.  See also a government engineer’s report on Alfred 





Bache thought that his invention would keep the engineer alert to his responsibilities 
and this would lead to a weeding out of inferior men:  “The vigilance of the engineer 
would almost be insured by the use of these plates, from a knowledge that his 
inattention could not escape detection and its consequences.  Passengers would be 
guarded against the results of carelessness, should it exist, and captains, as well as the 
public, would have the means of knowing accurately the value of those employed in 
the responsible station of engineers.  The want of patronage which would inevitably 
attend an ill-regulated engine, would soon correct evils now so formidable.”80 
 
Thus, Bache’s invention was an improvement and extension of the simple French 
fusible plate, allowing it to be adapted to marine use.  More significantly, by virtue of 
the plate being designed to react to temperature and not pressure, it was thought 
superior to the slower acting safety valve. 
 
Bache apparently did not patent this device, and we are not sure it was ever 
constructed. Nevertheless, notice of the device evidently served as an inspiration to 
inventor Cadwallader Evans.  After 1831, a flurry of Evans’s inventions followed 
Bache’s lead; a host of mechanisms were invented that employed fusible alloy as the 
central component. Each device was designed to react to heat and relieve steam 
pressure through a poppet valve, give an audible alarm, or put out the boiler’s fires. 
                                                                                                                                           
by Mr. A. Guthrie, of this city, for the purpose of preventing Explosions of Steam Boilers, and for 
conveying to the Cabin, for the benefit of the passengers, an early intelligence of any dangerous stage 
of water in the Boilers, or of any undue pressure of steam, which may be used by the engineer on any 
Boat to which the invention may be applied.” 1851 12-2 (IMG 1133). 




Cadwallader Evans, Son of Oliver Evans 
 
Although Cadwallader Evans (1799? – 1854) is a relatively obscure inventor, he was 
well connected to Philadelphia and its centers of steam technology, including the 
Franklin Institute. Evans contributed articles and ideas to the Journal of the Franklin 
Institute from 1832, and was likely a collaborator (if only through correspondence) 
with Bache.  It is possible that the two met and discussed their ideas, perhaps at 
meetings of the Franklin Institute, or at the Mars Works, a large manufactory of steam 
engines, boilers, and machine parts owned by Cadwallader’s father, Oliver Evans.  It 
is certain from correspondence in the Journal that there was a cross-pollination of 
ideas between the two men regarding the development of the safety guard in the 
crucial years of the invention’s emergence in the early 1830s. It is also certain that 
Evans’s safety guard idea made its way into Bache’s laboratory during the boiler 
explosion investigation.  It is even possible that Evans built a prototype under 
contract to the Franklin Institute, although there is no evidence to support this. 
Leaders of the Institute maintained close relationships with inventors at this time; 
they organized annual inventor’s competitions to promote American inventions.  
Therefore, it is possible that Evans was a member of this inventor’s community.81 
 
Cadwallader Evans was one of seven children born to celebrated inventor Oliver 
Evans.  Widely considered America’s first truly great inventor, Oliver Evans  
                                                 
81   Evans’s 1799 birth date is conjecture. In his 1850 Treatise on Steam Boiler Explosions contained in 
the NARA records (the document was written in 1849), Evans stated that he had 40 years of 




(1755-1819) led the development of steam technology in the United States from the 
1780s, developing an amphibious steam carriage and dredge called the Orukter 
Amphibilos (“amphibious digger”) in 1805, and most famously, inventing the 
lightweight, high-pressure steam engine that made navigation on the western waters 
of the United States practicable.  Because Oliver was an innovator in engine 
development from the 1780s, there is circumstantial evidence that he contributed key 
early engine design and propulsion ideas to pioneer steamboat designer John Fitch.82 
 
Oliver Evans also expended his creative energies in industrial enterprises.  He began 
building his first revolutionary automated flour mills in 1785, and, by 1831, 
Cadwallader’s name accompanied his father as an “arranger” on a merchant flour mill 
driving four pairs of 5-foot millstones (Fig. 16).83 
                                                                                                                                           
three years after the Mars Works was founded. If we guess that Evans was 10 years old when he began 
his apprenticeship, this puts the year of his birth at 1799. 
82  On Oliver Evans’s novel high-pressure engine, Professor James Renwick mentions in an 1820 
reference:  “… we must reject the views of Robison and Watt as wholly impracticable; and indeed the 
impossibility of using the condensing engine was ascertained and admitted by Watt. Evans not only 
was the first to entertain correct views, but was also the first to submit them to practice.”  Professor 
Renwick on Steam Engines, 1820, p. 257, from Evans 1850 Treatise, back cover.  Also see an excerpt 
from “The Scientific Class Book” on the same page:  “The high-pressure steam engine invented by 
Oliver Evans, of Philadelphia, in 1784, and for which he obtained a patent from the State of Maryland 
in 1787, is the original of all those powerful machines which, for the last few years, have astonished 
the world with their wonderful performances.” Hunter wrote, “It was Evans who in private 
correspondence, in published writings, and in the public press proclaimed widely the superiority of this 
type of engine to the conventional Boulton and Watt type and who, years before the introduction of 
steam navigation in the West, urged the special value of his engine for overcoming the difficulties of 
navigation on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers (Louis C. Hunter: “The Invention of the Western 
Steamboat,” The Journal of Economic History, No. 3, November 1943, pp. 201-220).  On the 
consultations with Fitch, see Sutcliffe, Andrea:  Steam: The Untold Story of America’s First Great 
Invention.  Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 176. 
83 Evans, Oliver: Appendix to The Young Mill-Wright and Miller’s Guide by Oliver Evans, 
www.angelfire.com. For reference: The Young Mill-Wright and Miller’s Guide, Arno Press, New 











Figure 16. Oliver Evans’s automated flour mill. Cadwallader Evans invented an 
apparatus for tamping the flour into barrels. T. R. Hazen notes that “Oliver Evans 
would eliminate forever ‘the bag and shoulder boys’ working in the mills of the 
time.” Oliver Evans improvements consisted of the elevator, the conveyor, the hopper 
boy, the drill, and the descender. Evans’s “New Process” mill became obsolete in the 
1840s-1850s when Mennonites from the Ukraine brought hard wheat to the United 
States (Evans’s mill was designed to process soft or English wheat). A surviving 
Evans mill is currently undergoing a third restoration at Rock Creek Park, Maryland. 
(Source: Personal correspondence with Mr. Hazen, and his The Automation of Flour 
Milling in America, published online at LycosAngelfire. Drawing from "Peirce Mill 
Drawing," by T.R. Hazen. "Today at Peirce Mill-How it Works" (text and drawing), 





These mills featured a chain of mechanical systems (belts, gears, elevators, rakes, and 
shafts) that eliminated human intervention at many steps of the milling process.  
Together the systems facilitated “an integrated, fully mechanized operation, which 
produced fine flour that was drier and less likely to spoil in a bag or barrel.”  These 
mills were unique in that they required only one miller to tend them.84  It is 
significant that Oliver Evans became embittered toward the end of his life by his 
decades-long struggle to protect his estate from the wholesale violation of his mill 
patents.85  The problems with patent and license infringement led Oliver to retreat to 
the manufacture of steam engines, boilers, and machine parts at his Mars Works.
his official biography conveyed, this was hardly the innovative technology Evans was 
capable of creating but it produced dependable if modest wealth.  His health began
fail in 1816, and just before he died, his Mars Works burned to the ground in April 
1819.  Oliver’s frustration over proprietary matters evidently translated into caut
Cadwallader, who later demonstrated much secretiveness over the manufacturing 
processes of his safety guard’s fusible alloy component, compelling the Treasury 
Department to try to steal his trade secrets. 
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84  American National Biography, Oxford, 1999, p. 617, and see entry for Oliver Evans in The 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1964 ed. Theodore R. Hazen (www.angelfire.com) tells of how two millers 
traveled to inspect Evans’s self-acting flour mill on Red Clay Creek in 1785, but found the mill 
trundling away on its own with no living soul overseeing its operation. The visitors found Evans 
“working in a nearby field because it was haying time.” “The millers had found the mill clean and in 
perfect working order, and for the most part were greatly impressed. However, the strange sounding 
machinery to them sounded like ‘a set of rattle traps.’ ” Interestingly, Evans’s mill machinery featured 
a bell alarm on a leather strap that signaled “low grain” in the millstone hoppers; this is similar in 
concept to Cadwallader’s “low water” bell alarm. 
85  As his biography states, “By the turn of the century the Evans method had become widely adopted 
and yet Evans ultimately spent almost as much money in lawsuits as he made in selling licenses.” 




It is clear that Cadwallader’s interest in developing the safety guard proceeded from 
his talents and experience with chains of mechanisms for the automated mills as well 
as for steam machinery developed in his father’s workshops.  In an 1854 letter, he 
wrote of his early background:  “I was raised and bred up under my father the late 
Oliver Evans, to the business of Manufacturing Steam Engineer, and as a Machinist 
generally, I have planned and superintended the construction of many engines for 
various purposes.”86  In another document, he wrote that, “for the past forty years” he 
had “labored physically and mentally… with the mechanism and use of the steam 
engine.”  “My first lessons were received in the work-shop of my father, Oliver 
Evans, whose name is identified with the history of high-pressure boilers and the 
locomotive engine.”87 
 
Oliver Evans had opened his Mars Works in 1806, and a smaller foundry in 
Pittsburgh around 1811.  We know that Cadwallader managed one of the mechanized 
steam-powered flour mills there in 1840. Although no records of the Pittsburgh 
foundry survive, that establishment almost certainly employed Cadwallader as an 
associate with his brother George Evans by the 1830s.  It was George who, from the 
geographically strategic vantage point of Pittsburgh, started the manufacture and 
distribution of Oliver Evans’s high-pressure engines to the Western country. Writes 
Hunter of this outpost, “In 1811-1812… [Oliver] Evans was establishing there the 
first manufactory of steam engines in the West, with his son George in charge of the  
                                                 
86  See 1854 1-26. 




works. Other men quickly entered the new field, and Pittsburgh became the first 
center of steam-engine and steamboat building west of the Appalachians.”88  Later, 
Evans wrote that in his formative years he became “well acquainted with Steam 
Navigation on the Western Rivers, and [had] examined with much care the defects of 
the engines, such as tend to cause explosions, with a view of pointing out those 
defects as well as the remedy for preventing such accidents.”  He added, “I have 
projected and brought into use many improvements now incorporated with the high-
pressure apparatus.”89 
 
Details of Evans’s life and whereabouts are unknown to us during his Philadelphia 
years - - i.e., between the early years of his apprenticeship at the Mars Works and his 
move to Pittsburgh.  We do know that his interests in steam boiler safety devices 
intersected with those of Bache’s in the pages of the Journal of the Franklin Institute 
in 1832. 
2.2  Scientist and Inventor Devise the First Safety Guard, 
1832-1850 
 
Evans’s Improvement of Bache’s Concept, 1832 
 
Within a year of Bache’s article in the Journal of the Franklin Institute introducing 
his 1831 combination safety device, Evans put forth several variations of his own 
                                                 
88  See Hunter (1943). Although there is no documented link between Cadwallader Evans and the 
Pittsburgh workshop, it is highly likely he contributed his labors to the works because he established 
his residence in Pittsburgh sometime before 1840 as a base of operation for his start-up safety guard 
business. 




safety devices in a reply article (Figs. 17, 18).90  These included float mechanisms, 
differentially expanding rods, a “doctor” pump, and a mercury safety guard.  The 
float mechanisms and the doctor pump focused on alleviating the low-water condition 
whereas the expanding rods and mercury safety guard concentrated on detecting 
excessive heat.   
 
Many early safety inventions were based on the principle of flotation.  As the water 
level in the boiler decreased to unsafe levels, i.e., began to uncover the hot flues, a 
float activated a sequence of mechanical steps to open the safety valve, sound an 
alarm, or put out the fire in the firebox. But floats had the drawback of being subject 
to fouling in the harsh interior environment of the boiler. Evans spoke of his struggles 
with them:  “My first attempts [at a safety guard] were various plans for the 
application of floats, to regulate the height of water in the boilers, as well as to give 
notice of an undue depression of the water, by opening a small valve, and blowing a 
horn or whistle, without using stuffing boxes.  I succeeded in causing these 
contrivances to work well, particularly in clear water, but soon concluded that all 
fixtures  arranged  to work within the steam and water in a boiler,  were  more  or  
less   liable   to   derangement   by   sedimentary   matter   collecting   about  
                                                 
90  The reply was in response to a solicitation for inventors’ ideas by the Committee. Evans’s article 
was entitled, “Further observations for the consideration of the Members composing the Committee on 
the explosion of steam engine boilers, of the Franklin Institute.”  JFI,Vol. IX (new series), No. 2, 





(b) Mercury safety guard. 




(c) Fusible alloy safety guard. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Evans’s brainstorming of safety guards, 1832. The third idea caught 
the eye of the Franklin Institute. The fusible alloy C filled the bottom of cup B. 
When the alloy melted, the plunger and stem descended, opening a poppet valve 








Figure 18. Close-up of Evans’s mercury safety guard (1832). The mercury was 
confined in a cup (see A). The expansion of mercury activated a plunger, which 
opened poppet (F) and safety valves (N) to release steam pressure, and 




the joints, or by the valves becoming deranged from various causes, such as breaking, 
jamming, chips, packing yarn, et cetera…” (Fig. 19). 91 
 
At the end of the article, almost as an afterthought, Evans appended a small drawing 
of a fusible alloy safety guard, a device vaguely similar to Bache’s 1831 combination 
safety-valve/plate (see Fig. 17c). However, in place of the fusible plate was a plug of 
fusible metal placed in the bottom of an extended cylinder or cup. As the alloy melted 
from the temperature of steam in the steam chamber, a plunger mounted atop the 
fusible alloy descended, activating a release of steam through an alarm cock.  Unlike 
Bache’s device, there was no mechanical connection between the alloy and the safety 
valve. Instead, Evans had extended and sealed Bache’s cylinder, moved it from an 
external to an internal fixture, and changed the plate into a plug of fusible alloy acted 
upon by a stem and plunger linking the interior to the exterior of the boiler. Evans’s 
cylinder was a slight modification of Bache’s, but he was putting it to a new use:  
“What I consider to be an improvement is the use of the cylinder, which prevents the 
metal [from the plate] from being lost, and is always ready for a new operation.  I 




                                                 
91  Evans 1850 Treatise, p. 25. The mercury safety guard had none of these drawbacks. It used a 
reservoir of mercury placed on the flue. When the mercury expanded from heat, it mechanically 
activated a water injection pump.  This guard was in many respects similar to Evans’s final 1850 
fusible alloy safety guard; it reacted to temperature at the flue, and the mercury was isolated from the 
effects of steam pressure. However, unlike fusible alloy, the mercury was difficult to work with and 
could not be calibrated to specific temperatures, and hence this invention fell by the wayside. The 














Figure 19. Floats were subject to fouling, making them ineffective safety devices. 





steam down, and, in some cases, to empty the boiler before the metal could be applied 
for another operation.” 
 
Evans was a practical engineer and inventor; he had used no scientific principles to 
develop his concept (although the device was mechanically imaginative).  For 
example, Evans had not mentioned the thermometer-like quality of the alloy, wherein 
the alloy was portrayed as reacting to temperature rather than pressure.  Instead, 
Evans’s primary focus was on preserving the fusible alloy for reuse. 92 
 
It is possible there had been an informal collaboration between Bache and Evans to 
arrive at Evans’s sketch.  If so, Evans made no attribution to Bache for Bache’s 
improvements on the French fusible plate or his incorporation of a cylinder in his 
device (even though Evans had radically changed the function of the cylinder).  From 
Evans’s point of view, he had merely made Bache’s idea practicable as a “one 
operation” mechanism for purposes of preserving and reusing the alloy.   
 
Although at the time Evans probably did not see the departure his plunger design 
represented among all the other alternatives he had set forth in his reply article, this 
simple sketch nevertheless represented most of the qualities Bache had been looking 
for as an alarm or safety mechanism based on the detection of heat:  it was compact 
and simple (especially when compared to the mercury safety guard and expanding  
                                                 
92  Evans played up the temperature-sensing angle nearly two decades later in his 1850 Treatise. The 
rhetoric Evans used in the Treatise effectively upgraded the status of his safety guard from a mere 




rods); it could be reset in seconds by the engineer; it acted independently of the harsh 
conditions of pressure and fouling within the boiler; and after just a few minutes 
following resetting, its alloy would solidify and the steamboat could be made ready to 
resume its trip. 
 
A mere practical invention in Evans’s mind, Evans’s concept fit in well with Bache’s 
scientific approach, which sought to focus on the accurate determination of heat. The 
key idea to indicate the new emphasis is captured in Bache’s phrase describing the 
limitations of Evans’s expanding rods: “The expanding rods proposed by Mr. 
Cadwallader Evans are ingenious; they give, however, not the local temperature of 
the boiler, but its general temperature along the lines to which the rods are applied.” 
(Emphasis added). Fusible alloy would thus furnish an improvement in accuracy.  
Bache went on to promote Evans’s device: 
 
“A much more appropriate device, is the application of fusible metal 
proposed by [Cadwallader Evans].  This is intended to take the place 
of the ordinary fusible plate, and to avoid the difficulty, originally 
existing, but since remedied, of replacing the plate when it had 
fused…*The Committee prefer this to the apparatus acting by the 
expansion of mercury.”93   
 
                                                 
93 Report of the Committee of the Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania for the promotion of 
the Mechanic Arts, on the Explosions of Steam Boilers, Part II, containing the General Report of the 




It is improbable that when Evans developed his apparatus he recognized how his 
invention would become an integral part of Bache’s strategy for accurately measuring 
temperature in the boiler.  He had simply thought of a better way to preserve the alloy 
and reuse it. 
 
Experiments with Fusible Alloy Plates and Plugs, and Bache’s Pressure 
Principle 
 
At the same time Evans’s reply article appeared in February, Bache was busy 
investigating the temperature-sensing properties of French fusible alloy plates. 
Chemically preparing and calibrating the alloys so that they would fuse (melt) at a 
variety of different temperatures had no prior history.  Bache wrote, “The 
examinations which must have been made to determine the proportions of the metals 
necessary to produce an alloy fusing at a given temperature, and the circumstances of 
fusion, have not, as far as the committee know, been made public.”94 
 
                                                 
94  House Ex. Doc 162, 24 Cong., I Sess., Feb 1836, p. 27. This was a similar problem to that of the 
lack of good steam tables available to American scientists in their calibration efforts; see also p. 38 of 
same document (in footnote). In looking over the available literature of their time, the Committee 
found that the world’s scientists could not agree on the published steam table calculations linking 
pressure to temperature.  Steam tables worked out by French investigators disagreed with those of 
American-British inventor-engineer Jacob Perkins (1766-1849).  German chemist Martin Heinrich 
Klaproth (1743-1817) had come up with yet different results. See H. Rpt 478, 22 Cong., I Sess., (1832) 
for a summary of Academy of Sciences of Paris experiments, p. 145; Perkins’s theory of explosions 
arising from the interaction of water and steam on hot iron, ca. 1827, p. 179; and Professor Walter 




Complicating matters was the fact that, in a series of experiments, Bache had 
discovered chemical problems with the plates.95  The difficulty occurred in the state 
transition from solid to liquid when the alloy was exposed to pressure.  When fusing, 
the alloy exhibited the undesirable tendency to separate into its constituent metals; the 
lead component separated from the tin fraction and this formed a near-solid matrix of  
metal that blocked the escape of steam.  In a run of thirteen experiments, the 
problems started to appear in experiment number six.  In that experiment and in the 
three that followed, the fusing point appeared too high.  Bache wrote, “No. 6 
[experiment] presents a curious fact; the point of yielding of the plate, given by four 
experiments, is actually above the point at which the alloy from which it was 
composed became liquid; this would appear inexplicable to one who had not 
attentively observed the mode of fusion of these thick plates, and would lead to the 
suspicion of error… the explanation is [that…] the more liquid parts of the alloy are 
forced out, the less fusible remain, and if strong enough to resist the pressure, the 
process goes on; this takes place unequally in different alloys.”  He went on to note 
that substituting fusible plugs of greater thickness as had been directed by a recent 
ordinance in France would provide no remedy.96 
 
                                                 
95   Bache noted that “many trials to discover the cause of the separation of metals” had been 
undertaken, and referred to “perplexing circumstances, which had occurred throughout these 
experiments, and which had led to so many trials to discover their cause.” See House Ex. Doc. 162 
(1836), p. 37. 
96  The thick plates were approximately one-half inch thick. Bache’s statement presaged what  
Professor Smith later noted about alloy of greater thickness: “Fusible plugs have not been found to 
answer as well as was expected.” (Extracts from a lecture given by Dr.  J.L. Smith before the New 
Orleans Lyceum, JFI Vol. XXI (new series), 1851, p. 414.)  In the plates, fusing (melting) caused the 
alloy to behave like sand: “. . . if any part of the metal becomes fluid before the rest, and gives way, the 




This problem was significant because a smooth phase transition of the alloy was 
crucial to its calibration for purposes of accurately monitoring heat in the boiler. To 
give an idea of the importance of this goal of calibration (if we may judge from the 
percentage of text discussing the properties of fusible alloy in the final report), the 
effort to test the alloy’s properties as a thermometer consumed a considerable portion 
of the committee’s energy in experimentation--nearly twenty percent.  Most of this 
effort was expended trying to understand the inconsistent fusing points of the alloy. 
 
One benefit Bache saw in Evans’s early alloy-preserving device was that it promised 
a solution to the separation-of-metals problem. By enclosing the fusible alloy in a cup 
to permit easy recovery, Evans had inadvertently isolated it from the pressure of 
steam (the cup idea had arisen because of Evans’s need to use a cup or tube to contain 
liquid mercury in the mercury safety guard, and he had simply extended this same 
idea to the containment of liquid fusible alloy).  Bache seized on Evans’s cup as the 
solution to the pressure problem: “The true remedy is to be sought in inclosing the 
fusible metal in a case, in which it shall not be exposed to the pressure of the steam, 
but only to its heating effect.”97  Like the French thermometer, the alloy required 
protection from the direct effects of steam pressure to register an accurate 
temperature. In addition, the peculiar metallurgical properties of the alloy -- in which 
pressure caused a separation of its constituent parts -- required isolation from 
                                                                                                                                           
case, and to oppose an effective resistance to the pressure of the steam.” The discussion can be found 
in House Ex. Doc 162, pp. 27, 35, and 38. 




pressure. With both of these problems solved, the safety guard became (in theory) a 
practical mechanical analog of the mercury thermometer. 
 
For discussion purposes, we shall call Bache’s prohibition of exposing the apparatus 
to steam pressure the “pressure principle.”  The pressure principle would eventually 
be incorporated into the 1852 steamboat act as a legal requirement for safety guards; 
the principle would dictate the type of safety guard permissible under the act, and this 
was to have far-reaching implications for steamboat engineers and for the Treasury 
Department. 
 
Evans’s Patents of 1834 and Bache’s 1836 Apparatus 
 
By 1834, Evans sought to establish his priority as the inventor of the 1832 safety 
guard.  In his 1834 patent application (Patent Number 8185X, entitled, “A new and 
useful improvement in the mode of applying a fusible alloy as a guard against 
explosions of Steam Engine and other Boilers”), Evans introduced two new devices 
that refined his notion of making the fusible alloy recyclable as a means of repeatedly 
triggering a warning mechanism. Neither device made direct contact with the flue, 
and thus each was intended to react only to general steam temperature in the boiler. 
 
The two variants were refinements of Evans’s 1832 idea.  Both devices illustrate 
Evans’s originality and ingenuity with mechanisms, apparently a gift from his father 




technique.  The first design was similar to the previous Evans and Bache machines in 
employing a piston-like action (Fig. 20b).  In this device, mounted on the outside of 
the boiler head, a weight with stem plunged downward following the melting of an 
alloy ingot. This action set off an alarm cock, which gave notice “that the water is too 
low.”  The weight forcing the stem down can be seen to be massive, and the reason 
for this had to do with oxidation/congealing problems Evans had experienced with the 
alloy.98  Evans’s claimed improvement consisted of “the employment of an air tight 
tube or vessel to contain the alloy by which it will be protected from oxidation or 
waste for a great length of time, and in which it can be used many times in succession 
for indicating a certain elevation of temperature without the necessity of renewing its 
[alloy component]…”  
 
The melting of the alloy in the cup activated the downward thrust of the weight, 
triggering a stop cock that in turn released steam, causing “considerable noise.”  The 
engineer would then be made aware of the increased temperature of the boiler, caused 
by too high steam pressure or low water.  “The engineer will then proceed to examine 
the safety valve to see that it works freely, and the gauge cocks to try the height of the 
water.  He will then know from which of the two causes the alloy had fused and 
proceed to correct the evil.”  Evans specified that the apparatus should be enclosed in 
a cast iron cover under lock and key “so the engineer cannot get at it, the key being 
kept by the captain or other person whose duty it will be to raise the weight when 
                                                 
98  The heavy weight overcame blockage at the bottom of the cup caused by oxidized metal. This 
residue kept the piston from fully descending and setting off the alarm. Evans fought a losing battle 







                
 
(a) Mallet Concept   (b) Plunger Design 






the apparatus has gone into operation and to place the forked piece S between the 
guard and the handle so that the alloy may congeal in its place and be ready for 
another operation.”99  The fork could then be removed, the safety guard reset, and the 
box locked up again.  
 
Evans’s second device, a variation of the first, featured an internal weight shaped like 
a mallet mounted on the boiler shell turning axially on a horizontal shaft (Fig. 20a).  
On the melting of a small sample of alloy placed in the keyhole-shaped body of the 
safety guard, the mallet rotated, opening an alarm cock and alerting the crew.  
 
What is most interesting about this device was the rotating mallet fixture.  This 
feature shows that Evans was thinking of a rotating mechanism at this early date (in a 
later description of his final “improved” 1850 version of the safety guard, we shall 
see how and why Evans made the rotation of the spindle a key feature).  
 
While Evans developed these variations on his basic safety guard idea, Bache 
conceived and built an experimental apparatus in the laboratory of the Franklin 
Institute that was a near-copy of Evans’s earlier 1832 device (Fig. 21). He used this 
apparatus in his continuing quest to relate temperature to pressure within a working 
                                                 




boiler.100 Conceptually, Bache’s design changed the use of the tube from that of a 






Figure 21. Bache’s safety guard was quite similar to Evans’s 1832 concept, except 
that Bache’s extended the tube down to the flue (C-D) in order to calibrate the alloy 
to the hottest point in the boiler. The melting alloy released the stem upward to 
activate a bell alarm. Bache published his design in the boiler committee’s 1836 
general report. 
                                                 
100 The device was described in the Committee’s general report of November 1836, on p. 298.  It was 
specifically designed to help establish the Committee’s steam tables relating temperature to pressure 




Physically, the apparatus was a slight and almost cosmetic variation of Evans’s 1831 
device whereupon Bache reversed the direction of the plunger from “push down” to 
“pull up” to alleviate the alloy-congealing problem.101 Another important feature of  
Bache’s variation was that the tube extended all the way down to the flue so the alloy 
was in direct thermal contact with it.  This would give the “local temperature” that 
Bache wanted in order to properly measure heat in the hottest part of the boiler. 
(Evans did not extend the tube to the flue until one of his 1839 designs). Having the 
alloy in direct contact with the flue metal also had the benefit of preventing 
overheated iron due to the low-water condition. This was the postulated dangerous 
condition in which the supply of water evaporated off, leaving the flues exposed to 
intense heat. A safety valve reacting solely to steam pressure could not detect this 
condition, but a safety guard affixed to the flue could. With this refinement, the safety 
guard became the dual-purpose device intended to sense all potentially dangerous 
conditions.102 
 
A pronouncement in the boiler committee’s 1836 final report foreshadowed the 
usefulness of the Bache-Evans safety guard concept on steam boilers and at the same 
moment expressed the lowering of status of the safety valve.  Heretofore, the safety  
                                                 
101  Bache’s idea to make the stem traverse up instead of down upon the melting of the alloy was 
calculated to reduce the same mechanical problem Evans was having with the alloy.  The alloy was 
found to be vulnerable to rapid oxidization with each re-heating. Upon re-heating, the alloy formed a 
thick layer of dross, which accumulated in the bottom of the tube. This decreased the effective distance 
the plunger could travel, hampering its movement in the downward direction. 
102 The safety guard could thwart either (1) an overpressure condition, even with plenty of water in the 
boiler, or (2) a low-water condition in which steam pressure was low but the flues were weakened from 
heat. In Case One, heat would be absorbed by the water, steadily increasing steam pressure to the 
boiler shell’s bursting point. (The committee had found in its quarry experiments that plenty of water 




guard would constitute “a manageable, and useful check, in ordinary cases, upon the 
safety valve.”103 
 
There is no documentary evidence of any friction between Bache and Evans over the 
obvious commonality of the various designs of Evans’s 1832 design and Bache’s 
1836 apparatus.  It is possible, therefore, that Bache and Evans shared information 
about their designs and were in harmony in their working arrangements.  Evans 
patented his 1832 concept in 1834; Bache sought no legal protections for his 
modification of Evans’s 1832 idea.  Only after Evans had died did the issue of patent 
infringement come up, in 1855, probably because makers of “mongrel” safety guards 
were using Bache’s 1836 clone of Evans’s safety guard, or variations on that theme, 
in an attempt to evade Evans’s patent, which was by then controlled by the inventor’s 
widow, Jane Evans.104 
 
Evans’s 1839 Patent 
 
Throughout the 1830s, Evans continued to develop new safety devices and establish 
patents for them. Evans’s 1839 filing (Patent No. 1,122, dated April 15, 1839 and 
                                                                                                                                           
collapse or explosion. Although in this case, pressures were not great enough to burst the shell, they 
were sufficiently great to induce catastrophic collapse of the flues and attached boiler head. 
103  H. Ex. Doc. 162, p. 40. Offered as further support for the idea of demoting the safety valve were 
the results of the Committee’s tests on those devices, which suffered inaccuracies due to mechanical 
problems, see p. 86. 
104  Some sort of safety guard was necessary to meet the requirements of the ninth section of the act of 
1852 to protect the fusible alloy from the pressure of steam.  Jane Evans likely would have considered 
patent evasion a very real threat to her income. She is almost certainly the individual behind a query 
from chemist James Booth to the U.S. Attorney General in 1855  (just after Evans’s death) asking him 




reissued November 23, 1852) expanded his earlier safety guard ideas to include 
“certain new and useful improvements in Steam-Boilers and Steam boats for the 
Purpose of Preventing the Explosion of Boilers.”  In actuality, these consisted of 
some new ideas in combination with Evans’s older conceptions: a float-and-fusible-
alloy-safety guard hybrid design, a passenger-monitored water gauge, and an 
apparatus for holding a steamboat fast against a wharf or landing so that it would not 
careen (this apparatus included his 1834 piston device and his firebox deluge system) 
(Fig. 22).105 
 
What is most interesting about these devices is that, at this fairly late date, Evans was 
still focused on mechanisms and not on Bache’s heat theory.  His old 1834 piston 
safety guard, now employed in combination with a float mechanism, left optional the  
 
                                                 
105  The author of this thesis discovered the four missing figures for Patent 1,122 (shown here) in the 
NARA records.  They had been lost for 153 years.  The author remitted computer images of these 
figures to the U.S. Patent Office in the fall of 2005; to date the patent has not been updated.  How did 
the figures originally go missing?  In the patent filing there is a note from a Mr. Finis D. Morris of the 
Patent Office dated June 1, 1915, stating that he could not locate the figures.  The original patent was 
dated April 15, 1839; it was reissued on November 23, 1852.  It is surmised that the original drawings 
were lifted out of the applicant Evans's patent papers and inserted in his reissue application 13 years 
later (presumably to save the cost of redrawing).  The patent filing was summoned by the Treasury 
Department soon thereafter due to the question of Bache’s possible infringement of Evans’s patent.  
The original figures are located at present in Evans’s 1852 patent reissue request bound in the Treasury 
Department’s Steamboat Inspection Service records (NARA RG 41).  The reason Mr. Morris could not 
locate the drawings, therefore, was because they were contained in the Treasury Department, not the 
Patent Office, records.  Reference author’s IMG 1403 (Fig. 1); IMG 1404 (Fig. 2); IMG 1405 (Fig. 3); 






(b) Side View 
Figure 22. Evans’s 1839 Patent No. 1,122. 
Fusible alloy safety guard, combined with 
float for detecting low water, and firebox 
deluge system.  The engineer was still to be 
held accountable by passengers: “To render 
the fact of the absolute or relative deficiency 
of water in the boilers known not only to the 
engineer but to the passengers on board of a 
steamboat, and to lead to the immediate 
correction of the evil, I employ an alarm 
apparatus, which by giving two different and 
distinctive sounds, will communicate the 
desired information.” Note the firebox water 
deluge system in (b), at bottom left.  
 




(c)  Water Level for Passengers 
 
Figure 22 (cont). Water gauge in the salons of steamboats:  “. . . a water level, which 
is to be placed within the cabins of steamboats, and which will, upon inspection, 
point out to the passengers, at all times, the exact trim of the boat, and will cooperate 
with the indications of the horn and whistle in the last described apparatus, in 
making known the quantity of water in the boilers, and the deviation thereof from the 
proper level.” Passengers were instructed to move to the other side of the boat if the 
boat tipped. The water level scales can be seen at the upper left and right portions of 
the figure. 
(d) Anti-careening Fixture 
 
Figure 22 (concl). Evans described his wharf apparatus for preventing careening “. . . 
a strong upright piece of timber . . . is made to slide up and down by means of a rack 
and pinion, operated by suitable gearing. The sliding timber is retained in its proper 
position by passing through mortises, or guide pieces, and may be readily forced 
down when the boat is at a landing, so that its lower end bearing upon the bottom of 
the river will effectually prevent the careening of the boat, and thus disastrous 
consequences resulting therefrom.” Note the fusible alloy safety guard connected to a 




choice of extending the tube (cup) to the flues.  Thus, protection was limited to 
generalized heat built up in the steam chamber and was not provided for the low-
water condition. Further, Evans claimed that the other non-heat detection mechanisms 
in the patent were needed for “perfect safety.”  He wrote, “A part of [several distinct 
devices] may be omitted on board of certain steamboats, but in such as are used in our 
great western waters, it is believed that the whole of them will be required to insure 
safety.”   
 
Evans had absorbed the lesson of Bache’s that the safety valve was too slow-acting:  
“I use the ordinary safety valve on my boilers, but I combine therewith an apparatus 
intended to open the said valve when the temperature of the interior of the boiler is 
greater than is deemed compatible with perfect safety; and this I accomplish by a new 
mode of using the mixture of metals known as the fusible alloy, the fusion of which 
will cause the safety valve to open although the pressure of the steam may not be such 
as to produce that effect.” 
 
Rejection and the Great Fire of 1845 
 
With patents in hand, in the early 1840s Evans began marketing his safety guards at 
Pittsburgh’s local wharves, trying to convince steamboat owners and engineers of the 
guards’ benefits.  In this endeavor, however, he noted much prejudice by the 
engineers, many of whom considered his safety guard “an intolerable nuisance” and 




seems the oxidation problem had not been solved after all.  Meeting frustration at the 
wharves, he moved the debate over reliability into the newspapers.  Later patent 
documents describe Evans' “excessive zeal” in trying the issue in the press and in 
“forcing” the safety guards upon the boating community, which resulted in “all the 
difficulties and obstacles against which he has had to contend.”  Others noted a lack 
of demand for Evans’s guards based on the fact that he charged too high a price to 
install them.106 107 
 
Evans produced several different models in a range of prices.  For owners of 
steamboats, the safety guards’ high cost was a major obstacle to their purchase; it was 
an expensive fixture by the standards of the day.  If owners balked a few years later at 
paying five dollars for an inspector’s certification of their steamboats, Evans’s 
charging fifteen times as much for his safety guard in the 1840s was prohibitive.  His 
                                                 
106  Evans began selling his safety guards about 1840, see his 1850 Treatise, p. 51; prejudice noted, see 
1853 12-15 and many instances mentioned in Evans’s 1850 Treatise.  On the lack of demand for the 
invention, see 1855 4-10. Oliver and son George Evans’s Pittsburgh engine-building shop served as a 
base of operations in the western country around which Cadwallader set up his safety guard shop and 
“laboratory,” probably around 1838-1839.  His shop was located at No. 10 Water Street.  The 
particulars of Cadwallader’s relationship to his father Oliver and brother George, and to any business 
arrangements in setting up Cadwallader’s new business, are not known.  We do know that Evans 
employed a man in his shop whom he tried to teach accounting and mathematics; this was Morrison 
Foster, a brother of composer Stephen Foster (Stephen was born in Pittsburgh). Library sources note 
that Cadwallader was a cousin of Eliza Clayland Tomlinson Foster, who was Stephen Foster’s mother 
and niece of Oliver Evans’ wife Sarah Tomlinson.  This means Cadwallader and  Stephen Foster were 
first cousins once removed.  Cadwallader also had family connections to President James Buchanan 
through Stephen Foster’s sister, who was married to Rev. Edward Buchanan, James’s brother, of 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Cadwallader was married to a Jane Mahon. (See O’Connell, Joanne: 
Understanding Stephen Collins Foster, His World and Music, PhD Dissertation, University of 
Pittsburgh, 2007, pp. 68, 95; and the Wikipedia entry for Stephen Foster.) 
107  The “nuisance factor” was key to the rejection by engineers of Evans’s safety guard. Supporters of 
the safety guard believed “bad engineers” refused to accept self-acting control, and this choice had 
consequences.  When the Steamboat West Wind departed from St. Louis heading up the Mississippi 
River in 1842, the safety guard activated four or five times. The engineer reset the guard each time but 
grew weary of this and finally fastened down the guard’s lever.  The boiler suffered a flue collapse. 




most advanced model cost seventy-five dollars; a cheaper twenty-dollar version was 
the one most often sold to boatmen because, as Evans noted, “they usually opt for the 
cheapest… this cheap version works an alarm only, and does not relieve the safety 
valve.”108 
 
Whatever Evans’s problems in introducing his safety guard into the boating 
community, these were overshadowed by a catastrophic natural event.  His workshop 
and all of his papers burned to destruction during Pittsburgh’s Great Fire on April 10, 
1845 (Fig. 23).  “This flourishing adjunct of the city is well nigh annihilated,” an 
eyewitness recorded after he saw the fire, fanned by high winds, destroy the city’s 
entire central business district. Other witnesses were astounded to see the 
Monongahela Bridge consumed in a matter of minutes:  “The bridge took fire at the 
North [...] next to Pittsburgh, and the flames [ran] roaring and crackling through 
[with] railroad speed, and from the time the fire commenced, until it was prostrate [in 
the] river, only ten minutes elapsed!” Nearly all the businesses in the Water Street 
district where Evans had his shops were destroyed, including Fulton’s bell and brass 
foundry and other industrial concerns, small businesses, and residences.  “The 
appearances of things is awful--nothing but an immense forest of walls and chimneys 
is visible, and desolate heaps of brick and mortar,” a local newspaper recorded.109 
                                                 
108  Evans noted also that the improved version did not sell well because it was not required by law.  
See Evans’ letter dated 1854 6-9. 
109  Evans’s papers destroyed: “Ever since the great fire in 1845, in which perished his office, his 
manuscripts, with the results of his manifold chemical and mechanical tests and experiments…” 
Evans, 1850 Treatise, from a third party testimonial, p. 64, IMG 1059. Details of the fire, see The 




















After the fire, Evans relocated his office and laboratory to the second floor of a 
warehouse owned by an I.S. Waterman and Sons, located some distance away at No. 
81 Water Street “between Market and Ferry,” and from there he worked to “regain 
and replace” what he had lost.110 
 
Details of Evans’s life during the interval between the Great Fire of 1845 and early 
1854 are sketchy.  We do know that in those years Evans published, or was working 
on, three tomes on steam science:  (1) a treatise on steam boiler explosions and his 
improved 1850 safety guard; (2) a general 300-page volume on steam science; and (3) 
a report of experiments he made on the effects of pressure on fusible alloy plugs.  
Bache had left Philadelphia for Washington, D.C., in 1843 to run the U.S. Coast 
Survey and so his direct influence, if any, in Evans’s writing of these texts is 
doubtful.  However, Evans had requested funds in 1839 for conducting his 
experiments.  It is possible he was funded and commissioned to report his results and 
the basis of his studies in these three publications.  Bache’s -- or at least the Franklin 
Institute’s -- influence on the ideas in Evans’s treatise is obvious, for from 1850 
onward Evans concentrated on nothing but heat theory and the effect of pressure on  
the alloy.  There were no more discussions of floats, water gauges, or other non-heat-
related apparatus in his writings. 
 
We do not know if Evans was able to complete his 300-page volume on steam 
science before he died; apparently he did not because no copies survive.  In 




which technical information was to be freely exchanged in the interest of the common 
good:  “I have written a good deal on matters connected with my profession, and have 
now nearly ready for publication a large work on Steam, Steam Engines, Steamboats, 
and Explosions in detail, expressly designed for the use of Engineers on steamboats, 
and other practical men.  All this has been done with a view to impart to them 
whatever knowledge my opportunities and years may have enabled me to acquire.  If 
this displays hostility, then must sentence of condemnation be prosecuted upon 
me.”111 
 
Of greater significance for our story is Evans’s 1850 booklet, A Treatise on the 
Causes of Explosions of Steam Boilers, which did survive and was distributed to 
steamboat engineers at the wharves by Evans himself.  Because the document 
enlightens us more than any other source material about Evans and the safety guard, it 
will be useful here to explore this document in some detail (Fig. 24).112 
2.3  Evans’s Important 1850 Treatise on Steam Boiler 
Explosions 
 
Taken in isolation and without the backdrop of its scientific development, Evans’s 
1850 Treatise tells us little more than how the safety guard worked and Evans’s 
attempts to gain acceptance for it among the steamboat community (targeting  
                                                                                                                                           
110  Evans’s 1850 Treatise, p. 64, and back cover. 
111  Evans’s 1850 Treatise, p. 15. 
112  Full title: A Treatise on the Causes of Explosions of Steam Boilers with Practical Suggestions for 
their Prevention to Which is Added a Description of Evans’ Improved Safety Guard, or Engineers’ 
Assistant. In NARA RG 46, Commerce Records, Tray 26, folder 1 of 2. This was the same booklet 











Figure 24. Cover of Evans's 1850 Treatise on the Causes of 




specifically steamboat engineers); it also appears to be the sales brochure of a zealous 
inventor.  However, when evaluated in the context of Bache’s work on heat theory 
(and how this would play out with the engineers), the meaning of the document takes 
on a larger dimension.  The clarity and lofty rhetorical style of the Treatise is a vast 
improvement in communicating Bache’s theoretical concepts over the Franklin 
Institute’s obscurant, esoteric 1832 and 1836 reports of their experiments (“… the 
writers make this subject appear most vague, unaccountable, and mysterious to  
us…”.113   The Treatise makes all of the same scientific claims - - point for point - - 
that the Franklin Institute scientists had been making in the pages of the JFI over the  
previous 20 years.  It emphasizes heat as the sole quantity to be measured; highlights 
the deficiency of the common safety valve and the superiority of fusible alloy; and 
introduces the pressure principle.  Significantly, it veers away from Evan’s familiar 
nuts-and-bolts patent descriptions in favor of an emphasis on salient scientific 
principles and their experimental verification.  As such, the text succeeds in skillfully 
blending science and the technical arts, a significant achievement for its day, and one 
suited to Evans’s primary audience: “scientific” practical engineers. 
 
Thus, Evans’s Treatise appears to be scientific propaganda aimed at the leading 
engineers of the day in the western districts.  Evans’s likely goal was to use the 
document as a key part in a campaign to roll out the safety guard in coordination with 
the industry-reforming Steamboat Act of 1852.  The timing of publication in this 
regard (1850) is significant and provides some circumstantial support for the 
                                                 




conjecture that the Treatise may have been commissioned by Congress.  This was the 
year in which Congress was busily drafting the new Steamboat Act of 1852. A few 
years hence, the Act would contain a provision effectively mandating the safety guard 
on the basis of Bache’s pressure principle. 
 
The Treatise describes Evans’s difficulties in obtaining the acceptance of steamboat 
engineers for his safety guard, his struggle to overcome defects in the device, and his 
reorientation to Bache’s focus on heat as a scientific concept (for purposes of 
highlighting for engineers the scientific virtues of the invention).  Featured is Evans’s 
final “improved” version of the safety guard, pictured in a handsome illustration on 
the frontispiece (Fig. 25).  The key innovation of the device was a clever rotating 
stem to get around the oxidizing/congealing alloy problem at the bottom of the tube.  
This particular device was the culmination of all of Evans’s work for the past 20 
years; he claimed it made all of his previous float and gauge mechanisms obsolete. 
 
With a skillful blend of science and salesmanship, Evans’s purpose was to persuade 
river men of the merits of Evans’s invention and to defuse criticisms of it, which as 
we have seen had been frequent in the 1840s leading up to publication of the Treatise.  
The Treatise included as support for its ideas the endorsements of prominent 
scientists, steamboat practical engineers, and captains.  In fending off criticisms that 
the fusible alloy used in the safety guard was defective (comments such as “humbug,” 















Figure 25. Evans’s 1850 Safety Guard. The impeller was seated within a cup upon the 
right flue. The cup was filled with fusible alloy. When the alloy melted, the impeller 
was released and rotated, turning the stem D. This in turn released weight K, which 




science as well as appeals to scientific authority to convince engineers that his 
improved model was now made “perfect” by the rotating stem feature.114 
 
A synopsis of the document’s text illustrates these points. Evans notes that steam is 
the means of fulfillment of the country’s “commercial destiny”: 
 
“The unparalleled increase in trade and travel of late years, keeping 
pace with the development of our resources and the march of our 
population, and giving rich promise of a still more wonderful  
augmentation in the future, calls loudly for the adoption of every 
improvement, and all reasonable measures, calculated to advance or 
attain the objects proposed.  The commerce and wealth of the world 
will soon pour into our lap, to be conveyed on our railways and borne 
on our steam vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and thence to the 
most distant climes, bringing back in return the richest and rarest  
commodities of the earth.  The great agent by which all this is to be 
accomplished,--by which we have advanced, and must continue to 
advance towards the realization of our glorious manufacturing and 
commercial destiny, is steam.” (p. 67) 
                                                 
114 Evans gives a history of his invention’s development, first treating the dead-end inventions: floats, 
alarms, a doctor pump, and mercurial gauge “consisting of an artificial fountain often seen in the east, 
in the hands of venders of lemonade, only reversing its pressures, and using mercury in place of water 
… a mere indicator of pressure…  I never proposed this as a preventive against explosions.”  
Expanding rods were not effective because they would have required the boiler temperature to reach 
1,157 degrees Fahrenheit before they reacted.  He moves on to difficulties he encountered in 
harnessing fusible alloys; there were problems with successive operations of the plunging stem that 




He sees that this vision is threatened by the poor strength of contemporary boilers: 
“The evil lies in the radical defect of the machine, and can only be met by an 
improvement upon it, and that improvement must possess principles the same as the 
Safety Guard, viz: the power of relieving the boiler of all its steam before it arrives at 
a dangerous temperature.” (pp. 16-17)  Even the perfection of engineers and the 
encouragement by the government of associations of engineers, he writes, can not 
eliminate accidents under these circumstances (he compares engineers to doctors who 
are “not equally skilful and competent, although each one [carries] a regular diploma 
in his pocket.”)  Because it reacts to high temperatures and is self-acting, the safety 
guard is the only effective safety device.  To make the invention palatable to the 
engineers, Evans personifies it as a “faithful sentinel” and an “untiring friend and 
assistant to the engineer.” (pp. 31-32)  The safety guard’s self-acting feature serves a 
dual purpose: it not only protects against the negligence of the “bad engineer” but it 
corrects for the oversights or ill-providence of the good engineer115:  
 
The Guard is put on as much for [the good engineer’s] benefit as for 
that of any one else.  It was intended to be his friend and assistant in 
                                                                                                                                           
operate the mechanism. For this problem, he devised the rotating impeller and spindle. With this 
innovation, his invention “became perfect.” (p.28) 
115 Evans on the good engineer: “A good engineer should be a man of sobriety and temperance in all 
things.  He should have a proper sense of the moral relations in which he stands to society.  He should 
possess firmness, courage and self-possession.  Neither obstinacy nor rashness should form an element 
in his disposition.  He ought never, under any circumstances, to yield to excitement, no matter what the 
temptation or what the reward.  Coolness and calmness should be daily practiced, until they become 
fixed habits.  A just respect for the opinions and for the feelings of others, should accompany him in 
his intercourse with all men.  Together with this, the most amicable relations should subsist between 
himself and all those connected with the ownership and management of the boat.  Finally, when on 
duty, the engineer should have his whole mind bent upon his duties.  Nothing should distract him from 
his business, or lull his vigilance into supineness or indifference.  It makes no difference what Safety-
Valve or Safety-Guard may be placed upon his boilers, his duty is plain; namely, to attend to every 




moments of danger, and under circumstances in which all ordinary care 
and skill would be utterly powerless to save.”  (p. 19) 
 
With this passage, in conjunction with Evans’s view that the “radical defect” in the 
machine exonerates the good engineer from blame for explosions, he cleverly implies 
that to not accept the safety guard as a friend would be irresponsible and immoral.  
He writes, “…notwithstanding the exercise of the highest skill and watchfulness, 
there is still room enough for accidents; and in this respect the Guard becomes the 
best friend of the engineer.” (p.20)  Clearly, the good engineer (i.e., the scientific 
engineer, or conscientious aspirant to the name) is the party Evans most wishes to 
influence in his argument. 
 
In this, Evans feels a kinship toward practical engineers like himself. He feels 
discomfort in justifying his invention on purely scientific grounds; he makes clear that 
he wishes to strike a bargain with his fellow engineers in not abandoning them for a 
“merely scientific” approach.  “Government should not always employ in its 
experiments and offices the merely scientific professor, to the exclusion of men of 
enlarged practice and experience. The statistics of the Treasury Department 
abundantly show that in point of economy, if nothing else, a reform in this respect is 
loudly called for.”  (p. 18) 
 
Part of Evans’s reservations about relying too heavily on scientists had to do with the 
stifling of the engineers’ freedom to innovate.  He does not wish a government 




its own merit: “I have not asked, nor do I now solicit the enactment of any law to 
COMPEL the introduction and application of the Safety-Guards.  Others may do this, 
if they see proper.....  For myself, I have an abiding confidence in the intrinsic merits 
and acknowledged worth of the invention; and if its good qualities and practical 
operations are not sufficient to win its way to public confidence and general adoption, 
then so far as I am concerned, let it fall.  My determination is never to invoke any 
legal measures to force its application or use.”  (p. 65) (Emphasis his).116 
Embracing government research while at the same time making room for the views of 
practical engineers, Evans is walking a tightrope between science and practical 
engineering.  His balancing act reveals an internal conflict concerning two realms of 
expertise that hitherto have been separate and, below the level of the scientific 
engineer, antagonistic.  As such, he gives us a glimpse into an inflection point or 
seam between antebellum science and engineering. 
 
Evans is clearly moving his safety guard into the domain of the scientists, however. In 
sympathy with the scientific point of view, Evans’s rhetorical appeals in the Treatise 
to scientific practical engineers dovetails perfectly with Bache’s observations and 
conclusions - - although Bache is not credited. In fact, Evans’s points agree so well 
with those of Bache that we are tempted to infer that there was some sort of direct 
communication between members of the Committee and Evans.  Evans does quote 
several times from the Journal of the Franklin Institute’s 1836 final report and other 
                                                 
116  However, contradicting himself, Evans included several endorsements in the same document that 
urged the government to mandate his safety guard. Four years later, he petitioned the Treasury 
Department to enforce the pressure principle.  This would have had the effect of making his device the 




subsequent articles--on the pressure principle, for example. Evans gives the usual 
laundry list of factors that are thought to cause explosions (low water, flash theory, 
heat buildup, etc); he criticizes defective devices such as the common safety valve 
and devices using fusible alloy that are exposed to the pressure of steam (he notes 
how pressure renders fusible alloy ineffective); he lists the defects in fusible plates 
and plugs; and he disavows the hydrogen gas explosion theory. Most importantly, like 
Bache, he focuses on heat.  “I came to the conclusion that HEAT is the only effective, 
practicable and sure principle to be adopted as the means of preventing explosions; 
FOR HEAT IS THE CAUSE OF EVERY EXPLOSION… consequently, the plan is 
to use the heat so as to prevent itself from ever exceeding a safe temperature.....  A 
machine based upon this principle, becomes a corrector or guard against all the 
defects of all other kinds of contrivances applied to boilers, intended to effect the 
same object...” (p. 26, emphasis in the original)  
 
A substantial portion of the Treatise treats various criticisms of the safety guard then 
in circulation among the engineers. Here, Evans appeals to scientific authority and 
uses a scientific rhetorical style to defend against the attacks of his critics. His appeals 
to scientific authority are profuse, even to the point of renaming his mechanism an 
“apparatus,” as if to elevate its status to that of a laboratory instrument.  He writes 
that practical engineers and scientists have successfully tested the guard’s alloy fusing 
points on twelve steamers at Pittsburgh (on pages 37-40 he cites the report of the test 
committee, which is composed of “scientific and practical gentlemen” of the city and 




Ohio Mechanics’ Institute John Locke).  He also notes that the Navy Board of 
Examiners has tested and validated the safety guard and the fusible alloy in it, and 
that Professor Henry of Princeton has conducted further successful independent 
experiments: 
 
“Many of the names arrayed in favor of the invention, are illustrious in 
the departments of science, and associated in the annals of the country, 
with the progress of the arts.  These men cannot be deceived—cannot 
easily be mistaken.  With splendid reputations at stake, they would not 
give hasty opinions, founded upon half-tried experiments. It is idle, 
then, to talk of a ‘chemical change’ affecting the certitude of its 
operations, after the apparatus has passed through such hands.” (p. 37) 
 
A final endorsement connects Evans’s name to that of his father, an acknowledged 
authority on the science of steam, as well as the inventor of the high-pressure engine 
and the first practical steam boiler used in Western steamboats. 
 
Using scientific rhetorical technique, Evans provides several proofs of the 
mechanism’s effectiveness through experiment (appending tables as proof) and 
defends against his critics’ charge that the alloy hardens upon reuse (i.e., a casualty of 
the oxidizing/chemical change theory).117  
                                                 




He states the objection (A), and then refutes it (B):  
 
(A) “…the fallacy of a certain objection advanced against the 
apparatus, namely, that ‘the alloy is liable to be oxydized, and that, as 
the oxyde is a bad conductor of heat, it requires a higher temperature to 
fuse the alloy each time it is melted’;  
(B) “…if it were possible to convert the whole of the alloy into an 
oxyde, it could not, owing to the peculiar construction of the apparatus, 
resist or prevent the spindle from turning, and consequently no steam 
whatever could be kept in the boilers.” (p. 32) 
 
Here Evans is referring to the rotating spindle, which presumably would have 
functioned in spite of the oxidation of the alloy. 
 
A large portion of the treatise is devoted to a lengthy endorsement section (pp. 42-
69), which includes favorable reviews of the guard by some practical engineers who 
later rejected the invention.  One such endorsement is signed by forty-three engineers.  
Evans notes that many engineers are not listening to him because they have been 
guinea pigs for “so many fanciful plans and inventions for the… prevention of 
explosions… that they have become rather indisposed to listen even to the 
suggestions of practical men laboring for the best interests of the profession.”  Evans 
urges engineers to “cast aside prejudice” and approach the invention with open 




practical men,” and notes that “the collision of thought, like the clashing of steel, 
frequently produces sparks of light, which spreading, illuminate the minds of 
millions.” 
 
Professor Locke’s observations reinforce the notion that Evans has been persecuted 
by prejudiced engineers. He states that Evans has suffered bitter malignity at the 
hands of the critics; Evans has been attacked in a “tempest of passion,” and been 
forced to quit his occupation.  “His enemies promised a better substitute for his 
invention, they have not developed one.” There is much circumstantial evidence that 
engineers had been sabotaging the safety guards. For example, many endorsements 
state that the guard will work if left free to act. An endorsement from the Pittsburgh 
Daily Chronicle on May 31, 1850 opined:  “The best remedy ever invented to prevent 
explosions is Mr. Evans’ ‘safety-guard.’  We do not mean the ‘safety-guard’ when 
chained down, or plugged up, but as its inventor made it, when left free to act.” 
 
Captain James Atkinson urges “all SENSIBLE men” to receive the invention 
(emphasis in the original).  “People are… beginning to get their eyes opened about 
the matter, especially since the many explosions which have occurred within a very 
short time, and which have been attended with the loss of so many valuable lives.”  
William H. Young, an engineer with the Allegheny City Water Works, acknowledged 
on page 60 that he was one of these:  “I was engineer on the iron steamer Valley 
Forge, about one of the first boats on which the Guard was placed, and at that time 




that very circumstance, led to mark with caution, its operation, and the result was a 
complete dissipation of all doubt as to its value.”  Another wrote that “When Mr. 
Evans first gave his discovery to the public, it was assailed by the strongest 
prejudices, and even he himself was subjected to the ungenerous contumely of the 
very men who should have hailed him as a benefactor.  But it is cheering to observe 
that the storm is beginning to subside, and the merits of his invention becoming 
universally recognized.” 
 
In the final analysis, Evans’s 1850 Treatise stands as a testimony to Evan’s life work 
of trial and error with mechanisms, especially in the context of his developing 
intellect for the scientific point of view.  His pains at exposition were spottily 
rewarded; evidence indicates that the Treatise was warmly received by so-called 
scientific engineers like T. J. Haldeman, but the document produced little effect on 
run-of-the-mill engineers of steamboats.  Nevertheless, Evans moved on to pursue a 






2.4  Evan’s Last Years and General Comments on the 
Development of the Bache-Evans Safety Guard 
 
In 1854 Evans published his last work before his death.  This was the result of his 
experiments on fusible alloy plugs placed within a test boiler (Fig. 26).118  Evans’s 
alloy experiments may have been funded in part by Congress.119  The main intent of 
this work was to prove Bache’s pressure principle, i.e., that fusible alloy not isolated 
from the pressure of steam would fail to function properly.120  In a series of 
experiments, Evans placed fusible alloy plugs in two configurations interior to the 
boiler: one configuration in which the plug was exposed to steam pressure and 
another configuration in which the plug was protected from pressure.  Plugs exposed 
to pressure showed blockages caused by the separating out of constituent parts of the 
alloy; those that were protected from pressure fused and evacuated the plug housing 
perfectly.  The experiments successfully validated the pressure principle. Evans 
illustrated his report liberally with engravings to demonstrate the experimental 
results.    
 
In late January 1854, Evans wrote the government requesting a modification to the 
Act of 1852 to require that any device employing fusible alloy be isolated from the 
                                                 
118 Evans, Cadwallader: A Statement of Experiments upon the Temperature of Steam, the Operations of 
the Common Safety Valve, and upon Government Alloys: with a Description of Newly Invented Safety 
Valves, &c. Pamphlet. 1854. NARA RG 46, Commerce Records, Tray 26, folder 1 of 2, found with his 
1850 Treatise.  
119  See memorial of Cadwallader Evans for “an appropriation to enable him to test his invention to 
prevent the explosion of Steam Boilers &c,” House Ex. Doc. 88, 25 Cong., 3 Sess., January 7, 1839. 




























Figure 26. Evans’s fusible alloy experiments – blocked plug. The fusible plug 
deteriorated when exposed directly to the pressure of steam but would not clear the 
plug housing. This was due to the different melting properties of the tin and lead 
components when exposed to pressure. 
                                                                                                                                          






pressure of steam.  It appears that Evans was seriously ill and that this move might 
have been to protect his business from competition in preparation for his widow 
taking over his factory.  In the next several months, there was much activity by the 
government surrounding Evans’s fusible alloy formulation. The Treasury 
Department’s energetic actions during this period can best be explained as a reaction 
to Evans’s illness and the need to secure the formulation of Evans’s fusible alloy 
before he died. 
 
Evans died in September or October 1854, leaving his widow Jane Evans to continue 
his safety guard business.  Jane Evans knew the business, was technically skilled, and 
continued to supervise the workmen in the manufacture of the safety guards and 
fusible alloy after Evans’s death.121 
 
There are several conclusions we can reach in illuminating the subject of expertise 
during the period of the development of the safety guard.  First, we can see in this 
story that the development process mirrors Sinclair’s remark that science and 
practical engineering were merging during this period.  Scientific investigation was 
empirical in nature while being guided by Bache’s heat theory; invention and 
engineering were moving from practical mechanisms for their own sake toward an  
                                                 
121  Memorial of Jane Evans to the U.S. House of Representatives dated February 21, 1860: “Memorial 
of Jane B. Evans, widow and executrix of Cadwallader Evans, deceased, praying the renewal of a 




alignment with the scientific elites’ theoretical principles.  Second, we can see that 
development of a safety strategy was consciously guided by scientists at the Franklin 
Institute, and that this strategy was supported by the funding and authority of a 
powerful group, the Treasury Department.  Third, from the government’s overall 
development program, a practical safety device - - the safety guard - - emerged as a 
precise means of regulating temperature in the boiler.  The self-acting safety guard 
promised to control the “bad” engineer and assist the “good” engineer and was a 
replacement for the common safety valve, which operated on pressure.   
 
The self-acting feature of the safety guard depended on its “perfection” in accurately 
detecting heat and then activating at the right time.  With fusible alloy, this proved 
difficult as Evans’s hyperbole about the safety guard became tested through 
experience.  As engineers would express later, the safety guard habitually activated at 
too low a temperature.  We will go into more detail about the engineers’ rejection of 
the safety guard in a later chapter, when we discuss the implementation of Act of 
1852 on the western rivers.  At that time, the safety guard became a test of the legal 
aspects of safety and expertise as the Treasury Department moved away from the 
practical engineers’ strictly technical approach to safety.  
 
We turn now to the practical engineers, who would find themselves central actors in 
the development of a new inspection service and steamboat law (the Act of 1852).  




act of 1838.  In the process, they became the first true boiler inspectors.  This was a 
class of experts who had little to do with the development of the safety guard, but 




Table 1. Evolution of Evans’s Safety Guard (second page continues table). 
Idea or 
Invention 






Problems:  Safety valve 
“ceases to deserve the 
name” – due to flash 
theory.    Even opening the 
valve is thought to be 




Lock safety valve open, 
and combine valve with 
fusible alloy plate, 
separated by a cylinder.  
A modified safety valve 
design. 
Valve normally locked open (the reverse of 
usual).  Capt must close safety valve after 
alloy fuses, to get boat underway for repair.  





Alloy in Bache’s invention 
is not reusable.   
Improvement is to 
extend the cylinder and 
close the tube, which 
prevents the metal from 
being lost.  Always ready 
for a new operation.  The 
first safety guard in 
conceptual form. 
 
Plunger DOWN upon melting of alloy.  SG 
serves as an alarm (rapid release of steam) 
on a lever.  Alarm cock “gives notice.” 
Further refinement to 
recover alloy.   
Rotating shaft using 
“mallet” weight.   
Mallet ROTATES about horizontal axis upon 
melting of alloy. Activates alarm.  
“Considerable noise” from small valve.  
 










Further refinement to 
recover alloy.   
Vertical stem.  Weight 
depresses stem upon 
melting of fusible alloy. 
Plunger DOWN upon melting of alloy; heavy 
weight used.  Fork needed to hold up 
weight as alloy resolidifies.  
 
Opens small alarm valve, “engineers 






Another basic SG idea to 
recover alloy.   
 
Alloy acts as an accurate 
thermometer because it is 
in contact with the flue.   
Vertical stem, weight on 
lever pulls up stem, 
rings bell. 
Plunger UP upon melting of alloy. 
 
Activates bell alarm.  
 
Used as fixture to do experiments on 






Further refinement to 
Evans’s other safety guard 
ideas. 
Floats, plunger safety 
guard; anti-careening 
jig; passenger salon 
water gauge (tube) 
Combination float, plunger type safety 










Final version. Safety guard 
now made “perfect.” 
Vertical, rotating stem 
with impeller.   
Stem ROTATES about vertical axis upon 
melting of alloy.  Chain-wound reset.  
















Evans Patent 1122, dtd 4-15-1839m, 
reissued 11-23-1852.  (See 1855 4-10 
and 1853 1) Drawings lost, found 
during research.  
Isolated from steam, contact 
with the flue is secondary 
consideration.. 
 
Doc 162 (3/1/1836) and Committee’s 







Evans’s Patent 8185X, 5/1832.Isolated from steam but not 






Evans’s Patent 8185X, 5/1832.Isolated from steam but not 





Evans’s article to Committee on 
Boiler Explosions, JFI, 1832 
 
 
Isolated from steam, but not 










Bache’s article, JFI April 1831Alloy is not isolated from 
steam.  Alloy is with safety 





Isolated from steam, 






CHAPTER 3.  THE TRANSITION PERIOD  
1838-1852: PRELUDE TO THE STEAMBOAT ACT  
OF 1852 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The Practical Engineers React to the Act of 1838 
 
We have discussed the government’s approach to safety through its scientific and 
practical experts - - Bache and his Franklin Institute Committee on explosions, and 
Evans with his prototype “improved” safety guard.  Now we turn to another important 
group of experts, the practical engineers aboard steamboats, from whose ranks came 
the first bona fide steamboat boiler inspectors after passage of the Steamboat Safety 
Act of 1852.  This chapter will cover the crucial 1838-1852 period, a formative period 
for the practical engineers as they coalesced into labor associations and began to 
shape the character of the soon-to-emerge Steam Boat Inspection Service.  It was 
during this period that the “lame” Steamboat Safety Act of 1838 came under attack by 
the practical engineers, exposing its administrative and legal defects.  The practical 
engineers exploited these defects to remake their industry in the image of their own 
trade associations by (1) serving as technical consultants in revising the Act, (2) 
promoting the best technical experts among their ranks to serve as future steamboat 
boiler inspectors, (3) pushing for the examination and licensing of engineers in 
accordance with the technical and moral standards of the associations, and (4) the 




this was done under the auspices of a powerful government-scientist-industry alliance 
to set up a better administrative organization than the decentralized and ineffectual 
inspection service of 1838.122 
 
Historians have underestimated the depth of feeling of the western practical engineers 
in their struggle to overturn the 1838 Act.  These feelings arose as inferior engineers 
began to infiltrate the steamboat trade by the late twenties, taking jobs away from 
qualified men.  More significant for the final makeup of the associations, even some 
of the newcomers aspired to professionalism and joined with senior engineers to keep 
out new entrants to the profession.  The fact that this amalgamated bloc of practical 
engineers successfully maneuvered into position by 1852 to displace inferior 
engineers and inspectors operating under that act by 1838 indicates that the practical 
engineers were not a group to be trifled with—they had ambition, organization, 
power, and numbers.  As early as the mid-1840s, influential members within their 
ranks had formed a powerful alliance with steamboat owners, Whigs in Congress, the 
Treasury Department, and the Franklin Institute.  Each of these groups perceived the 
accidents as stemming from a crisis in qualified engineering manpower and a 
dysfunctional inspectorate.123 
                                                 
122  Congress invited the participation of steamboatmen in influencing steamboat regulation.  See 
Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 525.  Inclusion of the steamboat industry in the alliance pushing for a 
radical revision to the Act must be qualified.  Atlantic seaboard steamboat interests actively opposed 
the initiative, citing fewer accidents there, whereas western cities’ boards of trade, in concert with 
much exertion by the engineers’ associations, led the way to reform.  See Hunter, ibid., pp. 529-530. 
123  Two men who carried the engineers’ message to reform the act of 1838 to Congress were T. J. 
Haldeman and W. W. Guthrie.  Both were accomplished practical engineers who had ties with the 
Franklin Institute for decades before 1852, served as inspectors under the Treasury Department after 




In light of new information on the engineers’ motives and power on the western 
rivers, therefore, Burke’s theme that the government regulation of steamboats was 
brought about by a general technological innovation (steam technology) requires 
revision.  From the practical engineers’ point of view, it was the flooding into the 
labor market of ill-trained men to run steamboats that motivated the reinvention of the 
inspectorate by 1852.  Victorian religious attitudes toward improving the moral 
qualities of workmen were another powerful motivation for regulation, and this 
societal movement is intimately associated with the notion of the “good” engineer.  
Burke’s steam technology aside, it was the engineers’ movement that shaped the true 
character of regulatory reform of the steamboat community.  Thus, notwithstanding 
the form of technology, it is highly likely that the push of the artisanal classes toward 
professionalization of the mechanical arts would have occurred during the period of 
the 1840s-1850s at any rate.124 
 
This chapter will provide background information concerning the steamboat practical 
engineers’ professional motivations, their scope of expertise, and their relationship to 
scientific and government institutions during this period.  These facts will set the 
stage for understanding the engineers’ later rejection of Evans’s safety guard and the 
                                                 
124  President Van Buren wrote in 1839: "There is a power of public opinion in this country…which 
will not tolerate an incompetent or unworthy man to hold in his weak or wicked hands the lives and 
fortunes of his fellow-citizens."  President Van Buren’s Message to Congress, January 19, 1839, in 
Sen. Doc. 66, 25 Cong., 3 Sess. Similarly, the moral weakness of the dissipated or incompetent 
engineer was seen by industry reformers as the underlying reason for steamboat accidents and hence 
the main reason reform was necessary.  Calvert noted that in the 1840s, “Temperance, morality, and 
cleanliness were advocated as means of raising the mechanic’s lot, indicating a possible relationship 
with the reform movements abroad in society.” From Calvert, Monte A.: The Mechanical Engineer in 




turmoil that disrupted relations between inspectors and high government officials in 
the Treasury Department. 
 
Placement of Western Steamboat Engineers within Steam Society; the “Lame” 
Act of 1838 
 
Through Calvert (1967), we can trace modern mechanical engineers to the practical 
engineers of the antebellum period.  These “gentlemen engineers” worked in 
industrial machine shops situated in the eastern United States.  The shops had their 
origins in the establishments that made weaving machinery for the textile mills of 
New England.  The shop engineers were skilled craftsmen and designers of the 
privileged class who built steam machinery for mills, steamboats, steamships, and 
locomotives.  In addition to mechanical skill with sophisticated machine tools and 
factory processes, their expertise included familiarity with theoretical subjects such as 
mathematics, chemistry (including heat theory), metallurgy, natural philosophy 
(physics), and the latest textbooks and journals of American and European scientists. 
 
Between the years 1803-1813, the earliest steamboat owners on the western rivers 
ordered their engines and boilers from these eastern machine shops, the equipment 
being shipped overland or by sea to the ports of the western rivers.  Soon, the 
practical engineers from these shops migrated to the near-western and far-western 
frontiers bisected by the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers to serve the burgeoning 




factories in three main steamboat construction centers: Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and 
Louisville.  It was from these shops, and other minor ones, that the practical engineer 
emerged to install and run boilers and engines on the hundreds of steamboats that 
were beginning to ply the western rivers.125 
 
Within steam society, steamboat engineers belonged to “shop culture,” defined by 
Calvert as “the orientation, institutions, and traditions of the nineteenth-century 
machine shop.”  Calvert describes the shops as “experimental laboratories in which 
mechanics developed and perfected industrial and mechanical processes and 
equipment.”  Wealthy and connected industrialists placed their sons in these 
establishments, where they could partake of an intellectual challenge without 
becoming entrapped in mass manufacturing.  Thus, the machine shops provided “a 
gentleman’s occupation within an ungentlemanly industrial world.”  The practical 
engineer’s inclination to improve his mind put him in stark contrast to the capricious 
and itinerant “engine-drivers” who began to infiltrate the steamboat industry in the 
1820s from land establishments such as cotton, sugar, and lumber mills. These men 
had no connection to shop culture.  As Calvert stated, “All were involved with the 
more or less isolated job of tending one engine, which precluded their coming into 
contact with a large variety of mechanical problems.”  They had little inclination to 
improve their skills and knowledge and thus were little more than engine tenders who 
underappreciated the dangers of the trade.126 
                                                 
125  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), Ch. 3. 
126  Calvert (1967), p. 12. The nature of the shops as innovative centers is covered in pp. 6-8. Both 





As we have seen in Cadwallader Evans’s definition of the “good engineer,” shop 
culture also embraced certain Whiggish personality traits.  The gentlemanly qualities 
of temperance, morality, and a calm and steady demeanor were esteemed in the 
steamboat engineer, and like his shop counterpart, such qualities were expected to 
accompany the engineer’s technical mastery of his machinery. The gentlemen-
engineers observed that few engine-drivers possessed these qualities. Selecting for all 
of these traits two decades later would be the main task of the practical engineers in 
the role of local inspectors.127 
 
A Case of Mistaken Identity: The “Good” Engineer versus the Quack 
 
The good engineer considered the bad engineer a danger to himself, his colleagues, 
and the public. Worse still - - according to practical engineers - - the bad engineer had 
become predominant in the engine rooms of steamboats, invading the industry to such  
                                                                                                                                           
Some of the “shop aristocracy” valued a good education for their sons to such a degree that they 
eschewed American shops in favor of European ones, which they thought superior.  Local Inspector 
Thomas J. Haldeman and others habitually noted that not one in ten or twenty engine-drivers knew 
how to make a calculation of a safety valve. 
127  “Many of them are of dissolute habits, with no application, nor inclination to improve their minds, 
being satisfied with the name of Engineer, and in putting in the time .....  moral culture has been 
thrown aside; when one of them is asked if he has read anything on the subject of steam he will reply 
“No! That he has not time,” when he spends at least 3 months in the year unemployed, and ¼ of his 
time while on the boat in idleness; and it is not uncommon to hear them say, that they “are not afraid to 
carry 200 lb pressure in the boilers.” (See 1853 12-15).  The writer, W.W. Guthrie, had been “engaged 
in the manufacture of steam engines and in the capacity of engineer of steam boats for the past 20 
years.” At the time of writing, he was a local inspector of steamboats. Supervising Inspector and Whig 
Benjamin Crawford informed the press in 1853 that the purpose of the Act of 1852 was to reform 




a degree that no distinctions were being made as to the quality of personnel. Practical 
engineer W.W.  Guthrie wrote in 1853 that he had witnessed “good careful steady 
men, with long experience as engineers, hurried into eternity” by explosions caused 
by incompetent colleagues.  He provided the details of how technological changes in 
steamboat design had brought this about: 
 
“The introduction of double engine boats on our western Rivers 
created a demand for Engineers which did not exist before; this 
demand was supplied by taking young men, mostly from that class 
without education or mechanical skill, who in a few months or years 
took the place of their tutors, having no other recommendation than 
that of going for less wages, and assuming the skill in running the 
boat faster than others, which they no doubt accomplished through 
their ignorance & recklessness. They have finally succeeded in 
controlling this important business, many of them are not able to 
write, not one in 20 can weigh steam by the common safety valve & 
lever, and but few of them understands the principle upon which the 
lever is governed.128 
 
In a case of Gresham’s law as applied to expertise, these inferior engineers had driven 
out the good engineers: 
 
                                                 




“This is the class of men, who has for the last 20 years, gradually 
superceded [sic] others better qualified, in the management of our 
Engines and Boilers. . . Large numbers of the regular mechanics 
retired to the workshops, and to other employment in preference to 
remaining in a business that was no longer profitable, nor at all 
worthy; others remained in the business but were compelled to 
pursue a course contrary to their best judgment in order to keep their 
employment.”  [Ibid.] 
 
The tendency to blame all engineers, good as well as bad, for steam boiler accidents, 
served as the primary impetus for involvement of engineers in the reform of the Act 
of 1838. The bad engineer impugned the practical engineer’s technical skills and 
character, and he poignantly felt the rejection of the public, government officials, 
scientists, and the press, many of whom did not understand that there were varying 
degrees of expertise among engineers. Marginalized practical engineers lamented that 
“the existing state of affairs is causing a prejudice to exist in the minds of the public 
against the whole community of engineers.”129  Customs Collector G. J. Floyd 
testified to Congress in 1838, for example, that “to the engineer may be traced all the 
accidents I have ever known.” Another noted that engineers of land boilers were 
sober men whereas steamboat engineers generally were not, hence the increased 
incidence of accidents. Even scientist James Renwick indicated that in his 
                                                 




investigations, “all have been caused by ignorance, culpable negligence, or 
foolhardiness” on the part of the engineer in charge.130 
 
Captain Haldeman stated a more favorable view toward engineers in general but one 
that nevertheless revealed existing popular views of engineers, “…many persons not 
acquainted on our rivers, would suppose that our engineers are generally a dairing 
[sic], worthless, wreckless [sic] and intemperate set of men who would scarcely place 
more value on the life of a man than that of a spider, and that they are gathered up by 
taking halfway blacksmiths, runaway apprentices and handy carpenters and that 
engineers are made daily in this way.”131 
 
Identification of the “six-month” engineer with the “quack” doctor was common 
among practical engineers in the 1830s-1840s, and this comparison carried forth into 
inventor Cadwallader Evans’s later thinking and writings. Engineers with the 
Cincinnati Association of Steamboat Engineers wrote that “the public will be 
compelled to intrust their lives in the hands of young and inexperienced practitioners, 
unless the intervention of Government soon puts an end to this system of frauds and 
quackery, now so extensively practised in the Western country.....  the quack doctor 
can only destroy one life at a time, whilst the quack engineer may destroy, perhaps, 
hundreds at a blow, and that too without a moment’s warning; and yet the physician is 
compelled to go through a regular course of collegiate exercises before he is 
permitted to practise, while any man may practise as an engineer with no more 
                                                 
130  Floyd: H. Ex. Doc. 21, beginning on p. 291; steamboat engineers not sober, beginning on p. 221; 




knowledge of the business than may be acquired in six months’ time.  This state of 
affairs causes a prejudice to exist in the minds of the public against the whole 
community of engineers.” Haldeman echoed the same sentiment in making a case for 
the examination of engineers: “…many physicians and lawyers may carry a diploma 
in their pockets and never be able scarcely to make a living at the practice, owing to 
their want of practical knowledge, which they are not susceptible of receiving, and 
just so with engineers—there is no law in any country that requires the examination 
of engineers, yet I would not oppose such a course here as I think it would be a kind 
of stimulant to young men to seek for information in the science of Engineering, 
about which so many know but little at present.”132  
 
The economic and hierarchical labor structure of the trade favored the employment of 
the quacks. The practical engineers criticized newly commissioned steamboat 
captains for sustaining inept engineers in their positions and attempting to instruct 
them in the art of engineering. It was claimed that such captains had obtained their 
positions by buying them for the price of a few hundred dollars, and that usually in 
such instances their skills in managing a steamboat were poor.  They taught the 
inexperienced engineers to keep the water level low in their boilers; as a result, when 
the safety valve blew, the captains urged the engineers to weigh it down so as not to 
waste the steam, but rather to work it through the engine, “and the engineer, not being 
any wiser than the captain on the subject, (and neither of them knowing the amount of 
                                                                                                                                           
131  See Haldeman to Senator John Davis, 1852 5-1. 
132  Quack engineers: from A supplement to the petition of the practical steam engineers and others of 
the City of Cincinnati, to the Congress of the United States, H. Ex. Doc. 145, February 13, 1843, p. 7; 




steam they carry in the boilers,) suffers the captain thus to direct him, until, between 
the captain and the other ‘engineer,’ they blow the boiler out of the boat, and perhaps 
hundreds of persons into eternity.” When an experienced practical engineer took 
employment under such a captain, he had to suffer the guidance of the “directing 
engineer” (the captain), or find a more suitable job ashore.133 
 
Expertise akin to that of a doctor required a good grounding in practice as well as 
extensive training.  In addition, some persons had been born with the needed 
analytical skills for such trades and others had not. The former provided a high degree 
of flexibility of thought and the ability to adapt to new conditions through 
understanding and experience.  But with the advent of high-pressure steam engines 
and their refinements, an engine-driver could put on a good show, but would fail 
when his superficial knowledge confronted real-world problems on the rivers.  Engine 
design had been simplified so that any man of common sense could learn to start and 
stop an engine in a remarkably short time, and to pass a supply of water from the 
pumps to the boilers.  Everything would go according to plan so long as the engine 
and pumps remained in perfectly good order, which they did not.  The engineer must 
be “capable and ready, in every exigency, to counteract all difficulties that may 
unexpectedly occur on the trip from port to port.”  Engine-drivers “had perhaps been 
underassistants to a principal engineer on a large boat, or had gained limited 
experience running an ordinary grist or saw mill engine, or occupied a position as a 
tanner, grinding bark by means of a steam engine that he had started and stopped a 
                                                 




few times.”  They could gain employment on a boat by exaggerating these instances 
of superficial expertise:  “By telling a fine story… the most incompetent men are 
often found in the most responsible situations.”  The self-styled engineers were also a 
direct economic threat:  “Such men are very often found in full charge of a steamboat 
engine for the only reason that their services may be had for a trifling sum less per 
month than men of well known experience would require.”  Such complaints testified 
to the nexus of frustration the qualified engineers felt toward the engine-drivers, and 
this frustration motivated them to mobilize their trade associations to reform the 
steamboat law.134 
 
The Engineers’ Antipathy toward the Steamboat Safety Act of 1838; the 
Formation of the Engineers’ Associations 
 
The practical engineers had suffered from competition by inferior engineers since the 
early 1820s.  By the early 1840s, they believed insult had been added to injury when 
the confusion between the two classes of engineers was made official and codified in 
the Steamboat Safety Act of 1838.  The Act was a stopgap law that lumped all 
steamboat mechanics into one class and held all engineers legally responsible for 
boiler explosions.  For the engineers, the main objections to the 1838 law were that 
(1) it did not provide for the licensing and grading of engineers (to establish a 
distinction between skill levels), and (2) it unfairly singled out engineers as the 
                                                 




legally responsible party in cases of steam boiler accidents (i.e., accidents as prima 
facie evidence of neglect, carrying a penalty of up to ten years at hard labor).135 
The prima facie guilt clause within the Act can be found in Sections 12 and 13: 
“Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on board of 
any steamboat or vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam, by 
whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his or their respective 
duties, the life or lives of any person or persons on board said vessel 
may be destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and, upon 
conviction thereof before any circuit court in the United States, shall be 
sentenced to confinement at hard labor for a period not more than ten 
years.”136  
 
                                                 
135  The grading scheme eventually decided upon consisted of first, second, and at the low end, third-
class engineers or “Strykers” (engine tenders and oilers).  Strykers were usually young assistants 
(boys) or negroes who were not given much responsibility under the new scheme, but who previously 
had been employed by Captains, before the Act of 1852 (and to some extent afterward, to the protests 
of the practical engineers), as the sole engine-drivers because their wages were low.  The formal 
grading scheme of engineers evolved out of the types that were differentiated before the Act was 
passed. This is murky, but with Calvert and Hunter as sources, as well as a note from Haldeman and 
other NARA letters, we can infer an educated guess as to the various gradations of engineers.  These 
consisted of (1) experienced and educated practical engineers from the shop tradition; (2) ambitious 
engine drivers who showed intelligence and conscientiousness to apprentice under the experienced 
men, and whom Haldeman acknowledged could be allowed to attain the rank of practical engineer; (3) 
rank and file engineers who joined the engineers’ associations but who had little inclination to read the 
works of science or advance in knowledge; (4) other rank and file engine-drivers and strykers of 
dubious quality and experience.  How the above classes correlated to the later grades is unclear, but we 
may surmise that the experienced practical engineers and aspiring apprentices (once qualified) made up 
the First Engineers. These were supervisory engineers in charge aboard steamboats, and were the 
persons usually considered responsible in cases of accidents. Second Engineers actually monitored the 
operation and safety of the boilers under supervision of the First Engineers. These were rank-and-file 
engineers. Third engineers and strykers performed routine maintenance and lesser tasks.  It is inferred 
that opposition to the safety guard was strongest among the less educated engineers, but eventually it 
appears that most if not all grades of engineers engaged in sabotage, or acquiesced in it with the 
collusion of some local inspectors.  Further research is needed, but because sabotage was unlawful, 
only circumstantial evidence is available.  Some of this evidence will be presented in the next chapter.  
136  Section 12, “An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels 




“And be it further enacted, That in all suits and actions against 
proprietors of steamboats, for injuries arising to person or property 
from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat, or the collapse of a 
flue, or other injurious escape of steam, the fact of such bursting, 
collapse, or injurious escape of steam, shall be taken as full prima facie 
evidence, sufficient to charge the defendant or those in his 
employment, with negligence, until he shall show that no negligence 
has been committed by him or those in his employment.”137 
 
The practical engineers vociferously objected to the prima facie provision because 
they believed it violated fundamental rights due any citizen.  These rights were 
enumerated in the fifth and sixth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, “which 
articles guaranty to all persons under criminal prosecution the right of a speedy and 
impartial trial by jury, to be informed of the accusation, and be confronted with the 
witnesses against him or them, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.”  These were 
educated men from shop culture who possessed a sort of nationalistic pride based on 
Constitutional precepts.  For them, the startling implication of the flawed provision 
was that it in effect preclassified the engineers as criminals.  In this sense, the clause 
struck at the core political values of the engineers. They wrote:  “Why so large a class 
of industrious and enterprising citizens should be denied a privilege granted to the 
                                                 




greatest criminal—via, that of being deemed innocent until proved guilty—we are at 
a loss to conjecture.”138 
 
The Act suffered in reputation also because the men installed as the first steamboat 
boiler inspectors were considered incompetent and venal. Professor of Chemistry B.  
Silliman at Yale College wrote in 1838 that the compensation of the inspectors was 
too low, and that such trivial compensation would lead to inspectors “being bought” 
by powerful steamboat companies.  This outcome is verified by later commentators, 
who noted that the old inspectors “never gave [steamboat owners] any trouble,” and 
that the steamboat companies had succeeded in removing the good inspectors.139 
 
Administratively, these early inspectors were semiautonomous, appointed by federal 
District Court judges, and not supervised by a board of inspectors.  As a result, the 
Customs Service, focused as it was on its traditional role of collecting tariffs and 
regulating smuggling, seemed ambivalent as to results.  Inspections were poorly 
performed and were not adequately monitored. Although the more conscientious 
inspectors actually stepped inside boilers to do their inspections, most did a cursory 
and inadequate job.  Some stayed away from the wharves entirely and collected their 
fees. The hydrostatic test, an important strength of materials test borrowed from 
France and advocated strongly by the engineers’ associations, was uniformly ignored. 
Denault (1999) wrote, “By 1848, it was clear that the [safety act of 1838] created an 
                                                 




environment where unqualified inspectors obtained their positions through political 
favoritism and patronage. These inspectors regarded the position as a lifetime office 
and failed even to inspect boilers.  This was pervasive enough for one writer to 
suggest that boiler inspections be conducted in the presence of two witnesses.”140 
 
By the early 1840s, finding themselves driven from their boats by unqualified men 
and in the clutches of a punitive law, the practical engineers began forming trade 
associations (steamboat engineers’ associations) as a means of banding together to 
show the public and Congress the “true character of western engineers.”  A cross 
between labor unions and artisanal guilds (e.g., mechanics’ institutes and lyceums), 
the associations’ main political function was to begin pushing licensing laws.  The 
character ideal of the good engineer was in keeping with that of the engineers’ own 
associations; when performing their duties aboard steamboats, members were 
expected to exhibit a sober disposition, calm demeanor, high moral character, and 
knowledge and skill in the properties of steam.141  
 
The details of the formation of the engineers’ associations shed light on how the 
association engineers viewed themselves.  According to Cincinnati practical 
                                                                                                                                           
139  Venal inspectors, Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 534; B. Silliman, H. Ex. Doc. 21, April 1838, p. 
386; old inspectors gave no trouble, 1852 11-19; removal of good inspectors, 1852 9-18, “we hope the 
inspectors appointed under the new [1852] law will be as sacred men.” 
140  The hydrostatic test was a borrowing from the French used in the proof testing of cannon. In the 
test, the inspector pumped water under pressure into the boiler to about a third over the rated pressure 
to detect weaknesses in the joints of plates or to reveal other structural weaknesses in boiler shell or 
flue.  After 1852, we see frequent records noting inspectors carrying portable hydrostatic test pumps 
about with them at the wharves while performing their inspection duties.  See 1852 5-3, 1852 11-1, 
1853 4-12, 1853 6-3, 1853 7-8. also see Denault, 1993, pp. 162-163. 




engineers, their own members formed the first such association (Fig. 27 and 28). 
Engineers followed this example in other large western cities “having the same object 
in view,” which was to resurrect the tarnished image of western practical engineers.  
To achieve this, the associations aspired to conduct experimental scientific research 
of their own, putting them more on a par with scientists. They also wished to procure 
their own scientific apparatus so that young engineers could make their own 
experiments and gain a hands-on education that they would not ordinarily acquire. 
The association engineers admitted, however, that they did not have sufficient 
resources to finance such initiatives, and so they solicited funds from the federal 
government.  Further, they admitted that their members were not sufficiently 
educated to understand the higher aspects of the science of steam. This was not 
because they did not have access to science books, but because the texts they did 
possess were “written in such unintelligible language as to require of the reader a 
more than ordinary education to enable him to comprehend the meaning of the terms 
used by the authors.”  They attempted to bridge this gap by holding regular lectures 
and discussions in the engine-building shops where expertise was congregated. In the 
larger cities, they joined lyceums so they could be exposed to lectures provided by 
scientists.142 
 
                                                 



















3.2  Improving the Steamboat Law 
 
Reforming the Act of 1838 
 
How did the members of the associations plan to overturn the Act of 1838?  The 
move to modify the Act should be viewed as an action to restore the profession of 
practical engineering to its former high status before the influx of the untrained men.  
Thus, the examination and licensing of engineers was the first order of business.  The 
inspection of machinery and the incorporation of safety devices, while important, 
were of secondary strategic importance in the lobbying effort.  This was because 
trained engineers and qualified inspectors, unlike the engine-drivers, would 
presumably maintain all the mechanical components in proper working order. As far 
as safety devices went - - beyond the more traditional methods such as water gauge, 
steam gauge, and safety valve - - only the hydrostatic proof test of boilers was 
deemed useful and desirable.  All other inventions (labeled “gimcrack” and 
“humbug” by most practical engineers) were condemned as superfluous or even 
dangerous (Fig. 29).143  
 
Formal examination and licensing were to be done in accordance with the engineers’ 
associations’ own standards and personal codes of conduct.  For example, the  
                                                 
143  Technical inertia is the best explanation for the practical engineers’ preference for traditional 
monitoring devices.  According to Denault (1999), steamboat technology, generally, had frozen by 
about 1850. Practical engineer T.J. Haldeman was an exception to most engineers in this regard.  He 
cited the efficacy of several new inventions such as Evans’s safety guard, Borden’s mercurial gauge, 







Figure 29. Engineers’ standard suite of boiler safety apparatus and techniques. First, a 
qualified, sober engineer, water gauges, trycocks, mercury nanometers for measuring 




Cincinnati engineers noted that national law should base qualifications of engineers 
on the form specified by their association.  The form consisted of a written set of 
rules published by the association, which were provided to Congress.  Examinations 
embraced moral qualities of the applicant, as well as basic technical and scientific 
knowledge and the subject’s familiarity with the operation of traditional safety 
equipment. There must be a complete understanding of the workings and calculations 
of the safety valve, the ability to design a hydrostatic test based on the calculated 
strength of the boiler shell, and a thorough knowledge of boiler construction.  
Mathematics and geometry would constitute necessary skills in all calculations.  
Licensing of engineers would be performed by an acting board of engineers governed 
by a constitution or bylaws of a recognized practical engineers’ association in each 
port of entry in the Union.  In remote places, a chief engineer in residence would be 
chosen; he would have at least six years of practical experience as an engineer, and 
would be required to “give satisfactory evidence that he possesses sufficient energy of 
character, good morals, and proper attention to his duties.”144 
 
The engineers emphasized the reform or removal of “dissipate,” unskilled, or 
uncaring engineers in upgrading the Act.  Material aspects of safety such as those 
emphasized by Bache, Evans, and the government’s research establishment, while 
important to a select few practical engineers, were seen as secondary to personnel 
                                                 
144  H. Ex. Doc. 145, 1843, pp. 18-20. Examinations were a matter of paramount importance to the 
practical engineers.  The Cincinnati engineers wrote, “so long as Government refuses to interfere and 
enforce the qualifications of engineers, just so long must the public trust their lives in the hands of 
quack engineers, possessing no more knowledge of the business than any schoolboy may be taught in a 
few lessons.”  H. Ex. Doc. 145, ibid., p. 14. The Cincinnati rules for engineers’ qualifications were 
provided to Congress but do not survive. The NARA correspondence shows that after 1852 the 




examination and licensing. As one practical engineer wrote Congress in 1838, 
“Engineers are the inventions that your committee should test… the fault is not in the 
boilers, but in men calling themselves engineers.”145  This emphasis on licensing is 
confirmed by Calvert:  “The associations and organizations created by these groups 
sought to get license laws with such vigor that no other type of professional activity 
was pursued.” (Table 2). 
 
Thus, from the engineers’ perspective, the failure of the Act of 1838 was not a failure 
of regulation of an entire industry so much as a failure to regulate a single profession.  
Historians have tended to portray the act in the former light. For instance, Hunter 
noted that “by all evidence the law failed and failed badly,” and by this he meant the 
failure of the government to reform safety practices (Hunter, pp. 533-535).  Burke 
wrote of the disappointment in the law by the “informed public” (i.e., chambers of 
commerce, boards of trade, bodies of engineers, and other interested persons), citing 
the need for corrective legislation and agreeing with Hunter that “experience proved 
that the 1838 law was not preventing explosions or loss of life.”146 Although these 
portrayals are true in a “macro” sense, the accident rate was to a large extent a 
                                                                                                                                           
District) to follow the law and conduct proper examinations of engineers. See 1853 1-1, 1854 5-1, and 
1854 5-24.   
145 H. Ex. Doc. 21, p. 398. 
146  Burke (1966), p. 17. Denault’s relatively recent statistical study of steamboat explosions (1999) 
shows that there was a gradual and steady improvement in the accident rate over a long period due to 
government-guided boiler design and construction improvements (refer to Figure 8). Nevertheless, 
there has been an erroneous impression created by contemporaries and historians alike that the act of 
1838 did not alleviate explosions as expected, and that this ineffectual government regulation was 
corrected by the Act of 1852. This view continues to be propagated. See, for example, Jonathan Rees’s 
article in the journal Technology & Culture, in which he concludes, “Finally, in 1852, Congress passed 
the nation’s first substantive regulation of a technological practice. The death toll on the nation’s rivers 






• Can you find the area of a circle, a cylinder, or of a safety valve, the diameter being 
given? 
• By what process do you determine the pressure in a boiler? 
• What do you understand by the pressure of the atmosphere? What height of a 
column of mercury will equal the atmosphere? What of water? Does this ever vary? 
• What do you understand by a horse power? How do you determine it, the dimensions 
of an engine and diameter being given? 
• What do you understand by using steam expansively? What gain would there be in 
using steam cut off at half of the stroke, over using it through the whole stroke? By 
what rule? 
• How do you find the cubical contents of a globe or ball? 
• What do you understand by the term latent heat? What by specific, and what by 
special? 
• What is the temperature of water at the boiling point in the open atmosphere? Does 
pressure have any influence upon the boiling point? Can the height of a mountain be 
determined by the point at which water boils? Why is it? 
• What general views have you in explanation of the causes of explosions of steam 
boilers? 
• What would you do first on discovering that water was low in the boilers, and a 
probability that the interior had become greatly heated? What would be your first step 
on discovering that water was getting low in the boilers? 
• What measures should be adopted to insure perfect safety on making a landing and 
leaving it? Is one time more common than another for boilers to explode? What is the 
probable cause? 
• What is the probable condition of the surface of the water in a boiler while steam is 
generating, but before any escape or surcharge has taken place? What is the effect, 
upon a discharge? 
• What are the component parts of water? Of air? What is the explanation of 
combustion? Why is air necessary? 
• What is the principal cause of foaming? 
• Have you any general ideas of the truth or falsity of explosions through the agency of 
gas? What are they? What is the gas? How is it exploded? What is produced as a 
result of it? 
• Have you any general ideas of the course you should pursue if exposed to a violent 
storm upon the lakes? Suppose a derangement of your pumps, crank pin or other 
machinery, or in case of fire? In such peril, how far should the officers of the boat 
control your actions? 
• At what temperature has iron its greatest tenacity? What will a bar of iron one inch 
square sustain before being pulled asunder? What will copper? 
• What temperature is a red heat by twilight? What by daylight? 
• How do you estimate the strength of a boiler? Suppose, for example, a boiler 
perfectly cylindrical 42 inches in diameter with two sixteen inch flues: show the mode 
of calculating. 
• What is the weight of a cubic foot of water? Of wood? Oak, pine, and of cork? What 
is the ratio of the weight of mercury compared with water? What is that of air? 
• What are your habits in reference to the use of intoxicating liquors? 
Table 2. Partial list of questions proposed in the inspection of engineers, 




subsidiary concern of practical engineers.  They believed that by emphasizing reform 
of the engineering corps, a reduction of the accident rate would naturally occur.  But 
even had the steamboating community perceived a decline in accidents after 1838, the 
engineers still would have found certain provisions of the law odious and would have 
worked strenuously to overturn them.  This is primarily because the act as written 
could never have imposed the type of organizational framework that affixed the 
engineers within the topmost sphere of power and decision-making, as final technical 
arbiters of the technology within the industry—a position they believed they deserved 
by virtue of their expertise as applied scientists.  These men saw themselves as the 
inventors of the steamboat power plant, and as the innovators who brought it to 
perfection.  Out of their shops arose the technology—and out of their shops also 
would come the practical expertise that would provide the solutions to its dangers.  
This professional pride goes far to explain how conflict could arise when the Treasury 
Department later tried to move the findings of theoretical science into the engine 
rooms of boats. It also provides the sharp demarcation perceived by the engineers 
between theoretical scientists and applied scientists.  Each to his own realm; the two 
professions could participate in a sort of symbiosis of expertise, but science in 
practical application was the exclusive province of the practical engineers.  
Interference by scientists, inventors, and bureaucrats in the area of actual practical use 





The Commerce Committee Drafts the Replacement Steamboat Safety  
Act of 1852 
 
As the Act of 1838 revealed itself as an unpopular failure, the engineers’ associations 
began to lobby Congress in Washington for passage of their major points: the 
licensing of engineers, the removal of the prima facie “blame” clause, and the 
replacement of political appointees or local favorites with inspectors who were 
experts appointed from the engineers’ own ranks.  As Hunter wrote, “Western 
steamboat engineers were particularly active in criticism of the act of 1838 and in 
demanding a more thoroughgoing law.  When the bill of 1852 was under 
consideration steamboatmen met in the various river cities for discussion of its 
provisions, made criticisms, proposed modifications, and sent not only memorials but 
delegates to Washington to confer with those in charge of the bill.147  Delegates to 
Washington included two future supervising inspectors whom we shall meet in the 
next chapter.  These were engineer-inventors Alfred Guthrie (1805-1882) of Chicago, 
and Benjamin Crawford (1809?-1873) of Pittsburgh.  Both were presidents of their 
respective steamboat engineers’ associations.  Guthrie had spent decades 
investigating boiler accidents at his own expense; he frequently went aboard 
steamboats disguised as a common traveler, making inquiries of the engineer about 
his practices.  Crawford was a foundryman and inventor of steam and farm machinery 
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  Crawford’s particular gift was his administrative 
talent for organization.  He would go on to write most of the safety rules for 
                                                 




steamboats via his membership on various committees of the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors.  Another influential practical engineer who corresponded with the steam 
safety committee was practical engineer and steamboat captain Thomas J. Haldeman.  
Like Guthrie, Haldeman spent decades investigating boiler accidents on his own, and 
was a contributor to the Journal of the Franklin Institute on steamboat safety 
practices in the 1830s. He would go on to serve as a local inspector of boilers and 
machinery. He was particularly anxious to overhaul the Act of 1838, writing to 
Senator John Davis in May 1852, “We are all here in the West, take much interest in 
this Bill of yours, as we do not want to have saddled upon us such another useless law 
as passed in 1838, which has been a constant tax without the first particle of benefit, 
and we have been trying for years to get it repealed.”148 
 
When it was finished, the act of 1852 would turn out to be a long and elaborate 
document of 43 sections.149  Its emergence coincided with an unusual convergence of 
disasters during the years 1847-1852 - - explosions, fires, and collisions.150  Being a 
government enterprise attempting to merge political and legal contending interests, 
                                                 
148  T.J. Haldeman to Senator John Davis (1787-1854), chairman of the Steam Safety Committee, U.S. 
Congress, 1852 5-1.  The practical experts did not always agree amongst themselves. Guthrie had 
developed his own invention—a device with floats and alarms connected to indicators that displayed 
“water getting low,” “dangerous steam,” and other warnings when attention was needed to fix a 
problem.  Haldeman disliked this invention, and noted that Guthrie had ignored the three most 
important inventions just coming into vogue:  Evans’s safety guard, Borden’s steam gauge, and 
Faber’s magnetic water gauge.  The Safety Committee was left to sort out the provisions of the bill 
based on these and other inputs. 
149  “An act to amend an act entitled, ‘An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers 
on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam,’ and for other purposes.” (32nd Congress, 
Sess. I, Ch. 105, 106, p. 61, August 30, 1852). The reference in the title to “an act to amend” referred 
to the overhaul of the old act of 1838. In the same year, Harriet Beecher Stowe published Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, signaling the beginning of the abolitionist activism of that era and the looming split between 
North and South. 




the Act was an amalgam of the reforming ideas of several groups: scientists, practical 
engineers, owners and captains, and government officials. The framing of the Act of 
1852 coincided with the development of sectional political strife and the Compromise 
of 1850 that would lead to the Civil War a decade later.  At that time, the federal 
government would in effect nationalize the steamboat service in the Western country 
to provide troop transports for the Union Army, and safety would then take a back 
seat to military expediency. 
 
We have seen how the plan of the practical engineers was to overhaul the personnel 
in their industry.  However, events took another course after 1852 once the Customs 
Service imposed its own system of expertise—a bureaucratic expertise that 
engendered many more aspects than the practical engineers’ narrower technical and 
moral ideas of regulation.  These included political, legal, and bureaucratic traditions 
that were alien to the practical engineers, as well as institutional scientific and 
technical perspectives that came from a long accumulation of military engineering 
expertise in navy yards and armories.  There were also the important 1836 findings of 
the Franklin Institute’s investigation in 1836, compiled as a “pull out” section for 
insertion in the steamboat act.  These findings had been around for a long time, but 
despite wide distribution in 1848, they were not comprehensible to most engineers.151 
                                                 
151  “It quickly became apparent that those most directly concerned with steamboat power did not 
understand the General Report [of the Franklin Institute]”  See Brockmann, Exploding Steamboats, 
Senate Debates, and Technical Reports:  The Convergence of Technology, Politics and Rhetoric in the 
Steamboat Bill of 1838, Baywood Publishing Co., Amityville, New York, 2002, p. 81.  The printing 
history of the General Report was as follows: In 1836, 500 copies; in 1848, 10,000 copies, see p. 84.  





Parallel with evolution of the act of 1852, inventor Cadwallader Evans was beginning 
to gain official government acceptance for his safety guard as the single “catch all” 
invention that was meant to act as an insurance policy to prevent steam boiler 
explosions.  The official acceptance of the safety guard by the Treasury Department 
(via a Navy Commission) coincided with the mass distribution in 1848 of the earlier 
General Report on the Causes of Boiler Explosions issued by the Franklin Institute 
(1836); timing of its acceptance coincided as well with the initiative of Congress in 
1850 to redraft the steamboat law.  To the engineers, the inclusion of a fusible alloy 
safety device in the contemplated new federal boiler code took safety beyond the 
issue of personnel reform, but this was not realized at the time.  After enactment of 
the Act of 1852, the fusible alloy requirement would be seen by the engineers as a 
point of fundamental distrust of the engineer and a denial of his self-appointed role as 
autonomous applied scientist. 
 
In the next few years, from 1852 to 1859, there would take place a convergence of the 
various actors to create the first government agency to extend its technological 
expertise to the western waters of the U.S.  This convergence, and the reaction of the 







CHAPTER 4.  THE INSPECTION SERVICE 
MOBILIZES FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF THE 




4.1  Introduction and Background 
 
The New Inspectors Descend on the Western Rivers 
 
In January 1853, newly appointed Supervising Inspector of Steamboats Davis Embree 
of Steamboat Inspection District Five, St. Louis, published a notice in the local 
newspapers that he would be arriving at several ports on the Mississippi River to 
examine and certify steamboats, and to license steamboat officers and engineers.  
“The provisions of [the act of 1852] are very rigid,” he warned, “and subject all who 
disregard them to heavy penalties… ignorance of the act will be no excuse for its 
violation.”  The steamboat act itself had been made to run the gauntlet of critics and 
experts for the past two decades, and it now captured the best scientific research of 
the academy in combination with the best practical experience of the engineers.  The 
phenomenon of the supervising inspector, who brought with him a small host of field 
inspectors (trained practical engineers and carpenters called local inspectors 
organized into nine district “local boards”), was completely new to the steamboat 




understood the importance of action and had the will to strictly carry out the new 
steamboat act.152 
 
The new inspectors made rapid strides in screening personnel and checking the safety 
of steamboats. In one district, for example, in their first three months in office the 
local inspectors at Louisville certified 72 steam vessels, licensed 176 pilots and 263 
engineers and their assistants, and inspected 19,175 gross tons of shipping.153 
 
The new organization and the high level of activity signaled a sea change in the way 
inspections were to be conducted; the Congress and the Federal government had 
launched a radical program of reform and there was no going back. For the practical 
engineers in the associations, the most important consequence of the change was a 
professional one--the opportunity to reclaim the lost status and reputations of better 
days. Those had been days in which expert mechanics developed the first high-
pressure engines that conquered the western rivers, before the engine-drivers had 
arrived on the scene to command low wages and spoil the profession. It would now 
                                                 
152  Steamboat Act of 1852: “An act to amend an act entitled, ‘An act to provide for the better security 
of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam,’”  Thirty-second 
Congress, I Sess., Ch. 105-106, August 30, 1852, pp. 61-75. 
153  The Steamboat Act of 1852 was passed in August 1852 but was not put into effect on the western 
waters until early 1853 - - steamboat owners were not ready. Embree announcing his arrival on the 
river, see newspaper article 1853 1-1, D13. News source and date of publication clipped, but by 
proximity to other source materials, date is presumed to be January 1853.  Rapid strides of inspections, 





be possible to expel those operators who were not worthy to bear the name “practical 
engineer.”154 
 
Overnight, the Act raised the top class of old-guard practical engineers into positions 
of near absolute authority on the rivers as local inspectors of hulls, boilers and 
machinery.  The promotion of top engineers to the rank of U.S. inspector raised the 
power and prestige of the best-qualified rank-and-file engineers as well.  These 
engineers would now have a say as to who would be permitted to hold engineers’ 
licenses and who would be denied them.  Furthermore, the Act empowered engineers 
to overrule their captains in operational safety matters.  This grant of power was 
unheard of at the time, and was quite controversial with captains and owners.  We 
shall see later in our story, for example, how a powerful steamboat captain and owner 
of a fleet of steamboats, Captain William J. Kountz, engaged in a virtual war with a 
supervising inspector, Charles Ross, over a licensing matter.  It is an indication of the 
upset to the power structure on the rivers generated by the Act of 1852 that Ross was 
sufficiently provoked by Kountz to remark, “The only way he can get rid of us is to 
kill us.”  With this challenge, Ross summed up the conviction and pluck of the new 
                                                 
154  Scholars have underestimated the impact of the steamboat act on the western steamboating 
community.  The history of regulation was a considerably messier affair than what has been conveyed 
by the standard histories, which tend to merely recount the legislative aspects.  At the microhistory 
level, there was much reluctance to obey certain provisions of the 1852 Act due to economic costs, 
social traditions, and (in the case of owners) feelings of property ownership.  In some cases, provisions 
simply could not be enforced or were open to a degree of interpretation, such as the provisions on the 




inspector-engineers: the power structure on the rivers had changed and this time the 




The Act of 1852 created nine inspection districts, each under the control of a 
supervising inspector and two local inspectors—one of boilers and machinery 
and one of hulls (Fig. 30 and Table 3).  The supervising inspectors formed the 
Board of Supervising Inspectors, a quasi-independent executive board under 
the Treasury Secretary. In rank, the supervising inspectors were roughly on a 
par with the powerful Customs collectors.156  
                                                 
155  For purposes of discussion, the name “steamboat inspection service” or “inspection service” is used 
in this chapter in place of the formal “Steam Boat Inspection Service,” a designation arising sometime 
late in the nineteenth century. In its formative decades, the inspection service remained 
undifferentiated from the Customs Service and had no official name. 
156  There were important differences, however.  The supervisors were less broadly political than the 
collectors because their activities were restricted to the regulation of a narrow industry (steamboats). 
Further, their activities were specialized and did not generate appreciable revenue for the Federal 
government, whereas customs officials presided over entire political districts in the regulation of 
maritime commerce and the collection of government-sustaining tariffs. These tariffs constituted the 
main source of income for the Federal government. In addition, the supervising inspectors were 
latecomers to the Customs organization; because they had to fit into the administrative structure of 
Customs, for many years they were answerable to some extent to the collectors. For example, although 
there was no formal “pecking order” or authority of customs officials over inspectors, local inspectors 
did sometimes complain or express concern to collectors over the actions of supervising inspectors, see 
1858 5-10; and collectors sometimes became involved in disputes between local and supervising 
inspectors, see 1859 1-11. Ultimately, steamboat inspectors and customs officials were jointly 
responsible for carrying out the administrative and financial directives of the Secretary of the Treasury 
with regard to the Steamboat Act.  In one instance, for example, Customs surveyors complained that 
they were shouldering the extra load of preparing steamboat certificates and other documents for the 
inspection service, and they lobbied for more pay, see Proc, 4-8-1856, p. 11.  It should be pointed out 
that the specialized, technical, nature of the inspection service did not stop attempts to politicize the 
position of steamboat supervising inspector.  The traditions of political patronage in the Customs 
Service were already in place and ready for exploitation for political advantage. Details provided in the 





Steamboat Inspection Districts, 1852 
 No. 1: Upper New England  
 No. 2: NY, NJ, DE 
 No. 3: Mid-Atlantic 
 No. 4: Gulf Coast, New Orleans 
 No. 5: Lower Mississippi River, Missouri River 
 No. 6: Lower Ohio River 
 No. 7: Upper Ohio River 
 No. 8: Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi River 
 No. 9: Eastern Great Lakes, Oswego 
 (Red circles indicate local inspectors’ offices) 
 
Figure 30. The Supervising Inspectors divided the country into major river systems, 
lakes, and coastal bodies of water for purposes of administering the Act of 1852. Map 






Table 3. List of steamboat inspectors attending the annual meetings of supervising 
inspectors. Italics indicate a change in personnel from the previous year. 
District Supervising Inspector Location 
Proceedings 10-29-1852 
1 Samuel Hall Boston MA 
2 Chas. W. Copeland New York NY 
3 James Murray Baltimore MD 
4 P.H. Skipwith New Orleans LA 
5 Davis Embree St. Louis MO 
6 John Shallcross Louisville KY 
7 Benjamin Crawford Pittsburg PA 
8 Alfred Guthrie Chicago IL 
9 William A. Bird Black Rock NY 
Proceedings 8-1-1853 
1 Wm. Burnett Boston MA 
2 Chas. W. Copeland New York NY 
3 John S. Brown Baltimore MD 
4 (not present) New Orleans LA 
5 Davis Embree St. Louis MO 
6 John Shallcross Louisville KY 
7 Benjamin Crawford Pittsburg PA 
8 Alfred Guthrie (not present) Chicago IL 
9 John A. Campbell Black Rock NY 
Proceedings 10-6-1854 
1 Wm. Burnett Boston MA 
2 Chas. W. Copeland New York NY 
3 John S. Brown Baltimore MD 
4 William E. Muir New Orleans LA 
5 Davis Embree St. Louis MO 
6 John Shallcross Louisville KY 
7 Benjamin Crawford Pittsburg PA 
8 Isaac Lewis Chicago IL 




1 (not present) Boston MA 
2 Chas. W. Copeland New York NY 
3 John S. Brown Baltimore MD 
4 (not present) New Orleans LA 
5 Davis Embree St. Louis MO 
6 John Shallcross Louisville KY 
7 Benjamin Crawford Pittsburg PA 
8 (not present) Chicago IL 




Table 3 (concl).  
Proceedings 10-15-1857 




Machinery & Boilers 
1 Wm. Burnett Boston MA 
Andrew Burnham, 
Joseph W. Dyer, 
Calvin Lester 
Increase S. Hill, 
John Sparrow, 
Charles M. Daboll 
2 Chas. W. Copeland New York NY 
John W. Weeks, 
Samuel Vaughn 
Henry B. Renwick, 
Thomas Murphy 
3 John S. Brown Balto MD 
John T. Farlow, 
Wm. H. Hunter, C. 
Candler, John 
Christee 
James Curran, G. 
B. Davids, E. E. 
Hewes, Wm. Kine 
4 O.A. Pitfield New Orleans LA 
J.O. McLean, H.F. 
Towlmin, H. 
Wilson, John C. 
Hoyt 
John C. Barsh, J.M. 
Cumberland, 
George W. Coffee 
(California) 
5 Davis Embree St. Louis MO Henry Singleton James H. McCord 





7 Benjamin Crawford Pittsburg PA 





A.M. Philips, W.W. 
Guthrie 
8 Isaac Lewis Munroe MI 
R. Prindiville, 
George W. Strong 
Thomas C. James, 
Wm. F. Chittendon 
9 Augustus Walker Buffalo NY 
Charles Reeves, 
B.A. Stanard, J. 
White, J.E. Lee 
Thomas Truman, 
T.R. De Forrest, E. 
Root, Wm. T. 
Barnes 




The Board met two months after passage of the Act to decide the exact boundaries for 
the nine districts.  Each district would contain between one and four ports.  In the 
East, many of these same ports were long-established centers of operations in which 
Customs officials handled the usual tariff-collection and anti-smuggling duties.  No 
such Federal presence existed on the Western waters.  This is important for 
illustrating why many western river men were hostile toward the exercise of Federal 
power during the time of the introduction of Evans safety guard.157  For example, in 
the year Evans’s safety guard was introduced - - 1854 - - Eastern Districts 1 through 
4, along with District 9 in the north (part of the eastern Great Lake system) held by 
far the greater numbers of customs officials, totaling some 2,621 persons.158  By 
contrast, western Districts 5, 6, 7, and 8 held only 85 personnel.  Of these 85 persons, 
Detroit and Chicago, whose vessels plied the Great Lakes and so were not part of the 
western river systems, accounted for almost half. Thus, Eastern customs officials 
outnumbered Western officials by a ratio of 2,621 to 45, or about fifty-eight to one.159 
                                                 
157  The old established centers were the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Charleston, etc (classifying New Orleans as an Eastern seaboard port because that city connected the 
Mississippi River with steamship routes from the Atlantic coast). 
158  District 4 also contained California and Oregon, but these states contained no western river ports 
(Mississippi and Ohio Rivers) and so are not included in the analysis. 
159  The table below shows the number of customs officials in the nine inspection districts, excluding 
the Far West, in 1854 and 1858 (compiled by the author from a U.S. Treasury report to Congress; 
Source:  U.S. Customs House Data, 1854-59, http://eh.net/databases/customs.)  The ratio for 1858 
remained virtually unchanged from that of 1854.  The two years’ worth of data were selected from a 
spreadsheet giving the total number of personnel employed at each of 152 customs houses in the 










Geographically, the western districts were vast, making the Federal presence even 
more diffuse. District 5 contained most of the Mississippi River, extending some 
1,400 miles and passing through eleven states.  Districts 6 and 7 covered the Ohio 
River and its tributaries from the Mississippi to Pittsburgh in northern Pennsylvania.  
These two districts spanned approximately 1,000 miles of river in eight states and 
together with District 5 held the greatest concentration of steamboats in the country.  
Thus, six inspection offices served more than 2,400 miles of river (to put this distance 
in perspective, 2,400 miles is roughly the distance spanned by the coastline of the 
entire Atlantic Coast, from New Brunswick, Canada, to the tip of Florida). Districts 5, 
6, 7, and 8 were located in the heart of the western river country, and these districts 
caused Treasury Department officials the most trouble over the safety guard.  The 
Northern Districts 8 and 9 consisted mainly of the Great Lakes (the “Northern Lakes” 
district referred to in the annual reports) and the upper reaches of the Mississippi 
River.160  




1 557 544 
2 1256 1414 
3 302 316 
4 323 325 
5 9 7 
6 8 9 
7 7 9 
8 61 72 
9 183 157 
*Fiscal year ending on June 30. 
Summary Table 1854 1858 
“Eastern” Districts (1-4, 9) 2,621 2,756 
Western Districts (5-8) 85** 97 
**Forty of these were from Detroit and Chicago. 
160  The centers having the greatest number of steamboats in the U.S. at that time (1839) were 





The supervisors’ function was to supervise the local boards, execute the 
administrative aspects of the law, systematize rules and make modifications to the act 
as needed, and supervise the introduction and evaluation of new safety inventions; 
this latter function was part of the supervisors’ responsibility in executing Treasury 
Department technological policy.  The steamboat law required that the supervising 
inspectors meet as a board each year to report on progress and summarize 
developments.  The annual reports that historians have relied so heavily upon, called 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of 
Steamboats, captured the highlights of these meetings.161  
 
The local boards, whose inspectors reported to the Supervising Inspectors, were made 
up of practical engineers from the engineers’ associations and mechanics’ institutes of 
                                                                                                                                           
25 Cong., 3 Sess. (1838), p. 11.  The geographic expanse encompassed by district boundaries made 
inspection trips long and lonely.  In District Eight, covering the Great Lakes during a series of 
inspections in 1855, the local inspector of boilers at Oswego logged 1,500 miles on his circuit in just 
forty days.  These forays consisted of one round trip from Oswego to Ogdensburg, New York (on the 
St. Lawrence River high above Lake Ontario), and four round trips to Lewiston (Niagara subdistrict) 
on the isthmus between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, 1855 9-10.  Another inspector (Third District) 
had as his territory “all of the waters of North Carolina and Virginia that flowed into the Atlantic 
Ocean.”  He wrote, “The office [required] much of my time and absence from home.” (1859 1-26). 
161  The conduit of power for the Department’s technological policy is obscure.  For the fusible alloy 
safety guard, direction appears to have been communicated directly to the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors by the Treasury Secretary and special agent William M. Gouge in consultation with their 
scientific consultants Professor John L. Smith, Professor John Locke, Professor James Booth, and 
inventor Cadwallader Evans, among others.  See Proc 10-6-1854, 10-18-1855, and the Secretary’s 
instructions to the Supervisors in 1859 12-19.  The supervising inspectors came from a variety of 
backgrounds, most being “persons engaged in business.” see 1852 12-1.  (See detailed biographies of 
selected supervising inspectors in the chapter end notes).  One was a large industrial manufacturer of 
naval vessels (Charles W. Copeland, New York), several were owners and captains of steamboats 
(Davis Embree, St. Louis; John Shallcross, Louisville; and Charles Ross, St. Louis), one was a 
practical engineer (Alfred Guthrie, Chicago), and one was an inventor and foundryman (Benjamin 
Crawford, Pittsburgh).  The supervising inspectors each were paid an annual salary of between $800 
(Wheeling, Virginia) and $1,800 (Cincinnati, Ohio), the amount depending on the size and importance 




their respective cities.  These were the technically brightest, most skilled, scientific 
practical engineers in the industry. Unlike career customs officials and some 
supervising inspectors, these were technical experts who, on the whole, had little 
political skill or ambitions.  Under the Act of 1852, local inspectors were initially  
selected jointly by the collector, the supervising inspector, and the federal district 
judge.162 
 
The local inspectors were the actual interface with the river men and were the real 
power on the rivers.  Of this situation, at least one supervising inspector complained 
of powerlessness.  On the subject of pressure carried in steamboat boilers, 
Supervising Inspector Alfred Guthrie lamented in 1853 that he had “no power over 
what the local inspectors do.”  Supervising inspectors who were vulnerable politically 
also had to defend themselves against public criticisms by engineers and local 
inspectors vying for their positions.  In both of these cases, it was the local inspectors 
and leading engineers who best understood the current situation on the rivers and 
tended to operate in sympathy with the rank-and-file practical engineers.163 
 
                                                                                                                                           
and local inspectors appear to have worked part time on inspection matters, holding regular jobs or 
running their businesses for their primary incomes. 
162  After 1853, inspectors and engineers found themselves in the political world of the Customs 
Service, a nontechnical realm to which they generally were ill-suited.  There were exceptions:  a few 
engineers showed political skill in campaigning for inspector’s positions when inspectors came under 
political attack or were vacating their positions.  When these engineers began to understand the power 
the inspectors’ civil service position conferred, they were quick to campaign for the open slots.  For 
example, respected practical engineer John S. Dickey, in Crawford’s seventh district, built a 
considerable power base in his campaign for Crawford’s position because of his popularity with 
district steamboat engineers. 
163  Powerlessness of Alfred Guthrie, Supervising Inspector, 8th District, to TS Guthrie. Chicago, 1853 
4-12. Local inspectors challenge incumbent supervisor, see local inspector John S. Dickey’s campaign 




The emphasis of the local inspectors was primarily on personnel reform (removing 
unqualified engineers) in concert with use of tried-and-true safety practices and a 
trained eye toward boiler quality.  The main duties of the local inspectors consisted of 
examining, grading, and licensing engineers; inspecting and certifying steamboats; 
conducting legal investigations of accidents and preparing reports and testimony; and 
running the inspection office (Fig. 31).  Examinations served to place engineers in 
three grades, a system devised by the supervising inspectors at the behest of the 
Cincinnati local board.  Examinations determined experience level and aptitude of the 
candidate (as described in a previous chapter).  Ratings were generally assigned 
according to the size of steamboat.  Large boats having three or more boilers received 
the highest grade of engineers, and small boats with less than three boilers received 
the lower grades.  Under the new rules, promotion in grade could only occur with the 
approval of a local inspector, and only when a case was justified by “special and 
satisfactory reasons.”164 
                                                 
164  Large boats versus small boats, see Proc 10-9-1854, p. 103.  Crawford presented a communication 
from the local board at Cincinnati on the classification of engineers on the Western waters, referred to 
a committee, see Proc 10-9-1854, p. 101.  Promotion criteria, see Proc 1853 8-4.  Inspecting 
steamboats: the procedure consisted of the inspector entering the boiler with a lantern to explore the 
various internal parts for scale and rust.  He checked the number and placement of stays, which were 
metal straps that supported the internal flues; checked boiler plate for cracks, sufficiency of strength, 
and quality rating as stamped on the iron; checked for substandard plates patched into the old shell of 
the boiler, and for riveting flaws; checked the safety valves, water cocks, and gauges; and checked for 
obstructions in water and steam pipes.  A final strength test of the boiler was done using the 
hydrostatic test, a key test in the French System.  Here, the inspector forced water under pressure into 
the boiler at two or three times the rated strength of the shell using a portable hydrostatic pump. If the 
boiler failed during test, it would burst without releasing the excessive amounts of energy present in a 
steam explosion.  Boilers tended to fail along seams where rivet holes had been damaged in the 
manufacturing process, where patched sheets of plate iron had been spliced in during repairs, or around 
thinning or burnt sections of iron produced by the accumulation of “scale” (scale was a deposit of 
limestone and mud that hardened and produced local “hot spots” near the fire end of the boiler).  By 
1852, the hydrostatic test was a proven and accepted technology.  To execute the test, one had to know 
how to calculate the burst pressure of the boiler, a strength of materials exercise that required both 
practical knowledge and mathematical skill.  This precluded most engine-drivers and some supervisors 
from conducting the test.  The test was universally popular with scientific practical engineers and 










Figure 31. An engineer’s certificate and a steamboat inspection certificate. 
                                                                                                                                           
trade.  The hydrostatic pumps used were designed, built, and manufactured at the U.S. Navy Yard.  
These were portable devices that could be placed on wheels. For a detailed list of inspectors’ duties, 
see pp. 64-65 of the 1852 steamboat act (32nd Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 105, 106, August 30, 1852). Once 




In practice, the grading of engineers was not so tidy.  Engineer Leonard Harbaugh of 
Cincinnati complained that industry practice on the Ohio River combined the jobs of 
carpenter and second engineer.  If a steamboat happened to strike an object in the 
river, the engineer was forced to abandon his post in the engine room to tend to hull 
damage.  In the process, he turned over the running of the engine to an inexperienced 
“stryker” (third class engineer).  In this way, a steamboat being run by a second class 
engineer suffered an effective downgrading of engineering skill to that of a stryker.  
Harbaugh believed this a violation of the spirit of the law and was a serious hidden 
cause of accidents.165  In another case, engineers complained that the local board in 
New Orleans refused to prosecute the Ferry Steamer Trenton for employing 
unqualified negro strykers as engineers.166  In Alabama, labor combines were forming 
in 1857 by which engineers and pilots were subverting the grade structure by 
independently bidding up fees for their services.167  In other cases, skill in grade was 
evidently not as important as political affiliation. In New Orleans in 1855, an 
engineer could not find work unless he belonged to the Know-Nothing Party.168  
Another serious problem in which grades became confused arose during some 
accident investigations where no hard-and-fast rules governed whether the first or 
                                                 
165  See 1858 7-27. One also senses Harbaugh’s jealousy at suffering a third engineer taking his place 
while he performed carpentry, a humiliating occupation for an accomplished engineer. 
166  See 1858 5-10. This concern went nowhere. The local board’s decision was upheld by Captain 
Pitfield, the Supervising Inspector at New Orleans. 
167  Pilots, see 1857 9-4; engineers, see 1857 11-3.  These actions were condemned by the Department 
as “unlawful conspiracy.” 




second engineer should bear responsibility for negligence. In such cases, grading of 
engineers became almost meaningless.169 
 
Local inspectors operated on a shoestring budget, with the Treasury Secretary 
micromanaging even the smallest expenditure. Incidental expenses included 
firewood, floor coverings, and office rents.  In one instance Treasury Secretary 
Howell Cobb instructed his local inspectors to sell forty yards of surplus carpet 
“without delay,” then deposit the proceeds in an account or use it to credit other 
purchases. In quite a few instances, rooms were not to be had at all because there was 
no money in the appropriation to pay for them. Supervising Inspector Crawford 
wrote, “We also want offices for Local Inspectors, for which there is no provision 
made in the law.  I spoke to Mr. Hodge on the subject and he said he would send in an 
estimate to the Committee of Ways and Means and have it inserted in the 
Appropriation Bill, as it is a matter of great importance to us.”  For years, inspectors 
housed their offices and instruments in Customs warehouses or in basements of 
Customs offices. Accident investigations were conducted in the salons of 
steamboats.170 
                                                 
169  The case of the Fanny Fern explosion in January 1858 was a notorious one among engineers, in 
which the second engineer was blamed for the explosion and the first engineer was exonerated. Local 
Inspectors Dickey and Watson accused Supervisor Benjamin Crawford of nepotism in protecting the 
first engineer. See Dickey and Watson’s Vindication pamphlet, 1858 9-10. (Full title: A Vindication of 
the Action of the Late Local Inspectors at Pittsburgh in the Case of the Explosion of the Steamer Fanny 
Fern; with the Evidence and Correspondence. By John S. Dickey and Andrew J. Watson, local 
inspectors at Pittsburgh, 1858). 
170  The Secretary and his small staff, which, until the Civil War, consisted of a high clerk and perhaps 
a few assistants and copyists, kept the organization’s administrative machinery running.  The staff 
were consumed mainly with reimbursing expenses from the local boards and with arbitrating 
complaints and pleadings from the inspectors and steamboatmen.  Small appropriations, 1853 7-15 and 
1853 10-15, and many other letters; room rent charge not allowed because it was not pre-authorized, 
1853 10-12; non-reimbursed  travel expenses, 1853 10-10; unpaid salaries (a local inspector was paid 




Reactions of Owners, Engineers, and Inspectors of Steamboats to the  
Steamboat Act 
 
The strongest reaction to the new enforcement regime was by masters and 
owners of steamboats.  This was largely a matter of the additional costs 
imposed on owners by the new law.  These costs included the expensive 
retrofitting of engines to lower steam pressures so as to permit the boilers to 
pass the hydrostatic test.  Owners on the western waters were accustomed to 
operating their engines at 200 psi or more.  The 1852 law required them to 
reduce pressure to 110 psi.  The only way to achieve this reduction was to 
retrofit the engine by changing out the cylinder to increase its volume and 
hence lower the pressure.  Owners at Louisville argued that it would take a 
month to make a trip from New Orleans to Louisville under the 110-pound 
system. Inspector Alfred Guthrie called this argument “extravagance,” arguing 
that all that was needed was a re-gearing of the paddlewheel so it could turn 
faster and “do the same amount of labor in a given time.” He noted with 
disgust that owners of older steamboats requiring the modification were 
content to “let them blow up and when we build them we will do better.”171 
 
                                                                                                                                           
inspectors to sell carpet, 1857 11-9; no rent money for offices, 1853 2-3 and 1853 10-15; boiler 
explosion inquiries held aboard boats for want of office space, 1854 1-2. 
171  See 1852 5-3. In June 1853, Crawford reported that he was going to go after unlicensed engineers 
and pilots, as well as boats in the situation stated by Guthrie:  these were the boats that had received 
extensions because they could not meet requirements, but still they had not retrofitted after the allotted 
time.  They thus had not obtained their certificates of hull and boiler inspection. 1853 6-6.  The 110 psi 
limit was for a standard 42-in. boiler, see p. 65 of the Steamboat Act of 1852 (32nd Congress, Sess. I, 




Other additional costs were for unconventional safety devices.  A rough reception 
awaited devices such as Borden’s steam gauge, Faber’s magnetic water gauge, the 
French manometer, and Evans’s Guard, not to mention many other inventions 
spawned by inventors in an attempt to quell the growing number of boiler explosions 
(we recall that by 1850 most of the simpler safety equipments on steamboats had 
settled or “frozen” in their development so far as river men were concerned; novel 
equipment flooding the profession was most unwelcome).  Cost for owners was a 
cause of concern; novel appliances collectively cost in the several hundred dollar 
range; Evan’s device alone was quoted by Haldeman at $150 (Fig. 32).172 
 
Owners reacted as well to the new inspection regime. Supervising Inspector Benjamin 
Crawford in Pittsburgh reported that there was “a good deal of opposition to [the new 
law] by the owners and masters of steamboats” and that owners and captains 
lamented that they wished the old [1838] inspectors back because they “never gave 
them any trouble.”  In Cincinnati in March 1853 alone, local inspectors cited fourteen 
“masters and persons” for employing unlicensed pilots and engineers; these 
                                                 
172  Although many general safety devices and rules were not yet mandated by the law, a variety was 
being considered by the supervising inspectors after 1852.  Some of these had nothing to do with 
boilers;  they were for general safety such as for the prevention of fire and drowning (e.g., wire 
steering ropes, life vests, passageway clearances, navigation rules, etc).  Supervisor Benjamin 
Crawford had a hand in all of these.  See Appendix A, Index of Annual Reports (Proceedings) of the 
Supervising Inspectors.  Although Evans had a cheaper twenty dollar version of his safety guard 
available and another at seventy-five, he did not recommend these cheaper versions as the best 
protection against explosions.  Evans’s $20 version (the one most popular to owners because of its low 
cost) was an alarm only; the $75 and $150 versions activated the safety valve to release steam, or 





“Going downstream, pilots 
usually held to the channel, 
keeping to the outside of 
the many bends, to profit 
by the depth and swift 
current. The problem was 
to locate and make the 
‘crossings’ where the 
channel passed diagonally 
across the river. When 
rounding the bends going 
upstream, pilots held to the 
shallower but relatively 
slack water along the 
inside of the bends. By 
weaving back and forth in 
counter-direction to the 
channel, pilots could avoid 
the force of the current and 
save time, fuel, and wear 
on the machinery.” 
Figure 32. The Steam Boat Inspection Service soon expanded to govern safety in 
many other areas than boiler safety. Shown are the complexities of river navigation 
requiring the formulation of special rules and protocols for pilots. (Source: Hunter, 




paid their $100 fines and reclaimed their licenses or were suspended for “neglect of 
duty.”173 
 
Owners played cat-and-mouse games with the inspectors, thwarting inspections by 
painting a unique name on each side of their boats, or by stalling the inspectors by not 
making ordered repairs between inspection visits.174  Some captains interfered with 
the inspectors’ operations, as in the example of the aforementioned Captain Kountz, 
who continued to employ engineers who had had their licenses revoked.175 
 
Reaction from the rank-and-file engineers toward the inspection service was mixed.  
The supervising inspectors noted in 1853 that general trade opposition to the 1852 
law had been great in the beginning, but that after several months it had diminished.  
However, the law did create some major inconveniences which served to make it 
unpopular.  A number of engineers and pilots in Memphis, which had no local 
inspection board, complained that they had to travel great distances, to either St. 
Louis (310 miles upstream) or New Orleans (460 miles downstream), to be examined 
                                                 
173  Opposition to the new law, 1853 3-31; Table of masters violating law, 1853 3-31. 
174  Long times between inspectors’ visits, which were few and far between due to distances, allowed 
owners to put off repairs and apparently still operate, although it is not clear if owners could legally 
operate their boats in the interim. 
175  Problem of multi-named boats, see Proc 10-10-1854, pp. 113-114.  Owners dragging their feet, see 
1854 10-5. Local inspector Curran of the Third District answered the Secretary’s charges that he had 
overused the Department’s precious travel budget in inspecting the Steamboat George Page at 
Washington.  In fact, the inspectors had to make numerous trips back to the steamer to see that 
remedies to bring the boat into compliance were performed as ordered. “…it is a disagreeable task for 
me to have to say that this same Mr. Page has given the Board more trouble to carry out the 
requirements of the law than any other owner of a steamboat in our district.  The question may be 
asked why is he not arraigned for infringment [sic] and [this] is asked frequently. I can only say 
unfortunately for the laws he has been reported as far back as last July was a year, and still action is 




for licenses.  This caused them “unnecessary expense and loss of time… we consider 
this a great injustice.”  Further, after they had traveled “far away from home” to those 
points, they found they were unknown to the local boards there, could not be given 
the proper examination, and were turned away.176 
 
Some engineers lost their jobs and feared becoming hardship cases when they 
violated one provision or another of the steamboat act and had their licenses revoked.  
Often such hardship cases came under appeal with the supervisors.  In appealing the 
local board’s decision, however, engineers could usually count on an unsettling 
experience with a board of inspectors that held almost unlimited power. In 1855, a 
New York engineer of the Steamboat Thomas Hunt, Edward Barnay, was denied a 
license and suffered a loss of income for some violation of the act. Upon appealing 
for a re-examination, he was turned away.  His advocate wrote the Treasury Secretary 
that he accompanied Barnay to the inspectors’ office, “…prepared to show that he is 
an old, experienced and competent Engineer.  I asked that they would examine him, 
to which request they refused, saying that they would not examine him or give him a 
license until he settled the complaint they had preferred against him.  I represented to 
them that if they were permitted to exercise such unlimited power they could bring ill 
founded accusations against the whole Steamboating people within their District, put 
off the investigation of the charges for an indefinite period, and cause the ruin of all 
such persons by throwing them out of employment, leaving them no means of redress 
                                                 
176  Initial opposition to law, then improvement, see Proc 11-19-1853c.  This was likely Supervisor 
Benjamin Crawford’s optimistic appraisal of progress.  In his reports to the press and in the annual 




whatever.”  The advocate asked the Secretary if steamboat inspectors “are clothed 
with any such powers, and whether a citizen must be compelled to fold his arms and 
go to the poor house merely because an Inspector chooses to persecute him.”177 
 
Engineers could be caught in the middle between the inspectors and recalcitrant 
steamboat owners as well. After losing his license and being banned from his 
steamboat, a stryker at St. Louis made it known that he was intent upon reboarding 
his vessel to resume work. The steamboat was owned by the powerful Captain 
William J. Kountz. The stryker’s contempt for the law raised the ire of the 
supervising inspector, Charles Ross.  Ross chastised the stryker and told him that his 
immediate re-boarding of Kountz’s boat, due to leave in a day or two, was out of the 
question:  “You shall not work on any boat in any capacity whatever and my power is 
absolute and I will take care to use it.”  The engineer pleaded with the inspector to 
hear him out:  “Why not examine my case now so as I can earn Bread for my five 
little children [?].  They are now crying for Bread. They have none as I have no 
money to buy them any.”  The inspector was unmoved: “You shall not earn them any 
in Captain Kountz Boat.  He, Captain Kountz, shall not take who he pleases in his 
Boat as he did around at Pittsburgh.  He cannot scare us here [--the only] way he can 
get rid of us is to kill us.”178 
                                                                                                                                           
President of the United States from 20 steamboat pilots and engineers on the inconvenience of 
traveling to St. Louis to get licenses, 1854 11-1, Vol. 3, IMG 1192-93. 
177  1855 6-2, IMG 1682. 
178  1859 9-21 IMG 1291-1293.  Emphasis in the original.  Captain Kountz later became “Commodore” 
Kountz.  Throughout his career he either owned or held an interest in at least 36 steamboats.  He also 
led the group operating the horse-drawn Pittsburgh, Allegheny & Manchester Passenger Railway. 
Kountz was a powerful figure during the Civil War, serving as Master of Transportation (U.S. 
Quartermaster Corps) in Paducah, Kentucky, where he helped organize steamboat transportation for 




The clearest violation of the steamboat act was the engineer’s imbibing of 
intoxicating liquors.  In the past, spirits had been liberally served aboard many 
steamboats, not only for the benefit of passengers but also for the entertainment of the 
crew (presumably when not on duty).  Under the Act of 1852, abstinence of the crew 
while near a steamboat became a part of the reform program.  Abstinence had its 
origin in Whiggish religious sentiments of the day, but also had obvious safety 
implications. Supervising Inspector Benjamin Crawford at Pittsburgh reported 
progress in “making sober men of [pilots and engineers] as no one can get license 
who is known to be in the habit of drinking to excess.”  A Whig, Crawford had been 
instructing his local inspectors to “let us try and get clear of the drunkards in some 
way or other…” by which he meant denying them licenses. He optimistically reported 
to the Congress that he thought “we will show an improvement in the character of our 
River Men in the course of another year.”179 
 
Crawford’s obsession with making sure there was a sober and disciplined “man of 
character” in charge of the engine room caused friction with a supervising inspector 
in the adjoining fifth district, Supervising Inspector Davis Embree (St. Louis), in 
1854.  A pilot in Crawford’s district, Hamilton, had gone on a “mere fourth of July 
                                                                                                                                           
was the City of Memphis, of which Mark Twain was a pilot.  In the Civil War, it served as a floating 
hospital.  See http://members.tripod.com; and http://pghbridges.com/articles/haer/ 
sisters_HAER_PA490/sisters_HAER490a.htm. 
179  Crawford noted that on a trip to Cincinnati, his local inspectors had “refused licenses to a good 
many who were intemperate, one of whom took an appeal from their decision, but he did not fare any 
better with me.” 1853 2-3.  But Crawford noted in another letter that engineers were generally sober, 
and that pilots were more bothersome:  “As a body the Engineers… are generally sober and 
trustworthy.  The same may be said of a large majority of the Pilots; but it is to be regretted that some 
of them have shown a different disposition, and have tried hard to repudiate the law and bring it into 




frolic,” as Embree put it.  This consisted of Hamilton’s stopping at every landing for a 
drink of intoxicating liquor, and then reboarding and piloting his boat.  Crawford’s 
local inspectors gave the facts of the case: “[Hamilton has been]… known to us 
personally for 20 years, and whose reputation is that of a reckless and intemperate 
man—who has been the cause of great loss of life by running into Steam boats—been 
in more fights, sprees and difficulties, than that of any other man known to us—the 
result of his reckless and intemperate habits—besides it was only a short time 
previous to our refusing him a license, that he very deliberately let go the wheel of the 
boat he was steering, and shot at the pilot of the passing boat, who had not done in 
accordance with the particular whim of his (Hamilton’s) fancy.”180 
 
Hamilton complained to Embree of his treatment at the local inspectors’ hands, and in 
turn Embree charged that Crawford’s inspectors had acted with too extreme zeal. 
Because of this, Embree believed, the community would “revolt at the law.”  Changes 
brought about by the Act had come too suddenly, and the powers of the Federal 
government (in particular the Board of Supervisors) were revealing themselves as 
“monstrous.”  Embree wrote that Hamilton would become a beggar without his 
license, and that a description of the proscribed behavior befitting a crewman had not 
been printed on Hamilton’s license.  Crawford brushed aside Embree’s agitation over 
the matter, writing that he saw no “monstrous power” being levied, nor did he expect 
to see the community rise in revolt.  Hamilton had had his chance to appeal the local 
                                                                                                                                           
activity, a legal emphasis that became commonplace in the inspection service after passage of the 
steamboat act. 1853 6-6. 




board’s decision, Crawford argued, but had done nothing and so had acquiesced in 
their decision.  Now Hamilton was suing the local inspectors for $5,000 in damages, 
which disturbed the peace and harmony of Crawford’s own district. Hamilton’s suit 
later failed when the local board was exonerated.181 
 
While these disputes were occurring at the operating level of the new inspection 
service, and as painful adjustments were being made there to the new way of life on 
the rivers, political winds almost immediately began to drive personnel changes at the 
higher levels of the inspectorate. 
 
Politics and the Inspection Service 
 
The Customs Service was highly affected by politics, and this carried over into the 
inspection service.  Political attacks against high inspection officials were usually 
supported by complaints and petitions of engineers, who had some axe to grind 
because they believed the officials were not properly carrying out provisions of the 
                                                 
181  Hamilton case, see 1853 11-16.  To put this topic of drinking in historical perspective, Hunter 
described this “Mike Fink age” and the steamboat occupation as one of machismo, violence, and hard 
times.  Brawls, thefts, and fighting abounded on trips up and down the rivers.  Although inexcusable as 
a safety hazard, the excessive drinking to be found in the industry can perhaps in part be attributed to 
the roughness of the steamboating life.  On the correspondence of Crawford to Embree, “Even if his 
case was precisely as you state, and he was deprived of his license by extraordinary power, or even 
illegally if you choose, he had his remedy by appeal, and when he neglected to avail himself of it, he 
voluntarily cut himself off from all recourse by law, and acquiesced in the decision of the local board.” 
1853 12-2, C10.  Crawford had by now written his local inspectors Haldeman and W.W. Guthrie to get 
evidence against Hamilton:  “I wrote you yesterday in regard to Thos. Hamilton.  You had better make 
enquiries of the Captain and officers of the Steam boat I. M. Harris in Regard to the matter, perhaps 
you will be able to obtain sufficient evidence there without going further.  I had heard on my way up, 
that Hamilton was employed on that boat, at the time he took the spree.  This would certainly be 
sufficient to revoke his license, as no plea could be made, that he was not on duty, he might as well say 




law.  Local inspectors were generally immune to attacks by engineers; most of the 
local inspectors’ duties, if carried out according to the law (at least as interpreted 
according to the guidelines of the engineering associations), posed no problems. This 
was most likely because the reforming engineers and the local inspectors arose from 
the same professional body and were of a similar mind regarding safety reforms.  The 
supervising inspectors, however, were political appointees who did not always have 
the requisite experience and were often not engineers.  Adding to the Supervisors’ 
difficulties in this situation was the collusion of owners and captains against them, 
usually over the expense of meeting regulations or over issues of licensing.  
Disillusionment with the supervising inspectors tended to fester until a political need 
arose that provided an opportunity for the engineers to strike on the street with 
handbill campaigns against the inspector in question, or in the press.182 
 
Unfortunately for the practical engineers, who were generally apolitical, the timing of 
the creation of the inspection service itself coincided with political upheaval in the 
national government.  With the collapse of the national Whig Party in 1852, it was 
necessary (and followed customary practice) to replace Whigs with Democrats 
wholesale in all important government positions.  The inspection service, initially 
manned by Whig inspectors for the most part, was a prominent new target.  The 
                                                                                                                                           
will investigate that and every similar case that comes to your knowledge.  Let us try and get clear of 
the drunkards in some way or other…” 1853 9-16. 
182  On the subject of political needs arising, on a turnover in the national party, there could be severe 
political pressure to replace a supervising inspector with one from the newly voted-in party. On the 
relative immunity of local inspectors to replacement for political reasons, there were several cases in 
the NARA record of engineers criticizing the supervising inspectors, but no attacks by engineers 
against the local inspectors.  On the subject of supervising inspectors criticized for laxity, see 1853 1-1, 
1853 6-3, 1854 5-1, 1854 5-24, 1855 7-29, 1858 1-13, 1858 5-10, and others; details from these 




Treasury Department began its purge before the new supervising inspectors could 
even settle in; this continued at least until 1858.  Changes made to the supervisors’ 
roster in 1853-1854 included the replacement of supervisors in five of the nine  
inspection districts (the two Great Lakes districts, New England, Mid-Atlantic, and 
New Orleans). Another attempt was made to replace the inspector at Pittsburgh 
(Crawford) but this was beaten back by supporters. 
 
Eighth District Supervising Inspector and practical engineer Alfred Guthrie was the 
first appointee to fall.  A key founding inspector who had worked with Senator Davis 
of the Commerce Committee to shape the 1852 Act, Guthrie’s influence and 
experience counted for little in the face of the purge.  He wrote Treasury Secretary 
James Guthrie (no relation) in the spring of 1853 complaining that he was being 
removed on political grounds.  Apparently receiving no help from the Secretary, 
Guthrie went over the Secretary’s head and wrote two letters to President Franklin 
Pierce in September. Guthrie’s pleadings are quoted here: 
 
“We have had over 2,600 people killed by explosions in this country.  
I ask if the person who voluntarily and successfully undertook to 
correct this great evil would not be entitled to some little 
consideration.  Would Your Excellency think a selection of the proper 
person to check this great evil would be the person who knew nothing 




“And yet Mr. Lewis who had never thought ever of the causes and was 
profoundly ignorant of the subject is selected for this purpose. 
 
“Mr. Lewis will be frank enough I have no doubt to say that when he 
was appointed he did not know anything whatever about the subject.   
And Sir he cannot today go on board the U.S. Steamer Michigan and 
stop the engine if it should be running to save his life nor can he stop 
and start any other engine upon these lakes.  I have no doubt but your 
Excellency has been deceived in regard to his qualifications.  I do not 
expect a reappointment but I do think I have been wronged for the 
years of labor and study I had devoted to this subject to be superceded 
[sic] by one so… disqualified.183 
 
[Second letter]: “In my last letter I thought I would not again annoy 
Your Excellency with letters upon the subject of Steam Boat 
Inspectors but I feel so confident that you have been misdirected not 
only in my removal but in the appointment of Mr. Lewis that I feel 
constrained to ask if Your Excellency to [sic] grant me an interview 
upon this matter by my calling upon him in Washington in the early 
part of October.  I shall not require but a few minutes to make my 
explanations and will feel thankful for the opportunity.”184 
                                                 
183  First letter to President Franklin Pierce. dated 1853 9-4. 
184  Second letter to President Franklin Pierce, dated 1853 9-11.  There is no record that Pierce ever 
replied to Guthrie’s letters or met with him.  We recall that it was Alfred Guthrie who argued against 




Despite his appeals, which apparently were ignored, Guthrie was dismissed. The 
practical engineers reacted angrily to Guthrie’s removal.  A printed flyer signed “an 
engineer” appeared in June, urging engineers and pilots to protest Isaac Lewis’s 
(Guthrie’s replacement) continued appointment as the replacement supervising 
inspector.  The flyer attacked Lewis’s ignorance of basic practical engineering 
knowledge, noting that the owner of a steamer had complained that Lewis had refused 
to make a hydrostatic test of his vessel.  “I believe he declined to undertake such 
inspection from ignorance and not knowing how to do it.”  It seems also that Lewis 
was traveling around the district receiving a crash course in the basics of steamboat 
engineering.   
 
The flyer pointed out that the Act of 1852 required inspectors to be competent, and 
Lewis was not.  By the act of Lewis's appointment, the local Board of Inspectors had 
been “broken up,” steamers were now “running without inspections and without 
licensed pilots or engineers,” steamboats were exploding and collisions occurring, 
“all for want of competent individuals to inspect and control them.”  The flyer then 
complained that Lewis’s lack of credentials put the engineers in an awkward 
situation:   
 
                                                                                                                                           
inspectors), commenting that “the whole system of inspection seems to be deranged,” 1853 9-4.  It is 
clear from the record that the practical engineers (in positions as both inspectors and engineers) 
became increasingly uncomfortable with the overlay of the Treasury Department’s political and 
legalistic structure on their technically oriented community.  The practical engineers were ill-equipped 
to deal with the new and powerful bureaucracy and the political pressures that came with it.  Guthrie 
wrote in 1853, “I am the fartherist [sic] removed from being in any manner a politician possible, my 





“We who have paid our inspection fees and have been deemed 
competent by competent inspectors are now suffering for these wrongs 
…We are compelled to submit to the humiliating farce of an 
inspection by [Lewis]… Did the law ever contemplate this, or does a 
decent respect for the laws of the country require of us such 
acquiescence?” 
 
For the engineers, reverence for the law was paramount, but a paradox was arising: 
the flyer noted that as good citizens the engineers should submit, but that no 
obligation could require them to give Lewis their respect, whose capacities were so 
feeble.  "Apply the test fearlessly, for I feel certain that [Lewis can not] stop or start 
any one of your engines, or guide your vessel a single mile, however great the 
necessity.”185 
 
A similar attempt to replace Whig inspector Benjamin Crawford of the seventh 
district (the virtual creator of the inspection service) failed. Crawford had been able to 
fend off the attempt on his seat because of his value in parsing and updating the 
steamboat law.186  A political chameleon, Crawford had been faking his Democracy, 
                                                 
185  Printed flyer of engineers, 1853 6-3.  Lewis had evidently taken the sole hydrostatic pump in the 
district with him on his training junket, leaving steamboats at the main ports untestable.  On the 
incompetence of some inspectors, see 1858 1-13 in which Haldeman noted that recommendations for 
supervising inspectors were often made by personal friends, “but this tells us nothing of 
qualifications.”  He noted that some were good pilots or masters, but not engineers, and that 
Supervising inspectors were required to be knowledgeable because they had to inspect steamboats in 
some reaches of their districts where there were no local boards.  The supervisor had to carry a 
hydrostatic pump, solve steam pressure calculations, and act in all respects in the capacity of a local 
inspector. 
186  According to one who admired Crawford, a Charles Thaler, Crawford was the law’s “virtual 




but the attack prompted him to enlist advocates who testified as to his loyalty to the 
party in power. Seven local inspectors wrote Treasury Secretary Guthrie to support 
him, stating that Crawford “has been consistent and reliable in [the Democratic] 
cause” and the “carrying out of democratic principles.” Crawford had made steam the 
study of his life, the inspectors wrote, and “he is, and always has been, a thorough 
Democrat--clinging to his party in all fortunes.”187 
 
Crawford not only had to fight for his own position as supervisor, he also had to 
struggle to keep his newly appointed local inspectors. “Certain persons” in Pittsburgh 
had sent the Treasury “remonstrances praying that these men may not be appointed,” 
Crawford successfully defended his inspectors, writing the Secretary:  
 
“I am at a great loss to know what manner of objections can be raised 
to the appointment of Mr. Watson as boiler inspector.  He is a man of 
large experience as an Engineer, having regularly learned the business 
of engine building, and been a practical engineer on the Western 
Waters for some sixteen years, and is considered by all who know him, 
as one of the best practical as well as the most learned in the Science 
of Steam, and Steam Machinery, of any in this district.  He is a man of 
great firmness and integrity of purpose; he knows what is right, and is 
                                                 
187  The 1853 letter of support for Crawford had been signed, among others, by Captain David Lynch, 
John S. Hamilton, A.J. Dallas, and John S. Dickey, and included a column from The Pittsburgh 
Commercial Journal dated September 7, 1852, in which Crawford was named as the inventor of “two 
or three improvements on the Steam Engine.”  1853 3-11.  Captain Lynch exposed Crawford’s 
pretense when, in 1858, he accused Crawford of pretending to be a Democrat but in fact remaining a 




not afraid to do it; further than that he will not go.  In regard to the 
politics of those gentlemen, it so happens that one of them votes the 
Democratic ticket, the other the Whig ticket.  But neither of them are 
politicians.  I am aware, however, that the political opinions of those 
who are appointed to these offices will have no weight with the 
Department, one way nor the other, as they [certainly?] have not with 
me.”188 
 
Crawford managed to hold off the Democrats for five more years, but then 
succumbed. Criticisms by engineers were instrumental in his removal, and these were 
likely motivated by retribution against Crawford’s prosecution of an innocent 
engineer in an accident case. Crawford had acted in the matter over the objections of 
his local inspectors (one of whom was the same Andrew Watson that Crawford had 
defended in 1853).189  It appears that the Treasury Department used the case to 
                                                 
188  1852 11-19. Watson was able to hold onto his position as local inspector of boilers at least through 
1857. 
189  This was the aforementioned case of the explosion of the steamboat Fanny Fern in January 1858. 
The ensuing dispute between Crawford and his inspectors Dickey and Watson eventually precipitated 
the local inspectors’ removal. Dickey and Watson had accused Crawford of nepotism in protecting the 
guilty engineer King, whom the inspectors believed was clearly responsible for the accident. The 
backlash for Crawford was that one group of thirty-five engineers, and another of forty-eight engine 
builders and engineers, urged President James Buchanan to remove Crawford.  They argued that 
Crawford “never had any experience whatever on board steamboats,” and thus was unfit to fill the 
office of supervising inspector.  A steamboat captain noted that Crawford was accomplished at making 
wood patterns for sand castings but knew nothing of the technology of steam, 1858 1-3. He further 
accused Crawford of pretending to be a Democrat when in reality he was a Whig; Crawford had not 
even voted, he wrote, “unless after 1856, at which time he began supporting the Democrat position.” In 
the attacks, Crawford was accused of using a Whig printer for steamboat blanks when Democrat 
printers were available, see 1858 1-3. Local Inspector Haldeman wrote that “Efforts are being made to 
remove Crawford as Supervising Inspector,” 1858 1-13. A petition is circulating to replace Crawford, 
1858 6-27. Scheme concocted by enemies of Crawford to support other candidates for Supervising 
Inspector, 1858 6-29. Group of thirty-five engineers urging removal of Crawford, one of whom was 
Andrew Watson. See 1858 10. Engine builders and engineers write President Buchanan complaining 




leverage Crawford out. The Department compiled a list of Crawford’s deficiencies as 
set forth in lengthy self-published pamphlet by Crawford’s local inspectors after the 
flawed investigation of the explosion of the steamboat Fanny Fern in January 
1858.190 The list was entitled, “Shortcomings of Benjamin Crawford, Esq.,” and 
named thirty-five charges under “violations of law, evasion of duty, ignorance, etc.” 
In addition, other material was collected on Crawford; these bore more directly on his 
character. The letters were of a personal nature, concentrating mainly on Crawford’s 
chronic habit of skipping out on his creditors in former times. 
 
With this onslaught, the remarkable architect of the Act of 1852 eventually was 
drummed out of his post of Supervising Inspector. He thereafter fulfilled auxiliary 
roles in the inspection service as a substitute local inspector and then special agent. 
(See Crawford’s biography in the end notes of this chapter). 
                                                 
190 The pamphlet was entitled, A Vindication of the Action of the Late Local Inspectors at Pittsburgh in 
the Case of the Explosion of the Steamer Fanny Fern; with the Evidence and Correspondence. By John 
S. Dickey and Andrew J. Watson, local inspectors at Pittsburgh, 1858. Dickey and Watson were 
dismissed before they could file their report on the accident.  They were later exonerated by the 
Supervising Inspectors in October 1858, but their reputations had already been damaged. See 1858 1-




4.2  The Treasury Department Pushes the Safety Guard; 
Significance of the Safety Guard in Defining Expertise 
 
Unbeknownst to the practical engineers on the rivers, built into the enactment of the 
Act of 1852 was the ability of Treasury Department officials to devise and control a 
single definition of expertise; this definition hearkened back to the scientific research 
on fusible alloys conducted by Professors Bache and Johnson in the 1830s. We have 
already discussed personnel reforms meant to bolster the quality of the engineering 
corps.  Both the Department and the practical engineers were in harmony on this 
issue. However, the Department wished extra insurance against the mistakes or 
incompetence of engineers, and here they deviated from the engineer’s program. In 
this instance, the Evans guard became the tangible manifestation of the Department’s 
distrust of the practical engineers over the issue of the safe operation of boilers. 
 
The Department began promoting the Evans safety guard on the western waters in 
1854. This posed a legal problem for government officials: whereas it had been 
relatively easy to use the good engineers to keep bad engineers off the steamboats, it 
was a more difficult problem to convince engineers that a monopolistic invention that 
intruded into their everyday affairs could provide a scientifically enlightened 
improvement in safety. The safety guard had never been popular with rank-and-file 
engineers.  Early rejection was based on several factors: (1) the bad reputation of the 
safety guard’s early 1840s prototypes, which had reliability problems; (2) the 
“nuisance factor” of the safety guard going off constantly, or the danger of its not 




the safety valve, water gauge, and steam gauge; (4) the strong influence of owners, 
who resented the expense of the safety guard (especially in St. Louis and Louisville); 
(5) fear of the inventor’s monopoly of the technology; and (6) fear of losing wages 
because the safety guard lowered the qualifications needed to run steamboat 
machinery.191 
 
Further, the scientific justification for the safety guards apparently never reached the 
rank and file engineers, or never overcame their prejudices. The Department’s view 
that the safety guards were a last defense against explosions hardly penetrated beyond 
Washington and a handful of practical engineers in the Districts. Thus, the matter 
very quickly turned from a technical issue of safety to a legal one. Once the guards 
began to be pushed, inspector-engineers who balked at the use of the safety guard 
were not only considered “prejudiced” and unscientific, but also lawbreakers who 
risked anarchy. To the chagrin of the engineers and most inspectors, Evans’s device 
was destined to become the key test used by the Treasury Department to define 
expertise. But more importantly, it became the key test of obedience to the broader 
principle of law and order. 
 
The growth in the number of Evans’s Safety Guards deployed coincides with the 
assertion of federal power on the rivers.  Before the act of 1852, Evans only managed 
                                                 
191  Addressing Senator John Davis, Haldeman claimed that many practical engineers had endorsed the 
safety guard. He cited the names of “many, in whose opinions you will have confidence,” in the pages 
of Evans’s self-promotional 1850 Treatise. “. . . you will see a mass of evidence from practical and 
Scientific engineers, which it seams [sic] to me, is sufficient to prove to every unprejudiced [sic] man, 




to sell and install 125 of his safety guards to masters of steamboats. Even in those 
early years, as we have observed in Evans’s 1850 Treatise, rank-and-file engineers 
had begun disabling the guards, perceiving them as “humbug” and “hostile to the 
body of the profession.”  On the eve of passage of the Act of 1852, the number of 
boats having safety guards had grown modestly to 135.  But by 1856, it is estimated 
that about 300-400 steamboats had safety guards, amounting to about half of all 
western boats.192 The safety guard required more than physical presence, however; it 
needed the mantle of legal authority, which soon would be provided by the 
Department. 
 
William M. Gouge Clears Legal Hurdles Associated with the Evans Guard 
 
It had been known for years that the effectiveness of the safety guards depended on a 
fusible alloy having thermometer-like accuracy.  The job of developing and defending 
this product for the federal government fell to a powerful government official in our 
story, William M. Gouge (1796-1863).  Formerly an economic historian, Gouge 
joined the Treasury Department in 1854 as a high clerk and special agent serving 
Treasury Secretary James Guthrie. After reading Cadwallader Evans’s 1850 Treatise 
                                                                                                                                           
care and attention . . .”  1852 4-24. As time went on and the reliability problems of government-
manufactured alloys used in the safety guard surfaced, however, the engineers withdrew their support. 
192  The quantity of 125 is from Evans’s 1850 Treatise, page 51, and the quantity of 135 is from 
Haldeman 1852 5-1; Hunter missed the significance of the safety guard because he had not accessed 
the NARA records.  His footnote on page 72 of SBOTWR (1949) notes that a “small proportion” of 
boats had safety guards, but his source for this information was from a government reported dated 
1847.  The NARA letter collection shows that most of the western safety guards were installed after 
1850. The quantity of 300-400 is based on a conservative estimate of the quantity of pieces of 
government alloy (one piece of alloy per safety guard) distributed by metallurgist James Booth of the 
U.S. Mint to the districts on behalf of the Treasury Department (see 1855 10-1).  These estimates are 




on the causes of explosions, Gouge became convinced that the Evans guard was the 
only safety appliance that would provide protection of steam boilers in accordance 
with established scientific principles. The scientific rhetoric of Evans’s Treatise 
persuaded Gouge that only fusible alloy applied in a particular way (i.e., to exclude 
pressure effects) could be used to monitor heat in the boiler.193 
 
Gouge had what he needed in the ninth section of the new steamboat act to 
begin pushing the safety guards, but there were two problems: the provision on 
the alloys was vague, and the alloys were not yet ready. The provision was 
vague because it required that fusible alloy be applied in a “suitable manner” 
but it failed to specify a particular device for this purpose:  
 
“…in or upon the outside flue of each outside high pressure boiler, 
there is placed in a suitable manner alloyed metals, fusible by the heat 
of the boiler when raised to the highest working pressure allowed, and 
that in or upon the top of the flues of all other high pressure boilers in 
the steamer such alloyed metals are placed, as aforesaid, fusing at ten 
pounds greater pressure than said metals on the outside boilers, 
thereby, in each case letting “steam escape.”194 
 
At the time, there were three ways of applying the fusible alloy:  (1) in plates 
inserted in the top of boilers; (2) in an open tube, in which the alloy was 
                                                                                                                                           
boats on the western rivers by 1855, so, using the alloy shipment figures, we can assume that roughly 
half of the 727 steamboats had safety guards within 3 years of passage of the 1852 act. 




exposed to both the heat and the pressure of the steam; and (3) in a cup, by 
which the pressure of the steam was excluded, and only the heat operated on 
the mixed metals.  Gouge remarked that only the third method answered the 
intended purpose as set forth by the law and was thus the only “suitable 
manner” of application.195 
 
At their first annual meeting in October 1852, the supervising inspectors had left the 
choice of the three modes of application to the local boards. Gouge argued that this in 
effect permitted owners of steamboats to choose the mode of application.  This was a 
mistake because “the result was that in many cases the fusible alloy was applied in 
open tubes instead of cups, though there was most abundant evidence in books of 
science… that fusible alloy applied in open tubes was worse than useless.” 
 
This was a critical problem for Gouge and the Department’s idea of a single scientific 
technology that could be used once and for all to thwart explosions.  The entire 
                                                                                                                                           
194  Gouge’s emphasis. See Gouge notes dated 2-21-1855. 
195  Gouge got the idea of the three methods from practical engineer and supervising inspector Alfred 
Guthrie, see 1853 12-15.  The first mode had the drawback of stopping a boat after fusing (“This 
method was long in use by the French, but has, I believe, been abandoned by them.  It was rejected by 
the Supervising Inspectors as not at all adapted to the state of things in this country”).  The second 
mode caused the separation of constituent metals (“The objection to this is, that alloy thus employed, is 
deprived of its tin and bismuth by the simple pressure of the steam, even before the pressure is as great 
as is allowed by law, leaving only the lead, which as it does not fuse under 600 degrees of temperature 
is useless for the purpose intended.)  Gouge buttressed the legitimacy of the third mode by stating that 
advocates of that choice included Professors Henry (Smithsonian Institute), Renwick (New York), 
Lilliman (New Haven), Locke (Cincinnati), Colonel Long (U.S. Topographical Engineers), and Dr. 
William P. James, (Commissioner of the Patent Office). Confirming their testimony is that of C. H. 
Haswell (Engineer in Chief, United States Navy), William M. Ellis, (Chief Engineer, U.S. Navy Yard, 
Washington), and “two having engaged in steam engine building in Providence, R.I.,” three in Boston, 
nine in New York, eleven in Philadelphia, fifteen in Pittsburg, two in Wheeling, seven in Cincinnati, 
and seven in Louisville.  To these he added testimony of some “forty or fifty practical Engineers and 




steamboat act was mere window dressing if the single most important provision for 
guaranteeing safety went unheeded. Gouge believed that leaving a back door open 
with regard to this scientific requirement in effect neutralized all other provisions of 
the law--each was not in itself sufficient for the prevention of explosions; all 
provisions together were.196 
 
Highlighting Gouge’s legal problem was the fact that the local inspectors, and hence 
the supervising inspectors, were not showing much enthusiasm for the safety guards. 
The supervisors had been dragging their feet, reacting to the fears of engineers in 
their districts that Evans’s device, if mandated by the government, would constitute a 
monopoly; such a monopoly would restrict the innovation of the engineers.  Gouge 
believed this was little reason to hold up the safety guards; he thought it imperative to 
deploy the guards as quickly as possible even if the alloy was not yet fully ready.  
They were especially needed in light of a recent rash of accidents.  On February 16, 
1854, the steamboat Kate Kearney in Embree’s district (District Five) exploded, 
killing 15 persons.  The only action the local board could take after the fact was to 
revoke the engineer’s license.  A month later, the steamer Reindeer in District Six 
suffered a flue collapse, killing thirty-eight persons.  The inspectors blamed that 
accident also on the negligence and carelessness of the engineer.  They revoked his 
license, but “he died before he could be prosecuted.”  There were collisions as well, 
which, though not directly related to the boiler problem, contributed generally to the  
                                                 
196  In his notes, Gouge justified the Department’s attention to the procurement of fusible alloy metal 
by citing the usefulness of Evans’s guard:  “The Evans safety guard is a most useful contrivance.  No 




Department’s sense of urgency in pushing safety procedures and technology.  In 
March, the steamboats Fanny Fern and Thomas Swan collided. The Swan sank, boat 
and cargo suffering a total loss, and the Fanny Fern was wrecked and left for salvage.  
Two months later, the steamer Cuba ran upon the wreck of the Fanny Fern, sinking 
the Cuba.197 
 
From a legal standpoint, there was not much the Department could do about the 
supervisors’ lack of cooperation. The Department had no power over the decisions of 
the supervising inspectors; it could only pass judgment on the appointment of board 
members.198  However, at this point Treasury Secretary James Guthrie could 
intervene, and he did. He and Gouge urged the Supervising Inspectors to convene a 
special meeting to act on the true intent of the “suitable manner” provision of the 
ninth section, i.e., to draft a rule that disallowed the use of plates, plugs, and open 
tubes in attempting to meet the requirements of the provision. 
 
In April, the Supervisors convened a special session in Washington to pass such a 
rule. Asked to join in the meetings was chemistry professor John Lawrence Smith 
                                                 
197  On the equivocation of the Board, Gouge wrote, “The Board of Supervising Inspectors held 
meetings at New York in December 1852, and at Pittsburg in August 1853, but do not appear from 
their minutes to have taken any new action in regard to fusible alloys....At their meeting in Cincinnati 
in November 1853 (the first that I attended) the subject came up for discussion, but no new decision 
was made.  1855 2-21. 
198  “The powers granted to the Secretary of the Treasury and the responsibilities imposed on him by 
the law are strictly enumerated the power to make rules and regulations is confided solely to the Board 
of Supervising Inspectors, and if they err therein, they alone are responsible.  Neither has the Treasury 
Department power to take [responsibility] for carrying into effect those rules and regulations, nor 
power to punish the Local Boards for not attending to such directions, except by removing them from 




(1818-1883) of Louisville, Secretary Guthrie’s son-in-law. Smith drafted the 
resolution, which read as follows: 
 
“Resolved, that hereafter in all inspections of passenger steamers, which 
are by law required to have a suitable application of fusible alloyed 
metals, in or upon the flues of the boilers for greater security, the Local 
Inspectors be and are hereby directed not to permit of such application 
by any method which shall not exclude all pressure from the alloy 
which shall tend to separate its components, by enclosing the same in a 
case, or tube, or some equivalent device. Further, that in the preparation 
of the alloys, the temperature at which the same are to be considered as 
fused for the purpose of the law, shall be that temperature at which it is 
semi-fluid, or at which a solid is readily moveable within it.”199 
 
Gouge noted that there had been two main stumbling blocks in adopting the guards, 
and these turned out to be related to the same old concerns by owners and engineers 
over monopoly rights and cost. First, the patented aspect of the invention caused a 
                                                 
199  Special meeting held in Washington in April 1854. Professor Smith worked with the Department as 
a technical consultant on the fusible alloy issue and was related to Secretary James Guthrie by 
marriage. He began his career as a civil engineer; studied chemistry in France; developed an expertise 
in medicine, metallurgy, meteorology, and a host of other sciences; and eventually ran the Louisville 
Gas Works before his death in 1883. Resolution excerpted from Gouge’s notes dated 2-21-1855. The 
reason for the requirement that the alloy fusing point be defined as that corresponding to the state at 
which the alloy was  “semi-fluid” was so that it would be calibrated to correspond with the temperature 
at which Evans’s impeller (or Bache’s upward plunger) would be able to turn freely and activate the 
alarm mechanism. The resolution carefully avoided the specification of a specific device (such as 
Evans’s guard) for employing the fusible alloy.  This got around the discomfort the Supervisors felt 
over the monopoly issue, but this ambiguity would cause problems later, as we shall see.  The new rule 
did enshrine the pressure principle, however, and so in theory the Department found itself in a position 




“delicacy” to be felt in the Supervisors (the Board of Supervisors could not be seen to 
promote a particular invention). Second, owners opposed the additional expense. 
With assurances by Evans that costs would be kept under control, the Board passed 
the resolution.200 
 
Reluctant Local Boards 
 
Despite Smith’s resolution, the local boards failed to act. It was reported that the local 
boards at Wheeling, Louisville, St. Louis, “and other places,” were especially 
reluctant to support the resolution. Of the western ports, only Pittsburgh and 
Cincinnati had begun to apply the resolution “according to its true intent.”201 
 
The greatest hotbed of opposition was St. Louis.  The Supervising Inspector there, 
Davis Embree, came under considerable pressure from his local board to nullify the 
resolution. Embree had received the inspectors’ protest and forwarded it to the 
Treasury Secretary.  The protest was “against what they look upon as [an] improper 
legislative act of the Board of Supervising Inspectors; and they appeal to you [the 
                                                 
200  “The mode of applying the alloy in a cup, had been patented by Mr. C. Evans and to adopt a 
resolution requiring that this mode should alone be used, would be, in effect, to give the patentee a 
[grant] of monopoly.  The Supervisors felt the delicacy of their situation, but after receiving assurances 
from C. Evans that he would not raise the price of his Guards, and also that he would keep a sufficient 
supply in hand at the points where they were wanted, they adopted the… resolution… that all 
appliances known to this Board, which are so arranged as to expose the alloy to the temperature and 
direct pressure of the steam, are unsuitable, and do not accomplish the object of the provisions of the 
law with regard to such alloys, and must therefore be rejected by Inspectors in all inspections hereafter 
made of high pressure boilers…”  See Gouge notes, 1855 2-21. 
201  Western districts failing to apply the resolution, Gouge 1855 2-21.  At Louisville, Gouge thought 
that the supervising inspector there, John Shallcross, “not having been present at the board at their 




Secretary] to correct the mistake into which that Board has fallen, by not knowing the 
effect the measure directed will have… on the Boating interest of this Port.” Embree 
agreed with his local inspectors that if the safety guard were adopted and required on 
all steamboats, the objects of the law would not be accomplished due to the inferior 
nature of the alloy on hand and the “inferior instruments” furnished by Evans (Evans 
could multiply his profits several fold by selling inferior devices, and when they 
malfunctioned, by replacing the defective units at twenty dollars each.)  There was 
also concern over the exclusiveness of the patent:  “While the patent is held by others, 
steam boat officers can not make, or have made, real good instruments in thier [sic] 
port.”  Embree feared that if Congress did not act to limit the price of the safety guard 
(presumably through the government purchase of Evans’s patent), “the commerce, of 
at least this section of the country, will be placed in the power of one man, in a way 
that never was intended by Congress.”202 
 
Gouge, receiving the protest, summed it up for the Secretary:  “At St. Louis, the 
Local Board have presented a remonstrance against [the resolution], because it 
requires the use of a patented invention, and because it will put the owners of steam 
boats to additional expenses.” (See Fig. 33).  The inspectors requested instructions 
from the Secretary on how to proceed in the matter.203  On the concern about patents, 
Gouge countered that “most of the appliances used on steam boats to prevent 
accidents are protected” and that therefore the safety guard was no different.  On the 
                                                                                                                                           
fellow members to adopt the resolution,” had acquiesced to the opposition to the resolution in his 
district. 











Figure 33. Saint Louis waterfront in 1852, a major seat of opposition to the Evans 
guard. Supervisor Crawford complained that lax enforcement here spread dissent to 
his district (upper Ohio River, Pittsburgh). Note the bustling warehouse district with 
stevedores. 
 
                                                                                                                                           




subject of expense, Gouge believed steamboat owners were behind the opposition.  A 
Judge Wells of Missouri had observed that both the Supervising Inspectors and the 
local inspectors at St. Louis were “not deficient in intelligence but… wanting in 
courage to stand up before the Steam Boat interests, and enforce the law according to 
its true intent.”204 
 
Throughout April and May, general alarm spread in the steamboat community from 
Pittsburgh to Cincinnati and St. Louis concerning a possible Evans monopoly. In 
April, local inspectors, engine builders, and “other citizens” of Pittsburgh submitted a 
petition to Congress urging the invention be purchased and made available free of 
charge to the public. Less than two weeks later, steamboat officers, steamboat 
practical engineers, and citizens at Cincinnati (District Seven) placed no fewer than 
three similar petitions before Congress “praying that measures may be taken to make 
Evans safety guard free to the public, by the purchase of his patent right or 
otherwise.”205 
 
The Department was beginning to understand that inventions had political overtones 
for the engineers. Opposition to the safety guard was chiefly a protest against 
“officially sanctioned” innovation.  Evans’s invention was facing what others before 
them, such as Raub’s safety valve, had faced in the 1830s; government sanction 
                                                 
204  Gouge notes, 2-21-1855. 
205  The petitions apparently were never granted. See Pittsburg petition (Journal of the Senate of the 
U.S.A., April 19, 1854), and Cincinnati petition  (Journal of the Senate of the U.S.A., Vol. 45, May 1, 
1854, p. 353).  A Mr. Cooper and Senator Chase presented the petitions, which were referred to the 




threatened the innovation of the shops.206  But there were other issues for the 
engineers as well, namely the consistency and quality of the fusible alloy used in the 
guards, and the fact that some individuals (“the inventor and his friends”) were 
suspected of whipping up aspersions against the engineers for their own profit. We 
shall examine two reports by engineers’ associations covering these charges in a later 
section, but let us first discuss the attempt by the Department to engage a government 
chemist in attempting to develop a reliable fusible alloy upon which the fate of the 
safety guard ultimately rested. 
 
The Treasury Department Attempts to Develop a Reliable Alloy 
 
From early 1854, while the legal aspects of the resolution on the pressure principle 
were being hashed out, the Supervisors tried to develop a suitable fusible alloy.  They 
requested the Secretary to instruct the commandant of the Washington Navy Yard to 
begin developing an accurate alloy so it could eventually be distributed to the local 
boards.  This turned out to be a more difficult undertaking than anyone imagined, 
consuming nearly a year and a half and ending in failure.  Navy Yard scientists and 
                                                 
206  Ironically, some engineers favored a government monopoly for Evans’s Safety Guard over Raub’s 
device at the time. Raub’s device consisted of a flotation device that opened a valve via a lever, see 
House Ex.  Doc. 51, 25 Cong., 2 Sess.  It received a French endorsement, but was opposed by 
Pittsburgh engineers, who protested in memorials to Congress against “any law compelling the use of a 
particular plan of security as inexpedient, inasmuch as ingenious mechanics would thereby be 
discouraged from prosecuting their experiments with a view to perfecting the safety of steam-boilers.”  
They also asked for the appointment of a board of commissioners to test the relative merits of such 
inventions.  See Sen. Doc 188, 26 Cong., 2 Sess., February 15, 1841.  Practical engineer and later local 
inspector of boilers Andrew Watson’s, and Captain Thomas Rogers’s, names appear on the petition.  
Another memorial against the device, see Gov Doc 71, January 25, 1841.  A description of Raub’s 
device and Renwick’s criticism of it to the Navy, see House Ex. Docs. 170 and 171, 25 Cong., 3 Sess. 
(1839).  Renwick had recently been appointed to head a board of commissioners investigating 
inventions.  Review of Raub’s device was prompted by the Act of 1838.  See House Ex. Doc. 99, 25 




engineers noted the tedious nature of the experiments, noting the fact that determining 
the fusing points required many trials. Technical problems abounded owing to 
impurities in the metals used. The result was an unsatisfactorily wide range of fusing 
temperatures; these correlated to pressure differences as high as 40 psi.  Clearly this 
would not do for a “perfect thermometer.” The Treasury Department canceled the 
assignment in the spring of 1854 because of “unnecessary expense, delay in the 
preparation of the alloy, and after all, alloy of a bad quality.”207 
 
As Gouge began to see that the Navy Yard initiative was going nowhere, he 
approached Evans with an offer to purchase the alloy directly from him, offering him 
one dollar a pound.  But Evans drove what Gouge thought an unreasonable bargain; 
he insisted on an annual salary of $1,500, plus expenses, because he had “spent much 
time and much energy in bringing the art to perfection, and he was not willing that the 
public should have the benefit of his labors, without paying for them.”  It was later 
reported that Evans’s friends believed that Evans had in this case acted against his 
own interests and those of the public.  Gouge later regretted his refusal to deal with 
Evans, who would soon be dead.  Gouge wrote in 1855, “Not unfrequently success in 
an art or manufacture depends on a contrivance so simple that any one can apply it 
when he knows how, but which no one can apply who knows nothing about it.  Since 
                                                 
207  Tedious experiments, internal letter, Navy Yard’s H. Hunt to Commodore H. Paulding,  
1853 12-28; Gouge on unnecessary expense and delay, assignment canceled in spring of 1854, see 
1855 2-21; Navy Yard not making alloys quickly enough, see 1854 8-7.  Although not known at the 
time, eutectic alloys made with large proportions of lead are exceedingly difficult to make accurate; the 




Columbus set the world the example of making an egg stand on one end, nobody has 
had any difficulty in performing that feat.”208 
 
In February, Gouge found another source for the development of the alloy: he began 
to inquire into the transferring of the project to metallurgist and chemist James Booth 
of the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia. Booth accepted (Fig. 34). 
 
The argument for pushing development of the fusible alloy forward sooner rather than 
later was echoed by Booth when he took up Gouge’s assignment. Booth, aware of 
Gouge’s conundrum and experiences with the Navy Yard failure, admitted that 
previously he had reached a hasty conclusion that the Department “should not 
sacrifice the care of an engineer for fusible alloy that was not entirely reliable.” But 
he had experienced a change of mind.  He now believed that the Department could 
not employ too many precautions to prevent “the dreadful loss of life by explosions.”  
This was a compromise for the perfectionist Booth, but it highlights the attitude of the 
scientific community and of the government hierarchy at that time--that a self-acting  
mechanism must be employed as an ultimate safety check or insurance policy against 
the frailties of human operators.209 
                                                 
208  Gouge approached Evans in late 1853 or very early 1854:  “On my western journey [to Pittsburgh], 
I had three interviews with Mr. Evans.  I intimated to him, informally and unofficially, that if he would 
consent to supply the alloys at the price Government furnished it to the steam boats, namely one dollar 
a pound, perhaps the Department might be disposed to transfer the business to him.  But he declined 
having anything to do with it, unless he were allowed 1500 dollars per annum, some 400 or 500 dollars 
for fitting up his machinery, and the [illegible] price of the tin, lead and bismuth that form the alloy.  
The demand of a salary of 1500 a year appeared to me unreasonable, for, as the same alloy will serve 
for ten years or more, after the boats are once fully supplied, only a few hundred pounds additional per 
annum would be required.  Mr. Evans, however, intended that he had spent much time and much 








Figure 34. Chemistry Professors James Booth (left) and John Lawrence Smith.  Booth 
(1810-1888) was a U.S. Mint metallurgist affiliated with the Franklin Institute. He 
attempted to replicate Evans’s alloy formula, with mixed success. After conducting 
his own trials, Booth conveyed his doubts that Evans had ever accomplished the 
accuracy of melting points claimed. Smith (1818-1883) worked to convince the 
Supervising Inspectors that Evans’s Safety Guard was the best mechanism for 
employing fusible alloy. 
                                                                                                                                           
of his labors, without paying for them.” 1855 2-21.  Professor Locke remarked on Evans acting against 
his own interests, see 1854 10-21.  Gouge notes on making an egg stand on end, 1855 2-21. 




Meanwhile, The Department hoped it could get around the delicate situation of 
Evans’s patent by clearing Bache’s nearly identical plunging-impeller safety guard 
for use by the local boards.  Thus, in August 1854, Secretary Guthrie wrote Booth 
asking if he thought Evans’s patent necessary.  Booth suggested that the Attorney 
General should make a study of the Evans patent, and in May 1855 a letter was 
received acknowledging that there was no interference between the patents. The 
Attorney General’s office wrote that Evans’s language was “too general and 
sweeping to make his patent exclusive.....Bache’s device may be manufactured 
without infringement.”  This paved the way--in theory at least--for the notion of a 
government-manufactured safety guard combined with government-manufactured 
alloys.  Since the fusible alloy was the soul of the safety guard, these would need to 
be made perfectly reliable, and this was what the government next set out to do.210 
4.3  Making an Egg Stand on End: James Booth’s First 
Experiments with Fusible Alloy (1854) 
 
Having no access to Evans’s fusible alloy formula, in February 1854 the Department 
moved research and manufacturing efforts to James Booth (1810-1888) at the United 
States Mint in Philadelphia.211  Booth was a metallurgist and former University of 
Pennsylvania and Franklin Institute chemistry professor. Secretary Guthrie charged 
him with the importance of the work he was about to embark upon: “many lives 
depend on quality alloy.”  Booth accepted the Secretary’s challenge “cheerfully,” 
                                                 
210  Guthrie to Booth, query, 1854 8-7; Attorney General’s reply, 1855 5-1. 
211  The only establishment in the government that had “the requisite chemical skill.” 1854 2-7. James 
Booth (1810-1888), professor of chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, later, metallurgist at the 




stating that he was willing to superintend the manufacture of the alloy Guthrie 
mentioned.  He promised that there was ample space in the Mint Building in which to 
experiment on the proportions of metals. 
 
Booth’s subsequent correspondence with the Treasury Department is voluminous.  It 
gives much detail about the difficulty of trying to design and manufacture alloys that 
could live up to Bache’s and the Department’s theoretical expectations of the perfect 
mechanical thermometer.  The correspondence also provides a good deal of insight 
into the entire working relationship from the Treasury Department down to the local 
boards in conveying Booth’s scientific expertise to the engineers. 
 
Booth began by examining the report of the Franklin Institute experiments from 1836, 
as well as those of a Swedish metallurgist, an “F. Rudberg.” 212   In both cases, he 
found there were no alloy formulations provided for the necessary temperature 
increments (every ten degrees); he would have to conduct many sets of tedious 
experiments to determine these. There was also the problem with “absolute 
reliability” of the alloys issuing from the Franklin Institute’s discovery that the 
molten alloy’s components too readily separated. Booth was not sure how this could 
be overcome. Another technical problem was that the engineers’ remelting of the 
alloys to fit them in the safety guard could upset the delicate fusing point of the alloy; 
the solution here might be to send out the alloy in a shape that fit the guards. 




pound ingots or disks and ship them out in boxes to the inspection districts, where 
engineers would pour them into the safety guards with special ladles.213 
 
In March, Booth ordered and received quantities of lead, tin, and bismuth for his 
experiments.  He also ordered a small test furnace for melting the alloys.  He noted 
that the special meeting to be held by the Supervising Inspectors in Washington in 
April would include a discussion on how the alloy would be required to be used 
aboard steamboats.  “They [the Supervisors] are of the opinion that if the alloy is not 
used in a form that excludes the pressure of steam, it is worse than useless. Since their 
decisions will be important as to the form of use, I await the results of their 
deliberations [before starting manufacturing].”  In the mean time, he wrote, he had 
conducted some preliminary experiments in which he had measured the melting 
points of the alloy.  The results were not promising.  Some of the alloys had fused at 
their proper points; others had not, and this meant that many more experiments would 
be required in order to establish a reliable range of formulations.214 
 
Uncertainties in the individual formulations were due to the response of the alloys to 
heat depending on which phase the metal was in (solid, soft solid, thick fluid, or thin 
fluid). The transitional states made measurement difficult, he noted; a range of fusing 
                                                                                                                                           
212  Rudberg (dates unknown) was a Swedish physicist who worked with heat theory, expansion 
coefficients of gases, thermometers, and fusible alloys (particularly bismuth, used in the safety guard), 
and was a contemporary of Dalton and Gay-Lussac. 
213  Booth’s boxed shipments consisted of 55 or 56 pounds of alloy, see 1856 11-19.  The ladles 
supplied were later discovered to be defective, leading to erroneous melting points and casting further 




temperatures from a few degrees to 30 degrees and more was possible depending on 
how fusion was defined.  Unfortunately, this range would express too great 
differences in pressure for the higher pressure alloys (these higher pressure alloys 
were for use in the more dangerous high-pressure boilers.)  Further, the pressure 
tables Booth needed simply did not agree with each other.  “I have examined several 
sets of tables showing the correspondence between temperature and pressure, and 
found them quite variable.  The difference is so great that while one table gives a 
certain pressure for a certain temperature, another table gives a difference of 10 and 
even 20 pounds for the same temperature.”  He wanted to obtain from the Supervisors 
a table showing the correspondence between pressure and temperature for the 
pressures they wished to measure “because of the discrepancies between different 
writers and experimenters on this subject.”  The information never came; the 
Supervisors wrote that they had no knowledge of such a table.215  
 
Within a month, with the assistance of a Mr. Morfit, Booth managed to conduct a 
more thorough program of experiments. For these, he used a thermometer enclosed in 
a metal tube (a French method) and measured the point at which the tube could be 
withdrawn from the softening alloy. He was satisfied after this latest series that he 
would be able to prepare a full range of fusible alloys rated to fuse at pressures less 
than 130 psi.  Above this, there were problems: “I am not at all satisfied with any 
                                                                                                                                           
214  See 1854 4-6. 
215  Discrepancies in the fusing point were due to the different purities of metals of the various 
experimenters, as well as the different laboratory and manufacturing techniques of the investigators.  
See St. Louis engineers’ report, 1854 10-2. Booth: “If Evans or analogous method be adopted (and I 




proportion of metals composing alloys, which are designed to express pressures 
above 130 pounds, it being difficult to determine their melting point, or point of 
moderate fluidity, within 10 to 30 degrees of temperature.”  This was a serious 
stumbling block for Gouge and Booth because it was precisely the more dangerous 
higher pressure boilers operating in the 130-160-psi range that the Department wished 
to protect against. Booth inquired of the Secretary what the supervisors’ views were 
with regard to the use of alloys with “the apparatus.” Secretary Guthrie replied three 
days later that the alloys must be used “on the principle of Evans’s safety guard.”216 
 
With the instructions of the Secretary in hand, Booth proceeded under the assumption 
that the alloys would have to be made to work with the Evans Guards. This posed a 
challenge for Booth. Such a mechanism would have a great effect on the practical 
fusing points of the alloy.  He reported to the Secretary in early May that “The further 
I progress in my experiments, the more I realize it is essential for me to experiment 
directly with the Evans apparatus, which the Board of Supervisors has adopted, to 
determine the practical fusing points of alloys.”  He had determined that the alloy 
demonstrating the best reliability (i.e., expressing the narrowest pressure range for a 
                                                                                                                                           
passes through alloy, but a limiting range of many pounds pressure should be allowed because of want 
of exactness even in this fusing point.” 1854 4-11. 
216  This instruction of the Secretary’s was not quite correct.  The Supervisors’ resolution required the 
local inspectors be instructed “not to permit of alloy application by any method which shall not 
exclude all pressure from the alloy which shall tend to separate its components.”  The alloy was to be 
“enclosed in a case or tube… (etc),” but no part of the resolution singled out Evans’s device as a 
requirement.  This seeming fine point would be a major source of problems for the Supervisors in 
1859, when the safety guard issue came to a head. Booth’s inquiry of the Secretary, see 1854 4-28. 
Secretary Guthrie’s answer:  “The Board of Supervisors at their late meeting at Washington adopted a 
resolution… [that it is] imperative to use fusible alloys on the principle of Evans’ Safety Guard,”  
1854 5-1.  The Committee drafting the resolution consisted of Crawford, Embree, Burnett, and 





given temperature) was the one having a ratio of seven parts of tin to four parts of 
lead.  “This is the alloy usually quoted as showing the reliability of the fusible alloys, 
& has led to some error in overestimating their value.”217   But in order to express a 
pressure above 130 psi would require an alloy that fused at a higher temperature, and 
no one had been able to produce such an alloy except, presumably, Evans himself.  
For high pressures, a different ratio of metals would be required, and the alloys 
having these ratios had been showing poor reliability in Booth’s experiments.  Booth 
had deduced that using either of two high-temperature alloys (1:4 tin to lead, allowing 
the tube to be withdrawn at 420 deg F; and 2:4 tin to lead, withdrawing the tube at 
380 deg F) would allow an unacceptably large 65-degree temperature range, and this 
translated to a difference in pressure of 100 psi (!)  Clearly, this would produce an 
alloy that would be “absolutely valueless.”  He decided to lower his (and the 
Department’s) expectations.  If the Secretary could tell Booth when and where he 
might obtain a safety guard, he could proceed to manufacture alloys for pressures of 
130 psi and below, bringing to a close his preliminary investigations.  “For greater 
pressures, my data are too unsatisfactory as yet.”218  (See Fig. 35).  
                                                 
217  This translates to 64 percent tin and 36 percent lead (Calculation: 7/11 ratio = .64 for the tin 
fraction.)  On the chart, therefore, the useful range of fusing points is clustered in a small circle near 
the intersection of the phase-change lines (at the 60/40 ratio).  Beyond this cluster, the transition zone 
from solid to liquid widens such that the phase change is ambiguous; the resulting variable 
temperatures give a range of pressures that widens unacceptably. 
218  “…for that point ought to be taken, & only that one, as the fusing point, at which Evans’ guard will 
give the alarm.  Which point in the extremes of 65 degrees is it?”  The experiments were laborious for 
Booth and his assistant. Booth wrote the Treasury Secretary, “When you wished me to enter the… 
enquiry… I supposed that something more definite was known in relation to alloys, but I have been 
obliged to proceed step by step by experimenting upon numerous alloys of tin & lead, and of tin, lead, 
and bismuth… the results of the experiments are only ascertained by slow observation, repeated more 
than once… much time is consumed upon them.”  A government official, perhaps the Secretary, wrote 
on the wrapper of Booth’s correspondence:  “Try and get apparatus for Booth . . .” 1854 5-5. Five days 
letter Guthrie notified Booth that several models of safety guards were being sent to the Mint by Evans 






























Figure 35. Modern phase diagram for a fusible alloy similar to the one developed  
by Booth. The circle indicates the quite limited useful range of temperatures 
observed by Booth owing to the sluggishness with which the alloy changed from 
solid to liquid. As the triangular area marked “thick and sticky” diverges toward the 
right of the figure, the alloy becomes less accurate in its fusing point. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Evans sent his best model, and Booth used this device to manufacture alloys for the lower pressures, 
1854 5-10. Initially, Evans had sent his cheapest alarm-only models (the models most likely to be 




In May, Supervising Inspector Davis Embree wrote the Secretary wishing to 
know if Booth had yet succeeded in making the alloy more reliable.  Embree 
was also running short of fusible alloy, alloy that presumably had been 
furnished by Evans.  “We are nearly out of Alloys stamped 150 and 160.  It 
will require about 100 lbs of 150 stamps, & 50 lbs of 160 stamps to supply the 
Boats at this port.”  Embree also took the opportunity to strike a blow for his 
engineers.  He wanted the words "alloyed metals" removed from Law, due to 
fears of the Evans monopoly.  “If the words Alloyed Metals were out of the 
law; we could readily introduce other safe appliances.”  If Congress could not 
act in the present session, Embree asked, could it not pass a resolution to allow 
the local inspectors to suspend use of the alloyed metals until legislation could 
be drafted?  Embree’s request met with silence.219 
 
By September, frustrated by problems in formulating alloy for the higher 
operating pressures, Booth prodded Gouge to help him fast track his research 
by stealing some of Evans’s alloy. The trigger for this request was likely the 
fact that Evans had just died or was near death, his alloy secret threatening to 
disappear with him. Gouge, who was visiting Crawford in Pittsburgh at the 
time, indulged Booth’s wish, communicating his plans in a letter marked 
“PRIVATE” to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Peter G. Washington: 
 
                                                 
219  “I would inquire whether Professor Booth has succeeded in getting an Alloy for high temperatures 
more reliable than [those] in use, if so, would it not be well to furnish some of it to St. Louis.”  The St. 




“I have seen Professor Booth.  He can come to no satisfactory 
conclusion in respect to the alloys but he has the means of testing them 
with a boiler.  Mr. C. Evans told me that he himself was experimenting 
on the alloys for a whole year, before he hit upon the true method of 
preparing them.  In what this consists, he refused to tell.  But it 
[seems] to me that it would be an advantage to Professor Booth, if he 
had some of the alloys prepared by Mr. Evans to experiment on.  
Perhaps the [result] consists in adding some chemical ingredient.  If so 
Mr. Booth, would [deduce] what it is by analysis.  He would like much 
to have some of Mr. Evans’ alloys, if they could be obtained in a 
private way: and Mr. Crawford could probably obtain them without 
letting it be known for what purpose they are intended.”220 
 
It is not known if this plan for amateur industrial espionage ever panned out.  If 
nothing else, it was a sign that panic was setting in at the Department over Evans’s ill 
health and the decision to embark on a difficult research program, especially with 
growing calls by the inspectors to put the safety guard on ice until the alloys could be 
made reliable.221 
                                                                                                                                           
believed the guards were poorly manufactured, and thus the more they failed, the more dollars would 
accrue to Evans. See 1854 5-23. 
220  See 1854 9-8. 
221  A month later, the Department solicited a summary report from Booth as to his progress in 
preparing the alloys.  The Secretary wished the report for his own annual report to Congress.  
Curiously, Booth was also informed that the Department had taken no position as to the merits of the 
Evans guard. “I will be obliged to you if you will make a report in full as to what you have done in 
relation to the preparation of fusible alloys.....  Mr. C. Evans Safety Guard and Safety Alarm will 
receive the attention they merit: but, it is impossible to state at this moment to what conclusion the 




Booth spent most of 1854 trying to create a more reliable alloy. Mostly this was an 
altruistic undertaking. He managed to prod the Department to procure a small $500 
test boiler for his experiments, but he paid for bringing water into the laboratory 
himself.  He paid the extra rent occasioned by the hazard of a steam boiler on the 
premises out of his own funds, as well as personally taking on the expense of 
preparing alloys during the first five months of activity.  When he was not pursuing 
official Mint business, he labored to set up the casting furnace for the alloys, and he 
obtained the necessary casting pot, marking punches, fuel, and cast iron “shoe” 
molds.  In February, a year after he had begun, Booth had compiled a table of fusing 
points, the first of its kind.  Notably, the table stopped at 110 psi.222 
 
4.4  Evans’s Death, Jane Evans, and Booth’s Production of 
Fusible Alloy (1854-1858) 
 
In the summer or fall of 1854, Cadwallader Evans died.  His widow, Jane Evans, 
inherited his “secret” of manufacturing fusible alloy.  She approached the Secretary 
through an intermediary in October, explaining that when Evans was sick, she had 
superintended the weighing and mixing of the alloy, so she would be able to continue 
its manufacture.  She also intended to manufacture the safety guard in her own name. 
                                                                                                                                           
1854 10-28. The Department’s sudden ambivalence likely was a reflection of hesitation by the 
Supervising Inspectors to embrace the alloys, which were under attack in their districts. 
222  In “Results of Experiments on Fusible Alloys,” enclosed with other 1855 2-22 materials. Although 
there were spaces left for temperatures corresponding to higher pressures, these were left blank.  
Ironically, Booth had trouble getting fire insurance for the building; the insurers were afraid the boiler 
would explode and burn it down. The shoe molds came from the Mint’s stocks (1855 2-22), and the tin 
was procured from Trotter’s in Philadelphia, a company that is still in existence (1859 7-7). Booth’s 




She offered to provide the alloy to the government under contract at the price of 
Gouge’s old offer, one dollar per pound.223 
By now, of course, Gouge had already engaged Booth in the manufacturing 
enterprise.224  Gouge kept his options open, although he preferred to keep the alloy 
under the government’s roof, for cost reasons.  He noted that if Booth could not 
succeed in making the alloy reliable, Jane Evans could supply it. In that event, 
Professor Smith would be retained to test her alloys for accuracy.  This arrangement 
served to satisfy all parties; as long as there was promise that Booth could 
manufacture a satisfactory range of alloys, owners could be instructed to install Jane 
Evans’s safety guards while using alloy issued from the U.S. Mint. Booth would 
distribute his alloys, the quality of which was adequate for the lower pressures.  For 
the higher pressures between 110 and 160 psi, the plan was to use “simple plugs of 
the fusible metal… as formerly practiced.”  The Evans Safety Guard would be the 
specified device for employing the alloy.225 226 
                                                                                                                                           
Department regarding excessive laboratory room rent, see 1859 1-3.  It had taken nearly a year for 
Booth to derive the fusing points table that he had sought from the chemical community in April 1854. 
223  Evans died in the summer or fall of 1854, see 1854 10-21, “Evans is lately deceased.” Prof. John 
Locke to TS Guthrie.  The Jane Evans offer is captured in 1854 10-19; the intermediary was a D. 
Benson. Jane Evans noted that “The gentleman appointed by the government to manufacture the alloys 
has resigned.”  This was undoubtedly Booth’s assistant Clarence Morfit, who left Philadelphia about 
this time to help establish the U.S. Mint’s New York Assay Office.  Jane Evans was intimating that 
with Morfit’s departure, the Mint could not keep up with the government’s demand for alloy. NY 
Assay Office sources (to place date of activity):  See http://home.eznet.net/~dminor/NYNY1853.html, 
1853 3-3, and 1854 5-5. 
224  Booth begins formulating and manufacturing alloy;  See Booth’s retrospective letter dated  
1859 1-3. 
225  Booth’s announced plan to use plugs for higher pressures is puzzling.  Presumably, most 
steamboats operated in the higher pressure ranges and would require safety guards.  It is therefore 
likely that the lower pressure alloys were used in safety guards on these steamboats in addition to the 
plugs.  This would explain the “nuisance factor” of safety guards giving false alarms as retold by 






Booth now began to receive alloy orders from the local boards, although inspectors in 
some districts were still dragging their feet in making requests.  Supervising 
Inspectors Crawford (Seventh) and Shallcross (Sixth), for instance, wished a 
postponement of use of the alloy, “until Booth completes his studies of the different 
apparatus.....  The government alloys we have received before now have been 
defective.” (These were the Navy Yard alloys).  The “different apparatus” the 
Supervisors had in mind consisted of Bache’s and Booth’s modified safety guards 
(among others)--all intended to circumvent Evans’s patent monopoly.  Sensitive to 
the monopoly problems associated with linking the alloy to Evans’s guard, Booth had 
expanded his workload to experiment with alternative mechanisms.  He wrote that 
although he had little time to work with mechanical devices, he had learned that the 
most complex devices were those having rotating spindles.  In October, he published 
a report on these and other mechanisms used in safety guards.227  
                                                                                                                                           
226  With a strategy determined, Booth worried about manufacturing arrangements and cost. 
Manufacturing alloy at the Mint brought with it a range of peculiar problems.  He feared that bringing 
in workmen to manufacture the alloy in bulk would expose the Mint’s gold to theft or lead to its 
contamination; he therefore gave serious consideration to manufacturing the alloys outside of the Mint 
building.  This idea was later abandoned in favor of production in Booth’s own laboratory, “to save 
expenses.”  Cost of workmen was also a concern. Booth wanted to turn out a sufficient quota of alloy 
pieces for the many steamboats receiving safety guards, but he was afraid to ask for more assistants--
the Secretary had stipulated economy in the operation.  Nevertheless, after an oblique request, within a 
month help came. By March, in response to a “brisk demand” for the alloy, Booth had three assistants 
turning out three fifty-pound batches per day.  Tests were conducted on the first and last samples of 
each batch, and then the alloy was stamped with the correct pressure and packed in small kegs so they 
could be rolled about until transported.  Booth attached a one-page instruction sheet with each batch of 
alloy instructing the installer to make sure the metal tube of the safety guard touched the boiler’s flue. 
1855 3-13. 
227  See 1855 3-20, 1855 3-31, 1855 6-6, 1855 7-14, 1855 8, 1855 8-23, 1855 8-27, 1855 9-22, 1855 
10-10, 1855 11-2. Booth’s pamphlet entitled, “Report on Apparatus for the Use of Fusible Alloys in 
Steam Boilers,” was dated August 1855. The pamphlet was reprinted in the Proceedings of the Fourth 
Annual Meeting of the Board of Supervising Inspectors held at St. Louis, October 10, 1855, p.56, 
author’s index nos. 2C3, 2C5. Booth distributed a pamphlet version to supervising and local inspectors, 





Booth also reiterated the pressure principle in describing the segregating tendencies 
of fusible alloys when exposed to pressure.  He discussed the characteristics of fusible 
alloys and showed the “best form for [an alloy] plug” for the higher operating 
pressures (110-160 psi).  These simple plugs were to be placed in the boiler without 
being part of a safety guard, and were vociferously opposed by at least one or two 
“scientific” inspectors.228  
 
On May 23, 1855, Jane Evans wrote the Secretary complaining that steamboats were 
leaving port without Evans’s guards, and she was losing money. Her correspondence 
                                                                                                                                           
apparatus for using fusible alloy.” The pamphlet gave several alternatives besides Evans’s device for 
employing the fusible alloy.  The text described three types of guards: guards with circular movements 
(Evans's rotating impeller); vertical movement (Evans’s downward and Bache's upward plungers); and 
lateral movement (no inventor given).  These constituted an enlarged selection of safety guards based 
on the pressure principle and which would be in principle acceptable to the inspectors and engineers. 
Booth wished to “lay before the Board of Supervisors the whole subject of forms of apparatus [that] 
may be advantageously employed,” trusting in their experience to determine the best form. “Other 
kinds of motion in the alloys can be imagined, such as of a lever placed vertically in an oblong box and 
tube, with its fulcrum about the middle . . . but these and the above are merely thrown out suggestively, 
in order that machinists may avail themselves of the principles involved in them, and bring them into 
successful operation.” There was a printing run of 225 copies (although an order was placed for 500 
copies of the artwork showing the mechanisms). Booth sent a copy to Bache of the Coast Survey, “for 
I availed myself of a suggestion of his for the vertical movement.” This was the nippers arrangement 
shown in the report’s Figure 1, designed so the operator did not have to manually reset the apparatus 
after a firing. Artwork was not included in the pamphlet, but rather was inserted in the 1855 
Proceedings, on p. 56. 
228  Local inspector James Curry of New Orleans (District Four) did not agree with Booth’s strategy for 
using simple plugs of fusible alloy for the higher pressures, or for any pressure for that matter.  Curry 
had written the Department in January 1854 denouncing fusible alloy plugs. The plugs could not be 
applied “in a suitable manner,” i.e., in accordance with the pressure principle, because they were not 
protected in a tube. He dismissed a report of St. Louis engineers that was critical of the alloy and of the 
safety guards (the report “does not deserve a passing notice”). Curry was fighting a seeming never-
ending battle in his district. He had in the past year revoked the licenses of twelve engineers, mostly 
for loading the safety valve or fastening down Evans’s safety guards or other devices.  See 1854 11-1. 
Booth met with Crawford over the summer to discuss the alloy and plugs; he was impressed with 
Crawford’s intelligence and experience. Booth made no recommendations to the Department on plugs, 
his experience being only “theoretical” with regard to them; the inspectors were better with the 




is interesting because it shows how personal factors create pressure on decision-
makers with regard to the implementation of a technology.  She wrote: 
 
“I  would respectfully call your attention to the fact that 
notwithstanding the fusible alloy has been prepared by Prof. Boothe 
[sic] (at considerable expense to Government) for more than 3 months, 
yet the Steamboat Inspectors, both at this place and St. Louis and I 
believe in Cincinnati also fail entirely in performing the duties of their 
office as required by the Law in permitting boats to leave without the 
Alloy attached to their boilers in suitable manner and in giving said 
boats certificates that they have complied in all respects with the law.  
I did not understand the reason of this and I went to Philadelphia last 
week and seen [sic] Prof. Boothe who informed me that he had the 
Alloy made and subject to the order of the Hon. Secretary of the 
Treasury and I would have went [sic] to Washington City and saw 
[sic] you but had to return on account of my daughter’s illness.  I hope 
you will call the attention of the Inspectors to this subject and return 
me a favourable answer as soon as convenient as the Law is 
disregarded and I have already lost at least Two Thousand Dollars 
($2000) by the neglect of these men to procure & apply the fusible 
Alloy.”229 
                                                 
229  1855 7-23. The words, “in suitable manner” in the handwritten letter were added between the lines 
of text, indicating that they were a late addition, either by Jane Evans or by the copyist; someone was 
invoking the applicable provision of the ninth section of the steamboat law.  From this, we can surmise 
that some owners were installing non-Evans safety guards, or perhaps other unacceptable devices that 




It is not known if the Department responded, but by October, Booth had shipped out 
more than 300 pounds of alloy to various districts, noting at the same time that 
business was diminishing rapidly.  Officially, the Supervising Inspectors still 
supported the safety guard and fusible alloy, but evidently they were beginning to 
look askance at government alloy; there had been discussions of giving up the guards, 
including fusible alloy, and going over to plugs of pure tin.230 (See Fig. 38). 
 
From the summer of 1856 through 1857, despite Booth’s proclamations that he would 
succeed in manufacturing reliable alloys at the higher pressures, experimental results 
were indicating otherwise.  Experiments supervised by Professor Smith aboard the 
steamboat Reindeer reported in November disconcerting inconsistencies in the fusing 
points for the higher pressure alloys (i.e., those rated 140 psi and 150 psi).  In the 
experimental runs, the fusing points were at least 10 or 15 degrees Fahrenheit too 
high. Compounding the failure was the fact that the local boards had ceased placing 
orders for the alloy altogether.  As a result of the experiments, William M. Gouge 
conceded that Booth might not have possessed the ability to make the alloys as well  
as Evans after all.  Still, he had difficulty reconciling this cognitive dissonance; he 
remarked that Evans’s samples had fused consistently in a series of repeated firings as 
                                                                                                                                           
support for the position of Jane Evans, a new widow suffering a loss of income, was tied to internal 
decisions about the safety guard, but there is no direct proof of this.  
230  Two hundred pieces of alloy went to Embree (St. Louis) over the summer, 1855 7-30, and 125 
pounds (about 125 pieces) to Nashville.  In addition, Wheeling had placed an order, quantity unknown. 
Changing from fusible alloy in a safety guard to plugs of pure tin, 1855 10-10. In the Supervisors’ 
1856 Proceedings, p. 29, there is a reference to the Supervisors advocating a revision of the ninth 









Figure 36. Captain John Shallcross, Supervising Inspector of the Sixth District, 
Louisville. According to T. J. Haldeman, Shallcross originated the “ridiculous idea” 





 evaluated by a “committee of practical and scientific men at Pittsburgh.”231 Gouge 
had picked up the item on the Pittsburgh tests from Cadwallader Evans’s 1850 
Treatise.  The experiments had been conducted in the late 1840s by “a Committee 
composed of scientific and practical gentlemen,” and repeated in a second series by 
Professor Locke, whom Evans had characterized as one of “many [who] are 
illustrious in the departments of science, and associated in the annals of the country, 
with the progress of the arts.  These men cannot be deceived—cannot easily be 
mistaken. With splendid reputations at stake, they would not give hasty opinions, 
founded upon half-tried experiments.”  
 
For his part, Booth was not convinced of the scientists’ claims. After spending nearly 
three years in his laboratory trying to replicate Evan’s results using an array of quirky 
metals, he wrote the Department expressing his doubt that Evans had ever been able 
to make a reliable high-pressure alloy as advertised. Nevertheless, Booth admitted 
                                                 
231  Business diminishing by the end of 1856, see Gouge’s and Booth’s retrospective notes, 1859 1-3 
(Gouge) and 1859 4-11 (Booth). January 1857 appears to be the correct date for Booth’s fall-off in 
business, however, as recorded in his 1857 1-12 letter.  Apparently Booth was confused in a summary 
account he gave the Secretary of the alloy business in 1859 in response to a Departmental query about 
the rental costs of his laboratory space:  “No orders have been received by me since the fall of 1856,” 
he wrote, see 1859 4-11.  (Booth’s summary account to the Secretary was in response to accusations 
that Booth was using the government’s portion of the alloy laboratory for other than official purposes 
[rent: $300].  He wrote, “The allegation to the Department shows a misunderstanding of the facts.”  He 
regretted the suggestion by "someone" that he was using premises rented by government for his own 
purposes.  He said he had kept the Department informed of the trailing off of business, but the 
Department had kept silent in the matter. He listed the remaining inventory of equipment as follows: a 
small boiler, various stocks of metals, 1000 pounds of fusible alloys from 60 to 160 psi.  Booth offered 
his defense "in simple justice to myself," not in a "vaunting spirit." From retrospective letter 1859 1-3.  
The Department reluctantly agreed to pay the room rent on the laboratory, 1858 11-17.)  On the quality 
of Booth’s alloy, Gouge noted in his 11-1856 letter that “Professor Booth, a melter and refiner at the 
Mint in Philadelphia, has high and important duties to perform.  It is only the little leisure his official 
duties allow him that he can devote to the preparation of fusible alloys.  It is easy to believe that, under 
such circumstances, the alloys prepared by him, may not be as good as those that were prepared by Mr. 
Evans.”  Still, for purposes of safety, Booth’s alloy should suffice to meet the safety requirements of 




that when he had commenced preparation of the alloys, he had doubted their utility; 
now he was surer of their usefulness and he urged the Department not to abandon 
them.232 
 
The Last Demands for Government Alloy 
 
By the winter of 1856, Booth shipped out the last of his alloy pieces to the local 
boards in several southern and western states (Fig. 37).  He shipped two boxes to 
New Orleans, five boxes to Mobile, two boxes to Louisville, and one box to 
Cincinnati.  These orders constituted an estimated 500 pieces of alloy.  It is not 
known how much alloy had already gone to the northern and eastern districts—we 
know of 300—or how much alloy was kept in storage until needed, but we can safely 
guess that enough metal for at least 300 to 400 working steamboats had by now 
shipped to the key ports of the country, and perhaps double that amount.  This  
                                                                                                                                           
1859 [D47] on Booth’s admission that the ladles used to pour the alloy in the safety guards were 
defective, throwing off the alloy’s melting points.) 
232  Experiments aboard the Steamboat Reindeer, see Gouge’s draft letter dated 11-1856, in RG 41, 
Vol. 6, Item 64, author’s IMG 1693-1711.  Letter addressed to Supervisor Davis Embree; it is not 
known if this document was ever transmitted to him. Repeated tests aboard the Reindeer had revealed 
that at higher pressures the fusing temperatures were at least 15 to 20 degrees too high (and, 
investigators remarked, would have climbed higher had experiments not had to be terminated at an 
expressed pressure of 165 psi due the danger of explosion). Complicating the experiments was the fact 
that the alloy had assumed a “mushy character,” i.e., was not perfectly fluid. (Note: this is the behavior 
of the alloy in the two triangular zones in the phase diagram of eutectic alloy provided in an earlier 
figure.) The Reindeer was likely the same boat that had suffered a flue collapse in March 1854, killing 
38 persons, as reported in Proc 10-10-1854 (but there is no way to know this for certain, since 
duplicate names abounded in the steamboat fleets). Pittsburgh tests, see Evans’s Treatise, 1850, p. 37. 



























Figure 37. An 1855 Adams’ Package Express receipt for four boxes of alloy being 
shipped to Embree’s district. Each box contained between 50 to 55 pieces, at one 








confirms that the major government initiative to push the safety guards occurred in 
the 1855-1856 time frame.233 
 
In January 1857, Supervisor Benjamin Crawford submitted an amended bill to 
Congress favoring plugs of tin over fusible alloy.  Booth opposed the bill; he noted 
that a combined remedy (i.e., fusible alloys and tin plugs) would secure safety more 
thoroughly than abandoning fusible alloys altogether.  Booth now claimed to be 
impressed with the safety guard’s value as an “acting thermometer.”  However, 
Crawford’s amendment was gaining momentum among the supervising and local 
inspectors and evidently was having an effect on the demand for alloy.  As orders to 
Booth from the local boards dried up, Crawford drew attention to the “signal failures” 
of government alloy in the 1858 Proceedings of the Board of Supervising Inspectors.  
He took a further step by introducing a resolution to form a committee to investigate 
“rescinding the resolution in regard to fusible alloys passed by the Board on April 13, 
1854.”234 
 
                                                 
233  Adams Express facilitated the second set of shipments in November and December 1856. Booth 
was precise in his notekeeping. In addition to recording the destinations of the alloy, he noted that one 
box of alloy weighed about 50-56 pounds, and each piece of alloy weighed about a pound. Thus, each 
box contained approximately 50 pieces of alloy.  See 1856 11-19, 1856 12, 1856 12-1. Booth’s actions 
to distribute his latest batch of alloy appear to have again provoked the engineers’ fear of monopoly. In 
January 1857, “citizens navigating the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers” (likely these were engineers and 
steamboat owners) making “remonstrance against the ninth section of the 1852 bill, praying the 
government to purchase and make free Evans’ Safety Guard.” 1857 1-7.  That same month, Booth 
lamented that he had “received orders a second time [for alloy] from only a few local inspectors.” He 
feared that “previously existing prejudices remain against their utility.” 1857 1-12. 
234  Booth impressed with safety guard’s value, 1857 1-12. Crawford noted signal failures of 




4.5  Gouge’s Perspective on the Safety Guard (versus that of 
the Practical Engineers) 
 
Before proceeding to the final act of the safety guard drama in this chapter - - the 
final confrontation between Treasury Secretary Cobb (and Gouge) and the 
supervising inspectors in 1859 over the safety guard - - we shall examine three 
documents that emerged between 1854 and 1856 that allow us to compare the 
attitudes of the key parties toward expertise.  One document is a lengthy reaction of 
Gouge’s toward a critic of the safety guard, local inspector James W. McCord of  
St. Louis, who has raised objections to government alloy on grounds that it is 
inaccurate with respect to pressure.235  In this document, Gouge argues that McCord 
is mistaken because the safety guard is designed to react to temperature, not pressure, 
and hence McCord has missed the whole point of fusible alloy as successor to the 
inadequate safety valve.  Gouge also attacks McCord for undermining the steamboat 
law by selective enforcement based on “[McCord’s] own practical views of the law’s 
expediency.”  The other two documents are reports from two engineers’ associations, 
at St. Louis and Wheeling, in which they attack government fusible alloy for its 
reliance on the incomplete and inconsistent results of scientists.236  The reputation of 
the engineers is upheld as the only sure way to guarantee safety from explosions.  Let 
the safety guard stand or fall on its own merits, they pronounce. 
 
                                                 
235  The draft letter or memorandum is 1856 11, NARA Vol. 6, item no. 64. It is seventeen handwritten 
pages. 
236  Wheeling, 1854 9-25; and St. Louis, 1854 10-2.  The Wheeling report is one handwritten page; the 




Comparing all of these documents side by side is important because they neatly sum 
up the roles and claimed territories of the opposing parties in the debate.  In the 
reports, we see clearly the outlines of the different perspectives of the groups we have 
introduced in earlier chapters—scientist, inventor, government official, practical 
engineer.  We learn how their professional and experiential biases provide different 
outcomes with regard to what they perceive as expertise. 
 
Before discussing these documents in detail, it is important to understand the voices 
and perspectives of the actors.  
 
Gouge’s bias is toward the work of establishment scientists and inventor Cadwallader 
Evans.  He accepts the received knowledge of the safety guard as a flawless and 
accurate scientific instrument and argues that the universal principles of chemistry in 
the laboratory do not differ from those principles put to practical use on the rivers.237  
More importantly, this received knowledge is seen by Gouge as the linchpin of the 
legal authority of the steamboat act itself.  He remarks that the safety guard will make 
a “fair experiment” of the act, and censures subordinate officers such as McCord for 
trying to decide on their own (in the absence of a complete scientific understanding) 
the merits of the device.  Coming through in Gouge’s letter in a subtle way is the 
view that although scientific truth is the foundation of the Department’s technological 
                                                 
237  “Perhaps it will be said that these were only experiments in a laboratory. And so they were. But the 
laws of nature are the same in the laboratory and on board a steam boat.  And however difficult may be 
the condition of things on board the steam boat from what they are in the laboratory, they cannot affect 
the principle that, if there is a sufficiency of water in the boiler, the fusible alloy will melt at a very 
different pressure from what it will if there is a deficiency of water, or if the steam is, in any other way, 




strategy, the more important principle is that government legal authority must not be 
challenged. Gouge sees himself as a conservative defender of the scientific status quo 
and of the legal order, whereas McCord is the uninformed disrupter of that order.238 
 
The St. Louis and Wheeling engineers’ voice upholds real-world science 
supplemented by man in control of technology by virtue of his character, skill, and 
training (rather than control by the self-acting mechanism).  As practical men, the 
most important principle is that engineers have a duty to put the ideas of scientists to 
the test in the real world.  The practical manifestation of a scientific idea should stand 
or fall “on its own merits” and not simply be granted authority as a useful practical 
invention because it is supported by the opinions and manipulations of interested 
parties (i.e., the inventor and his friends).  Here we see the self-defined role of the 
practical engineer as “applied scientist,” or technical arbiter of scientific knowledge 
as it is received from scientists.  The engineers’ words betray a sense that their 
perceived equal role in the development of practical scientific knowledge is not 
sufficiently acknowledged; they believe their positions should carry the same 
authority and respect as that of the “first men of the country” (scientists).239 
                                                 
238  Gouge’s aforementioned quote is here repeated: “The Evans Safety Guard is a most useful 
contrivance.  No fair experiment could be made of the law of 1852 unless they be generally adopted.” 
1855 2-21. 
239  The engineers’ reports were solicited by Joseph Sweegar, Local Inspector at Louisville (sixth 
inspection district) (see 1854 11-7).  To Gouge, who received them in Washington, the reports must 
have seemed unwelcome.  The engineers’ approach to testing science is a respectful one, but one that 
challenges the status quo.  One is tempted to perceive a tinge of ambition in the report; the engineers 
appear to want to take over the scientists’ role, as evidenced by a desire to conduct their own 
experiments.  But this would be a misperception.  The engineers’ only wish is to assume the role of 
“cross-checkers” of science, and then to be respected and left alone in their judgments as they 
selectively apply scientific knowledge to their machines.  They are too respectful of the institution of 
science and of scientists to usurp science, but they plead for an independent role as practical experts, 





The Gouge Memorandum:  The Known versus the Unknown “But as a Cup of 
Water to the Ocean” 
 
We shall first examine Gouge’s memorandum, written in November 1856.  
Ostensibly, Gouge wrote this 6000-word memorandum for Supervising Inspector 
Davis Embree, in which Gouge defended the Evans safety guard and fusible alloy.  
The memorandum was in response to a recent letter of Embree’s in which a local 
inspector at Saint Louis, James W. McCord, had criticized the safety guard, and in 
particular, the inconsistency of operation of the fusible alloy on which the invention 
was based.  McCord noted that he had gathered accounts from some 80 steamboats. 
On these steamboats, the alloy used had melted at points that varied between 10 and 
30 pounds per square inch pressure.240  Gouge attacked McCord for basing his 
argument on the fact that the fusing point discrepancy was in pounds per square inch, 
not degrees, since fusible alloy was designed to react to temperature, not pressure. He 
pointed out that the alloy’s fusing at different pressures testified to its usefulness 
rather than its disutility.  He wrote: 
 
“These alloys are not intended primarily as indicators of pressure (as 
Mr. McCord seems to have supposed), but as indicators of heat… It is 
                                                                                                                                           
disagreement will soon become a symbol of disobedience and intractability with regard to the authority 
of science and the legal establishment of the United States.  This is what Gouge means when he states 
that “no fair experiment” can be made of the Act of 1852 without the safety guards. 
240  McCord: “I have… evidences of some eighty boats before me where these alloys have been 
applied, together with the evidences of many intelligent and observant engineers who have used them, 




most astonishing that so intelligent a man as Mr. McCord would have 
supposed that fusible alloys are of no use, because they melt under 
different degrees of pressure, according to the circumstances of their 
[sic] being a plenty or a scarcity of water in the boiler, in according to 
the circumstance of the steam being, or not being surcharged with 
heat.  It is most astonishing that he should use as an argument against 
fusible alloys, that which is the chief argument in their favor.”241 
 
Gouge’s point was that the alloy would fuse when the iron became red hot, and this 
could occur at a full range of pressures depending on the water level in the boiler.  
Gouge cited Haldeman’s observation that in his experience, the same composition of 
alloy had fused at a 100-psi pressure difference depending on whether the water in the 
boiler was at a normal level or had dropped below the flues.242 
 
Evidently, what had thrown McCord off was that a pressure number was stamped on 
the alloys, and the fact that the steamboat act had expressed the alloy requirement in 
terms of pressure (alloys applied to the inside boilers were to be “10 pounds greater 
                                                                                                                                           
not in one isolated exception have the results been anything like satisfactory; thus showing practically, 
and, I think, conclusively, that the results thereof are not to be trusted or relied upon.” 
241  Gouge’s emphasis. 
242  Evans remarked in his 1850 Treatise on page 10 that iron loses its tenacity at 570 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Gouge noted that at 349 degrees (presumably red-hot iron), the pressure in the boiler 
would reach 160 psi, the upper safe limit of pressure.  Haldeman: “The great advantage of the Evans 
Safety Guard is, that it measures both pressure and temperature at the same time.  I have seen it go into 
operation on a boat under a pressure in the boiler of 150 pounds to the square inch, when there was 
plenty of water while the boat was under weigh: and I have again seen it go into operation when the 
boat was lying to, under a pressure of not more than fifty pounds to the square inch: but the water in 
this case had sunk below the flues, upon the tops of which the tubes rested that contained the alloy; and 
the fire passing through the flues, consequently the heat was communicated to the alloy which raised 




pressure than said metals on the outside boilers.”)  This misconception about pressure 
stampings had been poorly explained (or not explained at all) to the rank and file 
practical engineers and local inspectors, and it is little wonder that the error 
proliferated among even intelligent engineers such as McCord. It appears from this 
that only those practical engineers who corresponded regularly with the Franklin 
Institute, e.g., T. J. Haldeman, were familiar with Bache’s and Evans’s emphasis on 
heat in promoting fusible alloy.243 
 
What was particularly distressing to Gouge was the effect of McCord’s remarks in 
undermining the steamboat law.  McCord had been active in lobbying the supervising 
inspectors for the removal of the fusible alloy requirement from the law.  Gouge 
remarked that, “This provision of the law is just as positive as that to which Mr. 
McCord owes his office and his salary; and yet he would have the Board of 
Supervisors suspend its operation!  We shall have a beautiful government indeed, if 
each subordinate officer enforces the laws, or leaves them unenforceable, according 
to his own practical views of their expediency.”  And the renegade actions by 
engineers also undermined the entire concept of a country ruled by laws:  “Supposing, 
however, that the fusible alloys [in] use are regarded with disfavor by many 
                                                 
243  “The objections which certain engineers make would carry great weight with them, if it did not 
appear that they, like Mr. McCord, had entirely mistaken the object in using the fusible alloys—in 
supposing them to be used primarily as indicators of pressure, instead of indicators of heat.....  If Mr. 
McCord proved that the alloys prepared by Professor Booth melted and hardened at uncertain and 
widely different temperatures, he would have proved something to the purpose.  Proving that the same 
parcel of alloy melts and hardens at different degrees of pressure, is proving nothing to the point.  It is 
intended that the alloy should do so.  It is desirable that they should do so.  They are intended primarily 
as indicators of heat when it works at certain degrees; and only in a secondary sense as indicators of 
pressure.” Emphasis in the original. This restates Bache and Evans’s conception of the safety guard as 
a detector of excessive heat in the flue (to prevent flue collapse during the low-water condition) and 




engineers, that is not a sufficient reason for rejecting them.  The very object of the 
law is to provide safe guards for life, which steam boat owners and steam boat 
officers would not provide without law.”  Thus, Gouge holds up the law itself as the 
fundamental safety device, because owners and officers will not provide safety on 
their own. 
 
McCord represents the traditional practical engineer’s perspective; instead of pushing 
the safety guard, he favors instead that the law concentrate on “boilers constructed of 
good iron and made in a good workmanlike order, with a sufficient amount of safety 
valves, and an adequate amount of [water] supplying apparatus, with a steam guage 
attached, to render the increase and decrease of the pressure visible, and a sober, 
decent, and competent engineer in charge, and him hold to a direct accountability for 
the correct and faithful discharge of his duties.” 
 
Gouge opposes McCord’s statement that there had been a perfect safety record in the 
fifth inspection district since the time of passage of the Act of 1852 owing to 
conscientious engineers using traditional methods.  Gouge thought perhaps luck was 
the operative reason for this success:  “I remain in opinion with Mr. McCord that the 
freedom from accidents in the St. Louis district during the last year, has been chiefly 
owing ‘to the unremitting attention of the engineers.’  Yet I know not that their 
‘attention’ as during the last year, been more ‘unremitting’ than it was in former 
years, and during those years many terrible calamities occurred.  Not one of those 




Guard.  They may have been supplied with fusible alloys, but those alloys were not 
applied in a ‘suitable manner,’ but in such a way as to be disintegrated by the pressure 
of the steam.”244 
 
Gouge next objected to a move by the Supervisors to substitute traditional 
French fusible alloy plugs for safety guards.  The Board of Supervising 
Inspectors had met in special session in Washington in April 1856 to consider 
Crawford’s latest amendments to the Steamboat Act.  Plugs of alloy or pure tin 
were now being proposed in lieu of devices operating on the pressure 
principle.245 
 
Gouge expressed frustration with what he perceived as the retrogressive 
actions of the Supervisors:  “If Congress can't come up with anything better, it 
                                                 
244  McCord’s statement as quoted by Gouge: “In looking over our statistics in this district, you will 
find that during the year ending this day, that we have not had explosions, and but one death from the 
injurious escapement of steam, (and that caused by fright), and you and the public might naturally 
infer, that all this was owing to the protecting influences thrown around steam navigation, by these 
alloys and water guages; when I am satisfied in my own mind, that such an unexpected and happy 
result as this, is attributable to no such cause:  but on the contrary, as a result of the unremitting 
attention of the engineers, accompanied by the fact that they are being held to a strict accountability for 
the faithful performance of their duties.”  Gouge reacted with indignation:  “From what is here said, 
the reader might draw the inference that the steam boat law might be safely abolished, and the services 
of the Supervising and Local inspectors dispensed with.  It is no part of my duty to contravert [sic] 
such an inference; at times I am tempted to think it a correct one .....  But I deny that the fusible alloy, 
when applied in Evans Safety Guard, or even when applied in his Safety Alarm, have ‘nine tenths of 
the time been inoperative.’  On the contrary they have, according to Mr. McCord’s own shewing, been 
so “operative,” as to prove an “annoyance” to the engineers—that is letting off steam when they 
wanted to keep it on in order to make a suitable display of speed in passing a town, or when the wished 
to beat a rival boat in a race.” 
245  Benjamin Crawford’s proposed changes affected 26 sections of the Act, covering not just boiler 
safety but also fire safety, thickness of boiler iron, and the administration of official oaths.  Other 
amendments concerned inspectors’ compensation, the hiring of contractors to remove snags (cheaper 
than having the government do the work), and a provision to bring tow boats under the law.  Section 
Nine, the fusible alloy portion, was to be revised to allow the use of fusible plugs or rivets of pure tin. 
Fusible plugs were the same devices rejected in the 1830s by Bache. See Proc, April 16, 1856 session, 




had better give over all attempts by legislation to protect passengers . . .” 
Because the bill specified another form of technology (plugs), it would 
effectively ban the safety guards. To Gouge, this was tragic because the guards 
had performed flawlessly.246 
 
Gouge concluded his memorandum by stating that with regard to fusible 
alloys, the Act of 1852 had been imperfectly carried out.  When applied in a 
suitable manner, the effort had been eminently successful.  But the “enemies 
of the safety guard” were mobilized due to their fear of monopoly.  “I have 
never heard such an outcry [against other patent inventions used on 
steamboats],” he wrote.  In his closing statement, Gouge defended the 
government’s brand of expertise that, in the face of the attacks by the 
inspectors, was slowly slipping away and whose pending loss he perceived as 
undermining the entire body of steamboat safety law.  He cited as authority for 
his views a host of experts:  “If I am in regard to the use of fusible alloys when 
‘applied in a suitable manner, and so as to let steam escape,’ I have the 
satisfaction to know, that I am in company with many of our most 
distinguished men of science, with many of our most helpful steam engine 
builders, and with many of our most able engineers and other steam boat 
officers.” 
                                                 
246  There were now hundreds of safety guards in operation on hundreds of boilers, he wrote, only four 
of which had blown up.  Two of these were because the safety guards had been tied down.  A fifth 
steamboat had blown up; it had been fitted with a “mongrel” device (presumably still operating on the 
pressure principle).  Some steamboats blew up for unknown reasons, such as the Thomas Haight.  
There was still mystery attached to the science of steam, Gouge commented, and he quoted another 





The Practical Engineers Weigh in on the Safety Guard—the St. Louis and 
Wheeling Reports 
 
In the fall of 1854, at the same time Gouge and Crawford were contemplating the 
theft of a sample of alloy from Evans for Professor Booth, members of two steamboat 
engineers’ associations stated their views to the Department on the subject of the 
Evans Safety Guard.  The two communications were from Wheeling, Virginia 
(Crawford’s District Seven), and from St. Louis, Missouri (Embree’s District Five). 
Both reports provide insight into the associations’ concerns and fears about the safety 
guard, the perceived professional status of their members, and their relationship to 
higher authorities (scientists, government officials, and “self-interested” parties).247 
 
The presentation style of the two groups is quite different.  In the case of the 
Wheeling engineers, we see a summary, unpolished criticism of the safety guards. 
The demonstrative manner of the writer, who lacks sophisticated rhetorical skills, 
betrays that of a common practical engineer.  In contrast, the St. Louis engineers offer 
a more refined, persuasive, and well-articulated critical assessment of the safety 
                                                 
247  The reports are mentioned in a letter from Local Inspector Joseph Sweegar, Louisville, to the 
Treasury Secretary, 1854 11-7.  There may have been reports provided by the other western districts 4, 
6, and 8, but if so, these do not survive. Sweegar noted that according to “some of the most 
experienced engineers on our western waters,” the fusible alloys had “utterly and entirely failed.” 
Sweegar’s views did not stop with condemning the alloys; the Board of Supervisors was redundant and 
expensive, he wrote, and the new inspection service was completely disorganized. He called for a 
streamlined organization in which the Board should be eliminated and replaced with selected members 
of local boards from around the country.  This central board would meet once a year with the 
Secretary, presided over by a figure who possessed “scientific attainments.”  The 1852 act was 
defective as well; Sweegar wrote that it was “objectionable and in need of amendment.”  The wrapper 




guards and fusible alloy.  The writer has a more erudite, polished rhetorical style, and 
his careful arguments are designed to bring into doubt the scientific validity of the 
safety guard. He is a “gentleman engineer” of the type described by Calvert. 
 
Let us begin with the Wheeling letter: 
 
“Gentlemen: The undersigned officers of the union association of 
Steam Boat Engineers of Wheeling Virginia—beg leave to report the 
action of our association on your communication of Aug. 24th 1854.  
In relation to the Government “Fusible Alloy” employed as a measure 
of Safety on Steam Boilers—our association appointed a committee of 
experienced practical engineers to which was committed your letter of 
inquiry—and after having carefully and patiently investigated the 
subject—report as follows: 
 
In answer to the inquiries made by the Steam Boat inspectors of 
Louisville Ky in Regard to the Government Fusible Alloy and its 
application as a preventative of Explosions in Steam Boilers—we are 
unanimous in saying so far as our experience and observation goes, it 
has proved a perfect FAILURE and an imposition on Steam Boat 
money.  Most of the members of our association have used the fusible 
alloy on different boats—applied in different ways--and it invariably 




the alloy the second time—on this last account we regard the alloy in 
every form in which we have known it to be used or applied to Steam 
Boilers as PERILOUS and UNSAFE—and NO SENSIBLE and 
CAREFUL engineer would for one moment risk his life or that of his 
fellow beings in such an agent to warn him of danger—we would 
therefore esteem it a wise measure to REPEAL that provision of the 
Law of Congress beginning the use of the fusible alloy on steam 
boilers.  We should unanimously recommend the use invariably of the 
steam guage [sic] as an apparatus indicating with reasonable certainty 
the pressure of steam, and the water guage with a well adjusted OLD 
fashioned safety valve and try cocks as simple and efficient 
contrivances.  That in the hands of SOBER, CAREFULL [sic], 
SKILLFULL [sic] and EXPERIENCED MEN AS ENGINEERS will 
ensure safety to life and property in steam boat navigation.”248 
 
Several points in this letter stand out:  (1) the old criticism and prejudice from the 
1840s persists - - upon multiple heatings, the alloys undergo chemical changes that 
alter their fusing points; (2) steamboat owners are involved (“an imposition on steam 
boat money”); (3) the safety guard is unsafe; safety is only guaranteed by the sober 
and careful engineer using old-fashioned devices and methods; and (4) the law 
enforcing the pressure principle should be repealed. 
                                                 
248  Letter from “officers of the union association of Steam Boat Engineers of Wheeling, Virginia” to 
Messrs. John Livager and Rueben Dawson, “Inspectors of Steam” (local inspectors of machinery and 




Contrast this report with the careful reasoning style and erudition of the St. Louis 
Association of Steam Boat Engineers.  Their report is “the unanimous expression and 
sentiment of… 280 steam boat engineers.”249  A committee of engineers begins by 
stating that they have given careful consideration to the subject of the reliability of 
safety guards, that their duties require them to occupy the post of greatest danger, and 
that “consequently, they ought [to be] the first to hail with pleasure” any device that 
will relieve them of danger.  For this reason, the public may be assured that the 
engineers will not unjustly criticize “any plan for safety that can be relied upon for 
the prevention of steam boiler explosions.”  The engineers observe that because of the 
Act of 1852, their qualifications are now bound up in the public weal: “the rigid 
examinations [we] are now subject to under the law of the United States is a 
guarantee that [our] moral as well as professional character claims for their views the 
unprejudiced judgement of [our] fellow citizens.” (See Fig. 38). 
 
The engineers discuss the supporters of the safety guards; these are the inventor and 
“friends” of the device.  These parties base their confidence in the guards on two 
points, the “supposed certainty of their operation,” and their “capacity to act 
independently of the engineer.”  The engineers observe that the independent action of 
the guard appeals to the public and to this they claim to lodge no objection in 
principle.  But if the character of the steamboat engineer were as “reckless as it was 
                                                 
249  1854 10-2, “A Report on Fusible Alloys and Safety Guards Made to and Adopted by the Saint 











once supposed to be,” they argue, the public would be justified in requiring such a 
self-acting mechanism on every steamboat boiler.  With regulation, they state, 
engineers are now held accountable by a rigid examination and licensing process. 
Therefore, the requirement for a self-acting mechanism is unjustified: 
 
“…we have cheerfully submitted to the laws of Congress, and with a 
full knowledge of the high responsibility they impose upon us, and of 
the pains and penalties to which we subject ourselves for any disaster 
that may result from our negligence or incapacity, we still offer 
ourselves as humble instruments in promoting the prosperity of the 
public interests, by the safe transportation of persons or property.  We 
do not present this as an argument against the Fusible Alloy Safety 
Guards.  It is our purpose to investigate them upon their own merits, 
but we think it a favorable opportunity to defend ourselves against 
some of the claims which their friends present for the purpose of 
securing public approbation.” 
 
On the point of the supposed certainty of the safety guard’s operation, the engineers 
state that the device is flawed and is not what it is represented to be. The engineers 
protest its being thrust upon them under false pretenses (i.e., with false claims that it 






 “We are not enemies to the inventive genius of our own or any other 
country.  We sincerely hope that if there has not been, there may yet 
be, discovered some guard or protection against explosions.  All we 
ask of those who presume they have realized the happy conception is 
to present it to the Engineers and the public upon its merits and not 
seek to give it an importance by reflections or imputations upon the 
former, or by improper appeals to the feelings or fears of the latter.” 
 
The engineers use the remainder of their communication to attack the metallic alloys 
that are the heart of the safety guard, claiming that the chemical complexity of such 
alloys calls for a more thorough investigation and verification process, “before any 
reliance should be placed upon [them] for so important a purpose as a safety guard for 
steam boilers.” The engineers understand that the Achilles Heel of the alloys is the 
precision of their melting points; without a precise thermometer as Bache had 
envisioned, the safety guards are useless at best, and misleading and dangerous at 
worst. 
 
The engineers demonstrate that the composition and characteristics of fusible alloys 
are not well understood by scientists.  Thus, precise melting points have not been 
achieved for these types of metal.  Evidence that this is so has been provided by a 
Navy commission in a series of experiments.  They elaborate: (1) not all metallic 
alloys of a given composition are always fusible at a given temperature; (2) scientific 




alloys; (3) alloys are inconsistent when manufactured by different persons and 
institutions; (4) because of impurities, inconsistency is common, and repeated firings 
of the alloy yield inconsistent results over time; (5) mechanical injury likewise can 
alter melting points; (6) on the molecular level, the alloys are intrinsically defective 
and cannot be made uniformly reliable because they do not melt in the manner of a 
homogenous metal but rather as self-contained cellular structures; and (7) it has been 
demonstrated that French safety rondilles (plugs) did not work, so why should 
supporters expect fusible alloy safety guards to fare any better?250  
                                                 
250  The erudition of the St. Louis engineers is evident in their arguments. On Points 1 and 2: “. . . 
scarcely any two [scientists] operate in their experiments in exactly the same way, and with the metals 
in the same state of purity, aggregation, &c.  How then, are we to expect that alloys should be more 
uniform in their results?  Point 3: “Experience has shown that fusible alloys made by different persons, 
with the same proportion of elementary metals do not always fuse at the same temperature . . . . If left 
to private citizens little reliance could be placed upon their uniformity and he or they who would 
supply the best could only be relied upon as long as it was his or their interest to give proper attention 
to the preparation.” (This appears to be a direct attack on Evans as monopolistic private producer). 
Point 4a: “metal . . . may be very seriously affected . . . by the admixture or combination of a very 
small percentage of foreign matter .....  Point 4b : “Nor can we be always sure that the alloys . . . will 
always melt at the same temperature even for the second and third time, unless we can have some 
assurance that the original elements of which they are composed are always in the same state of purity, 
and perhaps, the same process always used for uniting them.” Point 5: “It is well known that metals 
may be generally modified in their physical properties by very slight causes, as for instance, iron in its 
softest, most fibrous and ductile condition, may by simple percussion be converted into a crystalline, 
brittle state, in which it looses [sic] so much of its original tenacity, as to become dangerous to be used 
for many purposes to which in the former state it was adopted.  The breaking of rail-road car axles has 
been frequently attributed to this cause . . .” Point 6: “[alloys] do not melt in the manner of a 
homogeneous metal as has been supposed, ‘in fact, the more fusible metal melts in the minute cells of 
the less fusible metal long before the whole mass becomes liquid.’ .....  This process is well known as 
liquation or elignation . . . .” The engineers quote a prominent engineer-scientist in England “to show 
how vague is the information even amongst scientific men on the subject of the fusing point of 
alloys.....”  “Experience has established no law by which we can say a priori, from the knowledge we 
have of the melting points of each individual metal, at what point certain combinations of these will 
melt.” Point 7: “This whole thing of fusible alloys as safety guards, has been a deception and a failure . 
. . . Pr[ofessor] Ure, in his Dictionary of Mines & Manufactures says, the employment of fusible metals 
or safety rondilles, to apertures in the top of steamboilers, has been proposed in France, because they 
would melt and give way at an elevation of temperatures under those which would endanger the 
bursting of the vessel, the fusibility of the alloy being proportioned to the quantity of steam required 
for the engine.  It has been found, however, that boilers apparently secured in this way, burst while the 
safety disc remained entire . . . . we know that on the Western Waters, where this mode of protection 
has been urgently pursued by those interested, that numerous explosions have taken place, with the 






Although they admit they are not scientists, the engineers assume for themselves the 
role of practical men who take theoretical knowledge and make it useful.  In this 
sense they view themselves as applied scientists.  They write: “It is not to be expected 
that we should treat [the fusible alloy issue] in a thorough scientific manner.  We 
profess to be practical men availing ourselves of the knowledge which scientific men 
develop and applying it to practice and useful purposes.”  Although they admit they 
are consumers of the experiments and productions of scientists, the engineers are 
careful to preserve their critical faculty with regard to the output of science.  They 
demonstrate that the scientific work on fusible alloys is inconsistent and incomplete.  
They do not seek to indict science or scientists; on the contrary, they see much value 
in the work of these men.  Rather, the problem in the case of fusible alloys is that the 
scientific knowledge is new and incomplete, and the outsiders - - the inventor and 
enthusiastic “friends” - - have blurred or glossed over gaps in that work.  These 
parties are acting in their own self-interest to push the safety guard with the public 
when the research has not been completed or agreed upon by scientists and 
engineers.251 
 





251  The engineers explain that in the area of metals, scientists are more familiar with iron.  Iron has 
been studied extensively, has been applied in the world, and offers a large knowledge base to the 
researcher or engineer who wishes to use it.  Fusible alloy has not been the subject of such intensive 




We may surmise from the engineers’ statements that inventor Evans is perceived as 
disrupting the natural process of knowledge creation and transfer:  (1) knowledge is 
to be created by the scientist and from thence it descends to the engineer; (2) the 
engineers subject it to debate and refinement through study and practical trials; and 
(3) after these trials, the engineers adapt it to useful application. Those in power 
(government officials perhaps, certainly the inventor and friends pushing the safety 
guard) appear not to have recognized the process.  It is a process that they, the 
engineers, claim for themselves as technological arbiters.  The engineers believe 
passionately in the role of science (and wish not to attack scientists’ authority; for 
example, regarding scientists’ own doubts about safety guards, they write, “…if we 
have to regret that they did not avow their doubts in stronger language, we should at 
least be thankful they have left us no necessity of combating authority in pulling 
down what cannot sustain itself on its own merits”).  They state that they would 
conduct their own experiments if they could afford them; in this they tacitly 
acknowledge that they are on a par with scientists, but that they do not see this as 
their ordinary role.  Rather, engineers are specialists who critically examine the 
output of scientists and translate it (with a critical thought process) into practical 
inventions. Hence the innovation of the shops, which rely on scientific texts as a 
source of valuable information, and the engineers’ dread of inventors’ monopolies, 
which stifle innovation. 
 
In analyzing the engineers’ “flow down” theory of science and technology, however, 




science and technology represent different functions performed by the same 
community.  But a fundamental fact is that they constitute different communities, 
each with its own goals and systems of values.”252  There are two possibilities, 
therefore, in explaining the perception by the practical engineers’ of their role:   
(1) They believed in the science-engineering symbiosis theory, although they did not 
realize that both were separate institutions with separate cultures, or (2) In the 1850s, 
science and technology were not as separate institutionally as they are in modern 
times.  Evidence for the second explanation might be found in the close relationship 
of engineers and scientists in sharing knowledge in lyceums and in the shops (e.g., 
employment of practical engineers in the Franklin Institute studies of the 1830s.)  
However, we underscore the first explanation as the best. Based on the source 
material, we know that scientists and engineers operated within their own 
communities, with their own “goals and systems of values,” and this separation is in 
the main what caused the conflict over the safety guard.253 
                                                 
252  Layton, Edwin: Mirror Image Twins (1971), p. 565. 
253  The practical engineers’ axiom that an invention must sustain itself on its own merits appears 
repeatedly in the engineers’ writing, and the same concept can be found in Evans’s earlier 1850 
Treatise (it is clear from this source that Evans considered himself first and foremost a practical 
engineer, and thus an “applied scientist.”)  This is informative because it points out the engineers’ 
strong belief that science and engineering are a quest to establish objective facts and relations from 
nature, and that scientific authority of itself should not enter into judgments about technical merit. As 
Alan G. Gross pointed out in regard to such authority, “The progress of science may be viewed as a 
dialectical contest between the authority sedimented in the training of scientists, an authority 
reinforced by social sanctions, and the innovative initiatives without which no scientist will be 
rewarded . . . [but] at times, the effects of scientific authority can be stultifying.”  Gross, Alan G.: The 
Rhetoric of Science (1990), p. 13. The engineers’ was an oversimplified belief, to be sure, because the 
engineers held to their own systems of authority (i.e., those of the associations, and of shop culture).  
However, the posture that inventions must speak for themselves in justifying their existence did allow 
the engineers to undermine--or at least question--scientific authority with regard to the safety guard. 
They effectively used the writings of scientists themselves to make their case. For example, the 
engineers skillfully quote from Booth’s own report: “Since the fusing points in most of the alloys is 
very uncertain, and cannot well be determined within many degrees, there should be a wider limiting 
range of pressure allowed for high pressure .... If we understand Prof. Booth, he means that although 





The engineers conclude with a plea to the Government to at least make the alloy in a 
consistent manner and protect them from Evans’s monopoly: 
 
“Finally, Mr. President and gentlemen, after having given this subject 
our most careful consideration, and after having proven our opinions 
by many years experience as practical engineers during which we have 
had the most ample opportunity of determining the value of alloy 
safety valves, we have arrived at the candid conviction that they are 
useless to the Engineer, and of no protection to the traveling public…. 
In conclusion, permit us to say that if the Congress of the united States 
shall still insist upon the use of fusible alloy safety guards, we 
respectfully ask that it will cause such investigation to be made… as 
will insure them to be uniform in operation and satisfactory in their 
results… and that the mechanical device, by which the alloy may be 
applied be left open to the inventive genius of the Country…” 
 
4.6  The Engineers’ Rebellion Comes into the Open, 1859 
 
After Professor Booth suffered a decline and cessation of orders for government alloy 
in early 1857, two more years passed with little or no activity in the Philadelphia 
Mint’s laboratory.  In February 1859, the steamboat Princess exploded at Port  
                                                                                                                                           
indicate the exact pressure to which our steam boilers are by law subjected.  It is scarcely necessary to 
say, that such an application of them would be entirely useless, as they would not accomplish the 




Hudson, Louisiana, in which “scores” perished. The Princess had been considered 
one of the safest by thousands of the boat’s habitual passengers. Haldeman was 
astonished at the fact that this hitherto safe boat exploded with the “large and 
approved” Evans guards on each of her boilers.254 
 
In April, Booth wrote the Treasury Secretary wishing to be relieved of the duty of 
manufacturing the alloys “since they are an unnecessary expenditure and a Supervisor 
has informed me that it has been determined that the alloys are no longer to be 
used.”255 
                                                 
254  The Princess exploded on February 27, 1859; the second engineer died and so could not be 
prosecuted. Haldeman guessed that the safety guards had been tied down, but the explosion damage 
was too extensive for the local inspectors to determine this. See “Report of the U.S. District Grand 
Jury,” reprinted in a newspaper whose banner was clipped off by the filer, and no date, but probably in 
the spring of 1859 (see 1859 3, D48). The grand jury’s findings were that the boilers exploded due to 
low water, that the chief engineer had employed a second engineer who had been known for carrying 
high steam and suffered the Evans’s guards to blow off steam on two separate occasions (indicating a 
low water condition), and that the chief engineer had not reported recent patches made to the shell of 
the boiler (thus, inspectors were not aware of the repairs and so had not hydrostatically tested the 
boilers after the repair).  In addition, the captain bore some culpability in not supervising his engineers 
more carefully.  See 1859 3-12 (local inspectors take testimony); The other steamboat that exploded at 
about the same time was the Panola: Crawford prosecutes that boat’s engineer Buffington, who pled 
guilty and was fined $200 for a misdemeanor after being threatened with 18 months in prison, 1859 3-
16; 1859 4-8; Haldeman’s observations on the explosion, 1859 9-12 (D46); Booth testifies, 1859 5-3; 
Booth on forensics, 1859 7-7; Crawford approves Booth’s new ladle design following discovery of 
faulty melting points of alloy in the case 1859 7-12; Crawford: “The inspectors and river men are all 
lately against the safety guards. The Buffington Case will bring them to their senses.”1859 12; official 
report of the accident, 1859 Proc, pp. 54-55 (IMG 1458); and 1861 or 1862 (date uncertain), author 
unknown, but Booth forensic analysis attached, in which he cites his experiments to prove the fusing 
points of the alloy in the case. The public testimony of Booth, if it followed this letter, appears to have 
contradicted Crawford’s correspondence 1859 7-12 in which the ladles are implicated in contributing 
to the explosion. Evans’s safety guard had been in use on the Panola for one year. 
255  1859 4-6. Five days later, Crawford placed a large renewal order for 900 pounds of alloy with 
Booth. “This is by far the heaviest order we have received,” Booth wrote, 1859 4-11. He cited details 
of reopening the business, but by July there was only one man making alloys (“he is slow but 
trustworthy.”) Crawford’s order appears to have been the final one for new alloy. The timing of this 
order, occurring at the same time that Crawford was pushing for the prosecution of engineer 
Buffington in U.S. District Court, is suspicious. Crawford had tried “strenuously” the previous fall to 
have the Steamboat Act amended to strike the requirement for fusible alloy, but his actions were 
rebuffed by the Department.  The renewal order may have been an indication that Crawford was trying 
to reverse his policies in order to get back in the good graces of the Secretary. See 1859 12-8, in which 





This latter statement that the Supervisors were ceasing use of the alloy (and thus the 
safety guards) must have been surprising news to Gouge and Treasury Secretary 
Howell Cobb, especially in light of the explosions of the Princess and Panola earlier 
in the year.  Supervisor Crawford’s “strenuous” attempt to abolish the use of the 
safety guards at the October 1858 annual meeting of the Supervising Inspectors had 
backfired because, according to Crawford, “the patent of Mrs. Evans would soon  
expire.” The exact meaning of the relationship of the expiration of the Evans patent 
expiration to the persistence of the safety guard remains a mystery. However, aside 
from this complication, it is clear that the Department did not want to part with its key 
safety invention at any rate.256 With pressure from local inspectors—backed by 
owners—primarily in Districts Five and Six (Embree, St. Louis; and Shallcross, 
Louisville) as well as parts of Crawford’s District Seven (Wheeling), the Department 
began to perceive the trend toward dismantling the law that sustained the safety 
guards. 257 
                                                 
256  It appears the timing of the expiration of Jane Evans’s (Cadwallader Evans’s) patent with the action 
of the Board of Supervising Inspectors may have prompted intervention by the Department to defeat 
Crawford’s initiative. Another factor was that the passage of Crawford’s resolution was expected to 
endanger his bill containing revisions to the 1852 Act, which at that time was before Congress. 
Crawford noted that the bill “if passed, [would] have all the desired effect of the resolution.” 1859 12-
8. The attempt to scuttle the safety guards was made again the following year, and defeated once again 
for the same reasons. The sponsor of the second attempt was Supervisor Charles W. Copeland, Second 
District. 
257 Behind the trend lay the long history of engineers tampering with or scuttling the guards, 
documented herein. Much circumstantial and some direct evidence testifies to the wholesale rejection, 
sabotage, and lack of support by rank-and-file engineers and inspectors toward the safety guards from 
the time of their introduction on the western rivers: prejudice of numerous engineers toward Evans’s 
invention, plus witnessing of tampering, referenced in Evans’s 1850 Treatise; Crawford admitting to 
Secretary Cobb in 1859 that the supervising inspectors, local inspectors, and river men were all against 
the safety guard due to the unreliable alloy, 1859 12-26;  Crawford’s earlier moves to get the law 
changed to exclude the requirement for fusible alloy, 1859 12-8 and Proc 1858 10-18; owners’ and 
engineers’ fear of Evans’s monopoly 1854 5-23 and others; Jane Evans’s letter that the local inspectors 





Secretary Cobb Reacts 
 
With Gouge and Secretary Cobb thus on a hair-trigger over the Supervisor’s plans to 
dismantle the Steamboat law, the final straw came in the late summer of 1859.  In the 
previously described case in which Supervising Inspector Charles Ross of St. Louis 
barred entry of the wayward engineer Robert Hood on board the steamboat City of 
Memphis (Hood had been found carrying too much pressure in his boilers), a fellow 
engineer on the same boat, Daniel Bloys, had filed a tit-for-tat grievance against Ross. 
Bloys’s affidavit alleged that Ross had expressed contempt for the safety guard, 
instructing Bloys to “pour the damned thing full of lead.”258 
 
Ross denied the charge that he made the statement to Bloys, but he provoked the 
Secretary when he revealed his low opinion of the safety guards. He made all of 
Embree’s former arguments, that the guards were “an unnecessary expence [sic] on 
our Steamers and of no utility,” and that “the Supervising Inspectors at their next 
convention would probably abolish their use.” Ross went on, “I advocated the 
abolishment and use of these so called safety guards, and gave as my reasons that 
these guards were attached to every high pressure passenger Steamer boiler that had 
exploded in the West in the last four years, and none of them had given the required 
                                                                                                                                           
Oglesby noting cases of wired-down safety guards, 1859 4-4; a supervising inspector reported 
instructing his inspectors to sabotage the guards, 1859 9-21; Haldeman’s observations that steamboats 
had exploded with wired-down safety guards intact; Buffington’s prosecution over tampering, 1859 3-
16; Local Inspector Grace’s comment that the safety guard “loses its character by neglect of the 
engineers or being so tampered with as to prevent its telltail [sic] operation,” his belief in the efficacy 
of the alloys, but “the bitter prejudice of river men prevented its usefulness,” 1862 1-17; the engineers 




alarm, and that I believed they had been the chief obsticle [sic] to a healthy 
enforcement of the law in the West.” Ross also noted in a postscript that nowhere in 
the law was Evans Safety Guard mandated:  
 
“The words ‘Evans’s safety guards’ are not found in either the 
Steamboat law or Acts of the Supervising Inspectors.  To find the 
meaning of them, see Proceedings of Supervising Inspectors 
Washington City 1854, Page 90.  And Crawford’s resolution (which I 
supposed was not published) Buffalo 1856, Page 12-13.  What was 
said and done on this subject this year at N. Orleans I think will not be 
published.” 
Ross’s statement was true.  The language of the Supervisors’ resolution of April 1854 
had been carefully framed so as not to inflame the engineers and local inspectors by 
specifying Evans’s safety guards. Now the imprecise language had come home to 
roost for the Department.259 
 
Treasury Secretary Cobb responded to Ross’s letter within the week, 
addressing his response to Supervisor Burnett in Boston and copying the 
correspondence to all the Supervising Inspectors (except Ross himself).  He  
                                                                                                                                           
258  Bloys’s affidavit, 1859 9-21. 
259  In making his case, Ross refers to the April 1854 special meeting, as noted on page 90 in the annual 
Proceedings, concerning the passage of the resolution that mandated the pressure principle. The 
resolution craftily left open which mechanisms could be used to meet the requirement of isolating the 




expressed his displeasure with the independent actions of the Supervisors in 




Sundry charges have been preferred against Charles Ross Esq., Supervising 
Inspector at St. Louis. Among other things, one witness alledges [sic] that he, 
the said Ross, “mentioned Evan's Safely Guards--what an absurdity they were, 
and said at the next meeting of Supervising Inspectors, they were going to 
abolish them altogether, and that they should not go on boats any more. He 
also enquired [sic] of one, if ours gave us any trouble, and said if it did, to run 
the damned thing full of lead.” 
 
In his reply to this charge, W. Ross says, “he has no recollection” of such a 
conversation, but he may have made the remark that Evan's Safely Guards 
“were an unnecessary expense on our Steam Boats, of no utility, and that the 
Supervising Inspectors at their next convention would probably abolish their 
use.” W. Ross makes many other remarks to the same purpose, all apparently 
founded on the opinion that the Board of Supervising Inspectors have full 
power to do just what they choose. 
 
The Steam Boat law gives great power to the Supervising Inspectors, but no 
power to repeal any provisions of the Act of August 1852, or any other act of 




regulations, but those rules and regulations should be such as are adapted to 
carry into effect the provision of Acts of Congress--not to defeat them. 
 
The Act of Congress of August 30th 1852 provides, among other things, for 
the use of “fusible alloys” in such a way as “to let steam escape.” Of the 
[illeg] of this or any other provision of the law, the Supervising inspectors are 
not judges--theirs is to see that this, and all other provisions of the act, are 
carried into effect according to their true sprit. We shall have anarchy instead 
of regular government if each subordinate officer undertakes to enforce the 
laws, so far only as, to himself may seem expedient. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has power to decide on the constitutionality of laws, but not 
in their expediency. From W. Ross’ letter, it appears that he, and at least a part 
of his fellow Supervisors, suppose[s] they have more power than the Supreme 
Court professes. 
 
If any contrivance can be found which will better than Evan’s Safety Guard 
fulfill the requisitions of the law, in regard to the use of “fusible alloys,” so as 
“to let Steam escape,” that contrivance ought to be adopted. Thus far the 
Supervising Inspectors have full power over the subject, but they have no 
power to dispense with the use of fusible alloys, or with their use, in such 





If the Supervising Inspectors believe that the use of fusible alloys, in any way 
and every way, is useless, it will be perfectly correct, in them, to make a 
specific report on the subject to this Department in order that the same may be 
laid before Congress. But so long as the law remains in its present form, it is  
their duty to enforce this and all other of its provisions, according to their true 
spirit and intent. 
Very respectfully,  
Howell Cobb,  
Secretary of the Treasury260  (See Fig. 39) 
 
Responding to the Secretary’s admonishment, the Supervising Inspectors now felt 
compelled to defend their positions on the safety guard. Caught in an uncomfortable 
middle ground between their own local inspectors and the Secretary, they responded 
with carefully measured words. Under the microscope, all now were careful to uphold 
the legal provision in question. However, signs of reservations about the fusible 
alloys and the Evans Safety Guard appeared through the carefully crafted rhetoric. 
                                                 
260  1859 12-19, p. 401 of the NARA bound volume; B7.  Emphasis in the original.  Gouge almost 
certainly drafted this letter for the Secretary.  The reply bore Gouge’s unmistakable syntax, choice of 
words, and lecturing tone.  The Secretary mirrored Gouge’s thought and language almost verbatim.  
For example, note the wording in Gouge’s internal notes of November 1856, in which Gouge chastised 
Inspector McCord: “We shall have a beautiful government indeed, if each subordinate officer enforces 
the laws, or leaves them unenforceable, according to his own practical views of their expediency.” 
(1856 11, Vol. 6, Item 64).  Contrast these words with Cobb’s sentence above: “ We shall have 
anarchy instead of regular government if each subordinate officer undertakes to enforce the laws, so far 
only as, to himself may seem expedient.” (1859 12-19). Another example from an earlier Gouge letter: 
“. . . the power to make rules and regulations is confided solely to the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors,” 1855 2-21. Cobb’s words above: “The Supervising Inspectors have power to make rules 






Figure 39. Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb. Cobb upbraided his inspectors 
in 1859 in regard to laxity of enforcement of the pressure principle and the 
Evans safety guard. His efforts were to no avail. In 1871 the steamboat law 




Supervising Inspector John S. Brown of Baltimore (Third Inspection District) stated 
that fusible alloys had given his district no trouble because there were few high-
pressure boats there.  “We are duty bound to enforce the law regardless,” he wrote.  
John Shallcross, Supervisor of the Sixth Inspection District, and the man who 
originated the idea of substituting plugs of pure tin for fusible alloy, agreed with the 
Secretary that the Supervisors had no power to change any provision in the law, and 
that Evans’s safety guard was the “best mode of using the alloy now known.”  
Objections by engineers in his district were numerous, however. The problem was 
with the “imperfect manufacture” of the device (implying that in principle the guards 
were fine). The imperfection resided in the alloy.  With such imperfections, the safety 
guard would not be a “true and reliable indicator” of safety.  The best solutions were 
still the qualifications and practices of the personnel running the engines.  For safety 
purposes, “the engineers have the steam guage and safety valves,” he wrote.  
 
Supervising Inspector Charles W. Copeland of New York (Second Inspection 
District) noted that formerly an unnamed member of the Board (this was almost 
certainly Embree) had a “difference of opinion” on the subject of the alloys but was 
overruled by the majority. Copeland did not hide his distrust of the alloy; they were 
“a source of trouble and anxiety” to him.  There were “constant complaints” that the 
alloys did not act as designed.  He doubted that the alloys worked any better in the 
absence of pressure than in the presence of it (Gouge must have recoiled at this 
repudiation of the pressure principle).  He closed by volunteering to aid in 




Crawford, in the Seventh Inspection District, Pittsburgh, waffled between opposing 
the safety guard and touting the party line.  He noted that the supervising inspectors, 
local inspectors, and river men were “all against the use of safety guards.”  Agreeing 
with Copeland, he believed the unreliable alloys were the problem. He admitted that 
he had had much difficulty enforcing the use of the alloys; there were constant 
complaints that they “fused at far less pressure than allowed by their certificates.”  
The sympathetic local inspectors had repeated these complaints. Crawford noted 
dissent in the St. Louis district.  Local Inspector James H. McCord, boiler inspector 
there, had requested the Board of Supervising Inspectors suspend the provision of the 
law relating to alloys. Supervisor Embree, who was Charles Ross’s predecessor at St. 
Louis, had not enforced the provision in that district; this made it harder for Crawford 
to enforce it in his.  Recent accidents, however, had brought the Supervisors to their 
senses.  Crawford argued that successful prosecution of the engineer of the Panola 
had made an example of the offender and this had had a beneficial effect.  As 
experience revealed that a number of steamboats had exploded with guards installed 
on them, Crawford noted that he had been desirous of a change in the law, “but still I 
upheld the law.”  He went on to write that since Buffington’s prosecution there was 
scarcely a complaint now against the safety guards. Booth had even changed his mind 
regarding the efficacy of safety guards with his forensic testimony in the Buffington 
case.  Now all that was needed was to make the safety guards tamperproof. 
Commenting on the ninth section of the law, Crawford wrote, “I should regret to see 





The last letter received was that of Supervising Inspector William Burnett of Boston 
(First Inspection District).  Burnett admitted of little experience with the safety guards 
in his district (these were mostly low-pressure steamboats), and he was not aware of 
any of Ross’s statements regarding sabotage of the safety guards.  The law was clear, 
however.  The safety guard’s “exclusive use” was “demanded substantially by a 
resolution of the Board passed at Washington in 1854.”  The Board could repeal that 
provision “if use should prove to be improper,” he wrote, but he believed the Board 
still thought the safety guard effective.  As far as is known, no letters were received 
from the other districts.261 
                                                 
261  Letters in the NARA RG 41 records as follows: Robert Hood and Daniel Bloys sworn statements, 
1859 9-12 and 1859 9-21 respectively; Ross defends self to Secretary Howell Cobb, 1859 12-8; Cobb’s 
reply, chastisement of Ross, 1859 12-19; Supervising Inspector Brown’s letter, 1859 12-21; 
Supervising Inspector Shallcross’s letter, 1859 12-24; Shallcross as prime mover in “ridiculous idea to 
substitute block tin for fusible alloy (i.e., Haldeman’s letter to Gouge), 1859 4-8; Supervising Inspector 
Copeland’s letter, 1859 12-24; Supervising Inspector Crawford’s letter, 1859 12-26; Supervising 




4.7  Epilog: The End of the Safety Guard and the Clouds  
of War 
 
The safety guards were dead. By the time of the next revision of the Steamboat Act in 
1871, we know that they were no longer in use and that Supervising Inspector 
Shallcross had moved to replace the fusible alloy requirement with plugs of pure tin.  
The death of the safety guard can be registered sometime in the early 1860s.  We 
have a letter, for example, from a hull inspector to Gouge in 1862 in which the 
inspector noted that “the safety guard loses its character by the neglect of the 
engineers.”  The inspector wrote that the “bitter prejudice” of the river men prevented 
the usefulness of fusible alloy. He concluded that the engineers “are jealous and 
conceited, view any device as an infringement of their rights, a slur on their own 
knowledge or practical skill.  I worked with them on the river for 22 years and I know 
them well.”262 
 
Even as early as January 1861, informed that the ninth section of the steamboat act 
was being rewritten to make fusible alloy optional, Jane Evans roused her agent to 
urge Congress to reinstate the alloys, which had fallen from grace with the vast 
majority of inspectors and engineers.  “In the name of suffering humanity, let’s have 
them!” the agent wrote. 263  But it was too late; the device had been defeated first at 
the lower levels of the inspection service, among the engineers and local inspectors, 
                                                 
262  1862 1-17, Vol. 4, Item 21. 
263  Jane Evans’s agent to Mr. Bigler, 1861 1-28. At this time, orders to Booth were spotty, and he only 
provided alloy to Pittsburgh (Jane Evans’s locale) and New Orleans. This alloy was issued from 




supported by the steamboat owners, and then by the powerful Supervising Inspectors. 
The Department, hamstrung by its own legal strictures, and by its lack of real power 
over the districts, was forced to admit defeat by taking a neutral position. 
 
The Civil War and the Steamboat Inspection Service 
 
Much of the safety guard controversy was shoved in the background with the advent 
of the U.S. Civil War, although serious accidents still occurred.264  Patriotic 
inspectors such as J.V. Guthrie resigned his post in April 1861 to join a regiment.  
Benjamin Crawford assumed Guthrie’s inspection duties in what Guthrie supposed 
would be a short three-month war.  As time wore on and Guthrie wrote that he must 
postpone his return, Crawford asked to be paid for time spent doing Guthrie’s 
inspection work.  Inspectors who stayed home sometimes wrote effusive letters to the 
Secretary, a surviving example of which is provided below.  The vignette was 
provided in February 1862 by inspectors of the third inspection district (Baltimore) 
praying to save the Union “in our little Basement Office, under the Collector’s 
Room”: 
                                                 
264  The worst steamboat disaster of all time occurred in April 1865 on board the steamboat Sultana. 
1500 lives were lost when the Sultana’s tubular boiler, which was in poor repair, became overstrained 
and exploded. The boat had been designed to carry a maximum of 376 passengers, but the captain 
packed 2000 additional returning Union Army prisoners on board. This excessive load was simply too 







And now Hon. Sir, I desire to say that on hearing of the Glorious 
News, of the tremendous Victories of our Army and Navy, it makes 
my heart thrill with Joy. In the day of our Country’s trial and at the 
Bull Run defeat, and when the Hearts of all men quaked with fear, In 
company with my Local Board, we bowed our knees, we humbled our 
souls in humiliation and prayer, here in our little Basement Office, 
under the Collector’s Room, and implored the Great God to show 
mercy, and Save the Nation. And now We will rejoice and say Glory 
to God in the Highest and on Earth Peace and Good Will to Man. And 
next—Glory to our Army and Navy.  And All Honor to the President 
of these United States. And All Honor to his Cabinet, and to the 
General in Chief. And highly to be honored is the honorable Salmon P. 
Chase and his Aids [sic]—for his long, continued, arduous labours in 
financeering and then providing for A Million people, An Army in the 
field—   and Women and Children at home. Glory—  Glory be to our 
Good and Blessed God. Glory be to our Country—  Glory be to our 
Country’s present Rulers in putting down this Wicked Rebellion. The 




us.....  And long, long may our Glorious Banner wave O’er the Land of 
the Free, and home of the Brave.   
 
Yours with great respect, J. Nells.265 
 
Further west, nationalist versus anti-Union passions ran hot among the inspectors as 
the long run of the Mississippi River cutting across both northern and southern states 
aggravated sectional strife.  Directives for the purging of disloyal local inspectors 
from the inspection service began to issue forth from the Department in March and 
April 1862 in response to reports of disloyalty among the inspection corps.  On the 
prompting of inspectors, the Department issued a requirement for all inspectors to 
sign a loyalty oath swearing to “support, protect and defend the Constitution and 
Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign.” 
With the appearance of the oath, old inspection hands like Local Inspector Singleton 
of St. Louis found themselves threatened not over the old, familiar, technical 
proficiency matters but over political loyalty.  Eight “citizens of St. Louis,” probably 
pilots and engineers, petitioned the Secretary asking for Singleton’s removal.  He was 
aged, incompetent, and a “secesh,” they wrote.  He took the oath, the men continued, 
but “that is moonshine in our opinion.”  In reality, they complained, Singleton 
                                                 
265  Guthrie desired to “save my country” and “sustain the government against the traitors,” 1861 4-29. 
Short war, 1861 7-1.  Crawford assumes Guthrie’s inspection duties, 1861 12-21.  Congratulatory letter 




advocated states rights and nullification.  The critics went on to write that there were 
thousands of men like Singleton in their midst.266 
 
While the inspection service was undergoing a cleansing of secessionist 
sympathizers, the Department concentrated on how it should fit in with the new 
military requirements of the U.S. Army.  It began to reorganize itself to allow the 
quick mobilization of the steamboat fleet for troop and supply transportation needs of 
the western army.  Hunter wrote that beginning in January 1862, “In addition to the 
immense forward movement of troops, munitions, and equipment, food and forage 
supplies of all kinds, draft animals, and livestock, there was a lesser return flow of 
wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, soldiers on furlough, captured equipment, and 
contraband goods .....  To handle this traffic the Federal authorities issued contracts 
and charters to large numbers of steamboats of all classes and even purchased and 
built many vessels for both transport and patrol purposes.”  The total number of steam 
vessels in government service under contract or charter at one time or another during 
                                                 
266  Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Supervising Inspector Charles S. Stephenson, Esq., of 
Galena, Illinois:  “. . . it would seem to me that those officers ought not to employ any Engineer or 
Pilot who manifests an unwillingness to take the Oath of Allegiance to the United States . . .”  1862 3-
11, B2.  Four inspectors (two of boilers and two of hulls) were listed as “disloyal inspectors” in a 
communication sent from the Treasury Secretary to the Supervising Inspectors of the respective 
districts. 1862 4 , B1. Supervising Inspector James N. Muller of the Third Inspection District noted that 
“Some pilots and engineers in charge of vessels chartered by the government are secessionists.” He 
asked if he could summon these men before him to take the Oath of Allegiance. (1862 3-10). The oath 
Muller referred to read as follows: “FORM OF OATH Prescribed by Congress, August 6th, 1861: I 
_______ do solemnly _______ that I will support, protect and defend the Constitution and Government 
of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, 
allegiance and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution or law of any State Convention or 
Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding; and further that I do this with a full determination, pledge 
and purpose, without any mental reservations or evasion whatsoever; and further that I will well and 
faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by law.—So help me God. ________, 
and subscribed before me this _______ day of ________ A.D. 186_.”  See 1862 Proc, 1862 10-16, 
Proceedings title page, Civil War Loyalty Oath of 8-6-1861, annual meeting held at Philadelphia. IMG 




the war was 640.  Together with railroads and military organization, the steamboats 
“formed the backbone of the service of supply that made possible the successful 
prosecution of the critical campaigns in the West, by which one part after another of 
the Confederacy was severed from the main body and brought under Federal 
domination.” 
 
We close with a note on how the western practical engineers contributed to the Union 
war effort.  Hunter relates that they provided a vital service to the Union Navy 
through their conversion of conventional steamboats to “light drafts” or “tin-clads.”  
These vessels were side and stern wheelers of the traditional western type that had 
been specially modified for war use.  To protect passengers and crew from musket 
shot, the engineers added oak-plank and sheet-iron armor for the boats, lowered 
boilers and steam pipes to a less exposed position, and placed an armament of six to 
eight light cannon.  With a light superstructure, these tin-clads had less draft than 
monitors, which could not negotiate the shallow western waters.  Hunter noted that 
U.S. military commanders were impressed with the innovative, improvisational 
engineers:  “Admiral David D. Porter commented admiringly that in the time that the 
professional naval engineers would have taken simply to make drawings and prepare 
for operations, these native mechanics had not only assembled materials and 
equipment but actually completed the job.”267 
                                                 
267  Hunter, SBOTWR (1949), p. 560n. Hunter’s source: Official Records . . . Navies, Series I, XXV, p. 




4.8  Chapter 4 End Notes 
 
Biographies of Selected Supervising Inspectors and Other Persons 
 
Charles W. Copeland (1815-1895) was the first Supervising Inspector of the District 
of New York (the second district), was a prominent naval engineer and a founding 
member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. As a child in Hartford, 
Connecticut, Copeland learned the rudiments of machinery under the guidance of his 
father, who was engaged in constructing steam engines and boilers. Copeland took a 
course at Columbia College and in 1836 at the age of 21 became Superintendent of 
the West Point Foundry Association. In this post, he designed the machinery for the 
Fulton, the first steam war vessel constructed under the direct supervision of the U.S. 
Navy Department. In 1839, with the official title of naval engineer, he designed 
machinery for five more U.S. Navy ships. In 1841 he patented a low-pressure steam 
engine, and in 1850 he became superintendent of the Allaire works in New York City, 
where he designed and supervised the construction of numerous merchant steamers of 
the Collins Line. Two of these steamers broke transatlantic speed records. Also in this 
time period, he was a trustee with the New York Floating Derrick Company, which 
built floating derricks used to fit large machinery such as pistons, boilers, and masts 
to ships. The company also performed salvage work. Just before the Civil War, 
Copeland became the director and consulting engineer of the Norwich and New York 
Transportation Co. During the war, he adapted merchant vessels for service in the 




death, he was engaged as the constructing engineer for the U.S. Lighthouse Board. 
Copeland died in Brooklyn, New York, in 1895. Copeland is listed as a patentee for at 
least two patents, one for an improved method of flooding and entering powder 
magazines (No. 6842; 1849), and the other for a stop cock (No. 6913; 1849).  There is 
some controversy attached to Copeland.  A Treasury Department letter dated October 
20, 1857, charges him with corruption involving kickbacks in the construction of the 
U.S. Navy steamer Niagara (outcome unknown), see 1857 10-20 (B3). Biographical 
data are taken from:  Johnson, Allen; and Malone, Dumas (eds.): Dictionary of 
American Biography, Vol. II, Charles Scribner's & Sons, New York, 1929, p. 423.  
Original source from which the DAB article was written: Trans. Am. Soc. 
Mechanical Engineers, XVI (1895), pp. 1191-92; and obituaries in the New York 
Tribune and Hartford Times newspapers dated Feb. 7, 1895.  Second source: 
http://www.bobcat.nyu.edu. Third source (patents): http://www.rootsweb.com.  
Fourth source: Correspondence of the Steam Boat Inspection Service of the U.S. 
Treasury Department, NARA RG 41, 1857, containing letters detailing the corruption 
charges against Copeland. 
 
John Shallcross (? - ?) was the first supervising inspector for the sixth district, 
Louisville, Kentucky.  Shallcross was a native of Louisville, Kentucky who became 
an engineer and then a captain of steamboats. In the late 1820s, he was captain of the 
steamboat Diana, which won $500 in gold from the U.S. Postal Service for being the 
first steamboat to make passage from New Orleans to Louisville in less than six days 




possibly of the ferryboat Black Locust, and the Peytona. Shallcross was appointed the 
first U.S. supervising inspector of the Louisville district in 1852 after becoming active 
in pushing for the original steamboat inspection laws in 1851. His district consisted of 
the Ohio River and its tributaries to above the mouth of the Kentucky River, with 
Louisville as headquarters. Shallcross seems to have been on a comfortable basis with 
Benjamin Crawford, who presided over an adjoining inspection district. Biographical 
data are taken from: U.S. Coast Guard site, Steamboat Inspection Service 
(Discussion), from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/h_Westernrivers.html.  
Steamboat data are taken from http://members.tripod.com. 
 
Alfred Guthrie (1805-1882), a Chicago practical engineer appointed first supervising 
inspector for the eighth district, had designed and constructed the hydraulic works of 
the Illinois and Michigan canal. Before passage of the 1852 law, he conducted his 
own clandestine 16-month study on boiler explosions, spending $1000 of his own 
money and disguising his role as investigator aboard steamboats by pretending to be 
an ordinary passenger paying full fare. Guthrie summed up the results of his 
investigations in a pamphlet, reviewed by the Franklin Institute in 1852. Guthrie’s 
results were in perfect accord with the Institute’s 1836 report: “[Guthrie’s] results are 
precisely in accordance with those before arrived at by Messrs Bache, Reeves, and 
others of the Franklin Institute committee.”268   In 1850, he had turned the knowledge 
he gained from his investigations into political currency by becoming a consultant to 
Senator Davis of the Commerce Committee, the member of Congress charged with 
                                                 




drafting the 1852 legislation. Guthrie advocated Evans’s safety guard from an early 
date as the most reliable mechanism for the employment of fusible alloy. Later, he 
qualified his acceptance of fusible alloy because of concern that although the alloy 
performed well in the laboratory, it did not work satisfactorily in actual river use 
(1853 12-15). During attempts to remove him from office in 1853 for political 
reasons, he noted that “Mr. [Benjamin] Crawford and myself are the only ones who 
have had the toil and trouble of [investigating boiler explosions] from the beginning.” 
Regardless of his technical expertise, Guthrie served as supervising inspector for only 
a little more than a year before being replaced by Isaac Lewis. Guthrie’s father, Dr. 
Samuel Guthrie, a chemist, was the inventor of chloroform and the inventor of 
percussion powder for firing cannon. Biographical data are taken from: NARA letter 
Item 256 in Vol. 2, spring 1853, and 
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~dav4is/people/GUTH158.htm. 
 
Benjamin Crawford (1809-1873; dates uncertain), first supervising inspector at 
Pittsburgh, was a key figure in drafting and administering the 1852 Act and 
promoting the safety guard. Little is known about Crawford outside of his numerous 
letters in the correspondence of the Treasury Department. He is listed as a mechanical 
engineer (M.E.) in one source and a foundry mold maker in another.  There is a 
reference to a “B. Crawford” of Allegheny City, Pennsylvania (made a suburb of 
Pittsburgh in 1906) in the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh’s Science and Technology 
Department as the first citizen of the city to receive a U.S. patent. The patent was 




this patent number in the Catalogue of American Patents confirms the patentee as 
Benjamin Crawford. This source lists five other patents in his name: a water gauge 
for boilers (No. 8,787; 1852), a pressure gage (No. 8,797; 1852), a steam-boiler 
furnace (No. 7,051; 1859), a “hame” (No. 75,250; 1868), and a steam generator (No. 
90,506; 1869). It is possible but uncertain that this is the correct Benjamin Crawford, 
but if he is the same person, he would have been actively developing inventions 
during a very hectic period discharging his duties as a high executive within the 
Treasury Department, which seems doubtful.  There is no mention of inventions in 
any of Crawford’s letters in the NARA letters. There is also a Captain Crawford listed 
in a list of steamboats belonging to the Pittsburgh U.S. Mail Line (as captain of a boat 
named Pioneer, but it is unknown if this is the same Crawford.  Moving on to the 
NARA records, we know that Crawford helped Senator Davis of the Commerce 
Committee write the act of 1852. Crawford was appointed supervising inspector of 
the seventh district at Pittsburgh in 1852 after serving as president of his steamboat 
engineering association.  Crawford was a key player on the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors; he was instrumental in establishing and organizing the inspection service, 
serving on many important committees of the Board for nearly a decade, working 
assiduously in researching and drafting key amendments to the act of 1852.  In his 
committee assignments, he led the way in introducing new areas of steamboat safety 
research such as fire protection. Commented one Charles Thaler of Crawford’s many 
talents pertaining to administering the 1852 Act, "No man in the Country is more able 
to elucidate [the SB Law].  He had so much to do with the law’s inception; he is its 




integrity and justice.  He is worthy due to not only knowledge but also his 'quasi-
judicial discrimination.” (1858 7-22). Thaler’s praise of Crawford’s administrative 
skills was not hyperbole; his considerable talents, tact, and slyness in shaping and 
coordinating execution of the act in the western districts come through clearly in his 
writings.  However, the supremely organized Crawford had chaos in his personal life 
and was severely criticized by his own local inspectors for being “supremely 
ignorant” in technical matters.  Critics charged that Crawford lived extravagantly, 
borrowed money irresponsibly, and hid his assets in his wife’s name to shelter them 
from multiple creditors, some of whom lodged cases against him in court.  In court 
papers, a victimized creditor wrote that Crawford skipped bail in his pending suit, 
pronouncing acidly that "a more dishonest, dishonourable, and ungrateful man lives 
not out of a penitentiary.” Crawford’s debt and credibility problems threatened his 
relationship with Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb. Cobb once noted that if Crawford 
were proved guilty on a particular unpaid debt charge, a case about which Crawford 
had apparently lied to the Secretary regarding the facts, he would “turn the rascal 
out.” (1858 9-8).  Crawford’s debt debacles even insinuated themselves in his 
management of his inspection district; he was investigated for graft by the 
Department when it was found that he had instructed his local inspectors to reject 
certain unpatented lifeboats when he owed the agent of the patented article a sum of 
money. (Letter filed with 1859 correspondence, no date, See NARA RG 41, Box 1, 
Item 338, IMG 1507-1508). Of more serious import for the integrity of the inspection 
service, in 1859 Crawford stood accused by his own local inspectors of assorted 




ignorance; lying to the Secretary; distortion of facts and manipulation in regard to 
assorted steamboat accident investigations; and nepotism and graft in exonerating a 
guilty engineer and punishing an innocent one in the Fanny Fern case. (A complaint 
of thirty-five such deficiencies was lodged against Crawford by his local inspectors 
Dickey and Watson and published in their 70-page pamphlet on the explosion of the 
steamer Fanny Fern in January 1858). Apparently Crawford’s more serious crime as 
far as the Treasury Department was concerned was that he belonged to the wrong 
party; he was a Whig in a newly formed Democratic administration. Crawford was 
accused of secretly supported Whig party candidates for inspectors’ positions while 
pretending to be a Democrat; he was humiliated in a report to President Buchanan 
when loyal Democrats refused to certify Crawford as one of their party, accusing 
Crawford of "baseness and want of moral honesty” in disguising his Whig 
sympathies. The facts of Crawford’s money, credibility, and corruption problems 
came to be used against him in a move to replace him with a Democrat as supervising 
inspector beginning in late 1858. Crawford was resilient, however.  When he was 
replaced by Edward M. Shield in 1861, he found his way back into the inspection 
service as a temporary local inspector, filling in for an inspector who reported for 
duty with the U.S. Army. Removed once again when his temporary position became 
filled, Crawford may have regained his footing as a local inspector at Pittsburgh in 
1862 (he requested the assignment but whether it came about is uncertain), and he 
was listed as a special agent in 1867.  In 1872 and 1873 he appealed and was granted 
$15,000 relief by Congress for use of a patented steam blower.  Clearly Crawford was 




longstanding accusations against him. It is regretted that the author could find no 
portrait for Crawford; he must have had an interesting face. (Sources of biographical 
material: See Scientific American, February 14, 1857, p. 181; http:// 
carnegielibrary.com/locations/scitech/ptdl/pgh/pathfind.html and 
http://www.history.rochester.edu/Scientific_American/ 
vol1/vol/n004/coap.htm.  On the captain of the boat Pioneer, see 
http://digital.library.pitt.edu.  Many letters by Crawford appear throughout the NARA 
volumes and are too numerous to catalog here.)   
 
[Supplemental Vital Data: According to information provided to the author in a 
genealogy forum by C. Henig, Crawford was born in 1809 in Port Chester, New York 
and died in 1873 in Pittsburgh. His father was a John Crawford of Port Chester, NY.  
Benjamin married Mary Armour (alternately spelled Armerer) from Morpeth, 
England. Crawford had sons (number not provided) who served in the Union Army 
and a daughter named Marion, whose husband was from Vicksburg and served in the 
Confederacy. Although genealogy information can be quite dubious due to the 
number of persons having identical names, the above-described person is the only 
Benjamin Crawford found by the author whose birth and death dates seem to 
reasonably correspond to the range of dates in the life of the Supervising Inspector. 
For example, in 1852, the above-named person would have been 43 years old, and the 
last record for Benjamin Crawford in the NARA records is February 10, 1873. 





Davis Embree (1787-1870?) was the first supervising inspector for the fifth district, 
St. Louis, Missouri.  A Cincinnati brewer, he introduced steam equipment into the 
family brewery.  Born in Pennsylvania into a family of iron founders from Tennessee, 
he moved to Cincinnati in July 1811 and married in 1813.  He became city treasurer 
in 1814 and a trustee of the Lancaster Seminary in 1815.  At this time he constructed 
a steam-powered brewery (possibly with his brother Jesse).  He was a well-known 
Quaker in Cincinnati, and one source claimed he “dispensed drinks free of charge and 
lived until the second half of the nineteenth century.”  Embree filed a report to 
Congress in 1832.  He claimed to have been “engaged in steam works for several 
years.”  He reported a want of proper inspectors on the rivers and noted that boilers 
were built of poor materials, Gov Doc. 478, p. 41 (January 1832). It is not known 
when Embree entered the steamboat trade, but in 1848, he began editing a periodical 
entitled The Western Boatman. The magazine contained a steamboat directory, a 
registry of pilots and engineers, and steamboat news of the day. Embree must have 
been a powerful figure in 1850, because Haldeman mentioned him in a letter to 
Congress; he complained that Embree opposed the safety guard (now required for use 
on boilers by the French government) in favor of the doctor pump, see 1850 12-23. In 
August 1852, Embree was appointed by President Fillmore to take the position of 
Supervising Inspector at St. Louis (District 5), see 1852 8-31. As a captain and owner 
of steamboats during this period, Embree was known to be sympathetic to St. Louis 
steamboat owners and river men.  He became embroiled in a fracas with Benjamin 
Crawford over the revocation of a drunk pilot’s license (Hamilton), railing against the 




will revolt at the law” because it impoverished steamboat men without a proper 
hearing.  Crawford calmed him down and castigated Embree for inflaming emotions, 
which had resulted in a $5000 suit against his local inspectors. He directed his local 
inspectors to “let the matter rest,” and regretted the loss of peace and harmony in his 
district. See 11-16-1853, C9; and 1853 12-2, 1853 12-5. Embree was criticized by 
engineers and others in 1854 for allowing an obsolete boiler to pass inspection and for 
hiring inspectors and engineers by mail instead of in person as required by the Act. In 
addition, he had not required an examination or oath for engineers. Anyone criticizing 
this met with Embree's "hostility," see 1854 5-24, C10; and 1853 1-1; C10. In 1854, 
Embree opposed the resolution calling for the instituting of the pressure principle in 
the steamboat law, on grounds of monopoly, angering Gouge (Embree was the sole 
supervisor in opposition). Embree was reported in 1855 as having not inspected 
steamers in his district, 1855 7-29.  He was removed from office in December 1858 
and was replaced by Charles Ross, who continued Embree’s underground fight 
against the safety guard. Crawford complained about this to the Treasury Secretary. 
See 1858 12-8, 1859 12-26. Embree lived a long life. There is a Davis Embree listed 
in the 1870 census for Clark County, Ohio, Mad River Township.  He is listed as 83 
years of age and living with his daughter.  (This appears to be the Embree of our story 
because the listed age corresponds exactly to his birth year of 1787 as specified by the 
Cincinnati Historical Society, the source for some of the biographical information 
above. Census background, see http://www.rootsweb.com, in Surnames Index, 1870 




Oliver A. Pitfield (1809-1880), appointed third Supervising Inspector for the Fourth 
Inspection District, listed his profession as steamboat or steamship captain. He was 
born in Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada. His father, George Jefferson Pitfield, 
was a loyalist in the American Revolution and was deported to Saint John in 1783. 
Oliver Pitfield was connected with steamships all of his adult life. M.D. McAlester, a 
Captain of Engineers, noted a memorandum of information obtained from Mr. 
Pitfield, “who, as supervising inspector of steam-boats under the Federal Government 
before the war, has visited the whole navigable portions of the rivers ... I place the 
fullest confidence in the above statements of Mr. Pitfield, who is a very intelligent, 
truthful man, and whose occupations and opportunities have been such as to enable 
him to know and judge correctly as to these rivers.” Pitfield appears in the 1857 
Proceedings as the Supervising Inspector of the Fourth District, New Orleans. 
Evidently in the Civil War Pitfield left the federal government for the Confederate 
cause.  In 1861, he is recorded as commanding the [Confederate?] steamer “Arrow” 
and is said to have been a blockade runner (although another source credits Pitfield as 
being “U.S. Navy” [unproven]). Pitfield’s name does appear in The Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion. May Terry Gill, in 
her book of poetry, "Mind and Melody," credits Captain Pitfield with the statement, 
“A river has a unifying influence on the land it traverses.” Pitfield died at his home on 
January 20, 1880. He is buried in the Greenwood Cemetery in New Orleans. 
Biographical data from a genealogy website: http://www.terry-family-historian.com, 




Biographies of Other Persons 
 
James Booth (1810-1888), professor of chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania 
and then metallurgist at the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia, received his scientific training 
under Charles Keating at the University of Pennsylvania, Amos Eaton at the 
Rensselaer Polytechnic in New York, and Friedrich Wöhler and Gustav Magnus, 
analytical chemists, in Germany.  Booth also studied in Vienna in the early 1830s and 
toured chemical factories on the Continent and in England. Taking a great interest in 
his mentors, he learned important trade secrets as well as the important principle that 
the chemical laboratory and the chemical industry were two sides of the same coin, 
only different in size. Booth returned to Philadelphia in 1836. From 1836 to 1845 he 
was a chemical consultant and professor of chemistry at the Franklin Institute, and 
took part in geological surveys of Pennsylvania and Delaware. From 1842 to 1845 he 
taught chemistry at the Institute-sponsored Central High School, and in the 1840s to 
1850s he wrote and published (singly and with others) reports, pamphlets, and books 
on the extraction of metals from ore, improvements in the chemical arts, and 
theoretical and practical chemistry. He translated at least one chemical text from the 
French. In 1849, Booth assumed the role of melter and refiner at the U.S. Mint in 
Philadelphia, where he comes into our story as the developer of government fusible 
alloy.  At the Mint, his primary responsibility was to develop and scale up laboratory 
techniques for improving the refinement and production of gold brought into the U.S. 
coinage system after the California Gold Rush, and to improve methods for 




innovations in inventing and refining metals were entirely original—they had not 
existed before—and Booth spent many years developing them in the laboratory. 
Booth retired from the Mint in 1887, exhausted from continual government demands 
to alter coinage specifications. He died in 1888. On the subject of Booth’s work 
creating government fusible alloys, his correspondence in the NARA holdings, RG 
41, SBIS, are voluminous (weekly or daily reports over several years) and precisely 
detailed, tracing every step he took in the heretofore virtually unknown history of the 
development and distribution of government fusible alloy used in steamboats. 
 
William M. Gouge (1796-1863), high clerk to the Secretary of the Treasury, began 
his career as an associate editor of the Philadelphia Gazette (1823-1829), and a 
reporter of the debates of the Delaware Convention of 1831. He was the author of 
several books and a journal on economics: A Short History of Money and Banking in 
the United States (1833), History of the American Banking System (1835), 
Expediency of Dispensing with Bank Paper (1837), and the Journal of Banking 
(1841), and The Fiscal History of Texas (1852). Early in his career he opposed paper 
money, banks, and corporations, but he softened on these positions later. He became a 
special agent with the U.S. Treasury in 1854. It is possible that Gouge was brought in 
by the Secretary in this capacity specifically to push scientific technology as 
represented by the Evans guard. Circumstantial evidence for this conclusion exists in 
the fact that (1) Gouge’s letters treated no other subject besides the fusible alloy 
safety guard, (2) he was the chief officer who tried to get the law changed to 




there should be letters covering all areas of administration, not just one narrow area of 
technology; there are none.  However, notes or letters of direction addressing this 
issue do not exist, and so this conjecture remains unsupported by direct evidence. It is 
likely that either Haldeman, who had close ties to the Department, or another of the 
government’s experts furnished Gouge with a copy of Evans’s Treatise. In 1857 
Gouge left the Department and became the accountant for the State Bank of 
Arkansas, writing the Report of the Accountants of the State Bank of Arkansas in 
1858. He died in Trenton, New Jersey, in July 1863.  Biographical sources: 
Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 2. Dictionary of American 
Biography (New York: Scribner, 1928-81). National Cyclopaedia of American 
Biography, Vol. 24. Texas State Gazette, April 17, 1852. 
 
Thomas J. Haldeman (1810?-1874), was appointed local inspector of hulls for the 
seventh district (Pittsburgh) in 1852.  He spent 25 years on the Ohio and Mississippi 
Rivers in the capacity of engineer and commander of steamboats.  His ambition early 
in his career had been to leave his native Louisiana to improve his craft as a practical 
engineer in the engine-building shops of Cincinnati. He moved there in 1830 (“I have 
been here [in Cincinnati] about one year, for the purpose of gaining all the 
information I could relative to the steam engine; and as Cincinnati is famed for 
building good engines, and for good mechanics, I have been favored with every 
opportunity I wanted.” ) (see Doc 478, p. 92, 1830.)  Evans gave Haldeman lengthy 
praise in his 1850 Treatise (page 53): “He has passed through all the grades of 




practical river men must feel compelled to respect his opinion. He has not rested 
satisfied with the mere manipulations of his profession, but he is looking keenly into 
the deep truths, which are both developed by practical men, and at the same time lie 
at the foundation of all practice. He has patiently and modestly studied his profession, 
which embraces so noble a circuit of physical knowledge, until he has evidently 
attained an eminence even enviable to his competitors, and in the highest degree 
useful to the community.”  In 1840, Haldeman went into business with riverboat 
Captain George Walker in which they began manufacturing steamboats and opened a 
paper mill.  By 1850, Haldeman was writing long letters to Congress from his 
steamboat Yorktown in which he advocated emulating the “French system” of safety 
(i.e., employing self-acting devices such as fusible alloy and a French safety guard) 
and properly training young engineers, many of whom “need regulation as so many of 
them know so little of the science of engineering.”  (see 1852 4-24).  His letters were 
often published in the Louisville Courier and other commercial newspapers of 
steamboat towns.   Haldeman defended the safety guard and fusible alloy through 
thick and thin: he wrote in 1852 that accidents would abate if Congress mandated the 
device; and that regulating engineers was not enough (“I have no objections to having 
engineers examined by the Inspectors, but this will do but little good in my opinion to 
prevent explosions.”)  In 1854, a year in which the safety guard was approaching the 
zenith of its unpopularity with the engineers, Professor John Locke recorded that 
Haldeman was solidly in favor of the safety guard (“he thinks its application the most 
essential part of the steamboat law”). In 1858, Haldeman wrote the Treasury 




on political grounds.  In 1859, Haldeman again defended fusible alloy, stating that 
supervising inspector Shallcross was the prime mover in the "ridiculous idea of 
substituting block tin for fusible alloy” (an idea that eventually won out). Haldeman 
frequently expressed a trust in the efficacy of the safety guards over the skepticism 
manifested by engineers. He believed any malfunction of the guards was the result of 
tampering, not a defect in the alloy. He was always deeply suspicious, for instance, 
that engineers had been tying down the guards since explosions were happening on 
boats that had the devices installed. Haldeman is mentioned briefly in an 1861 
correspondence that mulled over the appointment of Benjamin Crawford as a 
temporary local inspector, and then he passes out of view.  Nothing is known of 
Haldeman’s life after this time.   
 
Both T. J. Haldeman and Alfred Guthrie had their articles and letters published in the 
Journal of the Franklin Institute and in commercial newspapers from as early as 
1832. After 1852, Crawford was interviewed in numerous newspapers on the progress 
of the board in quelling steamboat boiler explosions (and he once commented on the 
need to extend the knowledge gained to stationary boilers on land).  The articles 
ruminated on the poor quality of steamboat engineers, the neglect of the science of 
engineering, and sometimes the laxity of Congress.  The criticisms aimed at bad 
engineers resonated with rank-and-file engineers, who had been forced to compete 
with these men in the labor pool.  Haldeman wrote, “There are now many men 
engaged and engaging in the engineering business, through the influence of their 




description; they learn, in a short time, how to start and stop an engine, but know 
nothing about the first or constituent principles of the machinery, or the construction 
of it .....  and so long as men of this kind are employed in boats, so long will accidents 
occur…” 269  
 
                                                 




CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of the foregoing study has been to ask some basic questions about 
engineering expertise in the nineteenth century steamboat inspection service.  Where 
did reliable, useful expertise to solve the problem of boiler explosions come from? 
How did the U.S. Congress and Treasury Department marshal that expertise and 
create a body of law for putting the technological “lessons learned” into practice? 
What were the obstacles to this process, and what were the reasons for the ensuing 
difficulties? How did time affect how expertise was defined? How did institutional, 
political, and economic factors influence the accepted definition?  Finally, what were 
the power relations among the participants, and how did power influence the selection 
of expertise? This chapter will attempt to answer these questions and arrive at a 
deeper understanding of technological expertise. 
 
As we have seen, the Treasury Department assumed the responsibility for deciding 
what constituted expertise, and for gathering that expertise for placement in a legal 
framework. Circularization in the 1830s of the steamboat community had contributed 
early practical expertise, but this information was highly contradictory and anecdotal. 
Much of the testimony on accidents was provided by persons untrained in 
engineering; experience with witnesses further indicated that no two accounts seemed 
to agree. Forensic studies of wrecks sometimes provided valuable information about 
the causes of explosions, but often the violence of an explosion obliterated evidence 




Thus, it became the key goal of the Department in 1830 to investigate the true causes 
of accidents, not with hearsay reports alone but by adding the tools of science. 
Science, in fact, was the primary thread running through the pre-1852 attempt to 
control steamboat safety, and functioned as a touchstone long afterward. As the 
professional frame of reference for the most powerful parties--elite scientists and 
government officials—science would define the technological expertise. Inventor 
Cadwallader Evans joined with these scientific communities in the early 1830s. 
Science was also the frame of reference for the practical engineers, who used it as a 
source of information but preserved their critical faculty in evaluating its merits. 
 
We have seen how scientific expertise behind steamboat boiler safety originated in 
the late 1820s and early 1830s with Alexander D. Bache and Walter Johnson, 
chemists at the Franklin Institute. Their purpose was to use heat theory as a means of 
detecting the low-water condition. We saw how years later another scientist affiliated 
with the Franklin Institute, James Booth, joined in the endeavor to make a reliable 
government fusible alloy as a component in the “apparatus” devised by Bache and 
Evans. American scientists gleaned much of their expertise from French and British 
scientists and engineers. Even so, American scientists pushed into new areas, in this 
case toward a radical new type of safety device based on the detection of heat rather 
than steam pressure.  
 
We have also noted how Evans used his connections within the Franklin Institute’s 




Franklin Institute and his reputation as the son of a famous American inventor and 
steam engine pioneer, Oliver Evans, cemented his scientific credentials. Although 
Cadwallader developed his 1832 prototype safety guard primarily as a means of 
preserving fusible alloy, this earliest design was the one favored by the Franklin 
Institute for its scientific virtue of heat detection. We have also seen that although 
Evans did not immediately promote his invention from a mere appliance to a 
scientific instrument, he did so in 1850 by publishing his Treatise, whose scientific 
rhetoric was so influential in government circles. High Clerk William M. Gouge’s 
reading of the Treatise resulted ultimately in the government action to distribute 
government fusible alloy aboard hundreds of steamboats in 1855-1856.  
 
While Evans worked out the details of his clever mechanism, self-made “scientific” 
practical engineers T.J. Haldeman and Alfred Guthrie joined with the members of the 
Franklin Institute in moving the safety guard and hence scientific engineering into the 
engine rooms of steamboats. Haldeman was a staunch advocate of the safety guard, 
encouraged engineers to read Evans’s Treatise--which he considered a scientific  
tract--and advocated scientific training for novice engineers. We recall that both 
Haldeman and Guthrie invoked scientific principles to provide technical guidance on 
safety devices to Senator John Davis’s 1850 Commerce Committee, an action that 
resulted in their being given positions as inspectors in the new inspection service.  
Among the association engineers (particularly those of Cincinnati, Louisville, and St. 
Louis), science figured prominently as well.  Members saw their role as performing a 




engineers in particular used extensive scientific argument to discredit the safety guard 
and its fusible alloy as they made the case for an equal share of responsibility with the 
nation’s top scientists in transforming theoretical scientific concepts into practical 
applications. 
 
So, it was in this setting that antebellum science gave birth to the Evans Safety Guard. 
And yet, if science was the backbone of the Government’s expertise, why was it that 
so much that determined the final outcome of the government’s safety program had 
nothing to do with science, or modified the scientific themes for other purposes? For 
example, for all of Gouge’s faith in the science behind Evans’s safety guard, his main 
concern was that the Department’s scientific expertise as codified in law be strictly 
obeyed. Gouge’s legal orientation (i.e., his emphasis on clarification of the pressure 
principle in the ninth section of the Steamboat Act) seemed to blind him to the 
practical problems associated with the safety guard and thus impaired his critical 
faculties with regard to the scientific expertise he was trying to promote. This is 
readily apparent in Gouge’s retrospective correspondence of 1854-1856, which in 
turn led to the official position of the Department as expressed by Secretary Cobb in 
1859 (“We shall have anarchy instead of proper government . . . [etc.]”).  
 
The reason that science became only a framework for expertise after 1852 was that 
the problem of steamboat safety opened up into many areas besides science at that 
time. One area was traditional engineering expertise as practiced for decades by the 




antithetical to the orientation of the government experts because it came from the 
engineers’ artisanal roots and emphasized praxis over the laboratory-developed, 
single-silver-bullet scientific solution represented by the self-acting safety guard. 
Freedom of technical innovation was a large part of the engineers’ concept of 
expertise, and this is the main reason the engineers fought the safety guard: they 
perceived Evans’s government-granted monopoly powers as a powerful threat to the 
freedom of innovation. We saw in our story many instances of engineers 
memorializing Congress to purchase Evans’s patent so that it could be disseminated 
free of charge. This was what we might call the engineers’ “democratic technological 
vision,” a vision they expected the national government to absorb into its institutional 
framework of regulation.  
 
Another important nonscientific factor was the engineers’ conservatism in using 
traditional safety techniques and devices, which had “frozen” by about 1850: water 
gauges, safety valve, steam gauge, knowledge and training, etc. Self-acting 
mechanisms that robbed the engineer of control over machinery were not wanted, 
especially if they were perceived to be malfunctioning and thus creating a “nuisance” 
or safety hazard. As practical engineer and Local Inspector McCord remarked, all that 
was needed were old-fashioned principles such as boilers constructed of good iron 
and workmanship, a steam gauge to indicate pressure, and a “sober, decent, and 
competent engineer in charge.”  
Joined with traditional engineering practice was another nonscientific thread of 




roots in contemporary religious moral codes of behavior. Here the practical 
engineers’ Victorian sensitivities intersected with those in high government circles 
(Bache built his later career as a Whiggish shaper of educational and governmental 
scientific institutions; Secretaries Guthrie and Cobb, Clerk Gouge, Supervisor 
Crawford, et al. focused sharply on inculcating Whiggish character traits in rank-and-
file steamboat engineers). The quack engine-driver of dissolute habits was to be 
replaced by a technically proficient practical engineer who displayed qualities of 
temperance, morality, and a calm and steady demeanor. Inspectors were to “be as 
sacred men.”270 The near-ecclesiastical personality traits desired in engineers and 
inspectors thus became bound into law by the examination, licensing, and grading 
provisions devised by the Cincinnati Association of Steamboat Engineers.  
 
To the elites in government, the safety guard illuminated its creators’ concerns with 
the difficulties of enforcing the prevailing Victorian cultural norms. Attempts to 
civilize engineers through religion had largely failed, as did attempts to have captains 
and passengers spy on them in the 1820s.  Building morality into the machinery 
promised a remote corrective. The safety guard would “tell a sad tale” on the bad 
engineer in a most effective, albeit impersonal, way.  If one could not control the 
heart of a man directly, the reasoning went, one could at least intervene physically to 
stop his sinful nature from killing others. It may seem an exaggeration, but in a very 
real sense, after 1852 the safety guard shed its scientific meaning and instead took on 
the regulating function of the Congregationalists’ All-Seeing Eye, the Holy Bible, the 
                                                 




Rosary, or the priest’s confessional (the safety guard was called, after all, a “tell tale” 
device). Thus, safety technology would serve as a mechanical extension of morality, 
and went hand in hand with more overt personal means of control such as Crawford’s 
campaign to “get the drunks out.” If overt means failed, covert methods would 
provide the “extra means of safety.” 
 
A final thread of expertise in the drive to regulation was the bureaucratic framework, 
personnel organization, and administrative set of skills provided by the Customs 
Service, an area completely overlooked by some historical accounts. This was the 
science of human organization, not machines. We have seen how the District Courts 
teamed with the Customs Service to confirm inspectors, how a licensing apparatus for 
enforcing the personnel provisions of the steamboat law was set up, and how Customs 
Collectors and Surveyors contributed their labors in the management and processing 
of licenses and certificates. Expert investigators could now depose witnesses and 
organize legal proceedings against offending engineers following accidents, as the 
scientists at the Franklin Institute had originally desired (in keeping up with the 
British practice of inquests). This would provide valuable feedback on the causes of 
accidents. The lumbering and inflexible nature of the Customs Service’s organization 
would also come into play, and we have seen how this caused a sea change on the 
western rivers in 1852. Owners and engineers balked at the high costs of regulation, 
which they thought unfairly levied on them (and which they had been able to escape 
under the administration of the 1838 inspectors, who “never gave them any trouble”). 




“monstrous” power over the property and intellectual freedom of its citizens. Finally, 
the Customs Service’s political patronage system ensured that technical expertise 
would be subordinated to the needs of the party in power. The penalty was a less 
expert technical corps of inspectors, a particular source of irritation to the engineers. 
 
Thus, although science was the primary thread of expertise up until 1852, it was not 
equipped to solve human and institutional problems. For these areas of expertise, 
there was a need for the steamboat inspector, the Customs official, the legal mind, 
and the moralizing Supervisor. These men took over and served in an active personal 
role (as opposed to the passive role of scientists). In this way, a time dimension 
(scientific expertise giving way to institutional expertise as a result of the passage of 
the Act of 1852) acted to redefine expertise. 
 
The fact that the engineers would not accept the safety guards was not known until 
the Department began receiving anecdotal evidence after 1854 that they were being 
tied down (these actions being attended by observations of much prejudice against the 
guards among the river men). This leads us into the area of conflicts and barriers to 
government expertise that arose because of the different perspectives of these two 
groups toward expertise.  
 
The Department had assumed that the latest scientific innovations would be well 
received by the steamboat community. In making this assumption, they had not given 




common safety valve. For years, engineers had used the safety valve as a throttle to 
provide more power when needed. The question arises, If the Department could not 
stop tampering with the safety valve over a period of some decades, what made 
officials think the safety guard would not suffer the same fate? 
 
The simplest explanation was that Department officials were blinded by the 
possibilities of science providing the silver-bullet solution to explosions. Who, they 
must have reasoned, would not want a precision instrument developed in a scientific 
laboratory to serve as an improvement over the obsolete and ineffectual safety valve?  
The common practice of the “fast” engineer stacking five or six heavy wrenches on 
the weight side of the safety valve would end once the heat principle of the safety 
guard became understood. Engineers such as T.J. Haldeman and the publication of 
Evans’s Treatise would help spread the news. It was only a matter of time before all 
steamboats would be protected by Evans’s guards and explosions would cease. This 
was the promise the Department made to itself in the 1830s, and the one it tried to 
execute in 1854. 
 
In point of fact, the engineers had longstanding reasons for rejecting the safety guard. 
First, they believed it to be a threat to innovation and an “imposition on steamboat 
money;” second, it was a nuisance and a danger to the engineer; and third, it was an 
unnecessary addition to the engineer’s arsenal of traditional safety devices and 
procedures. These objections resonated with the local inspectors, who in turn 




Ironically, the insistence by which Gouge pushed the safety guard, and his failed 
attempt to fashion a legal tool for his initiative, created another obstacle to the 
transmission of government expertise. For Gouge, the legal stakes were more 
important than the foundational science on which Department policy was based. 
Although his comprehension of the practical engineering aspects was limited and 
amateurish, his appreciation for the bureaucratic skill of the Supervisors in blocking 
the safety guard was even more limited. Despite his intent to pass a law favoring 
Evans’s safety guard, the Supervisors had been careful not to associate the law with 
any particular device. Therefore, Gouge could never fasten responsibility for 
enforcement of the guard on the inspectorate. Further, although it tried, the 
Department could not enforce the use of the Evans Guard in fulfillment of the 1854 
resolution because the Act of 1852 had granted the Supervisors autonomous legal 
status. 
 
The answers to the questions of institutional, political, and economic factors affecting 
expertise reinforce the observation that the determination of the proportions and mix 
that formed the final outcome of expertise in the Inspection Service was not a 
homogenous process. Institutional traditions, ways of working, scientific and 
technical knowledge, power relationships, economic factors, politics, religious  and 
cultural norms, time, and individual personalities were the key factors influencing 
how and in what proportions the various strands of expertise came together to form a 
“consensus expertise.” We have discussed all of these aspects in the main body of the 




well. In such cases, the losing side in any struggle to define expertise does not simply 
give up the fight and disappear, hence the instances of tampering with safety devices. 
One could in fact argue that in our particular case study, the expertise of the 
laboratory and its heat theory as passed down by Bache and Evans never reached its 
destination.  As we have shown, there is a strong suspicion that hardly any of the 
safety guards were ever “left free to act” by the engineers.  
 
We could expend much space mapping out and summarizing how the final outcome 
of expertise was determined in the case of the Evans Safety Guard, but it will serve us 
better to highlight the main features and the principles at work. This way, we may 
learn how the process works in modern examples, or perhaps we can apply it as a tool 
for the discovery of patterns in other historical examples. 
 
First, we might conclude that what we call “technological expertise” is largely 
nontechnical in nature, at least at the stage at which research ceases and institutional 
policy takes over. This is at first surprising since in our case study—concerned as it is 
with steam technology—we presume that the parties are most concerned with 
machinery, physics, chemistry, and the manufacturing and mechanical arts. But this 
turns out not to be so after 1852. As just one example, we have seen that the rank-
and-file engineers were most focused on personnel reform, for the reason that they 
wished to gain back their old authority, positions, and pay. We have also shown how 




Examples of many more “nonscientific” motives can be found in the narrative that 
influenced the bias of the actors toward nontechnical expertise. 
 
Second, we can see that a few powerful figures at the top of the power structure can 
exert an inordinate influence on the outlining of expertise (whether or not the outline 
is actually followed). In our case, the Treasury Secretary and William Gouge 
struggled against the Supervisors for several years to push through the safety guards.  
This delayed by a decade or more the use of tin plugs, the preferred technology once 
the controversy died down. 
 
Third, power at the level of the users--in this case steamboat owners and engineers--
was diffuse but it was tremendously influential. There were many more owners and 
engineers than government officials, and they used their motive and opportunity to 
sabotage the safety guards at will. Particularly in the case of the engineers, proximity 
to the technology (opportunity) resulted in an eventual victory for their group. 
Prosecutions such as Buffington’s provided no lasting deterrent because there was no 
power base supporting these actions. 
 
Fourth, diverse institutions do not tend very well to share expertise.  Referring back to 
the Introduction, we recall historian Tracy McDonald describing Heizen's notion of 
vedomstvennost, “an institution has cultures, political interests and constituencies that 
shape its actions, often in unexpected ways.” Each group has its own culture  




professional/economic), and constituencies (public/bureaucratic versus private/guild 
like) that shapes their attitudes toward technology, and these attitudes in turn are 
instrumental in guiding the technological development of the final product. In our 
case study, isolation seemed to be the order of the day. Chemists worked with 
chemists; engineers worked with engineers; rank-and-file engineers did not always 
understand (or wish to understand) scientific concepts; scientists did not always 
understand, or go out of their way to understand, steam engineering praxis on the 
western rivers; practical engineers appraised the results of scientists, but there are no 
indications that scientists were aware of, or had the inclination to react to, such 
questioning of their institutions; politicians/government officials ignored technical 
matters altogether at times since their priorities were focused on building a power 
base for their political party in the new government agency; religious and moral 
concepts suffused the higher ranks of society but did no reach down to the rank-and-
file engineers; and on and on. 
 
Fifth, all groups concerned with a technological outcome tend to view the technology 
in question through filters. The filters can be politics, economics, social order, 
knowledge, personal relationships, feelings of nationalism or patriotism, power 
relationships, institutional framework or mindset, and many others. 
 
Finally, the stated technological goal is rarely the real goal. In our case study, for 
example, the stated goal—safety of the public—was often of secondary importance. 




groups of actors.  Scientists focused on their experiments, engineers fought for 
socioeconomic position and prestige within their profession, owners worried about 
imposed costs, politicians were consumed with patronage, and government officials 
fretted over anarchy in the ranks, and so forth. Of all these parties, the local inspectors 
were probably the truest with regard to the primary goal of safety to the public, but 
they had to negotiate many difficulties of a nontechnical nature in trying to uphold 
right principles in the legal-bureaucratic environment of the post-1852 period. 
 
A New Picture Emerges of the Steam Boat Inspection Service 
 
With all of these complex dimensions accompanying the notion of expertise, one is 
struck by how the story of the safety guard gives a different impression of the Steam 
Boat Inspection Service from the one offered in the familiar accounts. These accounts 
embrace the idea of a smooth process of government regulation reforming an errant 
industry, of a consortium of experts and government officials getting at the bottom of 
the boiler explosion phenomenon and furthering a remedy. Historians’ focus on the 
legal code as it evolved tells us much about hardware, procedures, and methods, but 
little about the human motives and the human drama behind the attempt to design, 
construct, and use safe technology. 
 
The Evans Patent Safety Guard as a central technological actor provides needed relief 
to this previously featureless landscape. In the case study we have presented, the main 




program was a much more contingent affair than the received impression.  From the 
amount of archival correspondence devoted to the subject, the matter of the fusible 
alloys was a significant one, one that threatened to tear the fledgling inspection 
service apart (as Gouge believed, the safety guard issue was the make-or-break legal 
challenge for the Steamboat Act of 1852). As we have seen, although the western 
Supervisors regarded the Evans’s Guard in high esteem for a short time, immediate 
and strong opposition in their districts for various reasons (not all of them technical) 
reached a fever pitch by 1854-1855 and converted the Supervisors over to the 
engineers’ side. They then dedicated their energies to try to replace Evans’s guards 
with tin plugs. In this way, in terms of practical technological preferences, the die had 
been cast early, and in hindsight we can see that Secretary Cobb’s 1859 admonition to 
the Supervisors after the Ross disobedience was probably an ineffectual and late 
reaction. 
 
For his part, Gouge’s faith in Evans’s ability to precisely formulate the alloy was 
probably misplaced in light of Booth’s failed attempt to manufacture a reliable alloy 
for the higher pressure boilers, and in light of the engineers’ frequent reports of safety 
guard “nuisance” alarms. Whether Evans was an unusually talented chemist (he was 
not known for this; his expertise was in designing and making self-acting 
mechanisms) and had produced the only reliable “high pressure” alloys, thus 
demonstrating that the safety guard had worked as designed, or whether Booth had 
been correct in his appraisal that it was unlikely Evans had ever fulfilled his claims of 




provided evidence and arguments pro and con regarding the effectiveness of the 
guards, and because we do not know the exact experimental conditions (i.e., 
steamboats at rest or moving, careened or stable at the wharf, engine horsepower 
constant or abruptly changing, qualifications of the chemists involved, conditions of 
their experiments, experimental techniques employed, etc), we shall never be able to 
properly assess this technology. We do know in hindsight that Gouge was presiding 
over an experimental program (although Evans had convinced Gouge through his 
Treatise/sales brochure that his 1850 improved guard had reached “perfection”), 
eutectic alloys were poorly understood at the time, and the guards’ spindle 
mechanism appeared in so many forms and evolutions that it demonstrates 
circumstantially and convincingly that there must have been major fusing problems 
with the alloy. 
 
Whatever the situation, it is fortunate for historians of technology that the safety 
guard created such a high level of controversy among the interested parties. It has 
shed much light on how the inspection service functioned in its first years, how 
expertise was defined and negotiated, and how technology intersected with 
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 SELECTED FACTS – BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS 
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Date Description Page 
10-27-1852 First Meeting of Supervising Inspectors, Washington, D.C.  Minutes: start 10-27-1852. 
Rules for the government of the Board of Inspectors whilst in session.  Committee be 
appointed to examine the law, and report to the Board for their consideration, rules 
and regulations for the govt of the local boards of inspectors.   Committee:  Embree, 
Murray, and Skipwith.  Two further committees be appointed to prepare rules and 
regulations of pilots and masters to prevent collisions.  Another committee be 
appointed to confer with the TS to prepare forms for certificates. 
3-4 
10-28-1852 Forms adopted.  A committee appointed to superintend the printing of blanks.  Lists 
the various forms.  Inquiry as to whether the Board may direct the max number of 
passengers allowed to carry.  Consult with atty general. 
4-5 
10-29-1852 Appoint a committee of three—one from the lakes, one form the Miss. valley, and one 
from the Atlantic coast—to report on the division of the districts in which the Super 
Inspectors shall discharge their duties.  Lists the limits of each of the districts. Districts 
assigned to the various Super Inspectors.  They are named.  Rules recorded for the 
government of pilots. 
5-6 
10-30-1852 Reply from Atty General on the matter of specifying the max number of passengers.  
Local Boards compelled by law.  If Super Inspectors not compelled, they should at 
least adopt some rule to control the decision of the local boards, to make them 
uniform.    Committee appointed to specify the amount of space needed on boats for 
deck and second class passengers. 
7 
11-1-1852 Further discussion on Report on rules and regulations. (p.7)  Letter to Hon. Wm. L. 
Hodge, Asst TS:  Hydrostatic pump agreed upon by Super Inspectors, pump to be 
provided by your dept., beg leave to suggest that the mfg of them be put under 
contract soon.  (p. 11) 
7, 11 
11-2-1852 Rules for local boards:  steam pipe for holds to extinguish fires; force pumps; life 
preservers; areas of safety valves (with a table); fusible alloy – owners may with 
approval of the local inspectors elect as to the mode of its application; water gauges 
must be conspicuous; size and thickness of flues; earlier boilers must meet 15% 
margin of safety in terms of pressure test; additional means of steering in case of fire; 
when stopping engine, open furnace doors, close dampers, etc.; life boats required; 
fire buckets and axes (with large table of buckets needed, etc);  
7-10 
11-3-1852 Two committees be appointed:  rules for local boards re: number of passengers boats 
may carry.  Also additional rules for pilots in cases of steamers meeting and passing 
each other.   
 
Board, when it adjourns, will meet next in New York on 12-8-1852. 
 
Resolved that Local inspectors be instructed to furnish the Super Inspectors with all 
the info called for by the tabular form annexed.  Purpose: to give a proper 
understanding in regard to the character of the machinery in use upon the several 
boats in the several districts under their charge. 
 
Committee to obtain from the TS the mode of making up our accounts with the 
Treasury for traveling expenses, and the orders for offices, stationery, etc.  Acting TS 
Hodge refers them to the First Comptroller for this procedure.   
 
Letter to Acting TS Hodge.  Arrangement needed to pay local inspectors in port of San 
Francisco for traveling there and for transportation of the necessary implements for 
testing boilers, etc, and a room for the preservation of the instruments to be furnished 
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Date Description Page 
(11-3-1852 cont) 
Letter from Navy Department Acting Secretary Jos. Smith, dated 11-2-1852.  Orders 
will be issued to manufacture a certain number of hydrostatic pumps at the Navy Yard 
in this city, for the use of the Supervising Inspectors, under the late Steamboat law. 
11-4-1852 Discussion of alloyed metals, hose for hydrostatic pumps. 13 
11-5-1852 Ask TS to give information to mfg of boiler plate as to stamping rqmts. Order collectors 
to furnish local board the info required to be furnished to other collectors (under 
Section 23 of law).  Order collectors to furnish room for preservation of instruments, 
and for their offices for exam. of engineers and pilots, at the following ports (lists 
them).  Procure instructions to be given to the commandant of the Navy Yard to make 
35 sets of instruments for testing boilers; also the alloyed metals required by the 
second clause of ninth section of the law. 
 




11-6-1852 Board secretary P.H. Skipworth reported that he called upon the TS, and in answer to 
then resolution submitted to him yesterday, he requires time to examine into the law, 
and will make out the necessary forms and instructions as soon as practicable, and 




12-8-1852 Special Meeting:  no minutes recorded. NA 
8-1-1853 Special Meeting.  Pittsburgh  
8-1-1853 Provisions and regulations adopted at 12-8-1852 meeting in NY called up for revision, 
modification, alteration.  Subject of carrying lights on steamers discussed. 
2 
8-2-1853 Pilots not to receive licenses w/o producing satisfactory evidence of their experience. 2 
8-2-1853 Some districts are inspecting nonpassenger steamers.  Law only says inspect 
passenger strs.  Resolved – inspect only passenger steamers.  Resolved – take up 
matter of inspecting all steamers – should be inspected under law just like passenger 
steamers. 
3 
8-3-1853 Jurisdiction in case of accidents.  Investigation will be the responsibility of the 
supervising inspector in the district in which the accident occurred. 
4 
8-3-1853 Double-acting forcing pump specifications – stroke of not less than 6 in. – Doctor 
pumps. 
4 
8-3-1853 Pressure table – standard pressures for a 42-in. boiler, ¼ in. iron.  Various boilers 
from 34 in. to 46 in. dia. + iron 3/16 in. to 5/16 in. thick. 
5 
8-3-1853 Any [Supervising?] inspector may call on the Local Board of any other district to obtain 
testimony, etc., for investigations.  Duty of local board to comply with such request. 
5 
8-4-1853 Mode of ascertaining uniformity of action of the various local boards – present 
specimens of all certificates, licenses, tabular reports. 
6 
8-4-1853 Data in tabular reports – list. 6-7 
8-4-1853 Embree on the grading of engineers.  Local Board granting original license is the only 
entity capable of raising grade.  Only when “special and satisfactory” reasons given.  
Shall be endorsed on new certificate granted. 
7 
8-4-1853 Next meeting – Cincinnati – First Thursday in November 1853. 7 
8-5-1853 Rules re: number of deck passengers to carry on boats.  Resolution to continue 
committee work on this (in view of the absence of a member) and report at next 
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8-5-1853 Crawford to pay bills for Supervising Board special meeting. 9 
11-19-1853a First regular yearly meeting.  This Board at their meeting at Pittsburg in August last, 
passed a resolution requiring the Local Boards of Inspectors to prepare and present to 
their Supervising Inspectors, reports showing the amt of duty performed by each 
Board, and all such other general information in regard to the operation of the law 
under which they act as may be of value or interest.  We find upon examination of the 
reports from the Local Boards, they are not so complete in many respects as might be 
wished,  . . . but they are of the opinion that the information is sufficient to show that 
the operation of the law has been highly beneficial . . .  
53 
11-19-1853b Table of info from Local Boards, with numbers of steamers, boilers, accidents, 
licensed engineers, etc. 
55 
11-19-1853c Opposition to 1852 law was great in beginning, from owners, engineers, and pilots.  
This opposition to the law has decreased rapidly; many of those formerly arrayed in 
the ranks of its enemies are now numbered among its strongest friends. 
64 
11-19-1853d Insurance companies are far more ready to take risks upon those Steamers which 
have been inspected under the law than upon others. 
65 
11-19-1853e Law is not perfect; we have found many difficulties in carrying it out… further 
legislation needed.  Quotes from Local Boards of inspectors.  Some met little 
opposition, “we have been met by the owners and officers of the Steamers with 
kindness and a determination to carry out the spirit of the law.”  Public will make the 
law popular when they understand its workings.   System of licensing engineers has 
had a good effect in stimulating a laudable ambition to perfect themselves in a 
knowledge of their business. 
65 
11-19-1853f Boilers and engines now kept in better order than formerly, and that enquiry is 
awakened among Engineers, and that both they and Pilots have become sensible of 
the great responsibility resting upon them.  
66 
11-19-1853g Another Local Board reported:  The opposition to the law has in a great degree settled 
down, and is becoming more popular with those who understand its features, and it is 
only necessary for the traveling community to know the safe guards that have been 
thrown around them, and all opposition will cease. 
66 
11-19-1853h Another Local Board reported:  “There have been twenty-one steamboats built and 
finished in this district since the first of January last.”  These steamboats have given 
entire satisfaction; the captains and engineers (many of whom were opposed to the 
standard of steam) have given information that their boats perform well, and do more 
work with the same amount of fuel than under similar circumstances, with boats, 
before the passage of the law.  There has been considerable opposition in this district 
to the law in general, and particularly to the standard of steam.  This opposition is fast 
wearing away; the working of the act of 30th August, 1852, has demonstrated the 
value and utility of the law, hence the change now taking place in the views of owners 
and captains of steamboats. 
 
At the time the law went into effect, there were very few, who entertained a favorable 
opinion of it, believed it impracticable, but as the season advanced, those most 
opposed to the law at its commencement, have come forward and expressed warmly 
their approbation of its success . . . is fast gaining the confidence of the traveling 
community . . . 
 
Insurance Companies have taken a deep interest in the carrying out of the law . . . 
they went so far as to call a meeting an passed resolutions to use their influence in 
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11-19-1853i Licensed engineers and pilots “have urged in the strongest manner that the pilots and 
engineers of freight boats, towboats, etc. be required to take out licenses under the 
law.”  Unlicensed pilots of freight steamers and tow boats frequently annoy licensed 
pilots.  The former are “utterly indifferent, forcing licensed pilots to avoid collisions – 
because former are “not amenable to the law.”  Annoy the licensed pilots “in every 
possible way.”   
68 
10-6-1854 Annual meeting held at Detroit, MI.  Mentions minutes of previous special meeting 




Navy Yard experiments with fusible alloy.  (Page not copied)  “Experiments made in 
the Navy Yard at Washington.” 
88 
10-6-1854 Resolution of Super. Bd that local inspectors be instructed not to permit of alloy 
application by any method which shall not exclude all pressure from the alloy which 
shall tend to separate its components. Alloy shall be enclosed in a case or tube etc.  
Committee – Crawford, Embree, Burnett, Copeland (Copeland added on a motion).  
[Auth’s note: This resolution was a “search list” item and was found in 3-10-05 
session.  Excerpts are now typed and are filed with the other Proceedings docs.] 
89-90 
10-6-1854 Gouge invited to be present during sessions.   
 
Professor J. Lawrence Smith – requested by TS to meet the board – gave his views 
on alloyed metals and explosion of boilers.  His investigations.  [Long presentation 
occupied two sessions, discussion with Board] 
98 
10-7-1854 Reports of local boards.  Reports referred to a committee of three – Copeland, 
Crawford, Lewis. 
99 
10-9-1854 Crawford presented a communication from local board Cincinnati on the classification 
of engineers on the Western waters.   Referred to a committee. 
101 
10-9-1854 Oaths not recognized by law – do not issue license.  Pilots/engineers. 102 
10-9-1854 “Small boats” defined as all having three boilers or less.  “Large boats” have greater 
than three boilers.  For purposes of the classification of engineers. 
103 
10-9-1854 “It having been stated to this Board, that their action in regard to the application of 
fusible alloys, as set forth on p. 90 of the Proceedings, has been understood by some 
of the Local Boards to conflict with their former actions, by unanimous consent the 
following explanatory note is here inserted, viz: that while, by approval of the local 
Inspectors, as to the mode of application, they may still do so, but at the same time 
the Local Boards are instructed not to approve of any mode of application in which 
such alloys shall be exposed to the pressure of steam.” 
103 
10-10-1854 Copeland presented his report on the local board data.  First comparative report of 
accidents on the Western waters.  Tabular results and a statement of accidents 
(narrative of accidents).  “Generally the law has been carried out more fully, and with 
much less labor and difficulty, during the current year than the previous year.”  Greater 
familiarity of Local Boards with their duties; greater readiness of steamboat owners 
and officers in aiding the inspectors.   Reason:  by virtue of the evidence forced upon 
them of the beneficial and salutary effects of the law. 
106 
10-10-1854 Explosions – “Kate Kearney” 2-16-1854.  Fifth District – Embree.  15 dead; license of 
engineer revoked. 
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10-10-1854 “Reindeer” (flue collapse) 3-1854.  Sixth District – Shallcross.  38 dead.  
Negligence/carelessness of engineer.  License revoked, but he died before he could 
be prosecuted. 
 
“Van Ness Barlow” 8-12-1854.  Seventh District (Crawford).  Two hands killed.  Case 
under investigation. 
111 
10-10-1854 Collision of “Fanny Fern” and “Thos. Swan.”  “Swan” sunk.  Boat and cargo a total 
loss.  3-1854. 
 
Steamer “Cuba” ran upon the wreck of the “Fanny Fern” 5-1854.  “Cuba” sunk.  No 
loss of life. 
111 
10-10-1854 Our experience since our last annual report continues the favorable opinion then 
expressed re: general operation of the 1852 law.  “The opposition to the law and its 
execution, which had then been exhibited to some considerable extent, has been 
diminished, as its favorable effects have been exhibited.  In fact, we may say that 
many of those connected with steam navigation who now rank among the firmest 
friends of the law, were formerly its strongest opponents.”  Insurance companies have 
refused to take risks on uninspected steamers. 
113 
10-10-1854 A practice of steamboat owners has led to confusion.  Painting different names on 
different parts of the boat.  Same steamer three or four different names.  Remedy:  
name registered must be the exclusive name panted on all parts of the boat. 
113-
114 
10-10-1854 Confusion as to who brings suits, in the name of the U.S. or an individual.  
Recommends it be U.S.  Also, difficulty because no specific provision for the 
necessary expenses.  Inspectors are thus powerless to enforce the provisions and 
penalties of the law.  Amendments are needed to “correct these evils.” 
115 
10-10-1854 In issuing the certificate for a steamer with new boilers, Local Inspectors should insert 
the name of the manufacturer of the iron, and where manufactured.  Adopted. 
116 
10-11-1854 James W. King, Chief Engineer U.S. Navy, appeared before the Board in accordance 
with instructions from the Navy Department. 
117 
10-11-1854 Embree presented a “comparative report of steamboat disasters on the Western 
Waters.   Board secretary requested to condense report, which appears on p. 118. 
117-
121 
10-11-1854 Embree’s report mentioned TS report to the U.S. Senate dated 1-21-1852.  Number of 
boats lost through various means. 
118 
10-10-1855 Fourth Annual Meeting – held at St. Louis.  Minutes of previous annual meeting, held 
at Detroit, read and approved. 
1 
10-11-1855 Gouge present.  William E. Everett, Chief Engineer U.S. Navy present. 4-5 
10-15-1855 Inflated life preservers not reliable. 7 
10-17-1855 Crawford’s resolution – Committee be appointed to prepare a form re: such general 
instructions for the guidance of the Local Boards in preparing their annual report to 
this Board, as shall secure more full and uniform information upon the various points 
designed to be embraced therein.”  Committee – Crawford, Brown, Lewis. 
9 
10-17-1855 Board views invention model.  Mr. Pangborn.  Patent lifeboat and apparatus for 
extinguishing fire. 
9-10 
10-18-1855 Crawford presented communication from W.W. Guthrie, inspector of boilers and 
machinery, Cincinnati, re: use of fusible alloys.   Referred to committee on the 
supplementary law. 
10 
10-18-1855 TS James Guthrie letter of 10-13-1855.  Received 225 copies of Booth report re: 
mode of using fusible alloy.  Transmit one copy to each Local Board.  Distribute to 
inspectors so they will put before steam engineers for their suggestions in 
improvements in using the alloys. Committee formed to go over Booth report.  
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10-18-1855 Letter by Supervising inspectors to TS Guthrie (draft) dated October 1855.  St. Louis.  
Operation of the law has been favorable.  Constantly decreasing opposition.  Special 
request of non-passenger steamers for inspections.  Pecuniary interest at work (in 
best interest to inspect boats).  Local boards more familiar with their duties.  Number 
of contested court cases is constantly decreasing.  Changes to rules by supervising 
inspectors are ongoing necessity, but should reduce in time.  Will step on some toes 
with rule changes, but must sacrifice individual interests to the general good.  Table of 
data attached on p. 15. 
12-15 
10-18-1855 Local inspectors typically refuse licenses due to intemperance of applicant.  In FN of 
table on p. 15. 
15 
4-1-1856 Proceedings of special meeting held in Washington. 3 
4-1-1856 William E. Everett, Chief Engineer U.S. Navy, invited to meetings. 4 
4-2-1856 Crawford chairs meeting to discuss steamboat law amendments. 5 
4-3-1856 Board meets with Congress - Senate and House committee on Commerce consisting 
of Hamlin, Washburn, Kennett. 
6-8 
4-3-1856 Letter received from LI Burnett.  Unable to attend due to his summons to appear as an 
important witness at Superior Court of Boston. 
6 
4-3-1856 Continued discussion of Crawford’s amendments. 6 
4-4-1856 Continued discussion of Crawford’s amendments. Into evening session.  Nineteen 
sections agreed upon on motion. 
7 
4-5-1856 Crawford’s amendments – discussion completed.  26 sections agreed upon. 8 
4-7-1856 Mention of a letter from Henry N. Sands, Surveyor of Customs, re: fees. .p. 9. Taken 
up on p. 11. 
9-11 
4-7-1856 Hamlin, Washburn, Board, submitted to them six sections of the draft supplementary 
law. 
10 
4-8-1856 Paducah citizens petition for a local board.  P. 9  Taken up on pp. 12-13.  Refused. 9, 12-
13 
4-8-1856 Collectors, Surveyors of Customs want more compensation due to SBIS duties. 11 
4-9-1856 Reeder’s patent safety guard. 14 
4-11-1856 Board meets with President of U.S. (Pierce?) 16 
4-11-1856 Dickey and Watson letter received by Board 4-9-1856. 16 
4-11-1856 Supplementary law drafted, copied three times for use of the U.S. Committees on 
Commerce.  This was a draft bill. 
16 
4-12-1856 Removing snags on Western rivers.  Good detail.  Contractors to do work, cheaper 
than government doing it. 
19-20 
4-14-1856 Amend Corwin’s original circular to the manufacturers of boiler iron.  Add thickness. 18 
4-16-1856 Patent – detachable saloon cabin. 26 
4-16-1856 Supplementary Bill reproduced in proceedings. [Auth note: Truncated – some not 
copied.]  Brought towboats etc into compliance with the 1852 law. 
27-35 
4-16-1856 Section 9 of Supplement Draft – Override of existing provisions re: fusible alloy.  Use 
fusible plugs or rivets of pure tin. 
29 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – add Galena IL local board. 31 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – add asst. inspectors at local board of NY. 32 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – inspectors’ annual compensation, bottom p. 32.  Cincinnati - 
$1800; Wheeling - $800; Pittsburg - $1800. 
32 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – Customs officials warrant licenses based on local inspector 
signature. 
32 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – How informants to be paid.  [Auth note: This is the first instance 
found of “informants” re: SB law.  Ties to Customs Service mode of operating.] 
34 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – Summonses of witnesses. Powers. 34 







 SELECTED FACTS – BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS 
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Date Description Page 
4-16-1856 Supplement Draft – Officers of Customs to be paid $1.50 for each set of certificates 
processed. 
35 
10-15-1857 Proceedings – Sixth Annual Meeting, Louisville, KY  
10-15-1857 Biographical data – First annual report with “Appendix Containing a List of All 
Inspected Steamers, Together with the Pilots and Engineers, &c., &c.” 
61 
10-1857 Local Boards – difficulties encountered performing duties – Supervising Board steps 
in. 
55 
10-1857 Stamping thickness of boilerplate needed. 56 
10-1857 “Before and After” tables of operation of law.  (5 years before vs. 5 years after)  Table 
on p. 32.  Lloyd’s SB Directory – Western rivers only.  No statistics on Northern or 
Eastern waters. 
32 
10-1857 “With these facts before us, we conceive that the beneficial effect of the law can no 
longer be a matter of doubt.”   
33 
10-1857 Turning up equipment defects by inspections. 33 
10-1857 Hydrostatic test now generally recognized.  Contracts for new boilers require test 
before being contracted for.  Accidents due to defects decreasing. 
33 
10-1857 Temptation to overload safety valves, however.  P. 33  Resolution – no engineers 
permitted to weight safety valves.  P. 34 
33-34 
10-1857 Ambiguity in law met with “true intent and meaning therof.” 34 
10-1857 Codify law – we will index it better for local inspectors.  Lots of changes prompting 
confusion as to interpretation.  [Auth note: Backs up Hunter’s claim of better system, 
organization, due to SBIS]. 
34 
10-1857 Greatest loss of life due to collisions.  See table. 39 
10-1857 “The local boards generally more and more familiar with their duties; difference of 
opinion as to requirements of the law, or correct method of carrying out its provisions, 
have been so far harmonized by the Board of Supervising Inspectors.”  Differences 
constantly decreasing both in number and importance.  More good detail on the 
differences of opinion. 
38-39 
10-25-1858 Annual Report, Buffalo, NY.  Last report we reported loss of life and property was 
regularly diminishing.  Not this time.  “Several of the most serious disasters are of an 
unprecedented character.”  Mainly fire. 
39 
10-1858 Fraudulent stamping of boiler iron.  TS Howell Cobb. 43-45 
10-1858 Salt water corrodes boilers.  More frequent inspections needed where there is salt 
water exposure. 
44 
10-1858 Towboats embarrass inspectors.  Still not covered by 1852 law, but when they blow 
up, the newspapers blame the inspectors. 
45 
11-15-1859 Annual Report, New Orleans.   TS Howell Cobb. 31 
11-1859 “In our last annual report we were compelled to admit that the statistics of disasters for 
the previous year did not exhibit the continued beneficial results which the friends of 
the law had hoped.” 
31 
11-1859 This year, losses have been far less than in any year since the law went into 
operation.  The decrease may be attributed to the beneficial operation of the law, 
greater familiarity with its requirements on the part of SB owners and officers, and 
inspectors; also, as new causes of disaster or accident are developed, immediate 
measures are taken by this Board to remedy the evil. 
32 
11-1859 Crawford, Copeland – good experimental report on fire-retardant paint. 33 
11-1859 Cotton bales as fire hazard. 35 
11-1859 Explosion due to wrong use of “doctor pump.” 37 
11-1859 Instead of throwing out obstacles, licensed officers of SBs now cooperate with us. 42 
11-1859 Stamping fraud (iron).  Extensive in nature; difficulty of prosecuting. 40 




 SELECTED FACTS – BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS 
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Date Description Page 
10-25-1860 Annual Report, Ninth, New York.  TS Howell Cobb 23 
10-1860 Explosions – “Ben Louis” and “Alfred Thomas”  Alfred Thomas was uninspected boat. 26-27 
10-1860 Improvement of construction of boilers brought about by hydrostatic test. 27 
10-1860 SB laws – proof of effectiveness – SB laws are being used to regulate towboats, etc, 
and land boilers by cities.  I.e., seen to be effective, therefore other nonregulated 
industries are using the regulations developed by the Board. 
27 
10-1860 Except for collision of Lady Elgin, “the total loss of life for the past year has been 
much less than for any previous year since the law went into effect. 
28 
10-1860 The tabular statement presents a highly favorable result as compared with any 












INDEX OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH RESEARCH NOTES 
SECY TREAS - NARA STEAMBOAT INSP SERVICE RECORDS (RG 41) 
 
LEGEND:  A = Corresp FROM TS (typed notes);  B = Corresp FROM TS (typed notes 
except B7);  C = Corresp SENT TO TS (typed notes);  D = Corresp SENT TO TS 
(microfilm);  E = Commissions for Local Inspectors of Hulls and Boilers, 1852-96 Vol. 1;  M = 
Misc; JFI = Jour Franklin Inst; Proc. = Proceedings of the Annual Mtg of the Supervising 
Inspectors.   2C, 3C, 4C, etc are more C letters or notes typed or copied on large copier 
during different research sessions.  2C = 3-10-05 session; 3C = 3-16-05 session; 4C = 3-30-
05 session; 5C = 4-6-05 session. GD = Gov Docs notebook. See details of NARA bound 
volumes at the end of this appendix. 
     
Date Description Source 
1831 4 
Bache's first device, early 1831.  Safety Apparatus for Steam Boats, being a 
combination of the Fusible Metal Disk with the common Safety Valve, By A.D. 
Bache, prof of natural philos and chem at the Univ of PA. Combines fus plate 
with safety valve.  Good dwg.  This is the very first invention connecting fus 
plate with valve, but plate is directly beneath valve.  Also story of engrs cooling 
fus plate with water to defeat it.  Fear of drifting hazard.  His valve/alloy combo 
is remedy for this. 
JFI Vol. VII, 
No. 4, pp. 
217-221 
1831 12 
L. Herbert response to FI circular.  Haste makes waste--production rush 
facilitates burstings.  Intense heat weakens iron.  Draft of fire causes a torch 
phenomenon.  Arrangement of flue a factor, no sudden bends.  Soot--safety 
valve didn't help.  Tendency of the engr to get excited and do imprudent things.  
Engr leans on safety valve, etc  Bakewell response to circular:  Cincinnati 1830 
report. Bakewell's background.  Hydrogen gas theory.  Want of water.  Injecting 
water dangerous.  Lo vs. hi pressure boats - politics have a lot to do with 
preference. Etc. 
JFI Vol. VIII, 
No. 6, pp. 
374-388 
1832 X 
C. Evans first mention of fusible alloy application, with dwg, p. 94. This is the 
same idea he patented in 1834.  Also his expanding rods (w/dwg) and his 
mercury device (nice dwg incl).  Careening dwg, how his inventions prevent 
problems.  Letter of John G. Cassedy - starts p. 94.  Loading of safety valve.  
Racing story -  "I will beat her or else blow up." "To men so destitute of 
principles of prudence, the life of an unwary passenger should never be 
intrusted."  Put safety valve out of reach of him. Praise for FI labors in 
investigating explosions. 




Ingham letter, Haldeman ltr, others. Praise of sci institutions by GWL. Haldeman 
- poor quality engrs.  Perkins theory.  Flash theory.  Ignorant engrs. Effect of 
mud on water levels.  Copper rivets no good. Concept of "proper attention" by 
good engr.  Captain causes accident.  French law - hydro test.  Even prac engrs 
not equal in skill. French regulations.  Good engr best defense. Most engrs can't 
calculate a safety valve. 




French Royal Ordinances, 1823-1830.  Includes mention of table of fusibility of 
metallic plates. Forbids cast iron in boilers.  Rules on fusible plates, temps that 
they must fuse at. 
JFI Vol. X, 
No. 2, pp. 
104-111 
1832 8 
Article on perforated tube for improving the common gauge cock.  Thos 
Ewbank. 
JFI Vol. X, 
No. 2, p. 79-
82. 
1833 X 
Andrew Jackson's annual msg (State of the Union).  Fatal accidents - he 
blames navigators of vessels for criminal negligence. 
Gov docs GD 
24 
1834 5-8 
Evans Patent No. X8185.  Improvement in the Mode of Applying a Fusible Alloy 
as a Guard against Explosion of Steam Engine and Other boilers.  Evans' first 
SG using alloy, one of which is a short cup applied to the shell; the other a 
rotating device with weight.   





Date Description Source 
1834 12 
Evans patent specification, p. 391.  Patented 5/1834.  This is the same as 1832 
version. Plunger version of fixture using fus alloy.  Vague generalities are 
present  in specification, to cover all ideas. 
JFI Vol. XIV, 
p. 391. 
1836 10 
Report of the Cmte of the FI on the explosions of steam boilers, Part II. Also 
includes the Nov. issue (cont of article).  Key pages are 296 and 297, which 
explain C. Evans and Bache SG ideas, giving history of these devices (see 
FNs).  Mentions early Bache idea, then Evans's fus. alloy SG idea, and also his 
expanding rods and mercury guard ideas.  JFI judges which they like best. 
 JFI Vol. 
XVIII, No. 4, 
pp. 217-233; 
No. 5, pp. 
289-306 
1838 10-1 
Prac and theoretical engr Wm. B. Dodd complains that act of 1838 misses the 
point.  Rather than test boilers and inventions Congress should be testing 
engineers.  Not one in ten is a practical and theoretical engineer. 
Doc 21 p. 
398.  Gov 
docs GD 25 
1838 12-13 
Memorial of Shallcross and others engaged in SB navigation for Congress to 
alter and amend the SB act. 
Gov docs GD 
15 
1839 2-7 Navy commission surveys inventors' safety appliances.   
1846 3-6 
Memorial of travelers on Miss. and Ohio Rivers praying for passage of a law to 
compel the owners and capts of SBs to place Evans SG on each outside boiler, 
referred to the Committee on Commerce. 




Cad Evans, A Treatise on the Causes of Explosion of Steam Boilers w/Practical 
Suggestions for Their Prevention, to Which Is Added a Description of Evan's 
Improved Safety Guard, or Engineers' Assistant,  Pittsburgh 1850. 




Fldr 1 of 2; 
see also C4 
1850 12-23 
Haldeman's articles in newspaper.  On board Stmr Yorktown, etc.  Explosion of 
the Knoxville.  Explosions will continue w/o Evans SG reqd by law. Water low in 
boilers, instant steam production opn water hitting overheated flues (flash 
theory). Shock of explosion felt.  Wishes it to be the last.  Shrieks and scalded 
victims drown. Eng had declined to buy a booklet on Evans SG.  Seeks law to 
compel Evans SG.  Two other devices: Bordens Mercurial steam gauge and 
Fabers water gauge.  Cost of SGs an objection $200. Death of most estimable 
citizens.  French law requiring SGs.  Embree disparages SGs, prefers doctor-
pumps.  Haldeman criticizes him. French law compelled use of a SG (not as 
good as Evans's).  Etc. 





No date, but with other 12-1850 materials.  Newspaper article about bill before 
Congress sponsored in Senate by Mr. Davis, Chmn Commerce Committee.  
Need govt regulation badly.  Careless, ignorant, mismanagement among SB 
interests/operators.  Shameful delay, etc.  Inspection system has been a failure.  
Features of the bill:  Hydrostatic test, better mfg of boilers, better iron, 
manufacturer penalties for using cheap iron.  Explosions rare in France.  
"French System" works.  Some SB engrs profess difficulty in mfg a fit alloy . . . 
this is absurd. 





No date, but with other 12-1850 materials.  Newspaper article , Louisville KY.  
Memorialists representing owners of boats object to bill before Congress.  Too 
expensive; most objectionable is 100 lb pressure steam limit.  Boats operate at 
double this pressure.  Millions of dollars would be lost on these boats.  
Suggested provisions of the law whereby old boilers are retired. 





In JFI, Dr. J. L. Smith, presenting before the New Orleans Lyceum, desires to 
"make it punishable to insert any thing but fusible metal in the holes of the boiler 
meant for that purpose (p. 413).   "Fusible plugs have not been found to answer 





Date Description Source 
1851 11-20 
A. Guthrie to Hon John Davis.  Letterpress form letter.  Solicits aid regarding 
prevention boiler explosions, Guthrie wishing to put the matter before "the first 
men in the country."  "Prejudice and opposition to be encountered."  Papers 
apparently were attached to this corresp. Some general cursory biog info.  Ltr 
xcribed 4-2006.   
Tray 26 RG 
46 Commerce 
Recs. Folder 
2 of 2 IMG 
1134 
1851 12-2 
Form letter of intro of A. Guthrie to Hon. John Davis.  Letterpress form letter 
signed by J.D. Webster, US Topg Engrs.  Has witnessed Guthrie's invention to 
prevent steam boiler explosions.  See Tray 26 shot - IMG 1132.  Ltr xcribed 4-
2006. 
Tray 26 RG 
46 Commerce 
Recs. Folder 
2 of 2 IMG 
1133 
1852 3-19 Copy of Certificate of Seaworthiness for SB "Golden Era."  D7 
1852 4-24 
 
T. J. Haldeman to Hon John Davis, Chmn of the Comm. on Commerce.  
Onboard the Steamer Indiana.  16-pp letter.  Haldeman biog (cursory).  Bill is a 
good start, but needs changes. 1st - Evans SG should be mandated. 2nd - cast 
iron heads should be prohibited as in France.  3rd - Use wire tiller ropes.  4th - 
Law should compel use of Fabers Magnetic water guage, prevents flue collapse 
from want of water.  5th - compel a manometer or mercury steam gauge. 
Xcribed 4-2006. 
Tray 26 RG 
46 Commerce 
Recs. Folder 






Alfred Guthrie to Hon. John Davis, Senator & Chmn Commerce Cmte.  
Chicago.  Has been to New York, consulted w/engrs there.  They of opinion that 
new bill is perhaps too liberal wrt max press. for lo-press. boats - 50 lbs.  
Mentions high quality of engrs operating on Northern Lakes.  Also mentions 
explosion of Prairie State, result of recklessness.  Boat was racing, water was 
shut off.  Will "return to Wash. by 5-15 and make the test as was contemplated."  
Ltr xcribed. 
Tray 26 RG 
46 Commerce 
Recs. Folder 
1 of 2 IMG 
1113-1115 
1852 5-1 
Ltr from Thos. J. Haldeman of Cincinnati, OH, to TD, New Orleans 5-1-1852 A. 
Guthrie's theory that mud caused explosion "ridiculous."  Louisiana boat 
exploded due to Evans SG being tied down.  Advocates SGs, several types. 
Fusible plates.  French have used 30 years (in this shape). Prejudice agnst 
Evans SGs.  Engrs tie down SG and boat blows.  Prejudice agnst SGs, 
scientific engineers.  SB "West Wind" coming up from St. Louis [1842], SG 
keeps going off, weighed down by engr w/Capt's concurrence, blows up. 
Passengers note SGs tied down.  Guthrie implies Evans SG has sunk into 
oblivion, but it is on 132 boats plus 3 more recently put them on at Cincinnati. 
Stitched letter. [Ltr xcribed 3-2006.] 





Report to Capt T.J. Haldeman on SB Indiana, New Orleans, re numbers of 
Fabers Magnetic water guages in use on Southern & Western waters.  Guages 
are quite durable in use.  Writer: Wm. Bryce. 





A. Guthrie to Hon. John Davis, Commerce Committee re: Louisville 
memorialists. See also IMG 1095, 12-1850. Looks like masters and owners 
don't want restraint. Laws proper for everyone but them. Just-built boats: "Let 
them blow up and when we build we will do better." Cost of Davis's bill to 
industry an issue, but owners can install larger cylinders, lower pressures, pass 
hydro test.  Lifeboats interfere w/design of boats, then builders have no 
conception that the hydrostatic test has to be hi pressure to guard against the 
carelessness of engrs in allowing their boilers to become overheated. 







Date Description Source 
1852 5-3 
Thos. Borden to Capt. T.J. Haldeman, SB Indiana, New Orleans.  Report of 
number of Borden's steam guages.  Started making them in 1847, called 
'humbug' and useless.  Much difficulty in introducing them.  Saw a French 
manometer at sugar refinery. 





Newspaper article.  TJ Haldeman article excerpted in New Orleans Commercial 
Bulletin dtd 4-21-1852.  Engrs are in Washington lobbying re: new law, but do 
not inform chairman of "useful improvements", i.e., Evans SG. Accidents would 
abate if Congress mandated Evans SGs. We've lost 3000 persons; if we had 
only been like the French.  Costs of appliances:  Evans - $150; Borden guage 
$80; steam guage $60-80. 




like IMG 1091 
12-1850 
1852 5-10 
Crawford petitions for acceptance of 1852 bill.  He is the rep for Pittsburgh 
Assoc. of engrs.  See GD 18 
gov docs GD 
17 
1852 5-13 Crawford's memorial is being printed up.  See GD 17 
gov docs GD 
18 
1852 8-31 
Pres. Fillmore nominates men to be supervising inspectors of SBs.  Includes 
Embree, Crawford, Shallcross, Murray, etc. 
gov docs GD 
13 
1852 9-6 Crawford's appointment.  Crawford accepts. C11 
1852 9-18 
Sci. Am. Article.  Details of new act of 1852; details of insp districts; frustration 
of New Orleans man who wants tech educ for his son in U.S. but will send him 
to France if need be; explosion of SB Reindeer, NY; SB companies removed 
good inspectors.  M1 
1852 10 LIST OF INSPECTORS (ONLY SUPERVISING) 
1852 Proc 
IMG 1456 
1852 11-18 Fusible alloys.  First preparation of alloys, after experiments are completed. D2 
1852 11-19 
Atkinson and Watson defended by Crawford.  Steamboat capts. and owners 
want old inspectors, who never gave them any trouble.  Qualifications of Insp of 
Hulls, Boilers explained.  Discussion of politics, Whig, Democrat, status of 
inspectors.  Atkinson owns boats. D1 
1852 12-1 
Supervising inspectors.  Most if not all are persons engaged in business.  
Printing journals.  Specs for stamping iron (e.g., "No. 1CH" etc).  By James 
Murray. D3 
1852 12-13 
Licensing issue.  Crawford asks about Treasury Dept Policy on surrendering 
unexpired licenses. C5 
1852 12-20 
Licensing issue.  Asks for authority for Super Insp. to publish notice of district 
boundaries and where to apply. C6 
1852 12-29 Ques. about oath reqd to grant licenses.  (Local Insp.)  C6 
XXXX X-X 
Circular.  "Questions proposed in the inspection of engineers."  (Pilots too).  
Very detailed.  Can get qualifications somewhat from this. No date, but with 
1853 matl. D21 
1853 1-1 Newspaper clipping.  Embree will be visiting. Not sure of date.   D13 
1853 1-1 
Various letters charging Capt. Embree with approving inspectors by mail and 
not in person as reqd by law.  Anyone criticizing this is met with Embree's 
"hostility." C10 
1853 1-10 Commission of Loc. Insp James Curran as inspector of boilers for Baltimore.  E1 
1853 1 
C. Evans patent notice in JFI, Jan-Jun 1853, Vol 55 (LV), first patented 4-15-
1839; reissued 11-23-1852. JFI 1853 
1853 2-3  
Boiler plate.  Stamping rqmts; offices for Local insp. (No provision for this in the 
Law); sober men - appeals don't work for drunks.  "Most we have done is 
license pilots/engrs.  Crawford. C6 
1853 2-10 
Official notice to the mfgs of boiler iron.  Stamping conventions listed.  Excerpts 




Date Description Source 
1853 3-3 
TD directs establishment of an assay office in New York.  Web reference see 1-
06 class folder. Internet ref 
1853 3-11 
Loc inspectors to TS Guthrie.  Wash. City.  Seven insps urge the continuance of 
Crawford in office.  Have heard that "an attempt will be made" to remove him.   




1853 3-21 Atkinson resigns (hull insp.)  C7 
1853 3-31 Table of masters violating new SB law. D12 
1853 3-31 
Crawford resists request to replace his Whig inspector with a Democrat.  Cites 
the reqd qualifications to enforce a complicated law.  Opposition to the Law by 
owners and masters of SBs. D9 
1853 4-12 
  
Alfred Guthrie, Super Insp, 8th District, to TS Guthrie. Chicago Ill.  A. Guthrie 
needs hydro pump put into the hands of the inspectors right away. “Otherwise 
the want of them opens an excuse for SBs to run at high pressures.”  “The 
whole system of inspection seems to be deranged, the pressures are upon the 
Western rivers unlimited, many boats using as high as 175 to 200 pounds per 
sq inch.” Wants to limit pressures even w/o pumps, but has no control over what 
his local inspectors do.  Accidents of this type have no excuse.  Only need to 
recognize this and have a will to fix the problem.  













Appeal from a master for refund of $100 fine.  To Pres. Pierce.  His pilot had 
walked off.  C12 
1853 spring 
A Guthrie appeals to TS Guthrie, don't remove me, no one has done as much 
good as I have. No one understands the subj as well as I do. Being removed on 
political grounds.  I am not political, have not voted much. Crawford and myself 
are the only ones toiling on the act of 1852 from the beginning.  Others opposed 
the bill. His father was a chemist who discovered percussion powder, method 
for making Chloroform.  Credit given to others. Brother injured in war in Mexico. 
In 1850 I investigated SB accidents by going on boats in disguise, spent $1000 
of my own money. Why not move Mr. Lewis to 9th district and leave me here?  
On the removal, will you give me an answer yes or no? 





Typed flyer mobilizing engineers and pilots of the Eight District to protest the 
continued appointment of Isaac Lewis as "late appointed Supervising 
Inspector."  Signed, "An engineer of the 8th District."  Ltr from Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin to Hon. Jas. Guthrie, TS.  Owner of Stmr Montello complains to TS 
that Lewis would not make a hydrostatic test in June of his stmr.  Excuse given 
that there was a want of time.  Owner convinced, however, that Lewis didn't 
know how to conduct the test.  "I believe he declined to undertake such insp 
from ignorance and not knowing how to do it."  We who have paid our insp fees 
and have been deemed competent by competent insps are now suffering for 
these wrongs.  "We are compelled to submit to the humiliating farce of an 
inspection by him.  Did the law ever contemplate this, or does a decent respect 
to the laws of the country require of us such acquiescence?   
Vol. 2 Item 




Newspaper account.  Good results from lic. of engineers and pilots.  Reforming 
"dissipated" intemperate individs.  Opposition noted.  Wait til law becomes 
"better understood."  Crawford bases observations on report of Atkinson and 
Watson. C5 




Date Description Source 
1853 6-29 
Fusible alloys.  "Better and cheaper" at Navy Yard, where all alloys have been 
manufactured.  Chief Engr of Navy. 
A1, full text in 
4C5  
1853 7-1 
TD sending 50 copies of SB law to someone, probably a boat owner.  Reminds 





Letter from 51 engineers opposing replacement of Watson. "Our reputation as 
engrs depends on the skill, experience, & firmness of the insp of boilers . . ." D10 
1853 7-8 
Portsmouth VA inspector Davids wants to keep hydraulic pump at his business 
at Gosport Iron Works.  Working late at night, etc. D15 




Local Insps, Distr of Louisville, blame "fast men" who don't like being regulated, 
for agitating about method for granting licenses.  C12 
1853 9-4 
A. Guthrie, late supv insp, writes to President Franklin Pierce complaining of the 
wrong done agnst him by the hiring of incompetent Mr. Lewis to the position of 
supv. Insp.  Mr. Lewis was profoundly ignorant of the causes of explosions, and 
could not start an engine aboard a steamer to save his life.  Copeland fought 
the SB Law and is retained.  Copeland would have succeeded in stopping 
passage of the act had the Henry Clay and Atlantic not succumbed to 
accidents.  Copeland started the Collins line of steamers.   




Second ltr from A. Guthrie, late supv insp, to Pres. Franklin Pierce, requesting 
an audience to "make my explanations."  Doesn't wish to annoy Pres. with more 
letters on the subj of steam boat inspectors.  Xcribed. 
Vol. 2 Item 
263 IMG 1670 
1853 9-16 
Crawford writes Haldeman and (WW) Guthrie advising they get evidence of 
Hamilton's drunkenness.  "Let us try and get clear of the drunkards in some way 
or other . . ." C13 
1853 9-21 Hamilton license revoked by Haldeman and W.W. Guthrie.  "Incompetent." C7 
1853 9-22 
Chief Engineer of Ward's Steamers defends Isaac Lewis, Sup Insp 8th District. 
Xcribed. 
Vol. 2 Item 
271 IMG 1672 
1853 No 
date LIST OF INSPECTORS 1853 
1853 Proc 
IMG 1455 
1853 10-10 Expenses.  Local Inspector room rent disallowed.  Several letters of this type. A4 
1853 10-12 
TS Guthrie denies expense report.  Wm F. Barnes, Esq., Insp of SBs, Oswego 
NY. Near A3 
1853 10-15 
TS Guthrie to Chas Brown, Collector at Phila.  Brown cannot find rooms in 
custom house or other public bldg for the local insps to house their instruments 
and conduct their business.  TS advises Brown says no money available to rent 
rooms; advises them to put instruments in a warehouse rented recently by 
customs under authority of TD. A series, misc 
1853 11-16 
Embree on Hamilton case.  "Merely a 4th of July frolic."  Hamilton's 
drunkenness; Hamilton is a beggar without his license; "monstrous power" of 
the Board; conditions upon which license is granted are not on the license; 
Hamilton's appeal refused; full and fair trial requested.  To Crawford.  Board of 
Supervisors not instructing local boards in such cases. C9 
1853 12 
Legislation markup of 1852 Law.  Not sure of exact date, but with other 12-1853 
records. D19 
1853 12-1 
Hamilton sues!  $5000 suit against Haldeman and Guthrie, who are writing to 
Crawford. Is Embree involved?   C8 
1853 12-2 
Crawford's reply to Embree.  Fears no "monstrous power" or community revolt.  
Hamilton had his chance, acquiesced decision of local board by default.  Now 
he sues.  Intermediaries to blame for the fluff (implying Embree). 






Date Description Source 
1853 12-2 
Fifty copies of SB law being forwarded by TS James Guthrie to J.A. Campbell, 
Super Insp, Buffalo. 
Letters sent 
by TS, Vol 1 
IMG 1419-
1420, p. 38 
1853 12-5 
Hamilton case.  Crawford writes back.  "let the matter rest."  Pleads innocent re: 
Embree involvement.  Regrets loss of peace and harmony in Districts.  C8 
1853 12-15 
  
Letter from WW Guthrie copying b.crawford, responding to TD circular. 
Uneducated engrs gradually superseding others better qualified. Recommends 
hydro tests 4x per year. "Act of faith" in using steam and water guages.  
Guages get out of order.  Better:  "seeing," "feeling" of safety valves and sight of 
water in guage cocks.  BEGINNING OF DOUBT ABOUT FUSIBLE ALLOYS.  
Theory advanced by "scientific men" hard to reconcile w/engineers' 
observations in actual operation. Boat's boiler only fair test. Recommends govt 
buy Evans patent and his mfg experience, make SG free. 







Newspaper account of flue collapse aboard SB Zachary Taylor.  Acct by 
Crawford.  Careening, low water, sudden rush of cold water on hot iron (old 
theory) blamed.  Hogs careened boat.  D20 
1853 12-28 
Copy of correspondence from H. Hunt, U.S. Navy Yard to Com.[modore?] H. 
Paulding, commanding U.S. Navy Yard, Washington. Ltr originating from US 
Navy Yard, Washington.  Responding to Bureau of Navy Yards and Docks 
inquiry, to which Hunt was referred to provide an answer. Tedious experiments 
made under direction of Mr. Ellis were of no guide as the melting points varied 
greatly. Some varied as high as 40 psi, showing a difference in the purity of 
metals. 




1854 1-2 Holding inquiries aboard boats; lack of office space. C11 
1854 1-13 
Fusible alloys.  Secy Navy wants Treas Dept to manufacture fusible alloys.  
Experimental info needed, proportions of metals used. A1 
1854 1-26 
Cadwallader Evans letter to TS Guthrie.  Son of Oliver Evans; Evans's 
qualifications; Evans's recent experiments on Fus. Alloys; wants Congress to 
modify law so that fus. alloys are not used in boilers where the press. of steam 
can act upon them.  Effect of mud on the fixture in which alloys are placed.  D16 
1854 1-27 
J.C. Dobbin to TS Guthrie. Navy Department.  Complying with TS request of 
13th inst. for info on mfg of fusible alloys at Navy Yard for use by Super Insps. 
Forwarding ltr from chief of bureau of Navy Yards and Docks; stmt showing 
expenses incurred in prep of hydro pumps, alloys, etc; a report from Mr. Hunt, 
the engineer and machinist; a letter from Mr. Thos. Copeland covering a tabular 
stmt of experiments made by him with alloyed metals. 




BOOTH JOINS.  Fusible alloys.  TS Guthrie asks Booth/Mint to prepare alloys 
because Navy has not prepared it correctly.  Mint is the only establishment 
connected w/Treas Dept in which there is any chemical skill.  "Many lives" 
depend on quality alloy.  A2 
1854 2-8 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  In reply to your favor of yesterday, I am willing to 
superintend the mfg of the alloy you mention. If your purpose is for us to 
experiment on the proportions of metals, then there is ample space here is in 
Mint bldg. But if alloy to be mfgd largely, then not enough space. Need a 
separate bldg close by for that business. Mentions his duties at the Mint as 
providing “superintendence and direction.” 







Date Description Source 
1854 2-15 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  Booth has recd papers from TS as to alloys. But 
they contain nothing definite as to proportions of metals composing the various 
alloys. Unless more certain info can be collected from previous experiments, 
many more small experiments will be reqd. Question also must be resolved re 
successive fusions altering the fusing points thru repeated heatings. Booth 
admits he made a hasty conclusion on the subj a few years since. That he 
should not sacrifice the care of an engineer for fus alloy that was not entirely 
reliable. Has changed his mind since; we cannot employ too many precautions 
to prevent the dreadful loss of life by explosions.  
Vol. 2 Item 
152, IMG 
1651-1654 
1854 2-24 Fusible alloys.  Guthrie refers Booth to C. Evans' pamphlet on fusible alloys.  A2 
1854 2-27 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Booth will use his laboratory to experiment on, and 
manufacture, alloy to save expenses of a location. Shall I forward bills for 
metals and apparatus to the TS?  Has examined the FI experiments, plus those 
of Rudberg, but there are no alloy proportions for given temps as documents 
sent by TS require.  Will institute experiments to determine this. Notes problem 
of “absolute reliability” due to separation of components; not sure how this can 
be overcome.  




Booth to TS Guthrie, Phila. Heard from TS on 3-1, with Evans’ pamphlet. TS 
has referred to a document that contains a report of Sup Insp for last year.  Doc 
sent contains no report. The only point of interest to me is the number of 
steamers built in the U.S.  Some mistake in forwarding? Now engaged in 
collecting all data of past experience in relation to fus metal so as to shape my 
experiments. Has just ordered a small amt of Pb, Sn, Bismuth. Has authorized a 
business here to import by stmr about 500 lb of grain tin. Other metals can be 
obtained here.  









Wm Burnett, Local Insp of boilers, invents an improved arrangement of fusible 
plugs.  JFI, Vol 57, 1854, p. 300.  JFI 1854 
1854 4-5 Fusible alloys.  Guthrie asks Booth for report of experiments.  A4 
1854 4-6 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  To carry out TS request to prepare fus metal, Booth 
has ordered several metals, but did not recv bismuth until lately. Furnace just 
completed. At TS suggestion, Booth has consulted with Super Insp from NY, 
who informed Booth of the mtg in Washington.  Subj of fus alloy will engage the 
Board’s special attention. They (“the Supervisors generally”) of opinion that if 
alloy not used in form that excludes pressure of steam, it is worse than useless. 
In mean time have made some prelim experiments, some alloys have fused at 
proper points, others I fear will require many experiments to obtain reliable 
quality.   




Letter fr J. Booth (scribed) to TS stating that he has corresp. with Prof 
Alexander on subj of the alloys re: Evans' patent.  We both agree that the 
substance of Evans’ Patent is contained in the plan for preventing explosions 
suggested by Prof. Bache of Washington, in 1832. Prof Alexander even prefers 
Bache’s to Evans’s, and to an improvement that Booth suggested in order to 
reset the apparatus. Should we consult Prof. Bache? Also Prof Alexander of 
Baltimore, should I procure his opinions and presence in Washington? This 
would be done to secure sound decisions by the Board of Super Insp “on a 
subject of such moment.” 
Vol 3 IMG 
1180. [?]  
Also? Vol. 2, 





Date Description Source 
1854 4-7 
Proceedings dtd 4-7-1854, held in Washington City.  See p. 90.  What Ross 
uses to define method for use of alloys.  (Does not mention Evans' SGs).  
Supervising inspectors link alloys to SGs in general. Board resolution? 
 Proc. 1854, 




Booth to TS Guthrie. Lebanon, Lebanon Co. Pa.  As present mtg of super insp 
in Washington may lead to a modification of the SB law as relates to use of fus 
metal, you may want to communicate the following views to the Board: (1) 
different phases of melting alloys allow great range in temps, and thus 
pressures.  (2) If Evans or analogous method be adopted (and I can conceive of 
no others applicable), assume that the practical fus point be that at which iron 
passes through alloy, but a limiting range of many pounds pressure should be 
allowed because of want of exactness even in this fusing point. (3) Am looking 
for at least one alloy of proper composition that will give a more determinant 
fusing point for the pressures most needed, i.e., dangerous higher pressures. 
(4) I have examined several sets of tables showing the correspondence 
between temp and pressure, and found them quite variable.  
Vol 2 4C2, 






Haldeman and W. W. Guthrie charge Embree w/interference, resulted in $5000 
suit against us.  Hamilton stories - caused great loss of life running into steam 
boats, shooting at pilot, etc. C14 
No date Newspaper acct.  Exoneration of Haldeman and Guthrie in Hamilton suit. D28 
1854 4-19 
Petition of SB insps [prob loc insps], engine builders, and other citizens of 
Pittsburg represent the importance of Evans SG and praying for the purchase of 
the patent right, make same free to the public, referred to the Commerce 
Committee. 
Gov docs  
GD 10 
1854 4-28 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Have made a large no. of experiments, can prepare 
many fus alloy w/ pressures less than 130# above ordinary atmospheric 
pressure. I am not at all satisfied with any proportion of metals composing alloys 
to express pressures above 130#, it being difficult to determine their melting 
point within 10 to 30 deg of temp. Probable that I shall have to contrive new 
alloy for the higher pressures.  
Vol 2 4C3, 




Mr. Chase (a senator) presents a petition of SB officers and engineers at 
Cincinnati, praying that measures may be taken to make Evans SG free to the 
public, by the purchase of his patent right or otherwise, referred to the Comm on 
Commerce. 
Gov docs  
GD 9 
1854 5-1 
By Mr. Disney: two petitions of citizens, SB inspectors and prac engineers of 
Cincinnati, in relation to the public utility and importance of Evans SGs, referred 
to the Comm on Commerce. 
Gov docs  
GD 8 
1854 5-1 
Fusible alloys.  Fusible alloys must be used on principle of Evans SGs (to 
Booth).  Booth requests a table of press./temp but Board has no knowledge of 
one. A4 
1854 5-1 
Embree castigated by SB engineers on Embree's procedure for selecting engrs.  
No oath, no examination, etc.  D4 
1854 5-5 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  The further I progress in my experiments, the more 
I realize it is essential for me to experiment directly with the Evans apparatus 
(“which the Board of Supervisors has adopted”) to determine practical fusing 
points of alloys. Describes his experiments drawing tubes with thermometers 
out of molten lead/tin. Table showing relations of proportions of metals to temp 
observed. Fusible states are labeled in table: “perfect fluidity,” “pasty state,” 
“rather stiff,” “solid,” and “drew the pipe.” The best alloy (for consistency) is the 
4th in the table, and it is the alloy usually quoted as showing the reliability of the 
fus alloys. Ratio 7 tin to 4 lead. [Note written on wrapper: “Try and get 
apparatus for Booth and write Director to permit Morfit to experiment under his 
direction until his service is required at Assay Office.”  Gouge’s signature and 
the date are on the wrapper.] 
Vol 2 4C4, 








Date Description Source 
1854 5-10 
Evans Safety Guards.  Several being sent to Booth for experiments w/fusible 
alloys.  A5 
1854 5-16 
J.C. Dobbins to TS Guthrie. Navy Department.   Chief of Bureau of the Navy 
Yards and Docks has been instructed to comply with request contained in your 
ltr of 15th inst re disposition of the hydrostatic pump remaining at the Wash Navy 
Yard, to send it to Louisville KY. No address is contained in your letter. 




Embree cites Local Board of St. Louis criticism of effect of Evans SGs as 
presently mfg'd.  Fear of Evans's monopoly.  Power of his patent, poor mfg.  
Failure of SGs would make more $$ for Evans.  Letter also points to possibility 
that Evans SGs haven't been decreed to be used on all boats yet.  Inquires if 
Booth has succeeded in making alloys more reliable.  Embree wants words 
"alloyed metals" removed from Law. D5 
1854 5-24 
Singleton.  Complaint against Embree for hiring inspectors from a distance.  
Loc. Insp Singleton, St. Louis, writes his nephew at Treas Dept. C10 
1854 6-5 Evans informed to complete safety guards for sending to Booth for experiments. A5 
1854 6-9 
Cad. Evans to TS Guthrie. Pittsburgh. Long ltr. TS has apparently complained 
that SGs sent by Evans to Booth were not “complete in all respects.” But Evans 
said he was limited to NTE $100 and therefore did not send his most expensive 
SG. He notes correspondence with Booth, dates. 
Vol 2 Item 
116, IMG 
1635-1642 
1854 8 Gouge's notes, first part written in Aug 1854, see 2-21-1855 entry.   
1854 8-7 
Evans safety guards.  To Booth.  Is Evans' Patent necessary?  Trials of fusible 
alloys cannot be made at Navy Yard quickly enough.  Booth to buy a boiler to 
make the tests himself. A5 
1854 8-14 
Fusible alloys.  Shipment pending experiments.  If not prepared correctly, would 
be "worse than useless" A3 
1854 8-14 
TS to P.I. Barzize, Collector at Yorktown VA.  Re Stmr Gladiator, law specifies 
the districts for which loc insp are to be appointed, and mode of their 
designation.  TD has no power in these things. A series, misc 
1854 8-23 
Est. of expenses.  Louisville.  Hyd pump - difficult to maintain for testing old 
boilers (hi pressure reqd). C12 
1854 9-8 
M. Gouge's ltr to Peter G. Washington, Esq., Asst TS.  Phila. to Wash D.C. 
Marked PRIVATE.  Gouge's 'piracy' of printed law pamphlet.  Boston publisher.  
Booth wants some of Evans's alloy--get some "in a private way" via Benj. 
Crawford.   




Fusible alloys.  Wheeling Assoc. of Engrs complain it is unsafe.  References 
Kentucky inspectors.  A "perfect failure and imposition on Steam Boat money." 
Asks for repeal of the fusible alloy portion of the Law.  Engrs prefer steam 
gauge, water gauge w/safety valve and try cocks. C13 
1854 10-2 
Booth has prepared a dwg of boiler.  Cost $400.  Evans safety guards plus 
fusible alloys. A6 
1854 10-2 
Secy of St. Louis Assoc. of SB Engineers introductory letter on the report on 
fusible alloys.  "unanimous expression and sentiment of . . . 280 SB Engineers." D17 
1854 10-2 
"A Report on Fusible Alloys and Safety Guards Made to and Adopted by the 





Inspection details of SB "George Page."  "Gives us more trouble than any other 
owner." D14 
1854 10-7 Embree comments (Sci. Am.) on Timour No. 2 explosion.  Sci American. 






Date Description Source 
1854 10-19 
Letter on behalf of Jane Evans fr D. Benson to W. M. Gouge.  Pittsburgh.  Jane 
Evans interested in writing a contract w/govt for $1 per lb of alloy.   She intends 
mfg SGs in her own name.  When C. Evans was sick, she superintended the 
weighing and mixing.  The gentleman appointed by Govt to mfg alloys has 
resigned [Navy Yard or Booth?].  No one else appointed in his stead.  Several 
new steamers left this port w/o SGs.  Please write and advise Mrs. Evans. 
Box 1 IMG 
1472-1474 
1854 10-21 
EVANS DIES. Prof. John Locke to TS Guthrie, Cincinnati.  Altho there are 
enemies to Evans SG, I think it excellent.  Have myself examined it, 
experimented with it, and it's good.  Capt Haldeman is also in favor of it.  He 
thinks its applic the most essential part of the SB law. Regret that SG has been 
almost nullified by govt ceasing to furnish the alloy to inspectors.  Evans' 
workmen have the necessary experience to make alloy. To make alloy fuse at 
proper temp is the soul of the invention.  Evans succeeded in doing this, for I 
verified the results by rigid experiments.  Locke is "late prof of chymis in the 
Med. Coll. of Ohio."  




Evans safety guards under consideration by Board of Sup Insps.  No promises 
(to Booth)  A6 
1854 11-1 
J. Curry, local inspector, New Orleans, ltr to TS Ja Guthrie.  Timour No. 2.  
Absurd theories no engr should claim - in testimony. Refers to Super Insp 
Resolution of 4-7-1854 re applying alloy "in a suitable manner" in a tube.  
Steamer in his district using plugs - no good.  Regrets report of St. Louis engrs.-
-doesn't deserve a passing notice.  Convinced w/Evans SGs no explosion can 
happen if left free to act.  Has in past 12 mos. revoked licenses of 12 engrs 
mostly for loading safety valves or fastening down Evans SGs or other devices. 




To Pres of U.S. from pilots & engrs.  Inconvenience of going to St. Louis to get 
licenses.  20 signatures. 




Pamphlet:  "A Stmt of Experiments upon the Temp of Steam, the Opns of the 
Common Safety Valve, and upon Govt Alloys: with a Descript. Of Newly 
Invented Saf Valves, &c."  by Cad Evans.  







Mistaken reshots of Evan's A Stmt of Experiments upon the Temp of Steam, 





Suggested amendments to SB bill; bill too verbose.  Also, remove "fus. Alloy"  
Recd at TS 11-7-1854.  Jos. Swager [Loc insp hulls 6th District, Louisville, 
under Shallcross] to TS James Guthrie. Recommends org changes--eliminate 
super bd, call members of loc bds under a presiding person of scientific 
attainments. Super Bd too expensive.  Fus alloy has "utterly and entirely failed."  
SB engrs assoc to weigh in on subj of fus alloys.  Collision and signal matters.  
Pilot rules. Price of pilots and engrs lic renewals.  
Vol 3 IMG 
1174-79 
1854 11-11 
Process service to offenders for revocation of licenses is stymied due to no fees 
for service authorized in the Law.  Inspectors have no official seal.  Embree.  D6 
1855 




Gouge's notes ON FUSIBLE ALLOYS.  Copied on Dino 4-6-05.  Xcribed.  Six 
dbl sided legal pgs - blue.  Item 75 -- not labeled, but found just ahead of Item 
76.  FIRST PART OF NOTES (FROM 8-1854): Justifies fusible alloy iaw 
scientists’ opinions. History of difficulties of introducing alloys. Long, detailed 
letter. SECOND PART OF NOTES 2-21-1855: Events have occurred since last 
notes.  Evans has died, widow inherited his secret of mfg alloy; Super Bd in 
meeting in Oct 1854 did not rescind resolution on f.a., but left it to local boards 
to apply as they saw fit; Booth has made reports of progress but not reported 
Box 1 Item 75 







Date Description Source 
(1855 2-21 CONT) 
 alloy ready for use. Evans SGs most useful contrivance, but no fair experiment 
can be made of law of 1852 unless they be generally adopted. See text for 
quote, p. 6.  If Booth can't succeed, then jane evans is only route open.  Prof 
Smith could test alloys. 
1855 2-22 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Commencing the preparation & testing of the alloys. 
Procured small test boiler 3 weeks since, but trouble getting insurance for it.  
Insurers afraid boiler would explode [ironic] and burn down bldg.  Finally got ins, 
apparently, and is using boiler and a small apparatus.  Working to improve the 
character (reliability) of the alloy thru experiment.   Attached table of fusing pts.  
Enclosing invoice of Morris Co. for test boiler (see IMG 1143 for the bill).  Booth 
pd for intro of water into room himself.  Furnace set up, obtaining casting pot, 
marking punches, fuel, and cast iron molds.  Booth worried about pleasing TD 
re: mfg speed.  Could use more persons, but TD wants economy. 
Box 1? Item 
77 IMG 1140-
1142 
1855 2-22 ? 
Morris Co. invoice for Booth's small test boiler.  Date too hard to read, but came 
w/ Booth's 2-22-1855 ltr (see IMG 1140-1142 of same date). 
Box 1? Item 
78 IMG 1143 
1855 2-22 ? 
"Results of Experiments on Fusible Alloys," Booth's table of fusing points, 
derived from his experiments. 
Box 1? Item 
78 IMG 1144 
1855 3-13 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Continuing the mfg & test of fus alloys "as fast as I 
can prepare them," using 3-4 persons.  Testing in 50-lb batches, three batches 
per day.  Testing method--tests first and last alloy, then stamps them.  Uses 
Mint's "shoe moulds."  Just recd ltr from Shallcross re: apparatus. Doesn't know 
how to answer him re: apparatus.  Explores other apparatus besides Evans SG, 
e.g., Bache's.  Recommends TD investigate legal issues w/making govt SGs.  
Booth would pkg one w/each batch of alloy [cheaper than Evans SG, 
presumably].  Alloys need 1 page instrucs.  Tube must touch flues.  Put alloys in 
kegs so they can be rolled along. 




Evans safety guards.  Booth had asked for legal opinion.  Did Bache's mode 
infringe on Evans' patent? A6 
1855 3-20 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  Just recd 3 orders for alloys. Most have come from 
inspectors as Booth wants TS to certify them "as issuing from a proper source." 
Wants to procure circular of instructions also. 
Box 1? Item 
84 IMG 1139 
1855 3-31 
Shallcross and Crawford to TS Guthrie.  Alloys about to be distributed by Booth.  
We wish to postpone use of them in our districts, with your sanction, until Booth 
completes his studies of the different apparatus.  Govt alloys we have recd 
before now have been defective. xcribed. 




Evans's Patent renewal application for his SG - 1852.  True copy of letters 
patent from the U.S. Patent Office (w/red seal)  (Orig dtd 11-23-1852).  
Attached are Patent Office docs wrt to the patent.  These describe Evans' 
excessive zeal in advertising and pushing the SGs upon the community, which 
have resulted in the difficulties he has had to contend with in introducing his 






Connecticut inspector discusses small pressure of hydro. pump provided for 
hydro. test of large SBs.  Pay per day cited.  D27 
1855 5-1 
Ltr from Atty General's Office to TS james Guthrie.  Compared Evans and 
Bache's patents.  No interference between the patents.  Evans's language too 
general and sweeping to make his patent exclusive.  Other devices are okay.  






"Know nothing" politics intrude on choice of replacement local inspector at New 
Orleans.  Insists on statement of political position of all applicants. D26 
1855 5-26 
Local Inspectors, NY, want to spend $10 for a new tap to connect hydro pump 




Date Description Source 
1855 6-2 
Complaint of arbitrary power of inspectors in NY district agnst Edward Barnay.  
He denied license, refused appeal.  "I submit . . . Whether a citizen must be 
compelled to fold his arms & go to the poor house merely because an inspector 
chooses to persecute him."  [Xcribed.] 
Vol. ? IMG 
1682-1684 
1855 6-6 
Booth to TS Guthrie.  Phila.  The Evans SG model I have is fine; no need to get 
another model spoken of in Prof. Locke's comm.  Conclusions thus far--simple 
plugs of fus alloy may be used for 110-160 lb pressure.  Alludes to "favorable 
opinion expressed in regard to the new alloys we have issued."  I am well 
satisfied of the reliability of "every pound" of alloy we have distributed.  Others 
can now test the accuracy of alloys in relation to the pressure expressed on 
them." 
Box 1 Item 
100 IMG 1515 
1855 7 Louisville KY - Payment of witness claims.  U.S. Marshals etc.  Difficult to read.  D32 
1855 7-12 
Early ltr of Crawford's, where he supported Dickey/Watson's travel claims 
before the TS.  Shows contrast before/after Fanny Fern controversy.  See also 
3C1, 8-30-1858. 
Vol 6, 3C2, p. 
172 
1855 7-14 
Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Reply to Guthrie's 7-11-1855 comm. Have 
experimented on forms of apparatus (SGs) sufficiently to know that Evans SG is 
not the only way to go. Bache's method, slightly modified, works. Haven't had 
time to work on mechanism because I have been studying the chemistry ("my 
devotion to chemical pursuits to the neglect of mechanical.") 







Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila.  Just recd comm from J. P. Morris of Phil, 
boilermaker. Made Booth's experimental boiler.  Do not need their boiler as the 
small apparatus I use in the tests is superior.  Suggest using sale proceeds to 
finance experiments on fus alloys. Will have report ready in 10 days, xmit to TD. 
Box 1 Item 
102 IMG 1518 
1855 7-23 
Jane Evans ltr to TS James Guthrie.  Fus. alloy for past 3 mos. has been made 
by Prof. Booth.  Yet, SB inspectors here at Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cincinnati, fail 
in their duties by not mandating SGs on boats.  Went to Phila last week to see 
Booth about this.  Will you straighten out the inspectors, direct them to follow 
the law?  I have already lost $2000 because these men do not procure and 
apply the alloy. Ltr xcribed. 
Box 1 Item 
104 IMG 
1475-1476; 




Dashiel (?) writing (to whom?)  Hard to read.  Capt Embree not inspecting 
stmrs. Boat containing mail and business will be delayed unless you (TS?) 
provide some relief.  Ltr xcribed, but difficult to make out due to camera blurring. 
Box 6? IMG 
1691-1692, 
Item 81 
1855 7-30 Adams pkg receipt.  Booth to Embree--4 boxes [200 pcs] of fus alloy.  
Box 1 Item 
106 IMG 1522 
1855 8-9 
Booth to TS Guthrie.  Phila.  Booth xmits various docs in relation to fus alloys.  
(1) report on forms of apparatus, plus dwgs.  Have long since ordered an 
apparatus similar to Fig. 1; (2) a dupe receipt for 4 boxes of alloy shipped to 
insp at St. Louis 10 days ago; (3) receipts for work on fus alloys, incl Carleton's 
for boxes to ship alloys and those of Hunter, Morgan, Garrett, & Wm. Rogers. 
Box 1 Item 
104 IMG 1519 
1855 8-23 
Booth to TS Guthrie.  Phila. Responding to TS comm on Booth's report recently 
recd at TD. Would have provided more detail on plugs, but experience by insps 
in their use rendered this unnecessary.  My experience with them is only 
theoretical.  Anticipating printing of the report.  Prefers to meet w/ Benj Crawford 
[on the subj of the pending public release of my report].  Has had prior "short 
intercourse" w/Crawford--was impressed w/his intelligence and experience. 
Box 1 Item 
107 IMG 
1523-1524 





Date Description Source 
1855 8-30 
Booth to TS Guthrie.  Phila. Booth xmitting an order for 125 lb of fus alloys to 
Nashville Dist. Local Insp.  Booth wishes to proceed to Pittsburgh to visit 
Crawford on the "hitherto use of the fusible plug" and to inspect "apparatus now 
or formerly in use." 




Booth to TS Guthrie on Mint letterhead. Phila. Enclosed is an order for fus 
alloys from loc insp of Wheeling VA.  Booth has put the report and dwgs in the 
hands of the printers.  Met w/Crawford--useful meeting.  As a consequence, has 
added a dwg of best form for a plug, plus descriptive comments on plug in 
report. 
Box 1 Item 
112 IMG 1527 
1855 8 (but 
distrib in 
9?) 
J. Booth, published pamphlet, "Report on Apparatus for the Use of Fus Alloys in 
Steam Boilers."  Inventions w/circular movement (Evan's SGs); vertical 
movement (Bache's nippers); and lateral movement.  Problem of rust on such 
machines; segregatory tendencies of fus alloys.  Artwork not in pamphlet, but 
can be found in Proceedings, 1855, p. 56 
Box 1 - White 
Box 2C3 
1855 8 (but 
distrib in 
9?) 
Booth report from Aug 1855, including dwgs.  (Report incl in Proceedings).  
(Dupe of Booth's pamphlet). Fus alloys and machines for using them, etc.  Only 
7 pp of Proc.  Proc. Held 10-10-1855 in St. Louis.  See also 2C3, IMG 1447 
(artwork reshot - fus alloys, alloy in a cup), 2C5. 
Proc 1855 pp. 
50-57 of 
Proc., 2C5 
1855 9-10 Boiler insp Barnes submits his travel expenses.  10 trips, $150.60.  Oswego NY. 





Booth to TS Cobb. Mint letterhead. 300 lbs of alloy have been xmitted to their 
respective destinations. Past quarter's bills.  Ladles for melting alloy being 
made.   
Box 1 Item 
113 IMG 1528 




Proceedings of Fourth Annual Mtg on subj of Booth's report.  Issue of plugs 
exposed to pressure of steam.  Distribution of his report to Local Boards.  
Supers prefer SGs to plugs of tin. 




Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Order recd from loc insp of Phila for fus alloys: 100 
lb, 70 lb, 60 lb press. Sent by mail today. 225 copies of report. Wishes to lay 
before the Bd of Supers the whole subj of "forms of apparatus [that] may be 
advantageously employed."  Trusts their experience to determine the best form. 
Distrib report to super & loc insps, also to machinists of steam engines.  See 
what the latter think; object being "to elicit . . . inventions or improvements of 
apparatus for using fus alloy." Send also a copy to Bache of Coast Survey, "for I 
availed myself of a suggestion of his for the vertical movement." 
Box 1 Item 
118 IMG 
1530-1531 
1855 11-2 Fusible alloys.  To Booth.  500 copies of a plate re: report.  A7 
No date 
Newspaper article (no date, but prob 1855 or 1856).  Congress bought by 
special interests, drags feet; touts value of fusible alloys.  Combine forms to 
thwart law. Article based on interview w/Crawford.  Banca Tin--see 1856 
Proceedings, p. 29.  Super insp advocate changing 9th section that stipulates 
the method for using fus alloys.  Text of change to law shown. Now use fus 





Booth to TS Guthrie. Phila. Fuzzy, hard to read. Dwg of apparatus alluded to 
not yet "effaced from the stone." Refers to request of Mr. Lucas.  Bill for printing 
submitted.  500 plates. 
Box 1 Item 





Date Description Source 
1856 
1856 3-24 Adams pkg receipt.  To local inspectors, New Orleans.  Booth ships out alloy. 
Vol. 6? IMG 
1690 
1856 4-9 
Dickey & Watson letter recd by Board of Super. Insp.  P. 16, 1856 Proceedings. 
No further action deemed necessary.  This was anticipated by the Board.  Proc. 1856 
1856 7-1 
Booth admits he doubted the utility of fusible alloys when commencing their 
preparation.  Now reliable, don't abandon them.  








Gouge's notes on fusible alloys.  Gouge takes strong issue with McCord's stmts 
discovered by Gouge in a newspaper letter.  McCord is insp of boilers at St. 
Louis, writing to Embree, ltr dtd 9-30-2856. Experiments on fus alloy on SB 
Reindeer validate SG. Gouge indignant that McCord derives his office and 
salary from the law, but would have the Bd suspend its operation! "We shall 
have a beautiful govt indeed if each subordinate officer enforces the laws, or 
leaves them unenforceable, according to his own practical views of their 
expediency." Etc. Monopoly issue - "I have never heard such an outcry" with 
other patent inventions used on SBs. Evans' patent will expire shortly, but blocks 
of tin, which will do away with the use of SG, is intended to be permanent. In 
supporting fus alloy applied in suitable manner, I am in company with many of 
our most distinguished men of science, steam engine builders, and our most 
able engineers and other SB officers. Long, detailed letter. 










Booth ships alloys to Louisville KY.  Indicates each piece weighs a little over a 
pound.  One box = approx 55 or 56 lb.  Adams Express receipts all throughout 
this section of the correspondence.  Means Booth was shipping fus alloys out to 
all districts at this time. 
Vol 6 D22; 
p.155 
1856 11 & 
12 
Booth shipments of fusible alloy in late 1856 (11-1856/12-1856).  New Orleans, 
2 boxes (100 pcs); Mobile AL, 5 cases (boxes?); Louisville, 2 boxes (100 pcs); 
Cincinnati, 1 box (50 pcs).  Typed note only, Adams' Express receipts sprinkled 
throughout Vol 6. Vol 6 C15 
1856 12 Booth ships alloys to New Orleans, Mobile, Louisville, and Cincinnati. Vol 6 3C3 
1856 12-1 Booth (on U.S. Mint stationery) sends 50 pieces of fusible alloy to Cincinnati. D23 
1856 12-1 Package express receipt - 2 boxes. Refer to D23. D25 
1856 12-23 
Hydro pump broken.  Need to place it on wheels.  Request also a half cord of 
firewood to heat the office.  Curran/Farlow from Baltimore, Local Inspectors. D30 
1856 11 
Summary of shipments in nov and dec 1856.  New Orleans: 2 boxes, 100 pcs; 
Mobile AL: 5 cases (boxes?); Louisville: 2 boxes (100 pcs); Cincinnati: 1 box (50 
pcs).  [More accounts are spread out throughout Vol. 6]. Vol 6 
1857 
1857 1-7 
Remonstrance of citizens [engrs?] of the US navigating the Ohio and Miss. 
Rivers, against the ninth section of the 1852 bill, praying the govt to purchase 
and make free "Evans' SG. 
Gov docs GD 
5 
1857 1-12 
Booth to TS. Guthrie.  Phila.  Laments that he "has recd orders a second time 
from only a few loc insps." Fears that "previously existing prejudices remain 
agnst their utility."  Was himself "formerly prejudiced . . . now impressed with 
their value."  Combined remedies (I.e., fus alloys and tin plugs) better than 
nothing. Wishes to convey his opinion that use of tin plugs should not dispense 
w/ employment of fus alloy since their objects are different. 
Box 1 Item 










Date Description Source 
1857 1-26 
Mr. Bigler presents memorial of Jane Evans, widow and executrix of late Cad. 
Evans, remonstrating agnst the enactment of any law by which the use of plugs 
or rivets of pure tin may be reqd in the construction of engines for steam 
vessels instead of the SG now in use, referred to the Comm on Commerce. 
Gov docs GD 
6 
1857 1-31 
Mr. Bigler presented 3 memorials of citizens [engrs?] engaged in navigation 
upon the ohio and Miss rivers and in construction of steam vessels, praying that 
Congress will make an appropriation to purchase the right to use Evans SG, 
referred to the Comm on Commerce. 
Gov docs GD 
7 
1857 3-3 
R.T. Queen's 2-9-1858 copy of arbitrator's stmt of Crawford's debt owed Queen.  
$4,505 real estate at 6% int.  $1,400 with int in full of negroes.  See related IMG 
1498 2-8-1859. 
Box 1 Item 
333 IMG 1499 
1857 9-4 
Miss. River pilots have combined - unlawful conspiracy.  Abuse of licenses.  
Inattention to proper duties by combiners. B3 
1857 9-9 
Inspector of Hulls busy running a steam boat.  Also, the boiler inspector 
"incompetent" (Chas. Gilmore) as judged by a no. of engrs/pilots.  New Orleans. B2 
1857 10-20 
C.W. Copeland (Super. Insp NY) charged w/corruption.  Involves Steamer 
Niagara. B3 
1857 No 




Alabama Engrs conspire to monopolize employment of engrs.  Like Miss. R. 
Case in 1857.  "revoke lic. of ringleaders."  Extortion of exorbitant compensation 
for services charged.   B4 
1857 11-9 Expenses.  TS Cobb orders Dickey and Watson to sell carpet.  A3 
1857 11-30 
News clipping - W.R. Jackson's Patent Detachable Safety Deck Saloon Cabin.  






Inspection certificate, Steamer Eliza Battle.  Mobile, Alabama.  This boat burned 




Calif. Local Inspector engaged as agent for several insurance cos. and not 
paying attention to duties. B5 
1857 12-24 
Unspecified charges against Local Inspector in Phila.  Note concludes in margin 
re: Republicans/Democrats. D33 
1858 
1858 1-3 
D. Lynch [a SB capt, I think] newspaper article, Pitts Daily Evening Reporter, 
letter to editor, 1-14-1858 issue.  Lynch would not endorse Crawford's 
Democracy.  Crawford reported I was an applicant for Super Insp, which 
Crawford has held for 6-7 yrs.  False!  Also said I made great exertions at Wash. 
City as Dickey's replacement as hull insp.  Crawford not experienced in SBs--
made wood patterns for sand castings.  Crawford acts like a Dem but really is a 
Whig.  Watson a Whig also.  Crawford had $600 worth of SB blanks printed by a 
Whig printer when Dem printers were available. [with Dickey papers - he is 
applic for super insp].  Crawford hadn't even voted, unless after 1856, at which 
time he began supporting Democrat position. 




Loc Insp T.J. Haldeman to TS Cobb.  Cincinnati.  Efforts are being made to 
remove Crawford as sup insp.  Capt Ross vying for position, is an applicant--but 
he doesn't have the technical knowledge of steam.  Sup insp are reqd to inspect 
boats in their districts where there are no local boards.  Must carry hydrostatic 
pump, solve steam pressure calculations, etc. Ross a good pilot and master, but 
no engineer.  Bad choice.  Recommendations often are by personal friends but 
tell us nothing of qualifications.  






Date Description Source 
1858 1-20 
Fanny Fern explodes, report of details of explosion.  See also 10-15-1858 entry 
below.   In Proc. 1858, p. 7.  Super censures local board, TS rules in favor of 
super insp.  Actual report by Super Insp is on pp. 61-62, blames assistant 
engineer's "negligence or incompetence."  Asst engr was on duty at the time.   
Proc. 1858 
No Shot; see 
4C1 
1858 4-7 
James Guthrie concerned he is not being renewed as local inspector (political 
patronage perhaps).  Writes Guthrie that he's a loyal Democrat and won't 
support Black Republicans/Nation.  D36 
1858 5-10 
Loc insp. New Orleans to Collector Hatch. Complaints against loc insp due to 
them not prosecuting Ferry Stmr Trenton for employing negro engineers.  
Matter investigated by Capt Pitfield, who vindicated loc insp actions. 




Orig ltr, Capt Thos Rogers affidavit agnst D&W.  Blames carelessness of King 
for explosion of Fanny Fern.  "D&W did not make sufficient inquiry concerning 
said affair."  Green notary seal on ltr. 
Box 1  
p. 225 No 
shot, xcript, or 
copy. 
1858 5-31 Receipt for credit. Penalty paid by Jacob Poe for violation of SB Act.  D34 
1858 6-10 Ltr fr D&W to TS Cobb re: Capt. Rogers.  Box 1 
1858 6-27 
Crawford writes that charges have been made by Capt Rogers against his 
inspectors.  Also a petition is being circulated to replace Crawford.  Talk is 
about of reorganizing the Board of Supervising inspectors, and Crawford wishes 
to be notified of any meeting in Washington upcoming.  D39 
1858 6 
TD Notes - draft of ltr (date?) TD to Benj Crawford re problems w Debora 
Dashiel etc.  "The stmt of shortcomings of B Crawford have no bearing on the F 
Fern Case."  "For their neglect of duty in not revoking both licenses [King/Miller 
for arbitrarily carrying press. too high], the Secy removed D&W."  
Box 1 p.263 
No shot, 
xcript, or copy 
1859 6-29 
John R. Davidson to TS, New Orleans.  Lost a friend in explosion of Stmr 
Pennsylvania.  Mode of licensing engrs by recommendation vs. examination 
has rendered filling of engr positions beyond endurance.  Wishes an 
investigation made. 
Vol 5 IMG 
1323-1324, 
no pg no. 
(clipped) 
1858 6-29 
Supporters of Crawford to TS Cobb.  Scheme concocted (see also 5C4) by 
enemies of Crawford to support other candidates for Sup. Insp.  No feeling 
among people for removal of Crawford.  We have no desire for his removal--he 
a good and efficient offcr. 
Box 1 Item 
138 5C2 
1858 6-30 
Crawford to TS Cobb.  Crawford sued by Edward Warner, has had suit "for 2 or 
3 years standing."  Crawford lost case, thinking of appealing case to Supreme 
Court per attorney's advice.  Debora Dashiel memo - Crawford doesn't know 
her.  Warner's charges agnst Crawford for extrav living and abundant means in 




T. J. Haldeman, loc insp Cincinnati, to TS Cobb.  Regrets efforts to remove 
Crawford.  Crawford a loyal democrat; is surprised David Lynch (spelled 'Linch') 
said Crawford was not a Buchanan man.  Apparently Crawford pd Lynch for 
convention expenses. 
Box 1 Item 
141 5C3 
1858 7-1 
Mayor of Pitts affidavit fwded to TD (name is Shrum?). Deposes D&W; they 
testify that Crawford told them they could "take their time" to write their report.  
Date of mtg 6-4-1858.  Crawford since rushed them.  Has mayor’s seal. 
Box 1 No 
shot, xcript, or 
copy. 
1858 7-14 Embree replaced. Political change.  B5 
1858 7-22 
Chas. Thaler to John B. Guthrie (Asst TS?) re: Crawford - "No man in the 
Country is more able to elucidate [the SB Law]. He had so much to do w/Law's 
inception; he its virtual author.  Crawford has practical skill and theoretical 
knowledge, a man of integrity and justice.  He is worthy due to not only 
knowledge but also his 'quasi-judicial discrimination.'  Don't take out one whom 
the public trusts and replace him w/an untried man.  Friends of Crawford misled 
by agitators for his job--gave the impression to friends that inspectors are to be 
routinely overturned, thus they supported others.  False rumors being spread.  
Box 1 Item 





Date Description Source 
1858 7-27 
Leonard Harbaugh, Engr, to TS Cobb, from Cincinnati.  Industry practice on 
Ohio R. is injuring shippers.  Practice is combining Carpenter and 2nd engineer 
stations.  "Strykers" are beginners.  Engr must leave his post if strike an object 
in river, or fill it with an inexperienced Stryker.  Cause of accidents, re: neglect 
of his engine. 




Dickey and Watson.  Official act of removal noted.  Full letter in IMG 1418; not a 
good copy, but legible. 
Letters sent 
by TS, Vol 1 
B5; IMG 1418 
1858 8-19 
Miller license revocation - TS doesn't like it.  Crawford wants to come to Wash. 
and explain his decision to TS personally. D37 
1858 no 
date 
Newspaper acct.  Local inspectors Dickey and Watson dismissed from office in 
connection with explosion of Fanny Fern.  No date. D40 
1858 8-27 
Crawford to Mr. Ela (TD).  "D&W seem to take it pretty hard being removed from 
office."  Everyone surprised at Watson [heaping odium on Crawford].  Secy 
would be pleased at how his decision gives satisfaction.  Newspaper article 
from Cincinnati Gazette. Enclosed. 




Dickey/Watson answer Crawford's charges re travel improprieties.  Typed 
excerpt from ltr into keyboard. 
Vol 5 3C1, p. 
198 
1858 9-3 Crawford points finger at Watson for falsified travel expense report.  D38 
1858 9-8 
Warner's original 1855 ltr to Crawford.  New Brighton [PA?].  Pay up at least the 
interest on my claim immed or I shall lay proofs of my stmt before the TS.  You 
have no appeals [i.e., to supreme court]; you are misleading TS.  TS said if I 
substantiate my case [about your indebtedness] then he will "turn the rascal 
out." 
Box 1 Item 
221 5C7 
1858 9-10 
Dickey and Watson controversy.  Their "Vindication" pamphlet.  Fanny Fern 
Explosion.  Shameful deception of the super Insp. Crawford.  King/Miller.  King 
never tried the middle boiler.  Evans SG on these boilers.  Title:  "A Vindication 
of the Action of the Late Loc inspectors at Pittsburgh in the Case of the 
Explosion of the Steamer Fanny Fern; with the evidence and Correspondence."  
Pittsburgh, 1858.  See IMG 1328-1387 for full pamphlet.  Notes need to be 
compiled in a separate doc for this pamphlet; however, one interesting note is 
the feud between D&W's experts and the govt experts (see IMG 1386). 
Spineless Vol 
1852-60  
C1, C2, C3; 
full doc in 
IMG 1328-
1387; reshot 
pages as IMG 
1461-1470 
1858 9 
"Shortcomings of Benj Crawford, Esq." Not shot or typed.  Compiled by TD, is a 
list of charges from D&W's "Vindication" by page no. Charges are numbered 1 
thru 26; also under heading "Violations of Law, Evasion of Duty, Ignorance, 
etc." there are 9 more charges. 





Crawford to Edward Warner.  Pittsburgh.  [Warner case tried in Spring 1857.  
Crawford lost judgment in Allegheny County PA District Ct.]  Stat of Lim, writ of 
error, Supreme Ct.  Crawford didn't have funds to pursue writ of error at this 
time.  [Background: Case is about a $900 loan Warner made to Crawford that 
Crawford has not repaid.  Warner has witnesses that Crawford lives 
extravagantly, and has his wealth in his wife's name.  Crawford denies this. 
Warren had said TS said about the case that if Crawford guilty, then "I will throw 
the rascal out."]  You can't disprove facts in my [6-30-1857?] ltr to TS. 
Box 1 Item 
220 5C6 
1858 10-1 
Crawford to TS Cobb. Pittsburgh.  Xmitting Warner's letter threatening Crawford 
if he refuses his demands, plus assorted papers.  Lawyer has advised Crawford 
of his right to redress thru Supreme Court.  Crawford claims he suffered "great 
loss" in Warner matter. 
Box 1 Item 
222 IMG 1584 
1858 10-4 
"Draft of internal letter to Crawford."  Auth unknown.  Response to Crawford's 
letter of 10-1-1858 [?] and papers relating to the judgment of Mrs. Dashiel agnst 
him.  TS will not investigate [her charges of moral delinquency/unfitness].  No 
proof.   







Date Description Source 
1858 10-? 
TD side of Fanny Fern case - auth unknown. The "Shortcomings" of B. 
Crawford have no bearing on the Fanny Fern case.  Engrs had habitually 
exceeded pressure allowed.  Loc insp D&W totally disregarded this, and this is 
the reason TS removed D&W.  Crawford censured for restoring Miller. 
Box 1 Item 
223 (concl) 
IMG 1583 
1858 10-18 LIST OF INSPECTORS 1858 
Box 1 Item 
204 IMG 1449 
1858 10? 
Note - "These are testimonials in favor of appt of John S. Dickey one of the local 
board and removed by the Secy; to be appointed Super Insp in favor of B. 
Crawford."  To His Excellency James Buchanan, Pres. of the United States." 
Box 1 Item 
178 IMG 1562 
1858 10? 
SB engineers' petition to Pres James Buchanan.  Engrs urge Pres to remove 
Crawford from office.  He "never had any experience . .  .whatever . . . on board 
SBs."  "Entirely unfit to fill the office of Super Insp. Signed Andrew Watson, 
James Atkinson, and 33 others.  




No date, but among other 10-1858 items.  Engine builders and engrs, to Pres 
Buchanan.  Crawford is neither a practical man or a mechanic, and is "totally 
incompetent."  Urge his removal and a "speedy change."  Singed by Robt E. 
Rogers + 47 others. 




Crawford tried strenuously to abolish use of Evans SGs.  Failed due to Mrs. 
Evans' patent.  Ross’s letter? 
1858 10-14 
Proceedings of Seventh Annual mtg of the Bd of Super insp at Buffalo NY.  P. 
61-62 [Seems to vindicate D&W.]  Fanny Fern.  See also B5, 8-17-1858. 




Resolved, special committee of 5 members of Super Bd appointed to 
investigate facts of Fanny Fern explosion of 1-1858.  Members - Ross, Lewis, 
Pitfield, Burnett, Shallcross.  Investig necessary because Loc Insp never filed a 
report, they being dismissed.  Mtg at Buffalo NY. See also 10-14-1858 for 
result. 
Proc. 1858 
No shot; p. 7-
8 
1858 10-18 
Crawford reports "signal failures" of fusible alloys in Proc.  Resolution of board; 
committee on machinery to look into rescinding resol. of 4-13-1854. 





Crawford's resolution in Proc. To investigate "rescinding resolution in regard to 





Report by special committee re: Fanny Fern accident, pp. 23-25.  Ross's 
committee blames King for disaster, exonerates and even praises Miller for 
saving victims by throwing planks to them. 
Proc. 1858 




Super Insps evaluate Reeder's Safety Valve.  It is an indicator of pressure, i.e., 
does not guard against low water.  This valve is a modification to Reeder's valve 
presented to this Bd in 1856.  SI's don't like the modified one either.  Valve 
won't react until water is 2 in. below tops of the flues. 
Proc. 1858 
No shot.  pp. 
73-77 
1858 11-12 
John Shannon to Pres Buchanan. Testimonial in favor of his political friend 
Capt. John S. Dickey.  Dickey a true Democrat and "has not been tinctured in 
the least w/any of the political heresies, or isms of the times." 
Box 1 Item 
185 IMG 1574 
1858 11-17 
Fusible alloys.  Booth.  Treasury will reluctantly pay room rent on lab.  Alloys 
haven't been made for "some time past."  A7 
1858 11-18 
John Caruthers (friend of Dickey's) to Pres Buchanan.  Beaver County PA.  My 
neighbor is best qualified man for the job of super insp.  Consistent democrat.  If 
you appt him to office, "you will promote the best interests of Democracy." 
Box 1 Item 





Date Description Source 
1858 11-20 
Joseph Irvin to Pres Buchanan.  Rochester, Beaver City, PA.  Childhood friend 
of Dickey's recommends him as super insp.  Democrat, a good moral character, 
popular with all, etc.  "Never doubting an ultimate triumph." 
Box 1 Item 
184 IMG 1573 
1858 12-8 Ross replaces Embree (gov docs).  Embree "removed." 
 Gov Docs 
GD1 
1858 12-9 Bill to put on hydro pump.  D50 
1858 12-13 
Engrs oust super insp Crawford, exert pressure on TD.  Jas P. Barr to TS Cobb.  
Pittsburg ("Office Daily Post").  Efforts to "push aside" Benj Crawford.  Doubts 
"whispered" by one or two men in Pitts. as to his democracy and unfitness for 
office.  Crawford "never a brawling politician," but exacted the envy of others.  It 
is proper that in his current position, he NOT be a politician. These be "covert 
but systematic" efforts to unseat him.  Let me bring "a cloud of witnesses" to 
attest to Crawford's [democracy and confidence]. Counter "the tongue of 
slander."  




James Lundgraft [sp?] to Hon P.C. Shannon, Pittsburgh.  Crawford supported 
Lundgraft as Inspector of Hulls, but then withdrew his support in favor of a Mr. 
Grace.  Capt. Rogers a witness.  Xcribed ltr. 
Box 1 Item 




Feedwater heating inventions a big deal in 1859. Heater urged on technical 
community in order to keep boiler iron from being stressed from sudden temp 






Snowden (inventor of feedwater heater) is listed as a loc insp of machinery and 






More on boiler iron fraud.  Witnesses won't come forth due to "odium which 




Booth's "Analysis of the Corresp bet the U.S. Treasury Dept & J.C. Booth in 
Relation to Fus Alloys."  Portion of a large corresp bet Booth & TD.  Booth's list 
is in response to inquiries raised by TD's letter of 11-17-1858.  




Booth to TS Cobb.  Phila. In resp to request in TD letter dtd 11-17-1858.  Facts 
in regard to rent of premises used to mfg alloys (TD wants to know why it 
should pay rent during period of inactivity).  Chronol. list of corresp follows.  
Booth offers facts "in simple justice to myself," not in "vaunting spirit."  Does 
govt want to stop work and discontinue rent of $300 for lower part?  Please 
advise. 






Mr. Hastings (late collector of port) of IMG 1493-95 attests to convers bet. 
Lynch, Crawford and himself one yr earlier.  To Lynch from Stewart.  Allegheny 
City PA. 
Box 1 Item 
330 IMG 1496 
1859 1-12 
N. McAlarayne to Maj David lynch.  Crawford appeared interested in Dems after 
election of 1856.  Lynch would not endorse Crawford's Democracy. 
Box 1 Item 
337 IMG 1497 
1859 1-26 
Loc Insp Davids to TS Cobb, Norfolk VA.  Investigating puddled iron.  "Much of 
my time is spent away from home."  Covers a large area - NC, Virginia. 




A friend of John S. Dickey's to Pres [Buchanan] recommending Dickey to office 
of sup insp.  Wash. City.  Dickey is a hardworking and consistent Democrat.  
Good character, unblemished. 




R. T. Queen ltr.  Crawford accused of "skipping bail" on a bad loan held by 
Queen.  Crawford was in jail 2 days.  Promised to pay if let out, but did not.  "A 
more dishonest, dishonourable, and ungrateful man lives not out of a 
penitentiary."  See copy of Queen/Crawford arbitrator's stmt IMG 1499 (3-3-
1857) 
Box 1 Item 




Date Description Source 
1859 2-9 
D. Lynch's name on a wrapper.  "Notes relative to the within publication . . . 
please read." 




Affidavits showing "the baseness and want of moral honesty of [John B. 
Guthrie's] pet Crawford."  Also, Crawford borrowed money ($400) from one 
Edward Warren.  Letter clipped--money not pd back?  J. Guthrie "used . . . 
Crawford as a catspaw and procured a certificate of my pecuniary 
embarrassment." 
Box 1 IMG 
1492 
1859 2-9 
Crawford boarded at Isaac Beers's house. Crawford stated he was poor, and 
never paid his rent.  Crawford "shamefully violated" his promises.  Now avoids 
Beers's communications. 
Box 1, Item 
334 IMG 1500 
1859 2-10 
Affidavit affirming truth of Beers's stmt about Crawford's shameful behavior re 
debt owed.  See IMG 1500 (2-9-1859) 
Box 1 Item ? 
IMG 1501 
1859 3 
Newspaper acct, date clipped off.  Explosion of SB Princess (March 1859? 
Hunter).  Passengers considered her very safe until this.  Spirit of law vs. letter 
discussion.  Newspaper acct in among 1859 papers.  [Note:  from Proc. 1859, 
Princess exploded 2-27-1859, p. 25, and also pp. 54-55] 
 D48, IMG 
1458 
1859 3-12 
Loc insps J.O. McLean and John C. Marsh to Capt; O.A. Pitfield.  Loc insp have 
taken testimony in Princess explosion.  She had Evans SG on ea boiler.  No 
info that any of them fused before the explosion.  They were of the large model 
working with wts and chains.  Also they want to see the boilers that were on the 
Princess before they make any decision on the case. 
Vol 5 IMG 
1315, No item 
no. given 
1859 3-16 
Crawford to TS Cobb.  Engr Wm. Buffington charged with interfering w/SGs.  
Panola - boat that exploded.  "First case of this kind under law of 1852."  
Wishes to go to St. Louis to collect evidence.  [See Proc. 1859, shot 3-30].  
Conviction in Crawford's 7th District, fined $200 as misdemeanor.  Penalty laid 
out in law, could have been sentenced to 18 mos. prison also, but apparently 
was not.] 
Vol 5 IMG 
1313, p. 262 
1859 4-1 
Transmittal Hon TS Cobb to Crawford.  Papers w/charges made agnst 
Crawford.  Provide explanations. 
Box 1 Item 
342 IMG 
1505-1506 
(1506 a dupe) 
1859 4-4 
Sworn statement of George Oglesby reports engineers are tying up Evans SGs.  
Reported it to Dickey and Watson, nothing happened.  Reported it to current 
local insps., and they are taking care of it.  D49 
1859 4-6 
Booth to TS Cobb.  Phila. Receipt for rent of premises employed for prep of fus 
alloys. Lease ends on 6-30. Wishes to be relieved of the charge of the fus alloys 
since they are an unnecessary expenditure and a Supervisor has informed me 
that alloys are no longer to be used ("it has been determined").   




T.J. Haldeman to Gouge, from Cincinnati.  Shallcross is prime mover in 
"ridiculous" idea of substituting block tin for fus. alloy.   Salaries of loc bd.  
Booth's experiments on a boat here - something wrong.  TS conclusions 
incorrect.  Relationship of heat to press. re: alloys, where to place the alloy on 
the flue matters.  Astonished at explosion of Princess, which had the large and 
approved Evans SGs.  Thinks the SGs were tied down, but explosion damage 
too extensive to ever know.  Has seen a no. of boats w/SGs tied down but 
never able to get proof as to whom.  Can't prosecute w/o proof.  Crawford 
recently charged engrs in his district with fastening down SGs [Panola].  If he 
can only prove it, it may serve as a warning to others.  Haldeman injured - fell 
into hold of a SB. 






Date Description Source 
1859 4-11 
T.J. Haldeman to TS Cobb.  Cincinnati insp office.  In April 1857, SBs Northern 
Light and Alaska, Haldeman inspected (with W.W. Guthrie, now deceased).  
Found to have cast iron steam pipes instead of wrought iron.   




Booth to TS Cobb. Phila. Booth's acct of the stock in premises (at the Mint), in 
response to TS's query of 4-7-1859.  Lists a small boiler and 1502 lb fus alloy, 
among other items. Will furnish detailed list of alloy distributed over the yrs. ("I 
have kept a minute account.")  He also states that "no orders have been recd by 
me since the fall of 1856." Notes a renewal order by Pittsburgh super insp for 
900 lb of alloy.  "This is by far the heaviest order we have recd."   




Crawford re charges by David Lynch.  Legs of pipe connecting boiler w/steam 
pipe.  Made of copper, not inferior matls.  No violation of 1852 law.  Haldeman 
his backup (see also IMG 1561, 4-11-1859).  Law quoted incorrectly by Lynch. 
Copper permitted. Crawford quotes law.  I did not neglect attending to the 
matter.  Second charge refuted: passageway to upper deck in case of accident-
-D&W have certified passageways are adequate.  Small sternwheel boats are 
sometimes too crowded with gear.  Leave this to loc insp as no general rule can 
be laid down by sup insp that would apply to all boats.  Rogers (Crawford's 
critic) was a disappointed applicant for hull insp after resignation of Capt 
Atkinson.  Atkinson angry w/ Crawford--not on speaking terms.  Atkinson 
apparently also one of Crawford's recent critics.  Fulton City disaster--lost Nov 
1858.  Paper submitted by Crawford on this disaster exonerates Crawford wrt 
Lynch's charges. 
Box 1 Item 
343 IMG 
1502-1504 




Booth's forensic techniques used to prove melting points of alloy aboard 
Panola, Wm. Buffington Case.  Appears to have been quoted in an 1862 
internal report by TD. [see second entry at "1861-1862"] 





No date, but among spring 1859 records.  "Shortcomings of Benjamin Crawford, 
Esq."  A laundry list of accusations put together by TD, arranged by page 
number from D&W's "Vindication."  See IMG 1328, 9-10-1858.  Crawford's 
double dealing, etc.  Violation of law, evasions of duty, ignorance, etc.  
Corruption - Crawford instructs loc insps to reject unpatented lifeboats when he 
owed the agent of the patented article a sum of money (see pp. 45-53 of 
'Vindication.' for particulars). 




Pittsburgh Gazette "River News" column.  Allegations have been made that 
many members of the board of SB Inspectors for Western Waters are 
incompetent.  "Assure me that a certification of safety shall mean that." 
Box 1 IMG 
1477 
1859 5-26 
"Marine" writes to The Phila. Press newspaper, Pittsburg corresp section.  He 
knows a capt on Ohio & Miss. Rivers who tells him that the laws are "almost 
entirely disregarded on our Western Waters."  Not a single SB comes up to the 
stds of law of 1852.  Matters of minor importance are strictly obeyed, but 
precautions agnst accidents "are almost uniformly disregarded."  Crawford 
quick to remove D&W over Fanny Fern debacle; she blew up in Jan 1858.  13 
instances of boats lacking chains, rods, addl steering app as reqd by law; boats 
certified!  Complaints made to Pres Buchanan, but he refuses to act re honest 
and competent sup insp.  "God save us from an unjust [administration] if this be 
just."  TS no help either.  [Penciled note:  "The leading Democrats here are 
working hard agnst the state ticket and National administration. Pennsylvania 
[is] good for 75,000 opposition majority. [1860 election approaching]. 






Date Description Source 
1859 6-1 
"Engineer" responds to Marine.  Auth is prob. Crawford--same writing style.  Not 
all complete (some clipped), but most is here.  'Engineer' defends sup. insp. 
agnst charges.  Marine defended D&W in Fanny Fern accident but it backfired 
in Wash. City.  Charges agnst super insp did indeed go to TS, but super insp 
defended self.  TS saw the truth of the matter.  Marines' charges absurd and 
baseless. SB capt mentioned by Marine was applicant for office of inspector. 
Box 1 IMG 
1485-1489 
1859 6-2 
William Haslitt to the newspaper (says "for the Pittsburgh Post."  Pseudonym 
"Engineer" singled me out re: my dissatisfaction w/how inspectors are made 
here (Phila.).  "Engineer" is Crawford, he argues.  Hazlitt was one of the 
applicants for inspector.  I deny that I wrote to the press.  My denial will cause 
Crawford to "bob around" to find who real author is.  Mentions accident aboard 
the Fulton City; passageways too narrow.  "Marine" was speaking truth, 
Crawford evades his criticisms. "Marine" reveals Crawford's fabrications.  Col. 
Crossman explodes, burns - no steering gear. 
Box 1 IMG 
1478-1482 
(start at 1479) 
1859 6-13 
Booth to Wm. M. Gouge. Phila. TD wants Booth to use up Navy Yard alloys, but 
Booth says cost of analyzing them to ascertain how to modify them to make 
them useful is too expensive--would take months.  Agrees w/Gouge that these 
Navy Yard alloys should not be distrib to Western Waters as is--dangerous.  
Suggests selling them to Eastern stereotype founders. 
Box 1 Item 
124 IMG 1541 
1859 7-7 
Booth says one man is making the alloys.  Slow but trustworthy.  Purchases tin 
from Trotter Co.  Lab charge is forwarded (for making alloys).  US vs. Buffington 
case.  Buffington loaded the safety valve on SB Panola (see also 3-16-1859 
entry).  Fusing points from that boat were off.  Calls attention to problem:  ladle 
is defective.  Requests authority to make custom ladles for the purpose.  Will 
improve reliability of the alloys.  [Trotter Co. is now Nathan Trotter Co., Exton, 
PA, founded 1789 (near Philadelphia).]  D47 
1859 7-11 
Booth to TS, Philadelphia.  NY Times article well written on subj of 
bursting/exploding boilers.  Problems w electrical theory of explosions - not 
sure, would need to be tested.  Test boiler, experiments a great risk to Booth's 
life.  Should be done in large yard of a machine shop. 




Crawford writes TS that Booth's new iron ladle design is probably a good idea.  
Cost of ladles. 
Vol 5 D41, 
IMG 1303-
1304, p. 319 
1859 9-12 
Loc insp Haldeman discusses Evans safety guards and how they are rendered 
useless when boiler has crud in it.  Discusses Princess explosion.  Speculates 
on electrical theory, other baseless theories.  Talks of Booth as authority.  Best 
source on explosions is Evans.  Want of water is the real culprit.   D46 
1859 9-21 
Robert Hood sworn statement.  He appeals to TS about his job as Engineer 
under Super. Insp. Ross.  Ross won't let him get on a boat.  My power is 
absolute.  Kids hungry for bread.  No date.  Capt. Kountz, Captain and owner of 
boats.  He was called "Commodore."  Later expanded into railroads. 




1859 9-21 Statement under oath of Daniel D. Bloys.  Convers with Capt. Ross. 




date LIST OF INSPECTORS 1859 
1859 Proc 
IMG 1450 
1859 10? Princess explosion report. 
1859 Proc pp. 






Date Description Source 
1859 no 
date 
"Synopsis of papers filed in behalf of J.S. Dickey."  Dickey is gunning for 
Crawford's job. SB engrs call for Crawford's removal--he not a mechanic and 
not exper on SBs.  Call him "wholly incompetent."  Offcrs of SB Chariot defend 
D&W--injustice done them.  Offcrs of SB Potomac state same re: SB Fanny 
Fern.  Crawford was the only culpable person. Same w/other boat - Rockett--
McScan--Crawford is "insincere and deceptive."  Etc. 
Box 1 Item 
327 IMG 
1490-1491 
1859 10-13 Statement by Samuel Carlin re convers with Capt. Ross. 





Engr prosecuted for loading the safety valves and fastening down his SGs.  
Engr said alloy fused at less than indicated temp.  Booth tested it and 




Copeland tries to abolish SGs.  Failed due to Mrs. Evans' patent, same as 
before.   Ross letter? 
1859 11-19 
Ltr from a Mr. Davis.  Another anti-Ross complaint.  Detroit MI.  This time wrt 
Capt Kountz affair.  Kountz is complainant, represented by Davis [?]  Davis is 





Super Insp Augustus Walker, 9th Dist., Buffalo, to TS Cobb wrt letter of 19th 
inst.  "I fully concur with the views and sentiments set forth in your 
communication." 
Vol 5 IMG 
1302, p. 380 
1859 12-8 
Ross defends against attacks.  May have said that guards were no good.  
Failure of SGs.  Even the Super. Insp's have been pushing  to eliminate them 
from use.  Nothing in the Law re: Evans' SGs--But see A4, link bet. Evans SGs 
& fusible alloy (1854 5-1).  D43 
1859 12-19 
Evans safety guard.  TS chastises Super Insp Chas. Ross, St. Louis, for opining 
against using the guards.  "Run the damn thing full of lead."  Violation of law of 
1852.  B7 
1859 12-21 
Super Insp John S. Brown, Balto, to TS re TS ltr dtd 19th inst. re Capt. Ross.   
Fus alloys give us no trouble, we have few hi-press. boats in our district.  
However, we are duty bound to enforce the law regardless. 
Vol 5 IMG 
1299, p. 375 
1859 12-24 
John Shallcross, Super Insp 6th District, to TS Cobb re: Charles Ross charges.  
Bd of Super Insp have no power to change any provision in the law - I agree 
with you.   Evans SG is best mode of using the alloy now known. Objections by 
engrs are numerous, but problem is imperfect mfg by patentee.  SG and alloy 
will not be a true and reliable indicator.  "But for this purpose the engrs have the 
steam guage and safety valves." 




Chas. W. Copeland, Super Insp, 2nd Dist, NY, to TS Cobb re: Ross charges.  
Formerly, a member of the Bd [unnamed] had a difference of opinion on the 
alloys, overruled by majority. Alloys a source of trouble and anxiety to me.  
Constant complaints that alloy did not act successfully.  Doubts that alloy works 
any better due to exclusion of pressure than with it. Will volunteer to aid in 
experiments so as to lead to a more reliable mode of using alloys. 







Date Description Source 
1859 12-26 
Benj Crawford to TS Cobb re: charges against Charles Ross.  Super. Insp, loc 
insp, river men are all against use of SGs.  Unreliable alloy the problem.  Loc 
Insp McCord (boilers) asked the Bd to suspend provisions of law re: alloys.  
Super Insp. not enforcing all prov of law in their districts; makes it harder to 
enforce them in his district.  Ross's predecessor [Embree] didn't enforce fus 
alloys, nor require wrought iron heads.  Accidents wised up the Super 
Inspectors, however.  Has had much difficulty in enforcing alloys.  Constant 
complaints that alloys have fused at far less pressure than allowed by their 
certificates.  Complaints reiterated by the loc bds on the Western Waters.  I was 
desirous of a change in law (when boilers exploded w/Guards on them), but still 
I upheld the law.   Prosecution of engr on the Panola; make an example of him.  
Had a beneficial effect.  Scarcely a complaint now against the SGs.  Booth 
changed my mind re SGs with his testimony in the suit.  Now need to make SGs 
tamper proof.  "I should regret to see the provision of the law re use of alloyed 
metals changed." 
Vol 5 IMG 
1272-1278, p. 
379.  6-pp 
letter 
1859 12-26 
Super Insp. Wm. Burnett, Boston, to TS Howell Cobb re TS ltr of 19th inst.  
Little experience with SGs in this district, not hear Ross make stmts.  SG's 
exclusive use is "demanded substantially by a resolution of the Bd passed at 
Washington in 1854.  They can repeal it if use should prove to be improper.  But 
I believe Bd thinks the SG effective. 





Mr. Bigler presents memorial of Jane Evans, deceased, praying for renewal of 
C. Evans' patent, and referred to Committee on Patents, Patent Office. Gov docs GD4 
1860 3-17 
Steam Boat explosion.  Construction of boiler careless.  "Alfred Thomas" was 
boat, exploded at Easton PA.  Passengers were along for the trial run. C1 
1860 3-23 
Mr. Burnham from Committee on Patents, to whom was referred petition of 
Jane B. Evans, widow of Cad. Evans, made a report accompanied by a bill HR 
471 for her relief. 
Gov docs, GD 
3 
1860 3-23 
Bill for the relief of Jane Evans.  Extends her patent.  HJ.R. 471, 36th 
Congress, 1st Sess. 
Gov Docs GD 
2 
1860 4-26 
Custom Collector James McHetridge to Howell Cobb TS.  Requests Super. 
Inspector to come inspect a boat in his district.  Super insp. Said he couldn't 
w/o direction from TS.  Requesting that direction from Cobb. 
Vol 4 IMG 
1230-31 
1860 5-22 
Super. Insp. Ross to TS Cobb.  Ross's letter about the old 1838 inspectors 
phasing out.  He discusses why Cincinnati is the last place in the country 
where the old 1838 law is still being enforced, even while the act of 1852 is in 
force.  Different payment methods for inspectors, i.e., 1838 vs. 1852.  [Not a 
fully transcribed letter] 
Vol ? IMG 
1679-1680 
1860 6-1 
Schedule of public property at local insp. Office, Detroit.  Hydro pump, 14 
lengths of hose.  C1 
1860 10-15 Proceedings title page, LIST OF INSPECTORS, held at NYC, 1860. 
1860 Proc, 
IMG 1434-
1435, dupe of 
IMG 1452 
1860 10-15 LIST OF INSPECTORS 1860 




Booth to Philip Thomas, TS.  Mobile and Pittsburg orders for fus alloys nearly 
completed. But in conseq of condition of Treas Dept, want me to halt?  Two 
remaining orders. 






Date Description Source 
1861 1-28 
To Hon W. Bigler (TS?)  Law - versions - leaves use of fus alloys optional, 
advocates tin plugs.  "In the name of suffering humanity, let's have them! [fus 
alloys]"  Opposition to fus alloy by engineers, inspectors.  Unknown author. 




Boiler Insp J.V. Guthrie to Benj Crawford, Super Insp Pittsburgh.  Guthrie is 
going to war, will leave his office May 1, "to serve my country."  "Sustain the 
govt against the traitors."  Asks Crawford to attend to his loc insp duties in his 
absence. 
Vol 4 IMG 
1263, Item 17 
1861 7-1 
Boiler Insp J. Guthrie to TS Chase.  His leave of absence will expire on July 18.  
Requests extension of LOA for 3 more mos.  Little doing in the office, see no 
necess for anyone to fill his place.  Crawford doing a good job as temp loc insp.  
If extended he can go with his regiment and "fight traitors," thinks rebels will 
quit. 
Vol. 4 IMG 
1264, Item 40 
1861 7-6 TS Chase informs a local inspector that he cannot leave his duties to a deputy.  B1 
1861 No 




To Enoch T. Carson, Surveyor of Customs, Cincinnati, from US Atty F. Ball.  
Benj crawford to act as loc insp, at least for present.  Col. Guthrie at war.  
Mentions Haldeman and Shields. 
Vol 4 IMG 
1261, Item 15 
1861 12-21 
To TS Chase from Benj Crawford.  Has been temporary Loc Insp at Cincinnati 
district since last May.  Replacement for Col. Guthrie (who is at war).  Has not 
been paid, the salary being sent to Guthrie.  Wants Dept to pay him.  
References J. Guthrie letter, boiler inspector. 
Vol 4 IMG 
1262, Item 16 
1861 or 
1862 
No date, but probably in 1861 or 1862.  "The Fusible Alloy Used in SBs"  Letter 
(copied).  By TD internal, but quoting Jas. Booth earlier writings from 1859.  Fus 
alloy - criticized for hardening of alloy - not functioning for intended purpose.  
SB Panola, Wm. Buffington.  Temperatures (table), however, very consistent.   
Wrapper:  Local Insp. Snowden (Pittsburgh) re fusible alloys. [Was the old fus 
alloy unreliability argument being defused so the alloys could be reintroduced?  
Appears so.  If so, ignores Booth's later recognition that the fusing points were 
too low in Panola case.  He wrote that ladles were the problem.]   [See second 
entry made in this index - 5-3-1859.] 




1862 1-1 Purge of disloyal local inspectors during Civil War  B1 
1862 1-16 
Crawford removed (Gov Docs).  Replaced by E.M. Shield of Cincinnati.  
Crawford listed as a special agent in the SBIS in 1870 Proceedings. 
 Gov Docs, 
GD 16, Proc 
1870 
1862 1-17 
Redmond J. Grace, Inspector of Hulls, Pittsburgh Loc insp of SBs - to Gouge.  
Mentions Booth experiments.  "SG loses its character by neglect of the engrs."   
Believes in the efficacy of the alloys, but bitter prejudice of river men prevented 
its usefulness.  They are jealous and conceited, view any safety device as an 
infringement of their rights, a slur on their own knowledge or practical skill.  I 
worked with them on the river for 22 years and I know them well.  Mentions 
Snowden's invention, feedwater heater. 
Vol 4, p. 121 
IMG 1247-49  
Ltr xcribed. 
1862 1-17 
In among above item of Edmond Grace's.  Printed Flyer - "Snowden's 
Improvement in Feeding Water to Steam Boilers," Patented April 3, 1860, T. 
Snowden.   Heat feedwater to temp of that of water in boiler. 
Vol 4, p. 122 
IMG 1250-51 
1862 1-30 
Booth to TS Chase.  Am forwarding order for fus. Alloys to Boston.  First order 
recd since Booth first prepared alloys in 1854.  May I go ahead and prepare 
order? 







Date Description Source 
1862 2-5 
Petition letter asking for the removal of Loc Insp Singleton, who is aged and 
thus incompetent, and also a "Secesh."  "He takes the oath, but that is 
'moonshine' in our opinion."  There are thousands such in our midst.  He 
advocates states rights and nullification.  By St. Louis citizens, signed by eight 
men. 




Jas. Booth ltr to TS Chase.   Has forwarded to Wm Burnett such of fus alloys I 
have previously prepared re Law of 1853.  Sent to Burnett  [On wrapper] 
Vol 4, Item 
137 IMG 1245 
1862 2-18 
"Congratulatory."  My heart "thrills with joy" at our Army and Navy victories.  Bull 
Run defeat.  We bowed our knees in our little basement office under the 
Collectors Room, in company with my local board.  Glory to Army, Navy, 
President, Cabinet, TS Chase; Glory glory to our good and blessed God etc etc 
(effusive sentiments).  I. Nells [sp?] - engr or pilot?  Not stated. 




Mrs. Crawford's letter to Secy Treas.  Re: hiring Benj. Crawford as Loc Insp.  
Pittsburgh 
Vol 4 IMG 
1252-1255 
1862 3-10 
To TS Chase.  Some pilots and engrs in charge of vessels chartered by the 
govt are secessionists. Can I have those men summoned before me to take the 
Oath of Allegiance?  Signed James N. Muller Sr., Super. Insp. 3rd District. 
Vol 4 IMG 
1265, Item 
156 
1862 3-11 Oath of allegiance Civil War - reason to purge engrs/pilots. B2 
1862 5-29 A.S. Bemis - Buffalo NY to replace Augustus Walker as Supervising Inspector. B2 
1862 10-16 
Proceedings title page, Civil War Loyalty Oath of 8-6-1861, held at Phila. 








E.M. Shield, Super. Insp, Cincinnati.  Requests fus alloys No. 140, 150, a box of 
each.  Also, complaints have been recd re: the local inspectors at Wheeling.  
Refers TS to Collector of Wheeling for substantiation. 
Vol 4, Item 
274 IMG 1246 
1863 
1863 No 






Annual Report, Benj Crawford, pp. 38-40 - Alloy plugs dangerous to boats 
operating on the Northern and Western lakes if not able to be disabled.  Put it 
before the Super Bd.  Crawford is listed as a special agent. Minority report of 
Guthrie: alloys found to be of no use in the past. 
Proc 1867, 





Embree's food for livestock using steam process.  Sci Am New Series, Vol. 18, 
Issue 3, p. 44. 
Gov docs GD 
20 
1870 1-1 Calculations for specifying the proper area for a safety valve port. 
Sci. Am. Vol 
22, No. 1 Gov 
docs GD 23 
1872 2-12 
A bill for the relief of Benjamin Crawford, HR 1443.  Gave Crawford $10,000 for 




A bill for the relief of Benjamin Crawford, HR 3874.  Gave Crawford $5000 for 
compensation for govt use of his patent steam-blower. 
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